中国政治新时代的共产主义与儒家思想

中国政治新时代的共产主义与儒家思想

贝淡宁教授
https://www.ykeith.com/danielbell/

贝淡宁教授是香港大学法学院政治理论系教授、讲座教授。他曾于2017年至2022年担任山东大学（青岛）政治与公共管理学院院长。

他的研究方向为比较政治理论，尤其关注儒家思想和法家思想。

他的著作包括《山东院长》（2023年）、《公正等级》（与王培合著，2020年）、《中国模式》（2015年）、《城市精神》（与阿夫纳·德沙利特合著，2012年）、《中国新儒家》（2008年）、《超越自由民主》（2007年）和《东西方相遇》（2000年），均由普林斯顿大学出版社出版。他也是《社群主义及其批评者》（牛津大学出版社，1993年）一书的作者。

贝淡宁的最新著作《山东院长》以内部人士的视角，探讨了中国学术界和中国政治体制。

章节
00:00 引言
00:50 中国学术界的现实
06:05 贤能政治作为一种替代理想
11:02 规模在政治中的重要性
16:30 中国的腐败与治理
23:20 法家思想的实践
24:43 儒家思想对中国政治的影响
32:58 马克思主义在中国政治中的应用
43:19 一人统治的迷思
51:14 中国的公关问题
56:12 中国贤能政治与民主的未来
01:00:04 对“可爱”的批判
01:04:56 文化洞察：加拿大 vs. 中国
01:08:49 香港精神
01:10:30 给即将步入职场的毕业生的建议
01:13:03 哪里可以找到贝尔教授

Keith Yap 00:00

我首先想到的一个问题我读您最近的著作《山东院长》时，遇到过一个问题，是关于您对西方和中国学术环境的比较。大多数人认为中国到处都是审查制度，没有学术自由，但您似乎有不同的看法和生活经历。

Daniel Bell 00:24

虽然中国大陆存在审查制度，而且审查制度还在不断加强，但我并不否认这一点。然而，许多领域都存在着大量的知识交流和论证。例如，在儒家思想领域，就存在着多元化且激烈的争论。最近，有一篇颇具影响力的文章，认为从儒家的角度来看，性爱机器人是理想的，这引发了儒家女权主义者的强烈反应。

这体现了不涉及高层政治的辩论如何能够蓬勃发展。这些讨论通常涉及一些中国以外的人不太感兴趣的问题，因为像儒家思想这样的传统在中国并没有得到广泛的研究。

人们也不再那么在意政治正确的术语。虽然这种情况可能随着美国新政府的上台而有所改变，但许多西方学者在讨论与性别或种族相关的问题时仍感到如履薄冰。在中国，这种非正式的审查制度较少。

在我的书《山东院长》中，我首先列举了中国所有的问题，因为你必须表达这些观点才能真正表达出你想表达的意思。中国存在一种非正式的审查机制，你很容易被贴上“中国辩护者”的标签。所以你必须首先承认中国侵犯人权的行为，人们才会听取你的意见。

即使在学术界，如果你想在期刊上发表文章，却不使用威权主义的语言来描述中国的政治体制，也很难发表。幸运的是，在英语世界，以书籍形式出版能带来更多的自由和原创思维。

另一个关键的区别是中国对服务社会的坚定承诺。在中国，尤其是在人文或社会科学领域，将自己的工作与为社区做贡献完全割裂开来的想法并不常见。这种想法的根源远流长，远超政治体制——它与儒家思想息息相关，即认为人生的至善在于服务社会。

这种观点因领域、时期和地区而异。例如，香港的体制更接近西方，你的薪酬几乎完全取决于你在顶尖学术期刊和大学出版社发表的论文。你是否为社区做出贡献几乎与你的聘用和晋升完全无关。然而，香港比中国大陆拥有更大的学术自由。它与新加坡类似，只要不涉及当地政府，你基本上可以随心所欲地做事、说事。

Keith Yap 04:33

我认为，近年来新加坡为批评进入公共论坛开辟了更多空间。

Daniel Bell 04:40

我同意。我的第一份工作是在新加坡国立大学，从1991年到1994年。那段时期学术自由并不理想。但当我撰写《中国模式》时，我在新加坡待了一个学期，因为在中国，很难以平衡的学术方式探讨政治敏感问题。新加坡拥有优秀的中英文图书馆，以及几乎完全的学术自由。新加坡已经改善了

从那时起，情况就一直很糟糕。

Keith Yap 05:15

关于《中国模式》，您质疑了我们应该将民主与专制政府进行比较的假设，认为自由民主显然是更优的选择。您为什么认为这是一种错误的二分法？

Daniel Bell 05:35

这些标签太模糊了。民主意味着通过自由公正的竞争性选举选出政治领导人，通常涉及法治、权力分立和保护个人权利等自由主义价值观。它也是规范性的，表明该制度优于其他制度。

民主和专制的标签都涵盖了如此多样化的政府形式，以至于它们对于政治世界的分类作用不大。我刚开始在新加坡工作时，它在西方被贴上了专制政府的标签——同样的标签也被用来描述朝鲜和沙特阿拉伯，而这两个国家是完全不同的体制。

要理解中国的政治体制，首先必须理解其激励理念，然后思考这些理念如何在实践中实现，以及如何缩小理想与现实之间的差距。我之前在加拿大和英国生活，多少被这样一种观点洗脑：只有一种合法的政治体制——通过自由公正的竞争性选举选出领导人，并赋予其相应的自由。我带着这种观念来到了新加坡。

我花了很长时间才适应，甚至可能在新加坡我也没有适应好。直到我在北京清华大学工作了八年，我才意识到我的同事们关注的问题截然不同：我们如何培养、选拔和提拔能力和德行均超群的领导者？我们如何衡量能力和德行？它们之间究竟是什么关系？

我意识到，这种思维方式在中国既是一种理想，也是一种制度，源远流长。我称之为“贤能政治”，中文译为“贤能政治”。贤良政治 我写《中国模式》一书是为了理解这一理想，展示其优缺点，并提出缩小理想与现实差距的方法。

Daniel Bell 07:35

这是一种极不完善的政治贤能政治，就像美国的民主制度会被认为是极不完善的民主制度一样。我们需要理解其背后的理念、其优缺点，以及如何缩小理想与现实之间的差距。如果我没有在北京的一所大学与未来的领导人共事多年，我就不会想到这个问题。

在新加坡，尽管在那里待了三年，但对我的政治体制仍然构成了冲击。我很难摆脱那种教条主义的观点，认为新加坡的政治体制从根本上来说是不合法的，因为它与我从小就接受的理想不符。现在我认为新加坡也是一种政治贤能政治——虽然不完美，但可能是世界上所有政治体制中最接近理想的。

我非常钦佩您在播客中采访过的许多领导人，比如马凯硕。我在新加坡的时候认识吴庆瑞，非常钦佩他。但即便如此，我依然固执己见，认为只有一种合法的政府形式，而新加坡的政府形式并非如此。

Keith Yap 09:56

那么，关于贤能政治，您心目中理想的政府形式应该如何体现？

Daniel Bell 10:12

规模对政治至关重要。在较小的政治共同体中，民主机制更为重要。这是让-雅克·卢梭等哲学家提出的古老观点。我在新加坡的经历也充分说明了这一点。我非常钦佩杨荣文，但他落选后我感到很失望。

不久之后，我在新加坡的一辆出租车上与司机讨论了这个问题。司机也承认杨伟雄很优秀，但他没有投票给他，因为“他没来参加我父亲的葬礼”。这让我意识到，这种人脉关系只在小型政治社区中才重要。在中国，习近平主席不可能出席所有人的葬礼。

在中国这样的大社区中，不同级别的政府，选拔和提拔领导人的方式各不相同。通过采访包括负责领导层选拔的组织部部长在内的领导人，我了解到，不同层级的领导人能力也有所不同。

在中低层，民主机制更为重要——观察领导人如何获得民众支持，服务当地社区。在中高层，治理变得更加复杂。领导者需要考虑影响众多利益相关者的政策，这些政策不仅关乎当地社区，还关乎整个国家、子孙后代以及国际关系。这需要经济学、国际关系、哲学、历史和环境科学方面的知识，以及良好的政治判断力。

