财经观察 1331 --- 后泡沫世界的陷阱

史蒂芬·罗奇："后泡沫世界"的陷阱

作者史蒂芬•罗奇（ Stephen S. Roach ）为摩根士丹利 前首席经济学家 , 现任亚洲主席
[10-01 08:48] 　

http://www.caijing.com.cn/2008-10-01/110017177.html

世界能否从这次宏观震荡中汲取深刻的教训？美国和中国可能是其中的关键，而近期的迹象并不乐观

【《财经网》专稿 / 特约作者 史蒂芬·罗奇】这是一种似曾相识的逻辑。

　　一年前，几乎没有任何端倪暗示世界金融市场及全球经济将要发生什么。当然，美国住房抵押贷款市场中的次贷板块全盘表现不佳已有征兆，但是，正如 2000 年早期的网络公司泡沫一般，人们普遍认为次贷对宏观面的影响甚微。否认 —— 这种人类最强有力的情感之一，再一次占了上风。消费者、商人、决策者以及政客，全都忽略了次贷当中正在酝酿的问题，并一致相信此前五年的全球经济繁荣趋势依然完好无损。
　　一年前的争论被蒙上了一种令人心痛的似曾相识感。早在 1999 年底，网络公司仅占美国股票市场市值的 6% 。强大、灵活、富于创新的美国经济被寄予厚望，人们相信它会为股票市场另外的 94% 以及宏观经济提供内在弹性及持续支持；而一年前，次贷仅占已发行证券化抵押贷款总额的 14% ，依然强大、灵活、创新的美国经济被再次寄予厚望，人们仍相信它会为另外 86% 的抵押贷款市场及宏观经济提供持续支持。
　　 2000 年如此，一年前又是如此。这种逻辑是何等的谬误啊！
　　八年半以前，网络公司泡沫破裂。紧随其后的是美国广义标准普尔 500 指数在接下来的两年半内剧跌 49% 。一年前，次贷泡沫的破裂，触发了信贷及资本市场上危机的空前蔓延，使得那些曾经何等骄傲的美国金融界的 " 大众偶像 " 们纷纷倒下 —— 起初是贝尔斯登，现在是雷曼兄弟与美林。教训令人痛心地相似。当整个资产类别（或就此而论，一个经济体）走向极端，整个资产链中最微弱的环节常常会给整个系统带来决定性的打击。以泡沫类比恰是如此。当泡沫表膜最薄的部分出现问题，其中的空气便迅速逃逸。
　　但是，这种比喻漏掉了关键一点。泡沫的膨胀是一个在不知不觉中加剧的过程。从股票到房产再到信贷，泡沫在规模和风险程度上不断扩大，充满泡沫的美国经济酝酿着一场系统性风险的狂风暴雨，并对美国以及日益相互依存的世界经济带来影响。而今，只留下我们收拾残局。

（一）危机根源

　 　创纪录的美国消费狂潮事问题的根源所在 —— 触发源便是，从以收入为基础的储蓄模式到以资产为基础的储蓄模式的贸然转型

　　没有一个经济体可以永久地入不敷出。但正如那些曾经如此尝试的国家一样，美国自认为这次可以与众不同。美国的经常账户赤字从 1995 年占 GDP 的 1.5% 猛然升至 2006 年的 6% 。 2006 年第三季度，赤字按年计算的规模达到 8440 亿美元的顶峰，美国每个交易日要从海外引入 34 亿美元的资本，方能补足国内储蓄的巨大差额。

　　长久以来，这些资金支持随唤随到。大批新的理论被捏造出来，用以理性地解释，为什么无法持续的东西实际上也可能持续下去。很多人辩称，对于拥有世界储备币种的国度而言，无拘无束的海外借贷是一种特权。有些人甚至走得更远，开始庆祝新的第二代 " 布雷顿森林体系 " 的降临。他们认为，像中国一样拥有额外储蓄的国家会源源不断地将过剩的美元换成美国资产，以此保持本国货币的竞争力，以及出口导向型的增长模式。当然，到头来，关于这些 " 新范式 " 的解说也如以往一样，未能经受住时间及市场的考验。

　　问题的根源，是美国从以收入为基础的储蓄模式向以资产为基础的储蓄的贸然转型。美国消费者率先行动。在 1994 年到 2007 年的 14 年间，美国实际消费需求的趋势增长率按实值计算，每年高达 3.5% 。其持续时间如此之长，对现代历史上的任何一个经济体而言，都可谓一场最为盛大的消费狂欢。不用介意那看似正在缓慢衰竭的收入增长，虽然在这一时期，实际的个人可支配收入的平均增长率仅为 3.2% 。美国消费者感到他们不必再以传统的方式存款了。自大萧条以来，他们首次将收入型储蓄的利率逼为零。为什么不呢？毕竟，他们已经发现了一种新的以资产为基础的储蓄策略 —— 先是 20 世纪 90 年代后半期，拿股票质押；而后是本世纪的前五年，拿房产质押。宽松的规章条例及监督管理，加之过度的货币政策调整，导致这种廉价而随意的信贷最终崩溃，证明其不过是一层脆弱的糖衣而已。

　　回顾过去，与美国住房的价值空间相比，股票的财富效应就相形见绌了。在 2006 年中期的巅峰之时，出自住宅房产的净房产抵押提取现金量（ net equityextraction ）飞涨至可支配个人收入的 9% ，是五年前此项读数 3% 的三倍整。这就使得收入短缺的美国消费者不仅可以挥霍以收入为基础的储蓄，还把 2007 年的消费推高至当年 GDP 的 72% ，创下历史纪录。在这一结果的背后，是两个巨大泡沫 —— 房产和信贷的共同作用。它们把住宅变成自动取款机（ ATM ）。最终，美国消费者心安理得地透支了他们的住宅财产这一未来储蓄的主要来源，来为今天的消费买单。当然，他们最终也不可避免地背上了创纪录的债务负担。截至 2007 年底，家庭部门的负债率飞涨至可支配个人收入的 133% ，较之于区区十年前还是 90% 的主流债务负担率，竟也上升了 40 多个百分点，简直荒谬至极。而其持续的时间越长，它在美国人心目中就越根深蒂固。现在，终于结束了。

（二）亚洲的关联

　　随着美国消费陷入困境，亚洲出口导向型的增长机制目前也处境危险

　　虽然看似 " 美国制造 " ，但这个过剩时代的规模也确实席卷了全球。美国的消费狂潮，正是世界其他出口导向型经济体的给养，对发展中的亚洲而言尤其如此。自世纪之交以来，亚洲成为世界上增长最快的主要地区。其规模之大，足以占据世界总产出（按购买力平价测算）的 20% 。 2000 年至 2007 年间，亚洲新兴经济体的实际 GDP 平均增长 8% ，是同一时期世界其他地区 3% 的增速的 2.5 倍。为了寻求快速增长，以达到发展及减贫的目标，亚洲新兴经济体将美国的消费狂潮视为 " 来自天堂的甘露 " ；消费不足的日本也做出了类似的回应；韩国与台湾这两个亚洲地区较大的新兴工业化经济体亦是如此。

