正文
鲜为人知:印最大国防科研机构怎样搞垮印度军队!
2009年09月04日
How DRDO failed India's military
DRDO是如何搞垮印度军队的
（注：DRDO是印度的国防研究与发展组织的简称）
The difference between India's failure against Pakistan's success in their respective missile programmes is based on the purist mindset of the Defence Research and Development Organisation to develop indigenously all complex weapon platforms and Islamabad's intelligent alliance with China and the approach to achieve its goals 'by any means, fair or foul'! While Pakistan was pragmatic in its approach, India was merely pompous.
在双方各自的导弹项目中，印度失败了，巴基斯坦成功了，其间最大的不同就在于DRDO坚持要自行研制所有复杂的武器平台，而***堡的聪明之处就在于联合中国以任何方法达成目标，不论正邪！巴基斯坦在方法上务实，而印度则只不过是自以为是。
Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme has been finally shelved. This marks an unceremonious end of an ambitious technological misadventure by the DRDO -- country's premier defence R&D agency. For nearly two-and-a-half decades, it doled out mere promises to the country's armed forces -- delaying their much- needed modernisation plans.
因此，印度的综合导弹研制项目最终被搁置也就不足为奇了。这标志着DRDO——国家首屈一指的国防科研单位——的技术宏愿再一次以失败草率收场。在接近25年的历史当中，DRDO向印度军队做出了太多未能兑现的承诺——军队急需的现代化规划因此而进展缓慢。
The armed forces were forced to resort to off-the-shelf 'panic buying' whenever they realised that the strategic balance was tilting in favour of their adversaries. Besides missiles, there are other equipments such as the Main Battle Tank Arjun, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Nishant, Light Combat Aircraft Tejas, INSAS rifles which have been thrust on the end users despite unsatisfactory performances during trials.
当印度军队意识到战略平衡开始向对手一方倾斜时，只能被迫回到现成品“慌忙采购”的老路上来。除了导弹，还有“阿琼”主战坦克，“曙光”无人机，LCA“敏捷”战斗机，印度新一代步枪，这些项目无论在试验中如何让人无法接受，最终都会被强加给他们的用户。
In the bargain, the military lost 25 precious years and the taxpayers' nearly Rs 2,000 crore by keeping the IGMDP programme under wraps to hide its inefficiency from the nation.
除此之外，印度军队损失了25年宝贵的时间，因为故作神秘向国家隐瞒综合导弹项目的垃圾性能以求保留该项目，纳税人将近200亿卢布被浪费掉了。
Even when the IGMDP was embarked upon, many pointed out that to successfully complete such a high-end technological programme, foreign collaboration would be needed. But the DRDO's obduracy prevailed and the programme dragged for so many years.
哪怕是在综合导弹研制项目设立之初，也有很多看法指出这样一个高精尖的技术项目要取得完全的成功，与国外的合作是不可缺少的。但是DRDO的顽固不化占据着上风，以至于项目被拖延了这么多年。
It is wasteful to try and 'reinvent the wheel', but that is precisely what the DRDO backed by New Delhi did for all these years -- trying to develop every system and sub-system indigenously and ending up developing practically nothing of substance.
尝试重复“发明车轮”是一种浪费，但这正是新德里在背后提供财力支持的DRDO这么多年来在做的事情——尝试自行研制每一个系统和子系统，然后在几乎没有什么实质性成果的情况下结束研制。
The IGMPD started in 1983 after India failed to reverse engineer a Russian missile in the seventies, with A P J Abdul Kalam as the head. However, 25 years later the DRDO missiles remain off target. The army cannot rely on Prithvi, a battlefield support missile, unless technological issues affecting its launch readiness are resolved. Trishul, the quick reaction anti-aircraft missile, turned out to be a dud and is now being resurrected with the induction of foreign technology as a stopgap arrangement for the air force, till the Spyder missile systems from Israel finally arrives. Meanwhile this delay for the navy meant importing Israel's Barak missile. While Akash, the medium range surface to air missile with 27-km range, had its first user trial in end 2007, Nag, the anti-tank missile with 4-7 km range, is yet to begin user trials.