中国现行体制的目标是

在基层建立民主的领导选拔制度，在高层逐步推行精英管理。在这两个极端之间，存在着实验的空间。中国的成功部分源于其在中层政府领导的选拔和提拔方式上的创新。

Daniel Bell 13:40

对于高层职位，领导者需要具备超乎寻常的分析能力，因为问题复杂，需要多学科的知识。中国的政治体制与新加坡类似，高层领导者通常都非常杰出。

但政治不像学术界，仅仅坐在办公室里读书或做实验就能取得成功。政治需要花费大量时间与利益相关者打交道，这需要良好的人际交往能力或情商。如果没有这些能力，很难在政治体系中立足。

最重要的是，领导者必须展现美德——愿意服务社会，而不是滥用公共资源谋取个人或家庭利益。换句话说，就是不要腐败。中组部，就像世界上最大的人力资源部门，负责评估这些技能。尽管这个体系极不完善，并且不断在试验，但它对于理解中国政治至关重要。

Keith Yap 15:14

谈到政治贤能政治的实践，借鉴袁元昂等经济学家的观点，中国在很大程度上是实行贤能政治的。想想薄熙来这样的人，他确实帮助重庆走向了更加繁荣。他们面临的问题是地方腐败问题。

Daniel Bell 15:40

我刚开始担任山东大学校长时，正值反腐风暴的高峰期。山东大学是一亿人口省份的顶尖大学。我们的办公室很小，包括市委书记的办公室就在我隔壁。我们必须记录每道菜的点餐情况，公费消费不允许饮酒。这些措施使得花钱变得复杂，也使得包括我在内的人们比我们原本应该的样子更加保守，缺乏创新精神。

这并非一个原创的观点，但根据我的经验，过度使用法家手段来处理腐败问题，会使公职人员规避风险，不愿接受新的挑战。这对国家的长远发展不利。

反腐运动也影响了信任的建立。在人均酒精消费量较高的山东省，人们传统上将聚餐饮酒视为建立信任的方式。然而，这些严格的措施在很大程度上终结了信任的建立，使人们变得更加原子化和个人主义。

现在情况有所改变——人们对惩罚的恐惧减少了，规则也放宽了。不必记录每道菜，而且公费啤酒也允许。但还有很长的路要走。最终，我们需要减少对惩罚恐惧的依赖，更多地依赖其他机制，包括像新加坡那样提高工资，尽管中国作为一个相对贫穷的国家，无法达到新加坡的工资水平。道德自律很重要，而这正是儒家传统可以借鉴的地方。

Keith Yap 18:59

您谈到法家思想时，在书中提到过自己与法律的冲突。这是一个有趣的故事，讲述了政府如何通过法家思想实施严厉的措施，然后逐渐开始使用儒家思想等较为温和的手段，迫使人们通过道德手段进行自我约束。

Daniel Bell 19:24

没错。新加坡应该对这种做法并不陌生，它曾被称为“文明之都”，但现在人们已经内化了不乱穿马路或不乱扔垃圾等行为，因此不再依赖罚款。中国的情况也类似。法家思想意味着严厉的惩罚，严格且统一地适用，没有例外或特殊情况，这对于需要快速解决的严重问题可能是必要的。

例如，十多年前中国的酒驾问题，统计数据显示事故频发，因此政府采取了严厉的措施。在北京，他们进行随机检查，如果驾驶员的酒精含量略微超过限值，他们的车辆就会被暂时没收，驾驶资格也会被暂停六个月。这件事发生在我身上，而且很有效——我再也没有酒后开车。

最终，随着人们的观念从法律监管转向道德自律，需要的检查也越来越少。这项运动开始后不久就变得更加严格——如果几个月后被抓到，我肯定会被判入狱。现在在北京，酒精检查很少，但酒驾却很少见。他们还开发了一些实用的解决方案，比如一项服务，如果你喝酒了，可以打电话叫人骑自行车来接你回家。

Keith Yap 22:30

看来，严厉的法律是在这个国家建立你所期望的道德文化的先导。

Daniel Bell 22:40

没错，但如果人们不知道……，严厉的法律就行不通。

内心深处，你觉得有些事情不对劲。真正的先兆是某种道德信念，认为你正在做的事情是错的，但这并没有影响你的行为。然后，法律措施就会出台，强化这种信念。

Keith Yap 23:15

这就像在新加坡随地吐痰。我们都知道不应该这样做，但过去人们经常在街上吐痰。现在几乎没有人这样做了，也很少有人因为随地吐痰而被罚款了。

Daniel Bell 23:18

没错，乱扔垃圾、冲厕所等等都是如此。

Keith Yap 23:31

到目前为止，我们已经讨论了很多关于法家思想的问题，但我们也看到儒家思想对中国政治哲学的影响很大。您能解释一下儒家思想在当今是如何影响中国政治的吗？

Daniel Bell 23:53

儒家思想是一个非常丰富多元的传统。其核心是将美好生活视为滋养人道和谐的社会关系。虽然这听起来微不足道，但对美好生活还有其他看法，例如脱离社群或家庭的宗教生活。儒家认为，最好的生活是成为一名公职人员服务社群，因为一旦拥有政治权力，这样做才能最大程度地造福社会。

这听起来可能显而易见，但许多人并不认同。一些宗教理想主张脱离社群。在柏拉图的《理想国》中，最好的生活是追求真理，服务社群是其次。儒家认为，最好的生活是服务社群，而要做到这一点，你必须致力于在一个基于卓越能力和美德选拔和提拔公职人员的机制中不断自我完善。

Keith Yap 25:40

这一理想在中国历史上的政治体系中有着巨大的影响，最著名的是通过科举制度实现的。近年来，这种理想在中国经济改革时期再次兴起。公职人员的选拔基于其能力——通过在基层政府的经验和成就来衡量——以及德行，即避免腐败并展现服务社会的意愿。

人们常说中国进行了经济改革，却没有政治改革。但这究竟意味着什么呢？如今的政治体制与文化大革命时期截然不同。如今，中国拥有一个非常强大、制度化且复杂的官僚体系，旨在选拔和提拔德才兼备的公职人员。尽管它极不完善且不断变化，但它的存在源于古代儒家贤能政治理念。

这并非纯粹的儒家思想——墨家或许也持有类似的观点。即使是法家也重视能力，而非德行。影响了中国秦始皇的商鞅建议用敌军首级的数量来衡量功绩——这是一种非常客观的标准。法家对德行持怀疑态度，认为德行全是虚伪的。但儒家强调德才兼备，德才兼备不仅仅意味着军事上的成功，更意味着能够有效地服务社会。

儒家价值观以非常具体的方式影响着政治体系。在儒家文化的发源地山东曲阜，公职人员的晋升部分取决于他们的孝道。他们会亲自面试候选人的父母——如果年迈的父母说他们的孩子不孝，就会对他们的晋升产生负面影响。这在加拿大是不可想象的。但在中国，如果人们不能对父母表现出尊敬和关爱，就很难将这种关爱扩展到家庭之外。

此外，成为一名公职人员需要通过高考进入一所好大学，这包括学习儒家经典。学生必须学习和解读孔子、孟子和荀子的经典。

有时，儒家的影响是自下而上的。清明节之所以成为全国性节日，是因为数千万工人会在这一天休假祭拜祖先。政府最终将这一传统正式化。

Keith Yap 30:02

李光耀曾发表过一篇关于“士农工商”的公开演讲，他认为学者是人们应该努力追求的最高职业，是理想的人生。因此，在中国的政治生活中，似乎最优秀、最有德行的人应该努力成为政治家。这与美国形成了鲜明对比，美国的文化效仿资本家，人才集中在资本主义领域。您如何看待这种观点？

Daniel Bell 30:49

我认为这是对的，但请记住，中国是一个非常多元化的国家。儒家思想在山东省及相关地区的影响更大。在南方，企业家精神更为浓厚，更接近于“成功就是赚钱”的理念。

这体现在非常具体的事情上。在中国大部分地区，尤其是南方，幸运数字是8，因为它听起来像“赚钱”。你可以在驾照上看到它。

晚安和电话。但在山东省，幸运数字是七。俗话说“七上八下”——如果你在政府部门干到57岁，还有晋升的希望，但到了58岁，你就走下坡路了。在我所在的大学，七号办公室比八号办公室更有声望。

Keith Yap 32:08

这就引出了我的下一个问题：马克思主义对当今中国政治的影响。大多数西方评论员和媒体都持有一种粗略的看法，将共产主义等同于压迫和缺乏政治权利。更细致入微的看法是什么？

Daniel Bell 32:32

共产主义传统是多元的，尽管它可以说是相当新的，而且不如儒家思想多元。马克思对共产主义的最初设想认为，资本主义的问题在于资本被资本家拥有，而工人必须工作才能赚钱——工作变成了谋生的手段，而不是生活的主要目的。目标是建立一个工人不再被迫工作以谋生的社会。

