The Russian Attrition Advantage
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine ????????
Chernivtsi If the average number of launches in December remains consistent with last month,the Russian Armed Forces will have launched nearly 55,000 long-range drones against Ukraine by the end of this year. This is about six times more than in 2024.
Among ballistic and cruise missiles,other missiles will have numbered approximately 2,000, whileguided glide bombs hard to intercept and each capable of destroying a five-story building may reach as many as 66,000. Increasingly lethal in range and precision,FPV drones could number up to half a million. With daily peaks of nearly 40,000,artillery rounds fired could total approximately 4 million.
Depleting a large part of Soviet stockpiles,Moscowlaunchedapproximately 15,000,000 missiles over the three-year period 202220232024. However, relying on its own industry (whichproducesapproximately 2,500,000 per year) and external support,it maintained even higher production levels in 2025.
Concerning strategic missiles, Ukrainian intelligenceestimatedin mid-2025 that the Russian Federation had approximately 2,000Iskander, Kalibr, Kh-101, Kinzhal, and other types. Driven by 77.2% of GDP (over 15.5 trillion rubles in 2025,accordingto SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute),Russian annual missile production surpasses those estimates. Ukrainian military intelligence (GRU) alsoconfirmsthis trend in glide bomb production: anestimated120,000 units annually by 2025, which is substantially higher than thecurrentinventory.
These devices didnt even exist before the war, because without recently produced UMPK kits, the old FAB glide bombs would not have become smart KABs.In addition to newly produced ones, the Russians can therefore rely on the recycling of Soviet stockpiles.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)confirmsthatRussian production of Shahed/Geran-type drones has also increased, from around 200 per week to around 1,000, with an upward trend consistent with the 55,000 exploded this year. These figures are consistent with thosereleasedby Ukrainian intelligence, which also takes into account models imported from countries such as Iran. Regarding FPV drones, the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW)estimatesthat a single Russian brigade requires more than 2,500. Considering that at least sixty are engaged on the hottest fronts of the war, its plausible that with Beijings help Moscow already has well over the estimated half a million.
So Russia produces more than it fires.
By sacrificing growth and welfare, it has converted a large share of its energy exports into munitions. Goldman Sachs and the IEAconfirmthat sanctions are having a significant effect, with Russian oil revenuesdroppingby half as a share of GDP. However, what the Ukrainians callsanctions that workhave played a major role: deep-sea strikes as part of Operation Deep Strike havecutRussias nominal refining capacity by at least 20%.
Russian military spending in 2025 was four times the pre-war level and will continue to rise.
Furthermore,Moscow has strengthened crucial alliances with other autocratic regimes that have proven to be reliable partners. From North Korea alone,accordingtoReutersand theOpen Source Center, it has received4 million artillery rounds in at least 64 naval and rail shipments.This constant flow alsoincludedshort-range ballistic missilessuch as the KN-23 and Hwasong-11,multiple rocket launchers,andtens of thousands of soldiers. In addition to the permit and know-how to produce them, the Russian regime hasobtainedthousands of Shahed drones from the Iranian regime, worthnearly$2 billion.
Every year, China supplies the Russian Federation with dual-use goodsvaluedat approximately $5 billion. As early as December two years ago, the Carnegie Endowmentestimateda peak of $600 million per month inhigh priority goods.
Without them, Moscow would be unable to convert its old FAB bombs into KABs, nor would it be able to produce large quantities of Geran drones.
Then there are themore than 128 countries where the Russian Federationrecruitscannon fodder.
Others, including European ones, continue to finance its war machine; suffice it to recall that the ban on Russian hydrocarbon importsimposedby the 19th EU sanctions package will take effect in 18 months.
And Ukraine?
In 2024, the EUdeliveredfewer than 1 million artillery shells to Ukraine, and by the end of the year it aims toprovideeven fewer,despitethe Czech initiative. Amid delays and implementation problems,the EUaimsto deliver 2 million to Ukraine in the future, which alone could produce about half.
The US has ceased backing Kyiv and is slowing initiatives such as the PURL, asreportedrecently.
Ukraines response to Russias overwhelming superiority in artillery has been to saturate the skies with drones: 4.5 millionby2025, which the Ministry of Strategic Industries hasannouncedit can double with adequate funding. For 2026, the government and ministries are openlytalkingabout a theoretical capacity of up to 20 million drones.
Butmoney is needed.
The gap in missiles and guided bombs remains enormous in Russias favor: starting virtually from scratch,Ukraines national missile programaimedto produce 3,000 missiles and 30,000 long-range drones this year, butthe freeze on US aid and the lack of support for the Danish model have left Ukraines long-range strike capabilities dependent on Western missilessuch as Storm Shadow/Scalp and ATACMS.
In the field of glide bombs, Ukraine has nothing comparable to the Russian mass: it responds with drones, precision artillery, and air defense, butit lacks similar air-launched weapons in large volumes.
This is the Russian attrition advantage, as Donald Trumpexpressedyesterday. Being complicit in it.
THANKS TO ALL WHO BACK US IN THESE HARD TIMES
感谢所有在这些艰难时刻支持我们的人
????????感谢所有相信我们工作并愿意支持我们的人????????????
在过去三年里，作为自由撰稿人，我们一直在乌克兰战争的所有前线进行报道，自从大规模
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俄罗斯的消耗优势
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
乌克兰前线报道????????