联合制导导弹研制项目开始于1983年，即70年代印度对俄国导弹的反向工程失败之后，阿卜杜尔·卡拉姆当时是项目主管。但是在25年之后，DRDO的导弹依然是镜花水月。除非发射准备的技术问题得到解决，印度军队是无法依赖于“大地”战术支援导弹的。“三叉戟”快速反应防空导弹，已被证明是一个废物，现在正在引进国外的技术重新设计以做为空军的权宜之计，这种局面要一直持续到从以色列进口的“怪蛇”导弹抵达之后。同时这一拖延也导致了印度海军需要进口以色列的“巴拉克”导弹。而具有27公里射程的“阿卡什”中程地对空导弹，于2007年底才首次试射，射程4-7公里的 “毒蛇”反坦克导弹，也刚刚才开始准备试射。
Meanwhile, the air force with depleting fleet of obsolete Russian SA-3 Pechora and OSA-AK missile systems, is in a quandary as to how to plug holes in its air defence system in the western sector as the DRDO has failed to deliver.
与此同时，随着过时的俄制SA-3和OSA-AK 地空导弹退出现役产生空缺，DRDO又不能交付新导弹，印度空军正为如何填补其西部地区的防空漏洞而左右为难。
AGNI-I and AGNI-II with a range of 700 km and 2,500 km respectively, have been tested five times, which is inadequate to generate confidence in a nuclear capable missile. The end users of these ballistic missiles are army and the air force with 8 and 24 missiles in their arsenals but lack confidence in the quality of the product even as AGNI-IV is readied for trial in mid-2008 with a range of 6,000 km.
“烈火”I 型和“烈火”II 型地对地导弹分别具有700和2500公里的射程，已经进行了５次试射，均不足以提供作为核导弹的足够信心。作为这些弹道导弹最终用户的印度陆军和空军，分别拥有8枚和24枚这样的导弹，但是哪怕是2008年中期射程为6000公里的“烈火”IV 型完成试射，相信陆军和空军对于这些导弹的质量也缺乏足够的信心。
The tacit admission of the DRDO's inability must not be limited to the missile programme alone; a review of all projects under its aegis is needed for a reality check and course correction. The DRDO fault-line primarily is a result of lack of accountability, focus, and failure to develop scientific disposition.
DRDO显而易见的低能并不仅仅表现在导弹项目上；在其名下的全部项目需要更进一步的核查和清算。DRDO的错误根源主要在于对科研成果、重点、以及缺乏合理安排进行追究的缺失。
The director general of DRDO wears three hats. He is also, secretary defence R&D and scientific advisor to the defence minister. These three inter-linked hats on one individual destroy the basic principal of accountability. Therefore, he is not answerable to anyone.
DRDO的主管头上有三顶官帽。他同时还是国防科研部长和国防部长的科学顾问。这三顶官帽戴在了一个头上破坏了责任追究的基本原则。因此，他无需对任何人负责。
DRDO scuttled a contract that was on the verge of being signed by India in 1997 for the import of a Weapon Locating Radar as the latter promised to produce it indigenously within two years. Due to this negligence, the Indian Army could not neutralise Pakistan's artillery fire effectively in the Kargil conflict and suffered heavy causalities. Of course, the DRDO to date is not in a position to produce WLR and ultimately India bought it from the previously selected producer in 2003. In my view, DRDO should be held directly responsible for these unwarranted war causalities.
DRDO保证在两年之内拿出国产的同类系统，从而使得1997年一个几乎就要签字的进口武器定位雷达的合同被取消。因为这一错误，印度陆军无法在卡吉尔冲突中对巴基斯坦炮兵火力实施反击因而遭受重大伤亡。习惯成自然，DRDO 无法按照承诺生产出武器定位雷达，印度陆军最终还是于2003年从先前的供应商那里购买了这一系统。按照我的理解，DRDO应该为这些无谓的战争伤亡负直接责任。
The DRDO actually produces in its Tezpur laboratory orchids and mushrooms, identifies the sharpest chili in the world with pride, while its lab in Pithoragarh develops hybrid varieties of cucumber, tomato and capsicum. It spends merrily from the defence budget on developing new strains of Angora rabbits and 'Namkeen Herbal Tea'! DRDO by indulging in such irrelevant activities lost its focus and sight of its primary responsibility.