　　一点也没错，正是这种 " 高能燃料 " 推动了亚洲的繁荣增长 —— 那是一种日益强大的出口导向型增长机制。对于整个发展中的亚洲而言， 2007 年的出口创下纪录，占当年该地区总 GDP 的 45% ，比 20 世纪 90 年代中期时的主流比例高出十几个百分点。这就令亚洲这个世界上增长最快的地区比以往更依赖于外部需求。而随着上述外部需求的最大来源 —— 美国消费最终陷入困境，亚洲出口导向型的增长机制目前也处境危险。

　　在此，中国的角色无疑很关键。经过 2006 年到 2007 年这两年间 GDP 近乎 12% 的高速增长， 2008 年第二季度，中国经济的增速放缓至 10.1% 。这种下调很大程度上是中国对美国出口增长明显减速的结果 ——2003 年到 2007 年之间，出口年均增幅超过 25% ；而此后， 2008 年 6 月年同比增长仅为 8% 。很明显，约占中国总外需 20% 的以美国为核心的出口以及 GDP 增长都受到了挤压。而与此相伴的是，中国对欧洲（ 2008 年 6 月增长 25% ）及日本（增长 22% ）的出货量依然充满活力。但由于日本及欧洲也在减弱，迄今为止在中国外需中较有活力的部分（合计占中国总出口额的 30% ）也将开始衰退。由于这些因素的拖累，中国的 GDP 增长极有可能在未来六个月内从 10% 进一步降至 8% 。

　　日本对外需冲击的防御也很脆弱。其 6 月的出口总量增长同比下跌 1.6% ，是 16 个月内首次走向负值。导致这一局面的原因，是日本对欧洲及亚洲其他地区的出口也显现出疲软，而此前，这些一度活跃的市场还能掩饰日本对美国出口减弱的事实。主要由于上述原因，日本经济的年增长率在 2008 年二季度收缩了 3% ，为七年以来最急剧的下降。

　　就亚洲对外的脆弱度来看，中国和日本恰位居两个极端。中国拥有巨大的缓冲条件，过去两年内接近 12% 的增长率可以抵挡住外需震荡的打击；相反，日本经济近几年来仅维持着 2% 的增长率，缺少中国那样的缓冲。在外需走弱的环境下，中国经济增长的底线可能在 8% 左右，而对于日本，则更可能接近于零。这就突显出该地区最大的经济体再度萌发衰退的明显可能性。
　　

2002 年至 2007 年中期的全球经济繁荣，是全球化强大的跨境联接作用的自然结果。世界上没有任何地区比出口导向型的亚洲从这种关联性中获益更多。该地区以中国为主导的飞速发展的经济便是佐证。脱钩（ decoupling ） —— 将发展中经济体与发达世界的假设性分离 —— 与过去五年强大的全球化趋势的核心理论背道而驰。无论在全球经济周期的低谷还是高潮，这种全球化的关联度都不受影响。通过发达的跨境反馈机制，在一个相互依存的世界里，亚洲的出口导向型经济体对美国需求减弱的反应，正在各地市场及经济体中触发强大的影响。

（三）经济衰退 " 三部曲 "

　　金融危机及实体经济衰退相互交错的 " 三部曲 " ，掌握着未来几年宏观经济前景的密钥

　　

怎奈，全球经济周期已经转变。在 2004 年至 2007 年间，世界 GDP 年均增长率接近 5% ，是 20 世纪 70 年代以来全球增长最强劲的四年。而现在看来，未来几年似乎又要回归到 3.5% 的区间。虽然这也并非什么灾难性的结果，但确实意味着增长率比之前四年减速 30% 。
　

　全球经济周期可能转向低迷，这并非一则孤立事件。随之而来的，是信贷市场危机的空前爆发，对世界金融市场构成极大破坏。金融市场和实体经济间的相互影响，无疑掌握着未来几年全球宏观前景的密钥。
　　

为便于解说，我现将这一繁复的过程分为三个阶段：

　　信贷危机是第一阶段。由 2007 年夏天开始的次贷危机引爆，一场跨产品的危机迅速蔓延至资产支持商业票据、抵押贷款证券（ MBS ）、结构型投资工具（ SIVs ）、银行间同业（ LIBOR ）离岸融资、杠杆贷款市场、标售型利率证券（ ARS ）、所谓的单线保险商，以及其他众多含混的产品及结构化产品。

　　不同于十年前那场跨境蔓延的亚洲金融危机，如今复杂的工具及结构型产品所具有的 " 起始及扩散 " （ originate anddistribute ，指贷款产品原形及包装待售的证券化产品）的特性，最终也传染了离岸投资者。这使当前的这场危机罕见地滋生了 " 既跨产品又跨境 " 的双重特征。美国金融机构一向激进地减计 " 问题 " 证券的价值，同时，市场残忍地处罚了那些在美国 " 后泡沫时代 " 的悲惨世界中首当其冲的金融机构，尤其是贝尔斯登、雷曼兄弟与美林。多半由于这个原因，我相信第一阶段已经完成了大约 65% 。虽然我们已经经历了这个历程的大半部分，但随着经济周期的介入，我们仍有很多需要面对，因为这将对金融中介机构的收入造成新一轮的打击。

　　第二阶段反映的是信贷及住房市场内爆对美国经济实体面的影响。如上所述，这一阶段调整的表征可能是过分挥霍、储蓄短缺、过度负债的美国消费者的屈从。近 15 年来，每年的实际消费增长平均接近 4% ，而随着消费者开始重建以收入为基础的储蓄模式，并削减债务负担，消费需求将出现历时多年的下滑现已成为可能。

　　接下来的两三年内，我认为消费趋势增长率将减半至 2% 左右。甚至会有几个季度，消费开支不能达标，而美国经济也会陷入一种衰退的状态。毫无疑问，也会有几个季度消费增长高于 2% 这一标准，经济也看似复苏。但非常不幸的是，这样的反弹对于 " 后泡沫时代 " 的美国消费者而言，犹如昙花一现。这方面的宏观调整方才上演。因此，依我之见，第二阶段仅仅完成了 20% 左右。

　　第三阶段需要放眼全球局面 —— 美国消费业及世界其他国家之间的关联更强调了这一点。同样如上所述，这些关联才刚刚开始发挥效用。订货及跨境运输滞后，说明这一阶段的调整将花去大量时间。

　　前期影响在中国及日本已经非常明显 —— 很大程度上以美国肇始的出口调整为基础；而在欧洲，连锁反应才刚刚显现，未来几个月乃至几个季度内，这种跨境影响将蓄势待发。因此我认为第三阶段仅完成了 10% 左右。

　　简而言之，这场宏观危机远未结束。主要原因在于，已经破裂的房产和信贷泡沫变得如此之大，以至于最终传染了美国经济的实体面。美国正调整适应更加艰难的后泡沫现实，相互依存、全球化的世界其他地区应当紧随其后。