切尔尼夫齐如果十二月的发射平均次数与上个月持平，俄罗斯武装部队到今年年底将对乌克兰发射近55,000架远程无人机。
这是2024年的约六倍。
在弹道导弹和巡航导弹中，其他类型的导弹数量将达到约2,000，而导引滑翔炸弹难以拦截且每枚炸弹能摧毁一栋五层楼高的建筑可能达到66,000枚。随着射程和精度的日益提升，FPV无人机数量可能达到50万架。日均最高发射量接近40,000发，炮弹发射总数可能达到约400万发。
（图：我在乌克兰的帕夫洛格勒录制了这段视频版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
消耗了大量苏联的库存，莫斯科在2022至2024三年期间发射了约15,000,000枚导弹。然而，依靠自身工业（每年生产约2,500,000枚）和外部支持，其在2025年的生产水平保持在更高的水平。
关于战略导弹，乌克兰情报局在2025年中期估计，俄罗斯联邦约有2,000枚伊斯坎德尔、卡利布尔、Kh-101、金雕和其他类型的导弹。根据瑞典斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所（SIPRI）的数据，俄罗斯年度导弹生产超过了这些估计数量，占国内生产总值的7%至7.2%（在2025年超过15.5万亿卢布）。乌克兰军事情报局（GRU）也证实了这一滑翔炸弹生产的趋势：预计到2025年，年产120,000枚，这一数字比目前的库存高出很多。
这些装置在战前甚至都不存在，因为如果没有最近生产的UMPK套件，旧的FAB滑翔炸弹无法变成智能的KAB炸弹。除了新生产的设备外，俄罗斯还可以依靠回收苏联的库存。
战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）证实，俄罗斯的沙赫德/杰兰型无人机的生产也有所增加，从每周约200架增加到约1,000架，其增长趋势与今年发射的55,000架一致。这些数据与乌克兰情报局发布的数据相符，后者还考虑到了来自伊朗等国进口的型号。关于FPV无人机，东部研究中心（OSW）估计，单支俄罗斯旅需要超过2,500架。考虑到至少有60架在战争最激烈的前线作战，可以合理推测在北京的帮助下莫斯科的数量早已超过推测的50万架。
因此，俄罗斯的生产量超过了其发射量。
通过牺牲经济增长和社会福利，俄罗斯将大量能源出口转化为军火。高盛和国际能源署（IEA）证实，制裁正在产生显著效果，俄罗斯的石油收入在GDP中的占比下降了一半。然而，乌克兰人所称的有效制裁在其中发挥了重要作用：作为深度打击行动的一部分，深海打击已将俄罗斯的名义炼油能力削减了至少20%。
俄罗斯2025年的军费开支是战争前水平的四倍，并将继续上升。
此外，莫斯科还加强了与其他被证明是可靠合作伙伴的专制政权之间的重要联盟。根据路透社和开源中心的报道，俄罗斯仅从北朝鲜就收到了400万发炮弹，经过至少64次海运和铁路运输。这一持续的供给还包括KN-23和华松-11等短程弹道导弹、多管火箭发射器以及数万名士兵。除了生产这些武器的许可和技术外，俄罗斯政权还从伊朗政权那里取得了价值近20亿美元的数千架沙赫德无人机。
每年，中国向俄罗斯联邦提供约价值约50亿美元的双重用途商品。早在两年前的12月，卡内基国际和平基金会就曾估计高优先级商品的月峰值达6亿美元。
没有它们，莫斯科将无法将旧的FAB炸弹转化为KAB炸弹，也无法大量生产杰兰无人机。
此外，俄罗斯联邦还在超过128个国家招募炮灰。
其他国家，包括一些欧洲国家，继续为俄罗斯战争机器提供资金；只需提及第19个欧盟制裁方案中对俄罗斯碳氢化合物进口的禁令，仅仅是在18个月后才生效。
那么乌克兰呢？
在2024年，欧盟向乌克兰交付的炮弹不到100万枚，尽管有捷克倡议，到年底计划交付的数量甚至会更少。在延误和执行问题的背景下，欧盟计划未来向乌克兰交付200万发炮弹，而这只是需求的一半。
正如最近的报道指出的，美国已停止对基辅的支持，并正在减缓PURL（北约的乌克兰优先要求清单）等计划。
乌克兰应对俄罗斯在火炮上的压倒性优势的方式是用无人机饱和空域：到2025年预计达到450万架，战略工业部已宣布在获得充足资金的情况下可以翻倍。对于2026年，政府和各部委公开谈论理论上可达到的2000万架无人机的能力。
但这需要资金。
在导弹和制导炸弹方面，俄罗斯的优势巨大：乌克兰几乎从零开始，国家导弹计划今年目标是生产3000枚导弹和30000架远程无人机，但美国援助的冻结和对丹麦模式的支持缺乏，使得乌克兰的远程打击能力依赖于西方导弹，如暴风影/Scalp和ATACMS。
在滑翔炸弹领域，乌克兰没有与俄罗斯相比较的产量：它通过无人机、精确火炮和空中防御进行反击，但缺乏类似的大量空投武器。
这就是俄罗斯的消耗优势，正如唐纳德川普昨日所说的那样，这种局面是俄美勾结造成的。
（图：几天前，我在经过顿巴斯的乌克兰防线时拍下的照片版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