DRDO确实在其提斯普尔的实验室里生产出了兰花和蘑菇，以及引以为傲的全世界最辣的辣椒，还有皮特拉加尔实验室研制出的杂交品种的黄瓜、西红柿、灯笼椒。DRDO愉快地把国防预算花在了研究新品种的安哥拉兔和“辣味药茶”上！沉迷于这些毫不相关的活动的DRDO已经毫无章法、忘记了自己的主要责任。
Instead of building a scientific temper, DRDO from its inception indulged in empire building, spending a major part of its budget on world-class auditoriums, convention centres, conference halls, and hostels, while neglecting research work.
DRDO从一开始就沉溺于争权夺势而不是培养科学的素养，它把大部分的预算都花在了世界级的礼堂、会议中心、交流中心和酒店上，而科研工作被遗忘了。
To remove DRDO's fault-line, New Delhi should rapidly transform India into a low cost, high end R&D centre of the world without neglecting its manufacturing sector. Fairly ideal demographic conditions exist along with favourable geo-political factors whereby international actors are willing to invest, as well as, set up shop in India. To maintain their technological lead, the West finds India as a logical destination for their defence industries, both as a potential market and also a base to develop low cost high-end research projects.
要根除DRDO的恶习，新德里应该迅速地在不忽略制造能力的前提下把印度转变成为一种低成本的、世界级的高精尖科研中心。非常理想的现有人力资源和有利的地缘政治因素将成为国际上愿意在印度进行投资和设立经销点的理由。为了保持其技术优势，西方国家会发现印度是一个转移其国防工业的理想国家，因为印度既是一个潜在的市场，也是一个进行低成本高精尖项目研究的基地。
On the other hand, we need to leapfrog as well as piggyback technologically, as reinventing the wheel is not necessarily an answer to the yawning technological gap that exists between the western countries and India. Therefore, there are synergies that should be exploited. Enormous mutual benefits can occur to both, if New Delhi can develop itself as a world-class R&D centre and a global hub for manufacturing sensitive military equipment.
从另一方面来说，我们在技术上既需要跨越式发展也需要吸取众长，重负发明车轮对于我们填补印度与西方国家之间业已存在的技术鸿沟并不是一个必需的回答。因此，相互配合应该被加以重视。如果新德里致力于成为重大军事装备制造的世界级科研中心和全球核心，双赢的可能是存在的。
Due to the rapid march of technologies and huge costs involved in R&D, no single player is in a position to deliver next generation weapon systems. Whether it is Boeing, Lockheed Martin, DCN, Airbus, or HDW -- all of them sub-contract different assemblies and sub-systems globally to the most competitive and competent companies. The other interesting trend is the formation of trans-national consortiums of nations and companies to manufacture superior platforms like the Euro fighter or the Euro copter. The game, thus, is global as it is not feasible for a single player to manufacture or develop each item.
由于与科研有关的技术进步和巨大花费，没有谁能够独立开发出下一代的武器系统。无论是波音、洛克希德·马丁、法国造船局、空中客车、还是德国造船局——这些军工巨鳄都将其不同装配件和子系统的子合同分发给全球最有竞争力和最有能力的公司。还有一种有意思的发展方向就是像欧洲战斗机和欧洲直升机那样由多个国家和公司组成一个跨国机构的生产制造平台。这样一来国防科研就形成了全球参与的局面，就不再会出现谁单打独斗研究和制造每一个部件的现象。
In the development Sukhoi SU-30 MKI, the major player was the Russian corporation IRKUT but without the help of France [Images] and Israel, the fighter aircraft could not have developed the decisive technological edge that it displays. Therefore, India needs to shed its inhibitions, diversify, and form international industrial alliances to leapfrog technological gaps, boost export revenues from its military industrial complex, and leverage this strength as a strategic asset in Asia.
在苏霍伊苏-30MKI的研制过程中，主要的参与方是俄罗斯的伊尔库特公司，但是没有法国和以色列的帮助，该战斗机就不会有现在这样最尖端的技术优势。印度需要放下顾虑，组建国际工业联盟来跨越技术鸿沟，从其军事工业体系中获取出口收益，进而将这种力量转变成在亚洲的战略资源。
In any case, defence technologies become obsolete by the time a country can reinvent the wheel. Therefore, radical shifting of strategic gears to a more advantageous position by opening up the field to private sector will stimulate self-sufficiency. Companies like Tatas or L&T can enter into joint ventures and where necessary import CEO's and employ foreign scientists to kick start complex projects.