　　此外，各阶段间还存在反馈效应 —— 特别是经济周期现已开始施压于那些在信贷危机中首当其冲的金融机构。银行及其他贷款机构承受的新一轮收入压力可能导致信贷紧缩进一步恶化，加重美国及世界上依赖贷款的经济体面临的周期性压力。

　　总之，宏观调整应该持续至 2009 年，并有可能扩散至 2010 年。

（四）艰难的再平衡

　　由于不可持续的非理性增长已经停止，全球经济将会面临一个历时多年的再平衡过程

　　经济繁荣的本性源于对经济增长的贪婪渴求，而这种繁荣现已败落。收入短缺的美国经济拒绝缓慢的内需增长节奏；相反，它转向了一种与历史悠久的、源自生产力现状的创收支柱不太相关的资产融资与债务融资的狂热增长。

　　而对发展中世界而言，快速增长是脱离赤贫的一剂强力良方。正像发展中的亚洲所经历的那样，旺盛增长成为即便造成通货膨胀、污染、环境恶化、收入差距加大、以及周期性的资产泡沫等外部经济的负面效应，也要不择手段地实现的目标。世界各国政府从前想要 —— 现在仍然想要增长，为此不惜付出任何代价。

　　但现在，是付账的时候了。

　　全球经济正面临一个历时多年的再平衡历程。对美国而言，抛弃其新发现的资产导向型储蓄与消费相结合的策略，而重拾往昔的收入导向型储蓄作为根基，这注定意味着个人消费增长将持续下滑。

　　然而希望是永远存在的。弱势美元令美国人顺利地巧妙完成这场变奏 —— 现在，美国的消费主导型增长又将让位于货币主导型的出口增长。一切皆有可能。但是鉴于美国的制造及出口产业已然经历了多年的虚空，我对美国出口的复兴甚为怀疑。一度 " 永远消失 " 的工作机会和工业门类不会一夜复苏。在我看来，美国现在将不得不认真应对更加缓慢的增长趋势 —— 在未来两三年内乃至更久， GDP 增长可能将从过去 13 年中的 3.2% 减速至 2% 以下。

　　这对世界其他地方而言，应是一个颇具挑战性的结果 —— 特别是那些发展中国家。它们向过度挥霍的美国消费者出口商品，并从中获得了太多的经济给养。它们的目标在本质上与美国所面临的正好相反。出口导向型的发展中经济体应该将增长方式转向国内需求，特别是私人消费。这对那些依赖廉价货币、额外的储蓄及基础设施战略而达到经济大跨步发展的国家而言，并非易事。但是随着美国这个它们的主要出口市场遭受到压力，与世界其他地方一样少有消费抵补，发展中世界几乎别无选择，只好着手自身消费导向型的再平衡。这可能意味着发展中世界在接下来几年内也将面临更加缓慢的经济增长 —— 前几年 7.3% 的年均增长率可能在未来两三年内降至 5% 左右。

　　这样的全球再平衡，源自经常账户赤字国与盈余国之间几年来的空前分化。按国际货币基金组织（ IMF ）的计算， 2006 年至 2007 年间，经常账户赤字的绝对值创纪录地占到了世界 GDP 的 6% ，是 20 世纪 90 年代的三倍整，当时此项份额仅占 2% 。在我看来，那些为失衡辩护的人，其严重谬误并非在于试图用新的说辞来解释这场空前的外部失衡，使之合理化；而是未能意识到资产和信贷泡沫在催生过剩问题上的影响。这些泡沫现已破裂，全球再平衡成为这个失衡世界的当务之急。毫无疑问，全球经济也将为多年以来的疏忽付出惨重代价，未来几年全球将走入更加缓慢的增长轨道。

（五）金融市场之鉴

　 　全球经济还有许多要经历的。从这个意义上说，众多门类的金融资产 —— 股票、债券、货币及商品概莫能外

　　过去几年的大事件对金融市场当然不无影响。如同前瞻性的贴现机制一样，在过去几年已展开的宏观调整，现在都体现在主要资产类别的价格上。但是对通盘调整的抗拒依然根深蒂固。全球经济还要经历很多，从这个意义上说，金融市场也不外乎于此。

　　就此，有四条重要结论：

　　首先，全球大部分地区的股市都呈现熊市，很容易让人断言 " 最糟的时候已经过去 " 。我对这种预测很是怀疑。在我看来，我们不应该把股票市场当作同质资产的看待。然而，分清楚金融机构和非金融机构很重要。前者当然已经被打倒了。前文所述的第二阶段和第三阶段的调整将毫无疑问地给金融机构带来周期性的收入压力，这一遍体鳞伤的经济部门可能正在经历股价超调。然而非金融机构并非如此。比如，标准普尔 500 指数中的非金融机构，其 2007 年到 2008 年的一致收益预期仍然集中在 20% 左右。随着美国经济增长迟缓，我完全相信收益风险将触及非金融机构 —— 凸显出全球股票市场下一波重大下挫的明显可能性。股票市场的熊市有可能从金融机构转向非金融机构。

　　其次，对于债券，预测的关键取决于通货膨胀及经济增长风险的相互影响 —— 以及两者的权衡对央行决策立场的暗示意义。由于通货膨胀恐惧近来急剧攀升，市场参与者不相信各大央行将回归更加激进的货币政策立场，主权政府债券收益率有所上涨。在增长缓滞的环境中，我觉得对周期性通货膨胀的恐惧最终将会停息，货币管理当局也会因顾虑针对通胀下药过猛而不安。短期看来，我得出这样的结论，再度审视央行激进的紧缩政策之后，我认为主要债券市场有可能重整旗鼓。中期看来 —— 也就是审视本轮周期 —— 我承认陪审团还在庭外争论滞胀风险 —— 特别是针对有通货膨胀倾向的发展中国家。在这段时间内，债券市场的预测会更加不确定。

　　再次，在货币方面，美元仍能保持其舞台中心的地位。六年多来，我一直看淡美元，原因只有一个：美国巨额的经常账户赤字。尽管美国的对外差额在过去一年半以来 —— 多半由于周期性原因 —— 降至 GDP 的 5% 左右，但该差额仍然过于庞大。因此，我从根本上还是看淡美元。同时，在过去的 12 个月里，由于惧怕次贷仅仅是美国的问题，因此美元似乎被过度地贬抑了。全球对这场宏观危机的反应按上文所述展开，我相信投资者会重新思量之前的观点，即他们可以从欧元或日元资产中寻求庇护。因此，我能预想，美元实际上会稳定下来，甚至将在 2008 年底维持强势，之后将因其依然庞大的经常账户赤字而在 2009 年重新恢复下跌。

