Niccolò Machiavelli 尼科洛·马基雅维利

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niccol%C3%B2_Machiavelli

尼科洛·迪·贝尔纳多·德·马基雅维利

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niccol%C3%B2_Machiavelli

（1469-1527）是一位生活在意大利文艺复兴时期的佛罗伦萨外交官、作家、哲学家和历史学家。他最著名的作品是政治论文《君主论》（Il Principe），该书写于1513年左右，但直到他去世五年后的1532年才出版。[6] 他常被称为现代政治哲学和政治学之父。[7]

多年来，他一直担任佛罗伦萨共和国的高级官员，负责外交和军事事务。他还创作过喜剧、狂欢节歌曲和诗歌。他的私人信件对历史学家和意大利书信学者也很重要。[8] 1498年至1512年，他担任佛罗伦萨共和国第二大臣的秘书，当时美第奇家族已失去权力。

马基雅维利去世后，他的名字开始让人联想到他在其著作《君主论》中最为著名的劝诫——那种不择手段的行为。[9] 他关注统治者如何在政治中生存，并知道那些通过欺骗、背叛和犯罪而获得成功的统治者。[10] 他建议统治者在政治需要时可以采取邪恶的手段，并曾指出，成功的政府创始人和改革者应该被原谅杀害反对他们的其他领导人。[11][12][13] 马基雅维利的《君主论》自出版以来就备受争议。有些人认为它是对政治现实的直白描述。许多人将《君主论》视为一本手册，教导未来的暴君如何夺取和维持权力。[14] 即使在近代，一些学者，例如列奥·施特劳斯，也重申了马基雅维利是“邪恶的导师”的传统观点。[15]

尽管马基雅维利以其关于君主制的著作而闻名，但学者们也关注他其他政治哲学著作中的劝诫。《李维论》（约写于1517年）虽然不如《君主论》那么出名，但据说为现代共和主义铺平了道路。[16] 他的作品对启蒙运动作家产生了重大影响，他们重新激发了人们对古典共和主义的兴趣，例如让-雅克·卢梭和詹姆斯·哈灵顿。[17]马基雅维利的政治现实主义持续影响着一代又一代的学者和政治家，他的方法常被拿来与奥托·冯·俾斯麦等人的现实政治进行比较。[18]

尼科洛·马基雅维利
首次发表于2005年9月13日星期二；实质性修订于2023年12月6日星期三
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli/

为什么是马基雅维利？任何人在哲学百科全书中看到关于他的条目，都会自然而然地想到这个问题。毫无疑问，马基雅维利对西方思想中许多重要的论述做出了贡献——其中最突出的是政治理论，但也包括历史和史学、意大利文学、战争原则和外交。但马基雅维利似乎从未将自己视为哲学家——事实上，他经常公开拒绝哲学探究，认为其无关紧要——他的资历也表明他无法适应学院派哲学的标准模式。他的著作体系混乱、前后矛盾，有时甚至自相矛盾，令人发指，臭名昭著。他倾向于诉诸经验和实例，而非严谨的逻辑分析。然而，将马基雅维利列入最伟大的政治哲学家之列，并非没有充分的理由，其中一些理由源于他的著作本身。尽管人们倾向于强调他的政治实用主义，但学术界仍在激烈争论，争论的焦点在于，他的思想核心中是否存在一种连贯而独创的哲学，这种哲学探讨的是哲学家们所关注的议题（Benner 2009；Zuckert 2017、2018；Baluch 2018；Bogiaris 2021）。此外，后来那些更明显有资格被称为一流哲学家的思想家们（现在仍然如此）感到有必要与他的思想互动，要么对其进行批判，要么将其洞见融入自己的学说。即使马基雅维利的思想仅仅停留在哲学的边缘，他广泛思考的影响却广泛而持久。“马基雅维利式的”或“马基雅维利主义”这些术语在关注一系列伦理、政治和心理现象的哲学家中屡见不鲜，无论马基雅维利本人是否发明了“马基雅维利主义”（该术语显然由皮埃尔·培尔在17世纪创造），或者他是否实际上是人们通常所认为的“马基雅维利式的”。马基雅维利对乌托邦哲学体系（例如柏拉图的体系）的批判，以一种引人注目、值得思考和回应的方式挑战了整个政治哲学传统。最后，新一代所谓的“新罗马”政治理论家（如菲利普·佩蒂特[1997]、昆汀·斯金纳[1998]和马