如何实现？通过发展经济，让先进的机器完成社会必需的工作，满足人们的基本需求，并解放人们，让他们自由地发挥创造力。这需要经历一个资本主义的过程——马克思的历史理论——因为只有通过资本主义，才能有效地发展技术，因为资本家必须通过竞争，通过改进技术来获取利润。

资本主义的副产品是技术进步和机器的改进。最终，根据马克思的观点，资本主义可以被推翻，走向共产主义制度，在这个制度下，技术归人民所有，机器完成必要的工作，人们可以自由地发挥他们的创造力。

Daniel Bell 38:36

如今在中国，马克思主义正在卷土重来，因为人们对人工智能持乐观态度。如果对其进行管理和监管，使其有利于社会发展，几十年后，我们或许能够实现这样的目标：先进的机器完成社会必需的、肮脏的、危险的、重复性的工作，解放人们，让他们自由地发挥他们的创造力。这就是马克思主义复兴的原因之一——马克思主义的共产主义理想如今似乎更有可能实现。

邓小平说得对：我们需要经历资本主义来发展生产力，但这只是达到目的的手段。最终，我们需要走向一个更加共产主义的社会。这与儒家通过和谐人道的社会关系实现自我的理想不同。对马克思主义者来说，我们是通过创造性劳动来实现我们的创造性本质。

这些理想在实践中可能会发生冲突。有一次，在中国介绍了这些理念后，一位年轻女士告诉我，她感受到了这种紧张——她想通过工作实现自我，同时又要对年迈的父母尽义务，这造成了时间和精力上的冲突，而这些冲突很难协调。

我认为这两种理想对于理解中国的政治体制都很重要。从历史上看，马克思主义之所以成为主流意识形态，部分原因是马克思认为政府的最终目标是为人民提供物质福利。儒家很久以前就持有这种观点——就连孟子也说过，人需要稳定的财产或基本的物质需求，才能有道德。如果你总是为生活必需品而挣扎，就不可能有道德。

纵观中国历史，早在西方政府将扶贫视为政府义务之前，各国政府就一直致力于应对饥荒和贫困。这也是马克思主义在20世纪中国扎根的原因之一。

马克思主义的阴暗面在于列宁主义的观点——需要强大的中央组织来统治，并使用极端手段清除政治对手。这种观点在战时非常有效，帮助共产党通过更强大的列宁主义组织赢得了内战。但在和平时期，用这种方法治理国家可能会导致灾难，就像1949年之后发生的那样。

Keith Yap 38:15

我接下来关于马克思主义的问题是关于这样一种观点：一旦你榨干了所有你能榨干的东西，一旦你的机器变得如此先进，国家就会逐渐消亡。但在中国，你认为情况并非如此——即使在理想状态下，国家也将继续扮演着非常强大的角色。为什么？
Daniel Bell 38:36

马克思没有预见到现在显而易见的几个发展。他对机械和技术最终完成社会必需的工作持乐观态度。但他没有预见到机械会变得如此先进，以至于可以主宰人类，甚至构成生存威胁。随着人工智能的发展，我们需要一个强大的国家来监管它，确保人工智能服务于人类的需求，而不是让我们成为技术的奴隶。

同样，马克思也无法预见到技术会发展到通过气候变化和全球变暖破坏环境的地步。我们也需要一个强大的国家来监管它。这同样适用于核武器、流行病——所有这些生存威胁都是马克思无法预见的。

马克思认为，一旦我们拥有先进的机械，人们的基本需求得到满足，我们就会

不需要国家，因为国家的主要目的是对统治阶级实施强制。没有统治阶级，就不需要强制性的国家——它会消亡。但现在我们知道，即使拥有先进的机械和社会平等，我们仍然需要一个国家来预防生存威胁。

Keith Yap 40:53

所以，国家实际上是为了提供护栏，确保生产资料不会反过来对付你。

Daniel Bell 41:03

是的，这是一部分原因。但它不仅仅是提供护栏——在我们达到更高程度的共产主义状态，即人们的基本物质需求通过先进的机械得到满足之前，我们需要一个积极的国家来确保技术服务于人民，而不是反过来。

在中国的政治体制中，人们倾向于认为一个人决定一切。 2012年，中国面临三大挑战：猖獗的腐败威胁着政治体系；快速经济增长导致的巨大贫富差距引发的不满；以及发展带来的灾难性环境后果。无论谁掌权，都必须应对这些问题。

自2012年以来，情况大致如此——更加重视减少腐败、缩小收入差距和促进环境可持续性。现任领导人是平等中的佼佼者。政治局常委从九人减少到七人，这使得处理阻碍必要变革的既得利益集团变得更加容易。无论谁是第一把手，这种情况可能都会发生。

Keith Yap 45:29

我想说，他们在这三个问题上取得了巨大的进步。即使在我去年访问中国时，你也能看到汽车电气化的普及以及主要城市在短短十年内空气质量的改善。在2012年，人们可能无法想象这一点。

Keith Yap 45:55

这个问题的延伸是：对许多外部人士和西方媒体来说，中国政治非常不透明。由于过于注重内部沟通，中国未能将自身形象充分地传达给外部公众。请举例说明中国未能很好地向外界传达自身形象的例子。

Daniel Bell 46:25

这部分与政治体制和反腐运动有关。反腐运动的弊端在于，它使公职人员变得更加保守，规避风险。要想与中国以外的人进行有说服力的沟通，你不能只说中国有什么好处——这听起来像是空洞的宣传。你需要承认中国存在的问题，并以更现实、更人性化的方式描绘中国。

但由于政治体制的这种保守性，试图描绘更平衡形象的记者或学者经常会遇到审查或当局的质疑。即使在政府内部，私下里也承认这一点，尤其是在中层官员中，公职人员仍然非常规避风险。

即使在我最近出版的新书《山东院长》中，我也试图以一种平衡的方式展现公职人员和官僚中的人性和幽默感。我得到了一些官员的许可，但由于内容并非完全正面，它尚未被中国大陆接受出版——不过它在香港出版了，展现了香港更大的学术自由。

话虽如此，情况正在好转。最近，我们看到“TikTok难民”涌向中国应用小红书。便捷的在线翻译让中国的人性和幽默感，包括问题，得到了更多的传播，这实际上比官方只展现好的一面更能提升中国的软实力。

Keith Yap 50:03

此外，还有关于命名规范的问题。您指出，他们通常不会试图在海外树立更温和的形象，或者可能不太了解语言差异。

Daniel Bell 50:24

一个明显的例子是2008年北京奥运会开幕式，他们选择了“和”字来代表中国文化。我记得在NBC上看过，当时解说员指着齐步走的士兵说：“看看这中国式的和谐”。他们说，每个人的思维和行为都一样，这很可怕。

但任何了解中文和孔子的人都知道，“和”指的是和谐中的多元，而不是千篇一律或千篇一律。中国人的和谐理念包含着对多样性的热爱。他们使用的比喻清楚地表达了这一点：只有盐的汤不会好喝——你需要很多配料。只有一个音符的音乐很枯燥——你需要很多音符。在政治上，这个概念被明确地用来表明，一个只听从一种政治观点的统治者永远无法发现错误并纠正它。

正确的翻译可以避免误解。为避免误解，中国文化中“和”的核心思想应翻译为“和而不同”。

Keith Yap 52:37

多年来，政府的部门职能不断变化

名称本身就需要更新。例如，新加坡有相当于通讯及新闻部的部门，由于信息传输涉及数字化，现在应该改名为数码发展及信息部。

Daniel Bell 53:01

一些政府部门名称的翻译存在问题。“宣传部”最初被翻译为“propaganda”，现在被翻译为“publicity”，但这听起来带有贬义——“communication”可能更中性。“统战部”——在战争时期，指的是共产党和国民党联合抗日。现在，这个战时术语并不合适，应该根据新的现实进行修改。

即使是党委书记的职责，尤其是在基层政府部门，其主要职责也并非是让人们遵守党的路线。在大学里，他们大部分时间都在处理人际关系和处理非学术工作。西方大学没有党委书记，这意味着审查较少，但有人负责社会问题可能很有价值。

例如，在山东大学，我们发生了一起严重的车祸，党委书记不得不去安慰家长。我们可以称他们为“和谐书记”。这种职能，如果脱离了政治审查，或许值得借鉴。有趣的是，随着中国历史上心理治疗的蓬勃发展，许多心理治疗师之前都担任过党委书记，因为他们擅长处理人际关系冲突和协调人际关系。