　　最后，商品市场的前景近来成为热门话题。一年之后，我相信，对经济变化较为敏感的商品 —— 石油、基础金属及其他工业原料 —— 其价格将远远低于其今天的价格。 " 软商品 "—— 主要是农产品 —— 以及贵金属也许是例外。对经济变化较为敏感的 " 硬商品 " 将出现调整，原因有二：全球增长明显减速将相对改善供需失衡的状况，追逐收益的财务投资人将在商品购买上撤资。以我之见，后者对商品泡沫的推动力不可小觑。有观点认为对冲基金及其他投机者导致了商品市场过剩，对此我无法苟同。相反，真正起作用的主要是那些仅作长期投资且有现钱的机构投资者，比如全球养老基金 —— 他们无一例外地接受顾问的建议，增加对商品类资产的资产配置。机构投资者的这种群羊效应常常被证明是错误的。我想这次也是如此 —— 其趋势似乎已经显现出来。

（六）让疯狂延续？

　 　美国政府似乎并不愿意深入探讨问题的严重性，即便它们已在这场危机中达到顶峰。从税收政策、对住房市场进行的 " 调整 " 以及金融系统的管理来看，确实如此

　　由于上述原因，围绕当前这场金融危机，几乎不乏各类极端描述。而它是否真如很多人宣称的，是大萧条以来最糟的一次崩盘，仍有待观察。但在很多重要方面，它的确堪称一则分水岭事件 —— 特别是因为它提出了一个尖锐的质疑：长久以来忽略了失衡及过剩问题的美国经济，其根本支柱究竟是什么？不幸的是，美国的政府部门看似既不愿意、也没能力深入探讨此类问题的严重性，即便它们已在这场危机中达到了顶峰。

　　税收政策便是佐证。向本已过度挥霍的美国消费者实行退税，成为了 " 第一道防线 " ，现在美国政府又在讨论第二轮的激励措施。然而，鉴于 2007 年美国个人消费开支已经创纪录地占到当年实际 GDP 的 72% ，政府向市场注入可支配收入，就会延续此番现代历史上最大的消费狂潮。对于一个为了偿还债务、降低巨额经常账户赤字，迫切需要增大储蓄、降低开支的国家而言，降低个人税收的政策无疑是一个在错误时机开出的错误药方。

　　美国政府对住房市场危机的反应也同样存疑。国会坚决把避免住房遭到强制拍卖作为处理一切问题的重要原则；此外，新立法为低收入家庭住房贷款融资提供了高达 3000 亿美元的政府担保。这与美国政府的施政理念一致，即一直以来将不断提高住房拥有率，作为公共政策的核心目标之一。虽然如此，次贷危机中的一个非常明显又令人心痛的教训就是，有一些美国人就是买不起房子的。丧失抵押品赎回权、住房遭到强制拍卖，是非理性购房行为的不幸后果，但最终，也是其必然的结局。对于这场住房市场泡沫中的低收入受害者而言，应该在收入上给予支持，而非延续其在经济上并不合理的住房所有权。但是国会选择采取后一种举措，这就抑制了房价的必要下跌。而这一下跌过程对于市场出清，以及住房市场危机的终结，终将变得十分必要。

　　另外，财政当局 —— 美联储及美国财政部 —— 在这场危机中也没有杰出的作为。十年前是一支对冲基金（长期资本管理公司） " 太大了而不能允许倒掉 " ；现在则是一家投资银行（贝尔斯登），以及国内贷款机构中的两大巨兽（房利美和房地美）。加之对于近期雷曼兄弟倒闭的通融，美联储这一为政府证券一级交易商开设的临时流动性工具，看上去越发不像临时的了。

　　毫无顾忌的冒险是酿成危机的泡沫的核心因素。而通过对泡沫破裂的后果进行干涉，管理当局其实是在庇护不负责任的冒险者，也因此助长了日益扎根于当今金融文化中的 " 道德风险 " 。与此同时，在货币政策的制定过程中始终忽略资产泡沫风险的美联储，对金融市场遭受的危害、以及变得日益依赖资产的美国经济，同样负有责任。

　　简而言之，美国政府在应对这场金融危机的过程中，采取了以政令为主导的事后补救措施。政策方案均依照眼下的状况制定，而没有根据美国经济重回可持续性发展道路所需的必要条件，进行战略评估。最后，在一个七拼八凑的补救方案中，过度消费、低储蓄、不切实际的住房所有权目标、以及金融市场中的道德风险统统得以延续。它的一个最大的缺陷就是，对于不良行为束手无策。美国政府根本没有铭记经济危机的痛苦教训，也没有从一开始就采取行动去阻止过剩的蔓延，而是让美国首当其冲，陷入过剩及其连锁反应造成的混乱。

　　如果说这次危机意味着什么，它是一记警钟。长久以来，美国破坏了很多作为一个领先经济体所要遵循的至关重要的行为准则。首先它未能实现储蓄；再者，它用股市和住房市场的资产泡沫支撑空前的消费过剩；其后，它为维持消费而深陷债务泥沼；最后，为了填补资金差额，它向世界其他地区大量借贷。在这场狂热的消费大潮中，管理当局亦有同谋之嫌 —— 特别中央银行，它宽恕激进冒险行为，并对货币政策进行了过度调适。

　　美国将其本该难以为继的状态持续得越久，就越执迷于维持自身永久存在的魔力。这场危机传递出的真实信息是，游戏现已结束；然而华盛顿的政客们惯于否认事实、又在政治味十足的总统大选之年感受到选民们的热情，于是他们坚称游戏可以继续。

　　美国现在需要 " 严厉的爱 " 胜过一切。这是一项新课程，需要对多年以来的过度挥霍坦然承认，并认识到这种挥霍现在需要补救。不难推测，新举措可能涵盖的框架大体包括了增加储蓄，并增加对人才及基础设施的投资；再囊括一项能源政策也是不错的 —— 只是金融系统的监管人员需要更谨慎才行。

　　无疑，这项提议不会赢得任何人气竞赛。但最终，它将是美国人在后泡沫时期实现可持续繁荣的唯一希望。

（七）前景使人忧

　　如果所有国家的管理当局选择此类以政令为主的权宜之计，执着于快速经济增长是解决所有问题的良方，世界将错过一个重新整饬的良机

　　其实，这些本都是可以避免的。美国玩得过了火，而其他依赖出口的国家也十分乐意凑凑热闹。全球经济的守护者 —— 各国决策者和监管者们对此坐视不理，听凭整个系统失控。投资者、商人、金融机构以及消费者，都成为 " 过剩时代 " 的积极参与者。

　　而今后的关键问题在于，我们这个相互适应并且日益相互关联的全球系统，是否能从这次宏观震荡中汲取深刻的教训。这种自我评价的核心必须是，对追求开放式经济增长的后果，要有更为深入的认识。美国若仅依靠国内创收这种传统方式，就无法达到其增长目标，因而它转向一种依赖资产和债务的全新增长模式。而依赖出口的亚洲发展中国家也将其储蓄主导的增长模型发挥到极致：不愿或者不能刺激国内个人消费，额外的资本经再循环，就进入基础设施建设或化为美元资产 —— 实际就是将具有超级竞争力的货币与出口品，强行转化为新一轮发展的源泉。