无论怎么说，国防科技都会在一个国家重复发明轮子的过程中变得落后。因此，通过向私营经济开放这一领域从而在根本上把战略势态转变到一个更为有利的局面将激发出自信心。像塔塔和L&T这样的公司可以以合资的方式加入，并且在需要的时候引进管理人材、雇佣外国科学家来启动复杂的项目。
In fact, to improve performance of the Public Sector Units there should be competitors making fighter aircraft, missiles, and warships in the corporate world. Such farsighted policy shifts will improve India's self-sufficiency in the shortest possible time frame. This in turn, will increase the stakes of multi-nationals in India's well being and marginalise sanction regimes.
事实上，要改进国有单位的表现就需要在战斗机、导弹以及舰艇的制造当中通过全球合作引入竞争。这种有远见的政策转变将在最短的时间内改善印度的自信心。进而将增大印度在多国合作当中说话的份量并削弱制裁的力量。
The Indian Foreign Office took 58 years to grudgingly acknowledge the criticality of military diplomacy in international affairs. If DRDO can appreciate that a technologically advanced and vibrant defence industry is equally critical for India's security and its global aspirations, we will not replicate this mistake. In other words, it should be made to realise that it solely exists to support the armed forces and not vice versa. Therefore, New Delhi should force ruthless accountability, create focus and development of scientific temperament within DRDO and ensure fruitful collaboration with the Indian and international private sector, instead of permitting them to fritter away the defence budget on irrelevant and peripheral activities.
印度外交部花了58才勉强承认在国际事务中军事外交的危险局面。如果DRDO能够认识到技术进步和强大的国防工业对于印度的安全和全球地位来说是同等的重要，我们就不能再重复这样的错误。换句话说，它应该认识到它对于印度军队的垄断性存在，印度军队也是这样。因此，新德里应该痛下决心，提出重点并在DRDO内部培养科学素养，确保印度和国际上私营公司的合作获得成果，而不是允许它们在不相关和非本职的活动上浪费国防预算。
The writer is editor, Indian Defence Review.
2009年09月04日
How DRDO failed India's military
DRDO是如何搞垮印度军队的
（注：DRDO是印度的国防研究与发展组织的简称）
The difference between India's failure against Pakistan's success in their respective missile programmes is based on the purist mindset of the Defence Research and Development Organisation to develop indigenously all complex weapon platforms and Islamabad's intelligent alliance with China and the approach to achieve its goals 'by any means, fair or foul'! While Pakistan was pragmatic in its approach, India was merely pompous.
在双方各自的导弹项目中，印度失败了，巴基斯坦成功了，其间最大的不同就在于DRDO坚持要自行研制所有复杂的武器平台，而***堡的聪明之处就在于联合中国以任何方法达成目标，不论正邪！巴基斯坦在方法上务实，而印度则只不过是自以为是。
Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme has been finally shelved. This marks an unceremonious end of an ambitious technological misadventure by the DRDO -- country's premier defence R&D agency. For nearly two-and-a-half decades, it doled out mere promises to the country's armed forces -- delaying their much- needed modernisation plans.
因此，印度的综合导弹研制项目最终被搁置也就不足为奇了。这标志着DRDO——国家首屈一指的国防科研单位——的技术宏愿再一次以失败草率收场。在接近25年的历史当中，DRDO向印度军队做出了太多未能兑现的承诺——军队急需的现代化规划因此而进展缓慢。
The armed forces were forced to resort to off-the-shelf 'panic buying' whenever they realised that the strategic balance was tilting in favour of their adversaries. Besides missiles, there are other equipments such as the Main Battle Tank Arjun, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Nishant, Light Combat Aircraft Tejas, INSAS rifles which have been thrust on the end users despite unsatisfactory performances during trials.
当印度军队意识到战略平衡开始向对手一方倾斜时，只能被迫回到现成品“慌忙采购”的老路上来。除了导弹，还有“阿琼”主战坦克，“曙光”无人机，LCA“敏捷”战斗机，印度新一代步枪，这些项目无论在试验中如何让人无法接受，最终都会被强加给他们的用户。
In the bargain, the military lost 25 precious years and the taxpayers' nearly Rs 2,000 crore by keeping the IGMDP programme under wraps to hide its inefficiency from the nation.