Keith Yap 55:22

您写了一篇关于2050年中国面貌的有趣文章，描绘了一幅贤能政治与民主政治相辅相成的愿景，在保持公职人员能力的同时，拥有更广泛的政治参与。那么，一个更加贤能民主的中国会是什么样子呢？

Daniel Bell 55:47

嗯，这很难说——那篇文章比较具有推测性，也包含一些幽默。执政的组织现在大约有1亿人，20到30年后可能会达到1.2亿。这是一个庞大的组织，内部有必要保持多元化。执政组织内部还有更多民主的空间。

如何在不引发公开冲突和派系斗争的情况下将其制度化至关重要，但不能一直压制民主。在中国，当你与人们进行非正式交谈时，一旦建立了信任，就能进行非常开放的对话。人们强烈认识到执政组织内部需要更多民主，以便所有党员在政治体系中都有发言权，不像现在这样自上而下。

民主可以采取不同的形式。可以采用抽签制，在执政组织内部随机选出人员，因为这本身就是一种质量检验，让他们在政策制定中拥有发言权。执政组织内部或许可以有更多的选举机制和协商机制。

对于执政组织之外的人来说，确保整个政治体系拥有持久的合法性至关重要。这可以是隐性的，也可以采取不同的形式——或许是未来的人工智能允许民众进行协商，或者通过全民公投赋予党30年的执政时间，足够做出影响子孙后代的决策，并培养长期人才，应对气候变化等问题，而不必担心每隔几年就举行一次选举。但30年后，体制会受到某种制约。

在中国的知识分子中，几乎所有50岁以下的人都支持更多的言论自由——这几乎是将自由主义者、社会主义者和儒家思想联系在一起的唯一纽带。因此，可以有更多的言论自由，更多的政治组织和表达声音的方式，同时承认执政机构对重大问题拥有最终决定权。这是将更强大的民主机制与精英管理制度相结合的一种方式。

Keith Yap 59:14

你对“可爱”的批评是什么？

Daniel Bell 59:16

乍一看确实很奇怪，但秉承儒家传统的东亚文化也拥有这种“萌”文化——社交媒体上可爱的动物、表情符号。虽然其他地方也存在这种现象，但程度不如其他地方。即使是作为一名官僚，我也会用表情符号和笑脸与其他官僚交流。当我把我的社交媒体账号展示给一位美国顶尖大学的教授时，他笑着说，他们肯定没有这些。

这种“萌”文化的好处在于，它软化了原本尖锐的沟通。精英主义的弊端在新加坡非常明显，它创造了一个竞争激烈的社会，人们雄心勃勃，害怕丢脸。这种“萌”文化与此背道而驰——它告诉我们，我们不在乎，只想享受生活。它就像道家无忧无虑的生活方式，平衡了竞争激烈和雄心勃勃的一面。

并非巧合的是，这种萌文化起源于日本，少女们逐渐形成了这种萌文化，并传播到了其他拥有儒家传统的国家。然而，这种文化的弊端??在于，公职人员可能会利用萌来逃避责任。

责任，或者在应该做出艰难决定的时候开玩笑。比如鲍里斯·约翰逊——我觉得他很有魅力，我很想和他共进晚餐，但一到做决定的时候，他就很糟糕，逃避责任，撒谎。

我在担任院长的时候就看到了自己的这个缺陷。有时我会开玩笑，装可爱，以此来逃避责任和艰难的决定。这就是这种可爱文化的弊端??。

Keith Yap 1:02:11

在新加坡，我们看到政客们更多地利用社交媒体来博取好感，而不是传达政策立场。他们追逐舞蹈潮流，炫耀自己的公务行程。即使在最近的美国大选中，营销也更多地依靠个性而非政策。

Daniel Bell 1:02:55

另一方面，公职人员展现人性化的一面是可以的，只要这不会占用他们太多思考惠及民众的政策的时间，也不会被用来逃避责任和艰难的决定。

Keith Yap 1:03:15

你必须找到中庸之道——恰如其分地展现可爱。

Daniel Bell 1:03:16

没错。吴庆瑞就具备这样的能力。他私下里魅力十足，可爱又不失风度，而且才华横溢、富有创造力。真希望我当时在吃饭的时候能做笔记，讲讲我们的故事。我只记得当时我被他深深地迷住了。

Keith Yap 1:03:43

人们也记得他如此——私下里魅力十足，但在公众面前却显得严肃沉闷。

Daniel Bell 1:03:50

所以他可能掌握了中庸之道，因为你必须做出艰难的决定，而他当然不会让自己的可爱妨碍你。

Keith Yap 1:03:58

你自己是加拿大人，也在中国。你希望更多人了解中国和加拿大最棒的一点是什么？

Daniel Bell 1:04:06

加拿大有两大魅力。首先是蒙特利尔，我的家乡。这座城市很酷，充满创意，也很安全，秩序井然，和谐共存，同时又热爱多元文化。它极具创造力，而且是双语城市。和新加坡一样，大多数人都会说两种语言。在蒙特利尔，几乎每个人都能完美地掌握法语和英语。双语能让你更容易地从他人的角度看待自己，从而产生更多的同理心和同情心。缺点是冬天非常寒冷——我已经很多年没在冬天回去过了。

另一大魅力是冰球——在加拿大，我们简称为“曲棍球”。它在其他地方鲜为人知，但它是一项将优雅、美丽与力量完美结合的运动。如果你像我一样喜欢运动，那么曲棍球就是最能体现优雅与力量的运动。它非常强调传球和服从。即使在采访冰球运动员时，他们也几乎是儒家式的，把自己放在第一位，声称自己所做的一切都是为了球队。目前，蒙特利尔加拿大人队或许是冰球界最令人兴奋的年轻球队。

至于中国，它实际上是一个大陆，而不是一个国家。差异不仅存在于城乡之间，那是完全不同的世界，也存在于城市之间。上海人和北京人差异很大，而且常常互相看不顺眼。我和来自耶路撒冷的合著者阿夫纳·德沙利特合著了一本名为《城市精神》的书，试图阐述其中的一些内容。即使在山东省，济南和青岛之间的差异也很大。

中国国内的这种多样性在国外并不为人所知。此外，日常生活中也充满了人性和幽默。人们总是想到政治体制和政客，他们往往极其沉闷和严厉，但正如我在新书中试图展现的那样，在日常生活和中层官僚机构中，存在着如此多的人性和幽默，这些都值得向世界传达。

Keith Yap 1:07:54

如果说今天的香港有一种精神，它会是什么样子？

Daniel Bell 1:07:59

香港之所以引人入胜，是因为它致力于资本主义——这写进了基本法。在一个共产主义国家里，人们热衷于赚钱，但这种热衷往往以丑陋的形式出现。香港贫富差距巨大，一半人住在公共住房里，与新加坡相比，情况糟糕透顶。资本主义的弊端显而易见。

但你也有这样的社会秩序。有句俗话说，如果你在美国最贫穷的地区开着劳斯莱斯，你会被人扔石头砸到车窗上。但在香港最贫困的地区，人们会羡慕金色的劳斯莱斯。香港人对财富有着一种奇特的崇敬，这种崇敬在香港相当强烈。

但这受到儒家精神的缓和。香港没有经历试图摧毁儒家思想的革命。因此，日常的家庭生活在很大程度上受到儒家伦理及其服务家庭和社区的承诺的影响，将爱和关怀从家庭成员扩展到外部世界。这缓和了资本主义的过度膨胀。这就是我对香港精神的诠释。

Keith Yap 1:09:36

您通常会给毕业生在进入职场时什么建议？

Daniel Bell 1:09:40

我的学生非常多元化。孔子是一位

老师们，他有着出色的教学模式，会根据不同学生的需求和兴趣给出相互矛盾的建议。他没有泛泛而谈的建议——我需要了解每个学生所有精彩的个性。

但如果说有一点是普遍的：未来是绝对不确定的。如果我们足够幸运，能够避免毁灭人类的战争，唯一确定的就是快速的技术和社会变革。我上大学的时候，我们觉得一旦找到工作，就一直到退休。现在，尤其是在新加坡，这个国家在培养学生方面可能比其他任何地方都做得更好，我们需要不断学习，并做好准备，在一生中去做完全不同的事情。