　　这场危机发出一个强烈的信号：这些策略都将难以为继。它们导致了不同层面上的过剩 —— 世界最大经济体内部或相互间的内、外需失衡现象及其相互作用，更加凸显了这一点。这些策略利用不可持续的信贷和风险泡沫，将系统固定在一种不稳定的均衡状态下。但是现在，泡沫破裂了，暴露出一种令人担忧的不均衡。它需要决策方式的更新，也要求家庭、企业、金融市场参与者在行为上做出重大转变。

　　而这种新的决策方式在一开始表现并不如人意，尤其是在美国和中国 —— 新一轮全球化中的两大经济体。如上所述，华盛顿正返身将问题诉诸陈腐的药方，致使过去十年中的过度消费和道德风险问题得以延续。而随着 9 月 15 日的降息举措，北京也发出了支持经济增长的新信号 —— 鉴于中国的通货膨胀问题将持续存在，这一发展趋势颇为令人担忧。两国政体都固执地依附于自身的核心价值观 —— 快速的经济增长是解决任何乃至所有问题的良方。对于这种增长方式可持续性的担忧，则一律 " 改日再谈 " 。

　　金融、经济危机经常决定了历史中某些最重要的转折点。它们可能是我们汲取历史经验的过程中最为痛苦的阶段；然而，认真思考这些教训，并排除可能引发危机的系统性风险，其必要性是不可忽视的。但是如此繁重的任务往往难与国家政令保持协调一致。一条阻力最小的路径往往会被选中，并由此导致更多被动的回应 —— 这种权宜之计虽然可以立即调整混乱，但却对解决根本的系统性问题毫无帮助。如果所有国家的管理当局只是选择此类以政令为主的权宜之计 —— 例如对已然过度消费的美国消费者实施退税、对具通胀倾向的发展中经济体放松货币政策，以及创造更多的资产泡沫 —— 那么世界将错过一个重新整饬的良机。这将成为最大的悲剧。

作者史蒂芬·罗奇（Stephen S. Roach）为摩根士丹利亚洲主席

Pitfalls and Precepts in a Post-Bubble World

Stephen S. Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia

Caijing Magazine 

September 19, 2008

http://english.caijing.com.cn/2008-09-19/110014166.html

 

 

The world's worsening financial crisis was fed by U.S. consumer excess and Developing Asia's export model. Have we learned?

 

A year ago, we had barely an inkling of what would transpire in the world's financial markets and the global economy. There were some early warning signs that all was not well in the subprime slice of the U.S. mortgage market. But, as we saw with the dotcom bubble in early 2000, subprime was widely considered of little consequence for the macroeconomic story.

 

Denial, one of the most powerful human emotions, once again had the upper hand. The broad consensus of consumers, business people, policy makers and politicians ignored simmering problems on the subprime front, and believed that the global boom of the preceding four years was very much intact.

 

The argument a year ago was laced with a painful sense of déjà vu.  At the end of 1999, dotcom accounted for only six percent of the market capitalization of U.S. equities. A powerful, flexible and innovative U.S. economy was believed to offer built-in resilience and ongoing support to the other 94 percent of the U.S. equity market and the macroeconomy. A year ago, subprime accounted for only 14 percent of total, securitized mortgage debt outstanding. A still powerful, flexible and innovative U.S. economy was once again believed to offer ongoing support to the other 86 percent of the mortgage market and the broader economy.

 

How wrong this logic was – in 2000 and, again, just a year ago.  Eight and a half years ago, the bursting of the dotcom bubble was, in fact, followed by a 49 percent decline in the broader S&P 500 index over the next two and a half years. And the bursting of the subprime bubble a year ago has triggered an unprecedented contagion throughout the broader credit and capital markets, toppling many of the once proud icons of American finance – first Bear Stearns, and now Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch.

 

The lessons are painfully similar. When an entire asset class – or for that matter, an economy – goes to excess, the weakest link in the chain often deals a decisive blow to the system as a whole.  The bubble analogy works all too well. When the thinnest part of the membrane gives way, the rest of the air quickly escapes.

 

But the imagery misses one critical point. The progression of market bubbles is an insidious process. From equities to property to credit, the bubbles have expanded in scope and risk. A bubble-prone U.S. economy became a breeding ground for a gathering storm of systemic risks in America and in our increasingly interdependent world economy. Now we are left to pick up the pieces.

 

In the Beginning

 

No economy can live beyond its means in perpetuity. Yet like others that have tried to do so in the past, the United States thought it was different. America's current account deficit surged to 6 percent of GDP in 2006 from 1.5 percent in 1995. When its annual deficit reached a peak US$ 844 billion in the third quarter 2006, the United States required US$ 3.4 billion in capital inflows from abroad each business day to fund its massive shortfall in domestic savings. 

 

For the longest time, such funding was there for the asking. There were plenty of new theories concocted to rationalize why the unsustainable might actually be sustainable. Foreign lending with impunity was a special privilege that fell to the nation possessing the world's reserve currency, many argued. Some went further, celebrating the advent of a new, Bretton Woods II arrangement, whereby surplus savers such as China could forever recycle excess dollars into U.S. assets to keep their currencies competitive and their export-led growth models thriving. In the end, of course, these "new paradigm" explanations – like those of the past – failed the test of time and the markets.

 

At the root of the problem was America's audacious shift from income- to asset-based saving. The U.S. consumer led the charge, with trend growth in consumer demand hitting 3.5 percent per annum in real terms over 14 years, from 1994 to 2007. It was the greatest buying binge over such a protracted period for any economy in modern history.

 

Never mind a seemingly chronic shortfall of income generation, with real disposable personal income growth averaging just 3.2 percent over the same period. American consumers no longer felt they had to save the old-fashioned way; they drew down income-based saving rates to zero for the first time since the Great Depression. And why not? After all, they had uncovered the alchemy of a new asset-based saving strategy: first out of equities in the latter half of the 1990s, and then out of housing in the first half of the current decade. Lax regulatory and supervisory oversight, in conjunction with excessive monetary accommodation, resulted in an explosion of free and easy credit, which turned out to be the icing on a toxic cake.

 

In retrospect, the equity wealth effect was child's play compared to what the American home market eventually offered. At its peak in mid-2006, net equity extraction from residential property had soared to nearly 9 percent of disposable personal income – fully three times the 3 percent registered only five years earlier. That enabled income-short American consumers not only to ignore the imperatives of income-based saving but also to push consumption up to a record 72 percent of real GDP in 2007. Behind this trend was the confluence of two monstrous bubbles – property and credit – that transformed residential dwellings into the functional equivalent of ATM machines.

 

In the end, U.S. consumers had no compunction about tapping their main source of future savings – housing wealth – to fund current consumption. And they went on a record debt binge to pull it off. Household sector indebtedness surged to 133 percent of disposable personal income by year-end 2007, up more than 40 percentage points from the 90 percent debt loads prevailing just a decade earlier. It was the height of folly. Yet the longer it lasted, the more it became deeply ingrained in the American psyche. Now it's over.

