射天狼
天弓 神箭
基辛格 曾是 美国国家战略安全军事外交的高手，更是一位学者。
他有两部重要著作： 外交 Diplomacy； 关于中国 On China 分别出版于 1994 和2011年，见下。
前者已有汉译 可网上阅读（附上），后者已出中译版，但无网文可读。
在这两部著作里 基辛格都以浓墨重彩描绘了朝鲜战争及其意义
写的客观理性分明
也许从敌手那里看到感觉到的和得出的结论 比 不知底细 不求甚解的争论更实在和真正
愚訥 将基文的个别段落和好句 拙译（初稿）在下，以饗读者。
1994出版
全文
第19章：
The Dilemma of Containment: The Korean War
http://mrpatrickibhub.weebly.com/uploads/1/4/1/7/14173378/kissingerch19koreanwar.pdf?
第十九章 共20页
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2011 出版
尼克松 基辛格 1972年与周恩来 北京谈判
基辛格 不是被老周的 烤鸭和红酒 灌晕的 哦 ～
节选 关于 朝鲜战争
None of the participants achieved all of its aims. For the United States, the
armistice agreement realized the purpose for which it had entered the war: it
denied success to the North Korean aggression; but it had, at the same time,
enabled China, at a moment of great weakness, to fight the nuclear
superpower to a standstill and oblige it to retreat from its furthest advance. It
preserved American credibility in protecting allies but at the cost of incipient
allied revolt and domestic discord. Observers could not fail to remember the
debate that had developed in the United States over war aims. General
MacArthur, applying traditional maxims, sought victory; the administration,
interpreting the war as a feint to lure America into Asia—which was surely
Stalin’s strategy—was prepared to settle for a military draw (and probably a
long-term political setback), the first such outcome in a war fought by America.
The inability to harmonize political and military goals may have tempted other
Asian challengers to believe in America’s domestic vulnerability to wars
without clear-cut military outcomes—a dilemma that reappeared with a
vengeance in the vortex of Vietnam a decade later.
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参战各方谁也没有取得自己全部的企图。对于美国来说，签署停战协定实现了最初参战的目的：击溃了北朝鲜的成功入侵。但与此同时，却使最虚弱时期的中国，打了一场与超级核强国僵持，且迫使其从已攻占最深远处后撤。
，，，，如此的结局 是美国打过的所有战争里前所未有的。未能统一政军目标使得亚洲其他挑战者认为美国内对没有明确结局战争的脆弱性 --- 一个窘境在此十年后的越南漩涡里得以报复性的重复。
In that broader sense, the Korean War was something more than a draw. 更广意而论，朝鲜战争绝非仅是打个平手而已。
It established the newly founded People’s Republic of China as a military power and center of Asian revolution. 反而成就了新中国成为军事强国和亚洲革命中心的地位。
It also built up military credibility that China, as an adversary worthy of fear and respect, would draw on through the next several decades. 并且，这场战争使得中国建立起军事信誉，是一位值得畏惧和尊重的对手，在未来几十年里持续如此。
The memory of Chinese intervention in Korea would later restrain U.S. strategy significantly in Vietnam. 对中国人参与朝鲜战争的记忆，显著地拘束了美国后来在越南的战略。
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北京也不能说就取得了所有的目标，至少以通常军事术语而言。
Nor can Beijing be said to have achieved all its objectives, at least in
conventional military terms. Mao did not succeed in liberating all of Korea from
“American imperialism,” as Chinese propaganda claimed initially. But he had
gone to war for larger and in some ways more abstract, even romantic, aims:
to test the “New China” with a trial by fire and to purge what Mao perceived as
China's historic softness and passivity; to prove to the West (and, to some
extent, the Soviet Union) that China was now a military power and would use
force to vindicate its interests; to secure China's leadership of the Communist
movement in Asia; and to strike at the United States (which Mao believed was
planning an eventual invasion of China) at a moment he perceived as
opportune. The principal contribution of the new ideology was not its strategic
concepts so much as the willpower to defy the strongest nations and to chart
its own course.