除此之外，印度军队损失了25年宝贵的时间，因为故作神秘向国家隐瞒综合导弹项目的垃圾性能以求保留该项目，纳税人将近200亿卢布被浪费掉了。
Even when the IGMDP was embarked upon, many pointed out that to successfully complete such a high-end technological programme, foreign collaboration would be needed. But the DRDO's obduracy prevailed and the programme dragged for so many years.
哪怕是在综合导弹研制项目设立之初，也有很多看法指出这样一个高精尖的技术项目要取得完全的成功，与国外的合作是不可缺少的。但是DRDO的顽固不化占据着上风，以至于项目被拖延了这么多年。
It is wasteful to try and 'reinvent the wheel', but that is precisely what the DRDO backed by New Delhi did for all these years -- trying to develop every system and sub-system indigenously and ending up developing practically nothing of substance.
尝试重复“发明车轮”是一种浪费，但这正是新德里在背后提供财力支持的DRDO这么多年来在做的事情——尝试自行研制每一个系统和子系统，然后在几乎没有什么实质性成果的情况下结束研制。
The IGMPD started in 1983 after India failed to reverse engineer a Russian missile in the seventies, with A P J Abdul Kalam as the head. However, 25 years later the DRDO missiles remain off target. The army cannot rely on Prithvi, a battlefield support missile, unless technological issues affecting its launch readiness are resolved. Trishul, the quick reaction anti-aircraft missile, turned out to be a dud and is now being resurrected with the induction of foreign technology as a stopgap arrangement for the air force, till the Spyder missile systems from Israel finally arrives. Meanwhile this delay for the navy meant importing Israel's Barak missile. While Akash, the medium range surface to air missile with 27-km range, had its first user trial in end 2007, Nag, the anti-tank missile with 4-7 km range, is yet to begin user trials.
联合制导导弹研制项目开始于1983年，即70年代印度对俄国导弹的反向工程失败之后，阿卜杜尔·卡拉姆当时是项目主管。但是在25年之后，DRDO的导弹依然是镜花水月。除非发射准备的技术问题得到解决，印度军队是无法依赖于“大地”战术支援导弹的。“三叉戟”快速反应防空导弹，已被证明是一个废物，现在正在引进国外的技术重新设计以做为空军的权宜之计，这种局面要一直持续到从以色列进口的“怪蛇”导弹抵达之后。同时这一拖延也导致了印度海军需要进口以色列的“巴拉克”导弹。而具有27公里射程的“阿卡什”中程地对空导弹，于2007年底才首次试射，射程4-7公里的 “毒蛇”反坦克导弹，也刚刚才开始准备试射。
Meanwhile, the air force with depleting fleet of obsolete Russian SA-3 Pechora and OSA-AK missile systems, is in a quandary as to how to plug holes in its air defence system in the western sector as the DRDO has failed to deliver.
与此同时，随着过时的俄制SA-3和OSA-AK 地空导弹退出现役产生空缺，DRDO又不能交付新导弹，印度空军正为如何填补其西部地区的防空漏洞而左右为难。
AGNI-I and AGNI-II with a range of 700 km and 2,500 km respectively, have been tested five times, which is inadequate to generate confidence in a nuclear capable missile. The end users of these ballistic missiles are army and the air force with 8 and 24 missiles in their arsenals but lack confidence in the quality of the product even as AGNI-IV is readied for trial in mid-2008 with a range of 6,000 km.
“烈火”I 型和“烈火”II 型地对地导弹分别具有700和2500公里的射程，已经进行了５次试射，均不足以提供作为核导弹的足够信心。作为这些弹道导弹最终用户的印度陆军和空军，分别拥有8枚和24枚这样的导弹，但是哪怕是2008年中期射程为6000公里的“烈火”IV 型完成试射，相信陆军和空军对于这些导弹的质量也缺乏足够的信心。
The tacit admission of the DRDO's inability must not be limited to the missile programme alone; a review of all projects under its aegis is needed for a reality check and course correction. The DRDO fault-line primarily is a result of lack of accountability, focus, and failure to develop scientific disposition.