 

The Asia Connection

 

While seemingly made in America, the era of excess was truly global in scope. The U.S. consumption binge was fodder to export-led economies elsewhere in the world. That was especially the case in Developing Asia – the fastest growing major region in the world since the turn of the century. Large enough to account for fully 20 percent of total world output (as measured on a purchasing power parity basis), real GDP growth in Developing Asia averaged 8 percent over the 2000-'07 period – more than two and a half times the 3 percent growth trend elsewhere in the world over the same period. In search of rapid growth to achieve its development and poverty reduction objectives, Developing Asia viewed America's consumption binge as "manna from heaven." Consumption deficient Japan had a similar response, as did the region's large and newly industrialized economies such as Taiwan and Korea.

  

Yet there can be no mistaking the high-octane fuel that drove the Asian growth boom – an increasingly powerful, export-led growth dynamic. For Developing Asia as a whole, exports in 2007 hit a record of more than 45 percent of pan-regional GDP – up more than 10 percentage points from the share prevailing in the mid-1990s. That left the world's fastest growing region more dependent on external demand than ever before. And with the American consumer in trouble, Asia's export-led growth dynamic is now at risk.

 

China is undoubtedly a key player in that regard. After posting nearly 12 percent GDP growth in the years 2006 and '07, Chinese growth slowed to 10.1 percent in the second quarter 2008. That downshift was largely the result of a marked deceleration in the growth of Chinese exports to the United States – up 8 percent year-on-year in June 2008 following average annual gains of more than 25 percent over the 2003-'07 period. Significantly, the U.S.-centric compression of Chinese export and GDP growth – hitting about 20 percent of China's total external demand – was accompanied by ongoing vigor in China's shipments to Europe (up 25 percent in June 2008) and Japan (up 22 percent). However, as Japan and Europe are now weakening, the heretofore resilient areas for Chinese external demand – collectively accounting for about 30 percent of China's total exports – also will begin to falter. With lags, that could well prompt another downleg in Chinese GDP growth to 8 percent from 10 percent within the next six to nine months. 

 

Japan is also highly vulnerable to external demand shock. Overall Japanese export volume growth went into negative territory in June (down 1.6 percent year-on-year) for the first time in 16 months. At work in this case was emerging sluggishness in Japanese exports to Europe and elsewhere in Asia, which were once resilient markets that previously masked the emerging weakness in the United States. Largely as a result, the Japanese economy contracted at a 3 percent annual rate in the second quarter 2008 – the sharpest decline in seven years.

 

China and Japan are at opposite ends of Asia's external vulnerability chain. China has a huge cushion after solid growth over the past two years to ward off the blow of an external shock.  Japan, by contrast, has been only a 2 percent growth economy in recent years and has no such cushion. In a weaker external demand climate, the downside to Chinese economic growth appears to be around 8 percent. For Japan, the downside is probably closer to zero, underscoring the distinct possibility of a recessionary relapse in the region's largest economy.

 

The global boom of 2002 to mid-'07 was an outgrowth of the powerful cross-border linkages of globalization. No region of the world benefited more from this connectedness than export-led Asia. That has been especially the case in the region's high-flying developing economies, dominated by China. Decoupling – the supposed untethering of developing economies from the developed world – is antithetical to the linkages that have become central to the powerful globalization trends of the past five years. These linkages are just as intact on the downside as on the upside of the global business cycle. And through well-developed, cross-border feedback mechanisms, the responses to a major weakening in U.S. demand by Asia's export-led economies are now triggering powerful repercussions across markets and economies in an interdependent world.

 

Taking Stock

 

Alas, the global business cycle has turned. World GDP growth, which averaged close to 5 percent annually over the 2004-'07 period – the strongest four consecutive years of global growth since the early 1970s – now seems headed back down into the 3.5 percent range for a couple of years. While that is hardly a disastrous outcome, it does represent a 30 percent deceleration in the growth rate compared with the previous four years. 

 

This likely downturn in the global business cycle has not occurred in a vacuum. It has been accompanied by an unprecedented outbreak of credit market contagion that has wreaked havoc throughout the world's financial markets. But understanding the three stages of interplay between financial markets and the real economy is a key to forecasting the global macroeconomic outlook for the next few years.

 

The credit crisis is the first stage. Sparked by the sub-prime meltdown that began in summer 2007, a cross-product contagion quickly spread to asset-backed commercial paper, mortgage-backed securities, structured investment vehicles, interbank offshore financing, leveraged lending markets, auction rate securities, so-called monoline insurers, and a number of other opaque products and structures. Unlike the Asian financial crisis of 10 years earlier, which also involved a powerful cross-border contagion, the "originate and distribute" characteristics of the latest complex instruments and structures wound up infecting offshore investors as well. That puts the current crisis in the rarefied breed of being shaped both by cross-product and cross-border viruses.

 

U.S. financial institutions generally have been aggressive in marking down the value of distressed securities. And the markets have been brutal in penalizing those financial institutions that eventually were most exposed to America's post-bubble carnage – especially Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch.  Largely for those reasons, I believe this first phase is about 65 percent complete. More is behind us than ahead of us, but there is still a good deal more to come as the business cycle now kicks in and produces yet another round of earnings impairments for financial intermediaries.

 

The second stage reflects the impacts of the credit and housing implosions on the real side of the U.S. economy. Thus far, those impacts have largely been concentrated in residential construction activity. As noted above, however, the main event in this phase of the adjustment is the likely capitulation of the overextended, low-saving, excessively indebted U.S. consumer. For nearly a decade and a half, real consumption growth averaged close to 4 percent per year. As consumers now move to rebuild income based saving and prune debt burdens, a multiyear downshift in consumer demand is likely. Over the next two to three years, I expect trend consumption growth rates to be cut in half to around 2 percent.

 

There will be quarters when consumer spending falls short of that bogey and the U.S. economy lapses into a recessionary state. There will undoubtedly be quarters when consumption growth is faster than the 2 percent norm, and it will appear that a recovery is under way. Such rebounds, unfortunately, can be expected to prove short-lived for post-bubble American consumers. This aspect of the macro-adjustment scenario has only begun. As a result, in my view, the second phase is only about 20 percent complete.

 

The third stage is a global phase – underscored by the linkages between U.S. consumers and the rest of the world. As noted, those linkages are only now just beginning to play out. Ordering and cross-border shipping lags suggest this phase of the adjustment will take a good deal of time to unfold. Early impacts are already evident in China and Japan, largely on the basis of U.S.-led export adjustments. With ripple effects now only beginning to show up in Europe, these cross-border impacts should gather in force over the months and quarters to come. That suggests to me that Phase III is only about 10 percent complete.