Keith Yap 1:10:59

实际上，从这个角度来看，你教会了我两点。你教会了我阅读《论语》（《论语》）的正确框架，那就是不要泛泛而谈，而是要理解每篇文本的具体语境。

Daniel Bell 1:11:12

这是孔子和他的学生的故事，每个学生都是不同的。你必须把它想象成一出戏，并具备背景知识。孔子在教学生时，故意只说他认为正确的部分，希望他们自己能发展出剩下的部分。了解学生是谁、他们的兴趣爱好以及他们在后来的中国历史上因何而闻名，这一点很重要。

这就是高考存在问题的原因——学生必须记住包括《论语》在内的部分经典文本，并学习“正确”的解读。孔子会感到震惊，因为没有单一的正确解读。有些解读比其他解读更好，但解读会随着新知识、新挑战以及解读者在何种语境下的变化而变化。理解这一点对于理解和欣赏文本至关重要。

Keith Yap 1:12:14

那么，我们可以在哪里找到你的作品呢？

Daniel Bell 1:12:15

我的最新著作是《山东院长：一位中国大学小官僚的自白》。本书试图展现人性和幽默感，同时也从我担任院长的经历中汲取启示。

《中国模式》更具学术性，系统地探讨了什么是贤能政治、它的优势和劣势，以及如何在中国的环境下缩小理想与现实之间的差距。

我与香港大学的同事兼妻子王佩合著的《等级制度》表明，任何现代社会都需要等级制度。我们知道哪些等级制度不好——基于种族、性别或阶级——但哪些等级制度好，以及为什么好？我们用许多例子来解释这一点。这些书在亚马逊等常见网站上都有售。

Keith Yap 1:13:15

谢谢教授的到来。

Daniel Bell 1:13:18

感谢您的参与。我很喜欢你的播客，我把关于吴庆瑞博士的那期播客看完了，非常精彩。期待你更多的播客，也希望你能学到更多。谢谢。

Communism and Confucianism In The New Age of Chinese Politics

 Professor Daniel Bell
https://www.ykeith.com/danielbell/

Professor Daniel A. Bell is Professor, Chair of Political Theory with the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong. He served as Dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University (Qingdao) from 2017 to 2022.

He specialises in Comparative Political Theories, focusing on Confucianism and Legalism.

His books include The Dean of Shandong (2023), Just Hierarchy (co-authored with Wang Pei, 2020), The China Model (2015), The Spirit of Cities (co-authored with Avner de-Shalit, 2012), China’s New Confucianism (2008), Beyond Liberal Democracy (2007), and East Meets West (2000), all published by Princeton University Press. He is also the author of Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford University Press, 1993).

Bell's latest book, The Dean of Shandong, is an insider’s perspective of Chinese academia and China’s political system.

Chapters
00:00 Intro
00:50 The Reality of Chinese Academia
06:05 Political Meritocracy As An Alternative Ideal
11:02 Why Scale Matters In Politics
16:30 Corruption and Governance in China
23:20 Legalism in Practice
24:43 The Influence of Confucianism in Chinese Politics
32:58 Marxism in Chinese Politics
43:19 The Myth of The One Man Rule
51:14 China's PR Problems
56:12 Future of Meritocracy and Democracy in China
01:00:04 Critique Of Cuteness
01:04:56 Cultural Insights: Canada vs. China
01:08:49 The Spirit of Hong Kong
01:10:30 Advice for Graduates Entering the Workforce
01:13:03 Where To Find Prof Bell

Keith Yap 00:00

One of the first questions I had when I was reading your most recent book, The Dean of Shantung, was about your comparison between Western and Chinese academic environments. Most people assume that in China it's all censorship with no academic freedom, but you seem to have a different view and different lived experience.

Daniel Bell 00:24

While there is censorship and increased censorship in mainland China, I don't want to deny that. However, there are many areas with tremendous intellectual engagement and argumentation. In Confucianism, for example, there are diverse and heated debates. Recently, there was an influential article arguing that sex robots are ideal from a Confucian perspective, which prompted furious reactions from Confucian feminists.

This exemplifies how debates that don't touch on high-level politics can and do flourish. These discussions often address issues that wouldn't be of great interest to people outside China, where traditions like Confucianism aren't widely studied.

There's also less concern about politically correct terminology. While this may be changing with the new U.S. administration, many Western academics have felt they're treading on eggshells when discussing issues related to sex or race. In China, there's less of this informal censorship.

In my book, The Dean of Shandong, I began by listing everything wrong with China because you have to express those views to get to what you really want to say. There's an informal censorship mechanism where you can easily be labeled a China apologist. So you must first acknowledge China's human rights abuses before people will listen.

Even in academia, if you want to publish in a periodical and don't use the language of authoritarianism to describe the Chinese political system, it's very hard to get published. Fortunately, publishing in book form allows more freedom and original thinking in the Anglophone world.

Another key difference is China's strong commitment to serving the community. The idea that you would do your work, especially in humanities or social sciences, completely separate from contributing to the community's good is less common in China. This has roots deeper than the political system – it connects to Confucian ideas that the best life involves serving the community.

This varies by field, time period, and region. Hong Kong, for instance, is closer to the Western system where you're rewarded almost exclusively for your publishing record in leading academic journals and university presses. Whether you contribute to the community is almost completely irrelevant for hiring and promotion. However, Hong Kong has more academic freedom than mainland China. It's similar to Singapore, where you can generally do and say what you want, as long as it's not about the local government.

Keith Yap 04:33

I think in Singapore in recent years there's been an opening up of spaces for critiques to enter the public fora.

Daniel Bell 04:40

I agree. My first job was at NUS in Singapore from '91 to '94. Those days weren't ideal for academic freedom. But when I wrote The China Model, I spent a semester in Singapore because it was very hard to address politically sensitive issues in China in a balanced academic way. Singapore offered great libraries in English and Chinese and almost complete academic freedom. Singapore has improved tremendously since then.

Keith Yap 05:15

Regarding The China Model, you've challenged the assumption that we should compare governments between democracy and autocracy, with liberal democracy being the clearly superior alternative. Why do you think that's a false dichotomy?

Daniel Bell 05:35

The labels are too vague. Democracy means selecting political leaders through free and fair competitive elections, usually involving liberal values like rule of law, separation of powers, and protection of individual rights. It's also normative, suggesting that system is better than the alternatives.

Both democratic and authoritarian labels encompass such diverse forms of government that they're not very useful for classifying the political world. When I first worked in Singapore, it was labeled in the West as an authoritarian government – the same label used to describe North Korea and Saudi Arabia, which are completely different systems.

To understand China's political system, we must first understand its motivating ideals, then consider how those ideals are realized in practice and how to reduce the gap between ideal and reality. Having spent my previous life in Canada and the UK, I was somewhat brainwashed by the view that only one legitimate political system exists – one that selects leaders through free and fair competitive elections, with associated freedoms. I carried that baggage with me to Singapore.

It took a long time to adjust, and maybe I didn't even adjust well in Singapore. It wasn't until I spent eight years at Tsinghua University in Beijing that I realized my colleagues were focused on different questions: How do we train, select, and promote leaders with above-average ability and virtue? How do we measure ability and virtue? What's the relationship between them?

I realized this way of thinking has such a long history, both as an ideal and as an institution in China. I use the label "political meritocracy" – in Chinese, "xian lang zheng zhi." (贤良政治) I wrote The China Model to make sense of that ideal, show its advantages and disadvantages, and suggest ways to reduce the gap between ideal and reality.

Daniel Bell 07:35

It's a highly imperfect political meritocracy, just as democracy in the U.S. would be considered a highly imperfect democracy. We need to understand the underlying idea, its advantages and disadvantages, and ways to reduce the gap between ideal and reality. I wouldn't have conceived this question had I not spent years at a university in Beijing with future leaders.

In Singapore, despite spending three years there, it was a shock to my political system. It was difficult to shed this dogmatic view that Singapore's political system was fundamentally illegitimate because it didn't match the ideals I had learned since childhood. Now I think Singapore is also a political meritocracy – imperfect, but probably the closest to the ideal of any political system in the world.

I have great admiration for many of the leaders you've interviewed on your podcast, like Kishore Mahbubani. When I was in Singapore, I knew Goh Keng Swee and admired him immensely. Yet even that didn't change my dogmatic view that there was only one legitimate form of government, and it wasn't Singapore's.

Keith Yap 09:56

So regarding political meritocracy, what would be the ideal version in your mind as to how it should manifest itself in government?

Daniel Bell 10:12

Scale matters for politics. It's more important to have democratic mechanisms in smaller political communities. This is an old point made by philosophers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I had an enlightening experience in Singapore that illustrated this. I greatly admired George Yeo and was disappointed when he lost his election.