DRDO显而易见的低能并不仅仅表现在导弹项目上；在其名下的全部项目需要更进一步的核查和清算。DRDO的错误根源主要在于对科研成果、重点、以及缺乏合理安排进行追究的缺失。
The director general of DRDO wears three hats. He is also, secretary defence R&D and scientific advisor to the defence minister. These three inter-linked hats on one individual destroy the basic principal of accountability. Therefore, he is not answerable to anyone.
DRDO的主管头上有三顶官帽。他同时还是国防科研部长和国防部长的科学顾问。这三顶官帽戴在了一个头上破坏了责任追究的基本原则。因此，他无需对任何人负责。
DRDO scuttled a contract that was on the verge of being signed by India in 1997 for the import of a Weapon Locating Radar as the latter promised to produce it indigenously within two years. Due to this negligence, the Indian Army could not neutralise Pakistan's artillery fire effectively in the Kargil conflict and suffered heavy causalities. Of course, the DRDO to date is not in a position to produce WLR and ultimately India bought it from the previously selected producer in 2003. In my view, DRDO should be held directly responsible for these unwarranted war causalities.
DRDO保证在两年之内拿出国产的同类系统，从而使得1997年一个几乎就要签字的进口武器定位雷达的合同被取消。因为这一错误，印度陆军无法在卡吉尔冲突中对巴基斯坦炮兵火力实施反击因而遭受重大伤亡。习惯成自然，DRDO 无法按照承诺生产出武器定位雷达，印度陆军最终还是于2003年从先前的供应商那里购买了这一系统。按照我的理解，DRDO应该为这些无谓的战争伤亡负直接责任。
The DRDO actually produces in its Tezpur laboratory orchids and mushrooms, identifies the sharpest chili in the world with pride, while its lab in Pithoragarh develops hybrid varieties of cucumber, tomato and capsicum. It spends merrily from the defence budget on developing new strains of Angora rabbits and 'Namkeen Herbal Tea'! DRDO by indulging in such irrelevant activities lost its focus and sight of its primary responsibility.
DRDO确实在其提斯普尔的实验室里生产出了兰花和蘑菇，以及引以为傲的全世界最辣的辣椒，还有皮特拉加尔实验室研制出的杂交品种的黄瓜、西红柿、灯笼椒。DRDO愉快地把国防预算花在了研究新品种的安哥拉兔和“辣味药茶”上！沉迷于这些毫不相关的活动的DRDO已经毫无章法、忘记了自己的主要责任。
Instead of building a scientific temper, DRDO from its inception indulged in empire building, spending a major part of its budget on world-class auditoriums, convention centres, conference halls, and hostels, while neglecting research work.
DRDO从一开始就沉溺于争权夺势而不是培养科学的素养，它把大部分的预算都花在了世界级的礼堂、会议中心、交流中心和酒店上，而科研工作被遗忘了。
To remove DRDO's fault-line, New Delhi should rapidly transform India into a low cost, high end R&D centre of the world without neglecting its manufacturing sector. Fairly ideal demographic conditions exist along with favourable geo-political factors whereby international actors are willing to invest, as well as, set up shop in India. To maintain their technological lead, the West finds India as a logical destination for their defence industries, both as a potential market and also a base to develop low cost high-end research projects.
要根除DRDO的恶习，新德里应该迅速地在不忽略制造能力的前提下把印度转变成为一种低成本的、世界级的高精尖科研中心。非常理想的现有人力资源和有利的地缘政治因素将成为国际上愿意在印度进行投资和设立经销点的理由。为了保持其技术优势，西方国家会发现印度是一个转移其国防工业的理想国家，因为印度既是一个潜在的市场，也是一个进行低成本高精尖项目研究的基地。
On the other hand, we need to leapfrog as well as piggyback technologically, as reinventing the wheel is not necessarily an answer to the yawning technological gap that exists between the western countries and India. Therefore, there are synergies that should be exploited. Enormous mutual benefits can occur to both, if New Delhi can develop itself as a world-class R&D centre and a global hub for manufacturing sensitive military equipment.