 

In short, this macroeconomic crisis is far from over. The main reason is that the bubbles that have burst – property and credit – became so big they ended up infecting the real side of the U.S. economy. And as the United States now adjusts to much tougher post-bubble realities, the rest of the interdependent, globalized world can be expected to follow. Moreover, there are undoubtedly feedback effects between the various stages – especially as the business cycle now starts to bear down on financial institutions that were initially buffeted by the credit contagion. A new round of earnings pressures on banks and other lending institutions could exacerbate the credit crunch further, reinforcing the cyclical pressures on debt-dependent economies in the United States and around the world. As a result, macroeconomic adjustments should last well into 2009 and possibly spill over into 2010.

 

Rebalancing Act

 

A voracious appetite for economic growth lies at the heart of the boom that has now gone bust. An income-short U.S. economy rejected a slower pace of domestic demand. It turned, instead, to an asset- and debt-financed growth binge that had little to do with the time-honored underpinnings of income generation forthcoming from current production. For the developing world, rapid growth was a powerful antidote to a legacy of wrenching poverty. And the hyper-growth that was realized in regions like Developing Asia became the end that justified all means, including the negative externalities of inflation, pollution, environmental degradation, widening income disparities, and periodic asset bubbles. The world's body politic wanted – and still wants – growth at all costs.  But now the bill is coming due as the global economy faces a multi-year rebalancing, and reins in its appetite.

 

For the United States, this rebalancing will mean a sustained deceleration in personal consumption growth, as households abandon newfound asset-dependent saving and consumption strategies in favor of the income-led fundamentals of the past.  Hope springs eternal that a weaker dollar will enable America to finesse this transition without skipping a beat; that consumer-led growth will now give way to currency-led export growth.

 

Anything is possible, but I have my doubts about a U.S. export renaissance, especially in the aftermath of a decades-long hollowing of America's manufacturing and export base. Jobs and industries that were "lost forever" do not spring back to life overnight. The United States, in my view, will now have to come to grips with a much slower growth trajectory, with real GDP growth likely to slow from the 3.2 percent trend of the past 13 years to no higher than 2 percent over the next two to three years, or longer.

 

This should prove to be a very challenging outcome for the rest of the world, especially for those developing nations that derived so much of their economic sustenance from exporting goods to over-extended American consumers. Their task is essentially the opposite of what the United States faces. Export-led developing economies must shift the mix of growth toward domestic demand, especially private consumption. That won't be easy for nations who have relied on cheap currencies, surplus saving and infrastructure strategies as the principal means to achieve spectacular progress on the road to economic development. But with their major export market – the United States – now under pressure, and with little consumption offset likely elsewhere in the world, the developing world has little choice than to embark on a consumer-led rebalancing of its own. This probably means slower economic growth in the developing world for the next several years, with the 7.3 percent average annual growth pace of past years conceivably slowing into the 5 percent vicinity over the next two to three years. 

 

Such global rebalancing arises from an unprecedented disparity that opened over the past several years between nations with current account deficits and those with surpluses. By the International Monetary Fund's reckoning, the absolute sum of current account balances hit a record of nearly 6 percent of global GDP in 2006-'07 – fully three times the 2 percent share prevailing in the mid-1990s. Apologists went seriously wrong, in my view, not by finding new ways to rationalize unprecedented external imbalances, but in failing to appreciate the impact of asset and credit bubbles in spawning these excesses. Now that those bubbles have burst, global rebalancing has become an urgent task in a lopsided world. And the global economy will undoubtedly pay a steep price for this long period of neglect by moving toward a much slower growth trajectory in the years immediately ahead.

 

Financial Market Implications

 

The events of the past year have certainly not been lost on financial markets. As forward-looking discounting mechanisms, much of the macroeconomic adjustments that unfolded are now "in the price" of major asset classes. But there remains deep denial about the full extent of the adjustments. To the extent that there is more trouble to come for the global economy, the same can be said for the broad classes of financial assets: equities, bonds, currencies and commodities. 

  

With equity markets now in bear market territory in most of the world, it is tempting to conclude that the worst is over. I am suspicious about that prognosis. The trick, in my view, is to resist the temptation to view equity markets as a homogenous asset class. Instead, it is important to make a distinction between financials and non-financials. The former certainly have been beaten down. While the adjustments of Phases II and III undoubtedly will put more cyclical pressure on the earnings of financial institutions, share prices for this bruised and battered sector of the economy may now be moving into overshoot territory.

 

That is not the case for non-financials, however. For example, consensus earnings expectations for the non-financials component of the S&P 500 are still centered on prospects of around 20 percent earnings growth through 2007-'08.  As U.S. economic growth falters, however, I fully expect earnings risks to tip to the downside for non-financials, underscoring the distinct possibility of yet another important downleg for global equity markets. As a consequence, the bear equity market could well shift from financials to non-financials.

 

For bonds, the prognosis centers on the interplay between inflation and growth risks – and the implications of such a tradeoff for the policy stances of central banks. As inflation fears mounted recently, yields on sovereign government bonds rose while market participants started discounting a return to more aggressive monetary policies among major central banks. In a faltering growth climate, however, I suspect cyclical inflation fears will end up being overblown and monetary authorities, fearing overkill, will turn skittish. Over the near term, that leads me to conclude that major bond markets could rally somewhat further on the heels of a rethinking of the aggressive central bank tightening scenario. Over the medium term – namely, looking through the cycle – I concede that the jury is still out on stagflation risks, especially in inflation-prone developing economies. The bond market prognosis is more uncertain beyond that time horizon.

 

For currencies, the dollar remains at center stage. I have been a dollar bear for more than six years for one reason: America's massive current account deficit. Although the U.S. external shortfall has been reduced somewhat over the past year and a half – largely for cyclical reasons – to 5 percent of GDP, it is still far too large. So I remain fundamentally bearish on the dollar. At the same time, it appears the dollar overshot on the downside during the first 12 months of the subprime crisis largely on the basis that subprime was mainly a U.S. problem. As the global repercussions of the macroeconomic crisis spread, I believe investors will rethink the belief that they can seek refuge in euro- and yen-denominated assets. That rethinking has already begun, prompting a significant rally for the dollar in recent weeks that could well continue through end of 2008. Once a more synchronous global growth outcome is built into the relative price structure of foreign exchange rates, I suspect the dollar will resume its decline in early 2009 due to America's still oversized current account deficit.

 

The commodity market outlook is especially topical these days. A year from now, I believe economically sensitive commodity prices such as oil, base metals and other industrial materials will be a good deal lower than today. Soft commodities, mainly agricultural products, as well as precious metals could well be exceptions to that outcome. Two reasons underpin the case for a correction for economically sensitive hard commodities: a marked deceleration in global growth leading to a related improvement in the supply-demand imbalance; and a pullback in commodity buying by return-seeking investors. This second impetus to the commodity bubble cannot be underestimated, in my opinion. I am not sympathetic to the view that hedge funds and other speculators have driven commodity markets to excess. At work, instead, are mainly long-term, real money institutional investors such as global pension funds, all of whom have been advised by consultants to increase their asset allocations in commodities as an asset class.  Such herding behavior by institutional investors invariably turns out wrong. I expect that to be the case this time as well – and the trend appears to be under way. 