Shortly after, I was in a taxi in Singapore, discussing this with the driver. The driver agreed that Yeo was outstanding but said he didn't vote for him because "he didn't come to my father's funeral." This made me realize that such personal connections only matter in small political communities. In China, President Xi couldn't attend everyone's funeral.

In a large community like China, at different levels of government, there are different ways of selecting and promoting leaders. Through interviews with leaders, including the head of the Organization Department which handles leadership selection, I learned that different abilities matter at different levels.

At lower to mid levels, democratic mechanisms are more important – seeing how leaders have support from people and serve their local community. At mid to higher levels, governance becomes more complex. Leaders need to think about policies affecting huge numbers of stakeholders, not just the local community, but the entire country, future generations, and international relations. This requires knowledge of economics, international relations, philosophy, history, and environmental science, plus a track record of good political judgments.

The underlying system in China aims to have democratic systems for selecting leaders at lower levels, becoming progressively more meritocratic at higher levels. Between these extremes, there's room for experimentation. Part of China's success comes from innovation in how they select and promote leaders at mid-levels of government.

Daniel Bell 13:40

For higher-level positions, leaders need above-average analytical ability because the issues are complex and require knowledge of many disciplines. One thing you can say about the Chinese political system, similar to Singapore, is that the leaders at higher levels are typically quite brilliant.

But politics isn't like academia where you can succeed just by staying in your office reading books or conducting experiments. In politics, you spend much time dealing with stakeholders, requiring good people skills or EQ. It's very hard to get through the system without those skills.

Most importantly, leaders must show virtue – a willingness to serve the community rather than misuse public resources for personal or family interest. In other words, don't be corrupt. The Organization Department, which is like the world's largest human resources department, assesses these skills. While highly imperfect and constantly experimenting, this system is fundamental to understanding Chinese politics.

Keith Yap 15:14

When you talk about political meritocracy in practice, drawing from economists like Yuan Yuanang, China has been meritocratic for the most part. If you think about someone like Bo Xilai, he did help propel Chongqing to a more prosperous state. The problem they face is the issue of endemic corruption.

Daniel Bell 15:40

When I began as dean at Shandong University, the premier university in a province of 100 million people, it was at the height of the anti-corruption campaign. We had to have small offices, including the party secretary whose office was next to mine. We had to record every dish ordered at meals, with no alcohol allowed at public expense. These measures made it complicated to spend money and made people, including me, more conservative and less innovative than we might have been.

This isn't a very original point, but from my experience, excessive legalist means of dealing with corruption makes public officials risk-averse and unwilling to consider new challenges. This isn't good for the country's long-term future.

The anti-corruption campaign also affected trust-building. In Shandong province, which has high per capita alcohol consumption, meals and drinking are traditionally viewed as ways to build trust. Much of that ended with these strict measures, making people more atomized and individualistic.

Things are changing somewhat now – there's less fear of punishment, and the rules have relaxed. You don't have to record every dish, and beer is allowed on public expense. But there's still a long way to go. Ultimately, there needs to be less reliance on fear of punishment and more on other mechanisms, including higher salaries like in Singapore, though China as a relatively poor country can't match Singapore's salary levels. Moral self-regulation is important, and this is where the Confucian tradition has much to add.

Keith Yap 18:59

As you spoke about legalism, you mentioned in your book your run-in with the law. That was an interesting anecdote about how the government implemented harsh measures through legalism, and then over time started using softer means like Confucianism where you were pushed to self-regulate through moral means.

Daniel Bell 19:24

That's right. It shouldn't be unfamiliar to Singapore, which was known as the "fine city," but now relies less on fines because people have internalized behaviors like not jaywalking or littering. It's similar in China. Legalism, meaning harsh punishment applied rigorously and uniformly without exceptions or special circumstances, might be necessary for serious problems requiring quick results.

For example, with drinking and driving in China over ten years ago, statistics showed many accidents, so the government took serious action. In Beijing, they conducted random checks, and if drivers were slightly above the limit, their cars would be temporarily confiscated and driving privileges suspended for six months. This happened to me, and it worked – I never drove after drinking again.

Eventually, fewer checks were needed as people's views changed from legal regulation to moral self-regulation. The campaign became even stricter shortly after it began – I would have been jailed if caught a few months later. Now in Beijing, there are very few alcohol checks, yet hardly any drunk driving. They've also developed practical solutions, like a service where you can call someone to come on a bicycle and drive your car home if you've been drinking.

Keith Yap 22:30

It seems the harsh laws served as a precursor to establishing the moral culture you want in the country.

Daniel Bell 22:40

Right, but harsh laws wouldn't work if people don't know deep down that something is wrong. The real precursor is some moral belief that what you're doing is wrong, but it just doesn't affect behavior. Then legalist measures can come in to reinforce that.

Keith Yap 23:15

It's like spitting in Singapore. We all knew we shouldn't do it, but people used to spit a lot on the streets. Now pretty much no one does it and no one really gets fined for it anymore.

Daniel Bell 23:18

Exactly, or littering, or flushing toilets, or whatever.

Keith Yap 23:31

So far we've talked a lot about legalism, but we also see that Confucianism informs a lot of Chinese political philosophy. Could you illuminate how Confucianism today informs Chinese politics?

Daniel Bell 23:53

Confucianism is a very rich and diverse tradition. At its core, it views the good life as nourishing humane and harmonious social relations. While this might sound trivial, there are other views of the good life, such as a religious life separate from community or family. For Confucians, the best possible life is serving the community as a public official because that's how you can do the most good once you have political power.

Again, this might sound obvious, but many disagree. Some religious ideals advocate separation from the community. In Plato's Republic, the best life involves seeking truth, with serving the community as a second choice. Confucians say the best life is serving the community, and to do that, you must be committed to constant self-improvement within a mechanism that selects and promotes public officials based on superior ability and virtue.

Keith Yap 25:40

This ideal has had huge influence in the Chinese political system throughout history, most famously institutionalized through the imperial examination system. More recently, this ideal has been revived during China's economic reform period, where public officials are selected according to their ability – measured through experience and success at lower levels of government – and virtue, meaning avoiding corruption and showing willingness to serve the community.

People say China has had economic reform but no political reform. But what does that mean? The political system is completely different from what it was during the Cultural Revolution. Now there's a very strong institutionalized and complex bureaucratic system aiming to select and promote public officials with superior ability and virtue. Though highly imperfect and in constant flux, it's there, motivated by this ancient Confucian ideal of political meritocracy.

This isn't distinctly Confucian either – the Mohists arguably had a similar view. Even the legalists cared about ability, though not virtue. Shang Yang, who influenced the first emperor of China, suggested measuring merit by counting severed heads of enemy soldiers – a very objective measure. The legalists were skeptical about virtue, thinking it was all hypocrisy. But Confucians insisted on both ability and virtue, with ability meaning more than just military success but serving the community effectively.

Confucian values affect the political system in very concrete ways. In Qufu, the home of Confucian culture in Shandong province, public officials' promotion depends partly on their filial piety. They literally interview candidates' parents – if elderly parents say their child isn't filial, it negatively affects their promotion chances. This would be unthinkable in Canada. But in China, if people can't show reverence and care for their own parents, it's considered difficult for them to extend that care beyond family.

Additionally, becoming a public official requires getting into a good university through the Gaokao (高考) examination system, which includes studying Confucian classics. Students must learn and interpret passages from Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi.

Sometimes Confucian influence comes from the bottom up. The Grave Sweeping Festival became a national holiday because tens of millions of workers would take the day off to pay respect to their ancestors. The government eventually formalized what was already happening.

Keith Yap 30:02

Lee Kuan Yew gave a public lecture about shi nong gong shang (士农工商) , where the scholar is seen as the highest vocation that one should strive for as the ideal life. So in China's political life, it seems the best and most virtuous people should strive to become politicians. This contrasts with America, where the country's culture emulates capitalists, with talent concentrating in the capitalist sector. What do you think of that view?

Daniel Bell 30:49

I think that's right, but remember China is a very diverse country. The Confucian influence is stronger in Shandong province and related areas. In the South, there's much more of an entrepreneurial spirit, closer to the ideal that success means making money.

This manifests in very concrete ways. In most of China, especially the South, the lucky number is eight because it sounds like "making money." You see it on license plates and phones. But in Shandong province, the lucky number is seven. There's a saying, "at qi shang ba xia"(七上八下) – if you're 57 in government, you still have hope for promotion, but at 58, you're on the way down. At my university, an office with number seven would be more prestigious than one with eight.