乌里齐奥·维罗利（Urizio Viroli）[1999 [2002]]）从马基雅维利的共和主义版本中汲取了灵感。因此，在任何一部全面的政治哲学著作中，马基雅维利都值得一提。

1. 传记
2. 《君主论》：权力分析
3. 权力、美德与财富
4. 道德、宗教与政治
5. 国家与君主：语言与概念
6. 《论李维》：自由与冲突
7. 大众自由与大众言论
8. 共和派领袖的性格
9. 马基雅维利在西方思想中的地位
参考文献
意大利语一手资料
英译一手资料
二手文献
学术工具
其他网络资源
相关文章
1. 传记
与意大利文艺复兴时期的许多重要人物相比，马基雅维利的早年生活鲜为人知（以下部分引用了 Capponi 2010；Vivanti 2013；Celenza 2015；Lee 2020 的资料）。他于1469年5月3日出生于佛罗伦萨，幼年时师从一位著名的拉丁语教师，保罗·达·龙奇廖内。据推测他曾就读于佛罗伦萨大学，即使粗略浏览他的著作，也能发现他接受过优秀的人文主义教育。然而，直到他进入公众视野，并于1498年被任命为佛罗伦萨共和国第二任总理后，我们才开始对他的生平有完整而准确的了解。在接下来的十四年里，马基雅维利代表佛罗伦萨开展了一系列外交活动，足迹遍布意大利各大城市、法国王室以及马克西米利安一世的帝国教廷。

自1494年起，佛罗伦萨一直处于共和政府的统治之下，当时主要的美第奇家族及其支持者被赶下台。在萨沃纳罗拉领导四年（并最终垮台）之后，佛罗伦萨共和国寻求更稳定的政府，并相应地进行了机构改革。在此期间，马基雅维利投身公共服务，并在终身执政官皮耶罗·索德里尼（Piero Soderini）的庇护下蓬勃发展。索德里尼于1502年当选为终身执政官。在担任公职期间，马基雅维利游历广泛，撰写了大量关于欧洲各地事件的快报（被称为“使节信函”）。他还撰写了私人信件、诗歌和简短的政治分析（Nederman 2023）。然而，在1512年，在西班牙和教皇军队的协助下，美第奇家族击败了共和国的民兵（由马基雅维利组织），并解散了政府。马基雅维利是政权更迭的直接受害者：他立即被解职，并因被（错误地）怀疑密谋反对美第奇家族而于1513年初被监禁并遭受了数周的酷刑。此后，他隐居在佛罗伦萨郊外的家族农场，这为他转向学术追求提供了契机和动力。

他第一部更具反思性的作品，也是最终最常与他的名字联系在一起的作品——《君主论》。《君主论》写于1513年底（或许是1514年初），但直到他去世后的1532年才出版。这部匆忙创作的作者，其动机之一就是试图重拾自己在佛罗伦萨政坛的地位。（他在前共和政府的许多同僚很快便恢复了名誉，并在美第奇家族的领导下重返政坛。）这部作品最初是为献给朱利亚诺·德·美第奇（他很可能很欣赏这部作品）而写的，但在朱利亚诺去世后，献词改为献给小洛伦佐·德·美第奇，而当这部作品于1516年落入小洛伦佐手中时，他几乎肯定没有读过。

与此同时，马基雅维利退出政坛后，他转向了其他文学活动。他创作诗歌、戏剧和短篇散文，撰写了《孙子兵法》研究（出版于1521年），并撰写了传记和历史速写。最重要的是，他撰写了另一部对政治思想的重要贡献——《论提图斯·李维十书》，这部作品以对这位罗马共和国著名历史学家著作的评论为幌子，阐述了共和统治的原则。与《君主论》不同，《论》的写作耗时很长（可能始于1514年或1515年，完成于1518年或1519年，尽管同样是在他去世后的1531年才出版）。这本书的创作可能源于马基雅维利在科西莫·鲁切拉伊的赞助下，与佛罗伦萨一些重要的知识分子和政治人物进行的非正式讨论。

在生命的尽头，或许是得益于他那些人脉广泛的朋友的帮助，他从未停止过恳求他们介入，马基雅维利开始重新获得美第奇家族的青睐。1520年，他受朱利奥·德·美第奇枢机主教委托，撰写一部佛罗伦萨史（即所谓的《佛罗伦萨史》）。这项任务于1525年完成，并呈交给了这位后来已登基的枢机主教。