毛未能如中国最初宣传的那样成功地从美帝手里解放全朝鲜。但他打了一场更大的战争，并且某种意义上更抽象，甚至浪漫的目标：火浴“新华”的尝试，摒弃毛感觉的中国历史性的软点的被动，向西方（某种程度上，向苏联）证明 中国现在是个军事强国，而且可以军力宣示她的国家利益，确保中国在亚洲共运的领导地位，并在毛认为时机成熟时打击美国（毛相信美国图谋入侵中国）。这个新意识形态的基本功绩 不是它的战略思维 而是它藐视群雄列强和走自己道路的坚强意志。
更广意而论，朝鲜战争绝非仅是打了个平手而已。
In that broader sense, the Korean War was something more than a draw. It
established the newly founded People’s Republic of China as a military power
and center of Asian revolution. It also built up military credibility that China, as
an adversary worthy of fear and respect, would draw on through the next
several decades. The memory of Chinese intervention in Korea would later
restrain U.S. strategy significantly in Vietnam. Beijing succeeded in using the
war and the accompanying “Resist America, Aid Korea” propaganda and purge
campaign to accomplish two central aims of Mao’s: to eliminate domestic
opposition to Party rule, and to instill “revolutionary enthusiasm” and national
pride in the population. Nourishing resentment of Western exploitation, Mao
framed the war as a struggle to “defeat American arrogance”; battlefield
accomplishments were treated as a form of spiritual rejuvenation after decades
of Chinese weakness and abuse. China emerged from the war exhausted but
redefined in both its own eyes and the world’s.
毛认为这场战争是打败美国傲慢气焰的斗争，战场的成就 是中国几十年来羸弱和饱受凌辱之后的精神复兴。
战争使中国疲惫不堪，但 不论是在她自己 和 在世界的眼里 重新明确：中国站起来了。
造化作弄人，斯大林是朝鲜战争的最大输者，，，，
Ironically, the biggest loser in the Korean War was Stalin, who had given the
green light to Kim Il-sung to start and had urged, even blackmailed, Mao to
intervene massively. Encouraged by America’s acquiescence in the
Communist victory in China, he had calculated that Kim Il-sung could repeat
the pattern in Korea. The American intervention thwarted that objective. He
urged Mao to intervene, expecting that such an act would create a lasting
hostility between China and the United States and increase China’s
dependence on Moscow.
斯大林 Stalin was right in his strategic prediction but erred grievously in assessing
the consequences. Chinese dependence on the Soviet Union was
double-edged. The rearmament of China that the Soviet Union undertook, in
the end, shortened the time until China would be able to act on its own. The
Sino-American schism Stalin was promoting did not lead to an improvement of
Sino-Soviet relations, nor did it reduce China's Titoist option. On the contrary,
Mao calculated that he could defy both superpowers simultaneously. American
conflicts with the Soviet Union were so profound that Mao judged he needed to
pay no price for Soviet backing in the Cold War, indeed that he could use it as
a threat even without its approval, as he did in a number of subsequent crises.
Starting with the end of the Korean War, Soviet relations with China
deteriorated, caused in no small part by the opaqueness with which Stalin had
encouraged Kim Il-sung’s adventure, the brutality with which he had pressed
China toward intervention, and, above all, the grudging manner of Soviet
support, all of which was in the form of repayable loans. Within a decade, the
Soviet Union would become China’s principal adversary. And before another
decade had passed, another reversal of alliance would take place.
与斯大林不同，毛精算了他能够同时打败这两个超级大国。
586页
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以下这段话 ， 不是基辛格的，很有意思，且简明扼要：
An armistice was signed on July 27, 1953.
A peace treaty was not signed,
and South Korea did not sign the armistice.
North and South Korea remained technically at war.
North Korea was to remain under communist rule.
Eisenhower's prestige as a soldier was great enough that only a very few hardliners accused him of appeasement. Senators William Jenner of Nevada and George Malone of Nevada called the settlement a victory for communism. Senator William Knowland of California spoke of the US losing Asia. But rather than the public attacks that Truman and Acheson had received, the public praised Eisenhower for ending the war.
http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch24kor8.htm