Keith Yap 32:08

This brings me to my next question about the influence of Marxism in Chinese politics today. Most Western commentators and media have a crude view, equating communism with suppression and lack of political rights. What would be the more nuanced view?

Daniel Bell 32:32

The communist tradition is diverse, though arguably quite new and less diverse than Confucianism. Marx's original vision of communism identified capitalism's problem as capital being owned by capitalists while workers must work to make money – work becomes a means to life rather than life's prime want. The goal was moving toward a society where workers aren't forced to work as a means to life.

How? By developing the economy so advanced machinery does the socially necessary work, meeting people's basic needs and freeing them to realize their creative talents. This requires going through a capitalist process – Marx's theory of history – because only through capitalism can you develop technology effectively, as capitalists must compete to make profit through improving technology.

The byproduct of capitalism is increased technology and better machinery. Eventually, according to Marx, capitalism can be overthrown, moving toward a communist system where technology is owned by the people, machines do necessary work, and people are free to realize their creative talents.

Daniel Bell 38:36

Now in China, Marxism is making a comeback because there's an optimistic view about AI. If managed and regulated for social benefit, several decades from now we might achieve the possibility where advanced machinery does the socially necessary, dirty, dangerous, repetitive work, freeing people to realize their creative talents. This is one reason why Marxism is being revived – the Marxist ideal of communism seems more possible now.

Deng Xiaoping had it right: we need to go through capitalism to develop productive forces, but that's a means to an end. Eventually, we need to move toward a more communist society. This differs from the Confucian ideal of realizing ourselves through harmonious and humane social relations. For Marxists, it's through creative work that we realize our creative essence.

These ideals can conflict in practice. Once, after presenting these ideas in China, a young woman told me she feels this tension – wanting to realize herself through work while owing obligations to elderly parents, creating conflicts in time and energy that aren't easily harmonized.

I think both ideals are important for understanding China's political system. Historically, Marxism became the dominant ideology partly because Marx saw government's ultimate aim as providing for people's material well-being. The Confucians had this view long ago – even Mencius said people need stable property or basic material needs before they can be moral. You can't be moral if you're always struggling for necessities.

Throughout Chinese history, governments have focused on dealing with famine and poverty, long before Western governments considered alleviating poverty as a government obligation. That's one reason Marxism took hold in 20th century China.

The dark side is the Leninist view of Marxism – needing strong central organization to rule and using extreme measures to purge political opponents. This was effective in wartime, helping the communists win the civil war through stronger Leninist organization. But ruling a country in peacetime with that approach can lead to disasters, as happened after 1949.

Keith Yap 38:15

The follow-up question I had regarding Marxism was about the view that the state will fade away once you've extracted everything you can, once your machinery is so advanced. But in China, you argue that's not going to be the case – that the state will continue playing a very strong hand even in the ideal version of itself. Why?
Daniel Bell 38:36

Marx didn't anticipate several developments that are now obvious. He was optimistic about machinery and technology eventually doing socially necessary work. But he didn't anticipate that machinery could become so advanced it could dominate human beings, even posing an existential threat. With AI development, we need a strong state to regulate it, ensuring AI serves human needs and doesn't make us slaves to technology.

Similarly, Marx couldn't anticipate that technology would develop to the point where it could destroy the environment through climate change and global warming. We need a strong state to regulate that too. The same applies to nuclear weapons, pandemics – all existential threats Marx couldn't foresee.

Marx thought once we had advanced machinery and people's basic needs were met, we wouldn't need a state because its main purpose was exercising coercion for the ruling class. Without a ruling class, there'd be no need for a coercive state – it would wither away. But now we know that even with advanced machinery and social equality, we'll still need a state to prevent existential threats.

Keith Yap 40:53

So the state is really there to provide guardrails to ensure the means of production doesn't turn against you.

Daniel Bell 41:03

Yes, that's part of it. But it's not just providing guardrails – until we reach this state of higher communism where people's basic material needs are met through advanced machinery, we need an active state to ensure technology serves people rather than the other way around.

There's a tendency to think one person decides everything in the Chinese political system. In 2012, China faced three major challenges: rampant corruption threatening the political system, a huge rich-poor gap from rapid economic growth causing resentment, and catastrophic environmental consequences from development. These issues had to be dealt with regardless of who was in charge.

That's more or less what happened since 2012 – more emphasis on reducing corruption, income inequality, and promoting environmental sustainability. The current leader is first among equals. The Politburo Standing Committee was changed from nine leaders to seven, making it easier to tackle vested interests blocking necessary changes. This probably would have happened regardless of who was number one.

Keith Yap 45:29

I would say they've made tremendous progress on those three issues. Even when I visited this past year, you could see the widespread electrification of vehicles and improved air quality in major urban cities within just ten years. In 2012, people probably couldn't imagine that.

Keith Yap 45:55

The offshoot of that question would be: looking at Chinese politics, to many outsiders and Western media, it's very opaque. China hasn't been able to translate itself to be sufficiently intelligible to the outside public because they've been so focused on communicating inwards. What are some examples where China hasn't translated itself well to the outside world?

Daniel Bell 46:25

It's related partly to the political system and the anti-corruption campaign. The downside of the anti-corruption campaign is that it makes public officials more conservative and risk-averse. To communicate persuasively to people outside China, you can't just say what's great about China – that sounds like empty propaganda. You need to acknowledge problems and portray China in a more realistic and humane way.

But because of this conservatism in the political system, journalists or academics who try to portray a more balanced picture often run into problems with censorship or authorities. This is recognized privately, even within government, but especially at mid-tier levels, public officials remain very risk-averse.

Even with my recent book, The Dean of Shandong, I tried to show the humanity and humor among public officials and bureaucrats in a balanced way. I got permission from certain officials, but because it's not wholly positive, it hasn't been accepted for publication in mainland China – though it has in Hong Kong, showing Hong Kong's greater academic freedom.

That said, things are improving. Recently, we've seen the phenomenon of "TikTok refugees" moving to Xiaohongshu, the Chinese app. With easy online translation, there's more communication of China's humanity and humor, including problems, which actually does more to promote China's soft power than official attempts to show only the good side.

Keith Yap 50:03

There's also the idea of having proper naming conventions. You've pointed out that they often don't try to promote a softer image overseas or maybe aren't too familiar with linguistic differences.

Daniel Bell 50:24

A clear example was the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony, where they chose the character "He"和 (harmony) to represent Chinese culture. I remember watching on NBC, and the commentators were saying, "Look at this Chinese harmony," pointing to soldiers marching in unison. They said it was scary to have everyone thinking and acting the same way.

But anyone who knows Chinese and Confucius knows that "he" means diversity in harmony rather than sameness or uniformity. The Chinese idea of harmony includes a love of diversity. The metaphors used express this clearly: a soup with only salt won't taste good – you need many ingredients. Music with one note is boring – you need many notes. In politics, this idea was explicitly used to show that a ruler who only listens to one political view will never find out what's wrong and be able to correct it.

Just getting translations right would prevent misunderstandings. The central idea of "he" in Chinese culture should be translated as "diversity in harmony" to prevent misinterpretation.

Keith Yap 52:37

Over the years, the government has changed ministry names to refresh itself. For example, we have Singapore's equivalent to the Ministry of Communication and Information, which would now be the Ministry of Digital Development and Information because of the digital dimension in information transmission.

Daniel Bell 53:01

Some translations of government ministry names are problematic. The Xuanquanbu (宣传部) was originally translated as "propaganda," now "publicity," but that sounds pejorative – "communication" would be more neutral. Or Tongzhanbu, (统战部) "united front" – in wartime, this referred to the communists and Kuomintang uniting against Japan. Now this wartime terminology isn't appropriate and should be changed to reflect new realities.

Even the party secretary role, especially at lower levels of government, isn't mainly about making people follow the party line. In universities, they spend most time smoothing out human relations and handling non-academic work. Western universities don't have party secretaries, which means less censorship, but having someone in charge of social problems can be valuable.

For instance, at Shandong University, we had a serious car accident, and the party secretary had to comfort the parents. We could call them "harmony secretaries." This function, stripped of political censorship, might be worth learning from. Interestingly, with the huge increase in psychotherapy in Chinese history, many therapists were formerly party secretaries because they were skilled at handling human conflict and harmonizing relations.

Keith Yap 55:22

You wrote an interesting essay about how China will look in 2050, painting a vision where meritocracy and democracy could complement each other, with wider political participation while maintaining competent public officials. What would that look like for a more meritocratic and democratic China?