 

Perpetuating the Madness?

  

For reasons noted above, the current financial crisis is hardly lacking in superlatives. Whether it is truly the worst debacle since the Great Depression, as many have argued, remains to be seen.  But it is certainly a watershed event in many important respects, especially since it draws into sharp question the fundamental underpinnings of a U.S. economy that has long ignored its imbalances and excesses. Sadly, America's body politic seems neither willing nor able to fathom the magnitude of the problems that have come to a head in this crisis. That's true whether one considers tax policy, the housing "fix," or financial system management.

 

Tax policy is a case a point. Rebates to overextended American consumers have been the first line of defense, and there is new talk in Washington of a second round of such a stimulus measure. Yet with personal consumer spending hitting a record 72 percent of real GDP in 2007, the government's contributions to disposable income are aimed at perpetuating the biggest consumption binge in modern history. For a nation that desperately needs to save more and spend less – and thereby pay down debt and reduce its massive current account deficit – politically expedient personal tax cuts are the wrong medicine at the wrong time. 

 

Washington's response to the housing crisis is equally problematic.  Congress is determined to make foreclosure containment a key aspect of any fix; new legislation provides government guarantees for up to US$ 300 billion in home mortgage refinancing packages for low-income families. This is consistent with a philosophy that has long stressed ever-rising rates of homeownership as a key objective of U.S. public policy. Yet truth be known, an obvious and painful lesson of the subprime crisis is that there are some Americans who simply cannot afford to buy a home.

 

Foreclosure is a tragic, but ultimately necessary, consequence of misguided home buying. For low-income victims of the housing bubble, assistance should be directed at income support rather than at perpetuating uneconomic homeownership. By opting for the latter, Congress is inhibiting the requisite decline in home prices that ultimately will be necessary to clear the market and bring the housing crisis to an end.

 

Nor have the financial authorities – the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Department of Treasury – distinguished themselves in this crisis. Ten years ago, it was a hedge fund (Long Term Capital Management) that was too big to fail. Now these include an investment bank (Bear Stearns) and the country's twin mortgage behemoths (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). And, courtesy of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the Fed's so-called temporary liquidity facility for primary dealers in government securities is now starting to look less and less temporary. 

 

Undisciplined risk taking was a central element of the bubbles that spawned this crisis. By tempering the consequences of the bursting of the risk bubble, authorities are shielding irresponsible risk takers and thereby enabling a "moral hazard" that has become increasingly ingrained in today's financial culture. At the same time, a Federal Reserve that continues to ignore the perils of asset bubbles in the setting of monetary policy is equally guilty of reckless endangerment to the financial markets and to an increasingly asset-dependent U.S. economy.

 

In short, Washington has responded to this financial crisis with a politically driven, reactive approach. Policy initiatives have been framed more by circumstances of the moment than by strategic assessments of what it truly takes to put the U.S. economy back on a more sustainable path. By perpetuating excessive consumption, low saving rates, unrealistic goals of home ownership and moral hazards in financial markets, this patchwork approach includes the worst of flaws: It does little to change bad behavior. Far from heeding the tough lessons of an economy in crisis, Washington now is doing little to break the daisy chain of excess that got America in this mess in the first place.

 

If this crisis is anything, it is a wake-up call. For all too long, the United States broke many of the most important rules of conduct for a leading economy. It failed to save. It levered asset bubbles in both equities and homes to sustain unparalleled excess in consumption. It went deeply into debt to sustain that course of action and borrowed heavily from the rest of the world to close the funding gap. Complicity in this binge has been shared by the authorities, especially a central bank that condoned unbridled risk taking and excessive monetary accommodation.

 

The longer the United States sustained the unsustainable, the more it believed in the perpetuity of its charmed existence. The real message of this crisis is that this game is now over. But steeped in denial and feeling the heat of voters in a politically charged presidential election year, Washington's politicians insist the game can go on.

 

More than anything, America now needs "tough love" – a new course that owns up to years of excess. It is not difficult to fathom the broad outlines of what such a new approach might entail, such as more saving, as well as more investment in people and infrastructure. An energy policy might be nice as well, as would more prudent stewardship of the financial system. A program based on these elements would not win any popularity contests. But in the end, it is America's only hope for sustainable, post-bubble prosperity. 

 

Tough Lessons

 

It didn't have to be this way. America went too far, and an export-dependent world was more than happy to go along for the ride. Policy makers and regulators – stewards of the global economy – looked the other way and allowed the system to veer out of control. Investors, business people, financial institutions and consumers were all active participants in this Era of Excess. 

 

A key question going forward is whether an adaptive and increasingly interrelated global system will learn the tough lessons of this macroeconomic upheaval. At the heart of this self-appraisal must be greater awareness of the consequences of striving for open-ended economic growth. The United States couldn't hit its growth target the old fashioned way by relying on internal income generation, so it turned to a new asset- and debt-dependent growth model. Export dependent Developing Asia took its saving-led growth model to excess. Unwilling or unable to stimulate internal private consumption at home, surplus capital was recycled into infrastructure and dollar-based assets which, in effect, forced super-competitive currencies and exports to become the sustenance of a new development recipe. 

 

Can the world learn the tough lessons of this upheaval? The United States and China are likely to hold the keys to the answer.

 

This crisis is a strong signal of strategies that are not sustainable.  They led to multiple layers of excess, underscored by a precarious interplay between internal and external imbalances within and between the world's largest economies. It took unsustainable credit and risk bubbles to hold this system together in an unstable equilibrium. But now the bubbles have burst, unmasking a worrisome disequilibrium that demands a new approach to policy and an important shift in behavior by households, businesses and financial market participants.

 

The early verdict on such a new approach is not encouraging.  That's especially the case in the United States and China, which are two key players for today's globalization. As noted, Washington is reverting to timeworn recipes that perpetuate the excess consumption and moral hazard problems of the past decade.  And by cutting policy interest rates on September 15, Beijing has sent new pro-growth signals – an especially disconcerting development in light of China's ongoing problems on the inflation front. The body politic in each nation is clinging steadfastly to its core values, claiming that rapid economic growth is the antidote to any and all problems. Concerns regarding the sustainability of that growth are being deferred to "another day."

 

Financial and economic crises often define history's greatest turning points. Though painful, they can be the ultimate learning experiences. But there can be no denying the urgent need to learn from these lessons and address the systemic risks that led to the crisis. Such heavy lifting rarely sits well with the body politic. A path of least resistance is invariably selected, leading to more of a knee-jerk response; a quick fix that tempers immediate dislocations but does little to tackle deep-rooted systemic problems.

 

If all the authorities can do is opt for politically expedient fixes -- such as tax rebates for overextended American consumers, lax monetary and currency policies for inflation prone developing economies, and the creation of more asset bubbles – the world will have squandered a critical opportunity to put its house in order. That would be the greatest tragedy of all.