从另一方面来说，我们在技术上既需要跨越式发展也需要吸取众长，重负发明车轮对于我们填补印度与西方国家之间业已存在的技术鸿沟并不是一个必需的回答。因此，相互配合应该被加以重视。如果新德里致力于成为重大军事装备制造的世界级科研中心和全球核心，双赢的可能是存在的。
Due to the rapid march of technologies and huge costs involved in R&D, no single player is in a position to deliver next generation weapon systems. Whether it is Boeing, Lockheed Martin, DCN, Airbus, or HDW -- all of them sub-contract different assemblies and sub-systems globally to the most competitive and competent companies. The other interesting trend is the formation of trans-national consortiums of nations and companies to manufacture superior platforms like the Euro fighter or the Euro copter. The game, thus, is global as it is not feasible for a single player to manufacture or develop each item.
由于与科研有关的技术进步和巨大花费，没有谁能够独立开发出下一代的武器系统。无论是波音、洛克希德·马丁、法国造船局、空中客车、还是德国造船局——这些军工巨鳄都将其不同装配件和子系统的子合同分发给全球最有竞争力和最有能力的公司。还有一种有意思的发展方向就是像欧洲战斗机和欧洲直升机那样由多个国家和公司组成一个跨国机构的生产制造平台。这样一来国防科研就形成了全球参与的局面，就不再会出现谁单打独斗研究和制造每一个部件的现象。
In the development Sukhoi SU-30 MKI, the major player was the Russian corporation IRKUT but without the help of France [Images] and Israel, the fighter aircraft could not have developed the decisive technological edge that it displays. Therefore, India needs to shed its inhibitions, diversify, and form international industrial alliances to leapfrog technological gaps, boost export revenues from its military industrial complex, and leverage this strength as a strategic asset in Asia.
在苏霍伊苏-30MKI的研制过程中，主要的参与方是俄罗斯的伊尔库特公司，但是没有法国和以色列的帮助，该战斗机就不会有现在这样最尖端的技术优势。印度需要放下顾虑，组建国际工业联盟来跨越技术鸿沟，从其军事工业体系中获取出口收益，进而将这种力量转变成在亚洲的战略资源。
In any case, defence technologies become obsolete by the time a country can reinvent the wheel. Therefore, radical shifting of strategic gears to a more advantageous position by opening up the field to private sector will stimulate self-sufficiency. Companies like Tatas or L&T can enter into joint ventures and where necessary import CEO's and employ foreign scientists to kick start complex projects.
无论怎么说，国防科技都会在一个国家重复发明轮子的过程中变得落后。因此，通过向私营经济开放这一领域从而在根本上把战略势态转变到一个更为有利的局面将激发出自信心。像塔塔和L&T这样的公司可以以合资的方式加入，并且在需要的时候引进管理人材、雇佣外国科学家来启动复杂的项目。
In fact, to improve performance of the Public Sector Units there should be competitors making fighter aircraft, missiles, and warships in the corporate world. Such farsighted policy shifts will improve India's self-sufficiency in the shortest possible time frame. This in turn, will increase the stakes of multi-nationals in India's well being and marginalise sanction regimes.
事实上，要改进国有单位的表现就需要在战斗机、导弹以及舰艇的制造当中通过全球合作引入竞争。这种有远见的政策转变将在最短的时间内改善印度的自信心。进而将增大印度在多国合作当中说话的份量并削弱制裁的力量。
The Indian Foreign Office took 58 years to grudgingly acknowledge the criticality of military diplomacy in international affairs. If DRDO can appreciate that a technologically advanced and vibrant defence industry is equally critical for India's security and its global aspirations, we will not replicate this mistake. In other words, it should be made to realise that it solely exists to support the armed forces and not vice versa. Therefore, New Delhi should force ruthless accountability, create focus and development of scientific temperament within DRDO and ensure fruitful collaboration with the Indian and international private sector, instead of permitting them to fritter away the defence budget on irrelevant and peripheral activities.
印度外交部花了58才勉强承认在国际事务中军事外交的危险局面。如果DRDO能够认识到技术进步和强大的国防工业对于印度的安全和全球地位来说是同等的重要，我们就不能再重复这样的错误。换句话说，它应该认识到它对于印度军队的垄断性存在，印度军队也是这样。因此，新德里应该痛下决心，提出重点并在DRDO内部培养科学素养，确保印度和国际上私营公司的合作获得成果，而不是允许它们在不相关和非本职的活动上浪费国防预算。
The writer is editor, Indian Defence Review.
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