Daniel Bell 55:47

Well, it's hard to know – that essay was quite speculative and involved some humor. The ruling organization now has about 100 million people, maybe 120 million in 20-30 years. That's a huge organization with necessary internal diversity. There's room for much more democracy within the ruling organization.

How to institutionalize this without leading to open conflict and factions is important, but it can't be constantly suppressed. When you talk to people off the record in China, once you have trust, you get very open conversations. There's strong recognition of the need for more democracy within the ruling organization, so all party members have some say in the political system, less top-down than now.

This could take different forms. There could be sortition where people are randomly selected within the ruling organization, as it's already a quality check, to have some say in policy making. There might be more electoral mechanisms and deliberation within the ruling organization.

For those outside the ruling organization, it's important to have lasting legitimacy for the whole political system. This could be implicit or take different forms – perhaps some future AI allowing consultation among the people, or a referendum giving the party 30 years of ruling time, long enough to make decisions affecting future generations and train people for the long term, dealing with issues like climate change without worrying about elections every few years. But after 30 years, there would be some check on the system.

Among intellectuals in China, almost anyone under 50 favors more freedom of speech – it's almost the only thing uniting liberals, socialists, and Confucians. So there could be more freedom of speech, more ways of organizing politically and making voices heard, while recognizing the ruling organization makes final decisions on big issues. That's one way of combining stronger democratic mechanisms with a meritocratic system.

Keith Yap 59:14

What is your critique of cuteness?

Daniel Bell 59:16

It's really odd on the face of it, but East Asian cultures with Confucian heritage share this culture of cuteness – cute animals in social media, emojis. While this exists elsewhere, not to the same extent. Even as a bureaucrat, I would use emojis and happy faces when communicating with other bureaucrats. When I showed my social media to a professor at a leading U.S. university, he laughed and said they definitely don't have this.

The good side of this culture of cuteness is that it softens otherwise hard-edged communication. The downside of meritocracy, very evident in Singapore, is that it creates a hyper-competitive society where people are ambitious and afraid of losing face. This culture of cuteness rebels against that – it's saying we don't care, we just want to enjoy ourselves. It's like a Taoist carefree way of life, counterbalancing the hyper-competitive, ambitious side.

Not coincidentally, it started in Japan with teenage girls developing this culture of cuteness that spread to other countries with Confucian heritage. The downside is when public officials use cuteness to evade responsibility or make jokes when they should be making hard decisions. Take Boris Johnson – I found him very charming, and I'd love to have dinner with him, but when it came to making decisions, he was horrible, evading responsibility and lying.

I saw that flaw in myself as Dean. Sometimes I made jokes and tried to be cute to avoid responsibility and hard decisions. That's the downside of this culture of cuteness.

Keith Yap 1:02:11

In Singapore, we see politicians using social media more to endear themselves rather than communicate policy stances. They follow dance trends and show their official trips. Even in recent American elections, marketing runs on personality more than policy.

Daniel Bell 1:02:55

On the other hand, it's okay for public officials to show their human side, as long as it doesn't take too much time away from thinking about policies that benefit people, and isn't used to evade responsibility and hard decisions.

Keith Yap 1:03:15

You have to find the golden mean – be appropriately cute.

Daniel Bell 1:03:16

Right. Goh Keng Swee had that. He was charming and cute in private, besides being brilliant and creative. I wish I'd taken notes during our meals to tell stories. I just remember being so charmed by him.

Keith Yap 1:03:43

That's what people remember of him as well - privately charming, but much more serious and stale in public.

Daniel Bell 1:03:50

So probably he had the golden mean because you have to take hard decisions, and he certainly didn't let his cuteness get in the way of that.

Keith Yap 1:03:58

You're Canadian yourself and also in China. What's the best part about China and Canada you wish more people knew about?

Daniel Bell 1:04:06

For Canada, there are two lovely parts. First is Montreal, where I'm from. It's a cool and creative city that's also safe, combining order and harmony with love of diversity. It's super creative and bilingual. Like Singapore, most people speak two languages. In Montreal, almost everybody is perfectly bilingual in French and English. Bilingualism lets you imagine yourself through other people's perspectives more easily, leading to more empathy and compassion. The downside is the very cold winter - I haven't been back in winter for many years.

The other part is ice hockey - in Canada we just call it hockey. It's hardly well known elsewhere, but it's such a beautiful sport combining grace and beauty with power. If you like sports, which I do, hockey is the sport that best combines gracefulness with power. There's strong emphasis on passing and deferring to others. Even when you interview hockey players, they're almost Confucian, putting themselves down and saying they're doing everything for the team. Currently, the Montreal Canadiens is perhaps the most exciting young team in hockey.

As for China, it's really a continent, not a country. The differences aren't just between city and rural areas, which are completely different worlds, but between cities too. People in Shanghai and Beijing are very different and often dislike each other. I wrote a book called The Spirit of Cities with my co-author Avner de-Shalit from Jerusalem, trying to articulate some of this. Even within Shandong province, the differences between Jinan and Qingdao are huge.

This diversity within China isn't well known outside. There's also the humanity and humor of everyday life. People think of the political system and politicians who are often deadly boring and stern, but in everyday life and mid-levels of bureaucracy, as I tried to show in my latest book, there's so much humanity and humor that's important to communicate to the rest of the world.

Keith Yap 1:07:54

If there was a spirit of Hong Kong today, what would it look like?

Daniel Bell 1:07:59

Hong Kong is fascinating because it's committed to capitalism - it's in the basic law. Inside a communist country, there's this celebration of making money which can often take ugly forms. Hong Kong has a huge gap between rich and poor, with half the people living in public housing that's terrible compared to Singapore's. The downside of capitalism is very clear.

But you also have this social order. There's a saying that if you drove a Rolls Royce in the poorest parts of the U.S., you'd get rocks thrown at your window. But in Hong Kong's poorest areas, people would admire a gold Rolls Royce. There's this odd respect for wealth, which is quite powerful in Hong Kong.

But it's moderated by a Confucian ethos. Hong Kong didn't go through the revolution which attempted to destroy Confucianism. So everyday family life is very much informed by Confucian ethics and its commitment to serve the family and community, expanding love and care from family to outsiders. This moderates capitalism's excesses. That's how I would articulate Hong Kong's ethos.

Keith Yap 1:09:36

What advice do you usually give to your graduates as they enter the workforce?

Daniel Bell 1:09:40

My students are very diverse. Confucius was a teacher of teachers, with a wonderful model of teaching where he would give contradictory advice to different students depending on their needs and interests. There's no general advice - I need to know the student in all their glorious individuality.

But if there's one general point: the future is absolutely uncertain. The only certainty, if we're lucky enough to avoid war that destroys humanity, is rapid technological and social change. When I was in university, we thought once you found a job, that was it until retirement. Now, especially in Singapore, which is probably doing better than anywhere else at preparing students, there's a need for constant learning and readiness to do completely different things throughout your life.

Keith Yap 1:10:59

Actually, in that light you taught me two lessons. You taught me the right frame to read the Lunyu (论语), the Analects, which is not to take a general view but to appreciate the individual context of each text.

Daniel Bell 1:11:12

It's Confucius and his students, and each student is different. You have to think of it like a play and have background knowledge. He deliberately only says part of what he thinks is correct when teaching students, hoping they'll develop the rest on their own. It's important to understand who the students are, their interests, and what they're famous for in subsequent Chinese history.

This is why the Gaokao is problematic - students must memorize parts of classic texts, including the Analects, and learn the "correct" interpretation. Confucius would be shocked because there's no single correct interpretation. Some are better than others, but interpretations change over time based on new knowledge, new challenges, and who's interpreting in what context. Understanding this is important to make sense of and enjoy the text.

Keith Yap 1:12:14

With that, where can we find your work?

Daniel Bell 1:12:15

My latest book is The Dean of Shandong: Confessions of a Minor Bureaucrat at a Chinese University. It tries to show the humanity and humor while drawing implications from my experiences as dean.

The China Model is more academic, discussing systematically what political meritocracy is, its advantages and disadvantages, and how to reduce the gap between ideal and reality in the Chinese setting.

Just Hierarchy, co-written with Wang Pei, my colleague and wife at the University of Hong Kong, shows that any modern society needs hierarchies. We know which ones are bad - based on race, sex, or class - but which ones are good and why? We theorize about that with many examples. These books are available in the usual places, like Amazon.

Keith Yap 1:13:15

Thank you, Prof, for coming on.

Daniel Bell 1:13:18

Thank you for this engagement. I love your podcast and watched the whole one about Dr. Goh Keng Swee, which was wonderful. I look forward to more of your podcasts and to learning more. Thank you.