继位为罗马教皇，即克莱门特七世。美第奇政府还给他安排了一些小任务，但还没等他有机会完全回归公众生活，就于1527年6月21日去世。

2. 君主论：权力分析
传统上，过去的政治哲学家认为道德善与合法权威之间存在着特殊的关系。许多作家（尤其是在中世纪和文艺复兴时期撰写君主之镜或王室忠告书籍的作家）认为，只有当统治者的个人品德严格高尚时，政治权力的行使才是合法的。因此，统治者被劝告，如果他们想要成功——也就是说，如果他们渴望长期和平的统治，并致力于将权力传给继承人——他们必须确保按照传统的道德标准行事，即美德和虔诚。从某种意义上说，人们认为，当统治者行善时，他们就是成功的；他们凭借其道德和宗教正直赢得了被服从和尊重的权利（参见Briggs and Nederman 2022）。

马基雅维利在其最著名的著作《君主论》中对这种道德主义的权威观进行了长篇批判。对马基雅维利而言，没有道德基础来判断权力的合法使用与非法使用之间的区别。相反，权威和权力本质上是平等的：拥有权力的人有权发号施令；但善良并不能确保权力，统治者也不会因为善良而获得更多权威。因此，与源自道德的政治理论截然相反，马基雅维利认为政治中唯一真正关心的是权力的获取和维护（尽管他谈论的与其说是权力本身，不如说是“维护国家”）。从这个意义上讲，马基雅维利对权威的概念进行了尖锐的批判，他认为，合法的统治权利概念对实际拥有权力没有任何帮助。《君主论》旨在体现作者自觉的政治现实主义，他凭借在佛罗伦萨政府任职的亲身经历，深知善与正义不足以赢得并维持政治霸权。因此，马基雅维利致力于学习和教授政治权力的规则。对他而言，任何成功的统治者都必须懂得如何有效地运用权力。马基雅维利认为，只有通过恰当地运用权力，才能使人民服从，统治者才能维护国家的安全和稳定。

因此，马基雅维利的政治理论在政治决策和政治判断的讨论中，将道德权威和合法性问题排除在考虑范围之外。这一点在他对法律与武力关系的处理上体现得最为明显。马基雅维利承认，良好的法律和强大的武器构成了秩序井然的政治体系的双重基础。但他紧接着补充道，由于强制手段能够创造合法性，因此他将重点关注武力。他说：“既然没有好的武器就不可能有好的法律，所以我不考虑法律，而只谈论武器”（《君主论》47）。换句话说，有效的法律完全建立在强制力的威胁之上；对马基雅维利来说，权威作为一种权利，脱离了强制力的执行，是不可能存在的。马基雅维利由此得出结论：对臣民来说，恐惧总是比感情更可取，正如暴力和欺骗在有效控制臣民方面优于法律一样。他观察到，

人们可以普遍地这样描述人类：他们忘恩负义、不忠诚、不真诚、虚伪、畏惧危险、贪图利益……爱是一种义务的纽带，这些可怜的生物会在任何时候觉得合适时打破它；但恐惧却让他们对惩罚的恐惧永不消逝。（《君主论》62；修订版）
因此，马基雅维利实际上不能说他拥有一种独立于权力施加的义务理论；人们服从仅仅是因为他们害怕不服从的后果，无论是失去生命还是特权。当然，权力本身并不能约束一个人，因为义务是自愿的，并且假设一个人可以有意义地做其他事情。只有当一个人拥有反抗统治者的权力，或者愿意承担国家强制力优势所带来的后果时，他才能选择不服从。

因此，马基雅维利在《君主论》中的论证旨在表明，政治只有根据强制力的有效运用才能得到恰当的定义，伊夫·温特（2018）称之为“暴力的命令”。权威作为一种命令的权利，并不具有独立的地位。他通过参考政治事务和公共生活中可观察到的历史和当代现实，以及揭示所有人类行为的自利倾向的论证，来证实这一论断。对马基雅维利来说，这是毫无意义和徒劳的。

任何声称拥有指挥权，却不拥有优越政治权力的统治者，都难免会因这些权利而衰败甚至死亡。因为在政治冲突的混战中，那些崇尚权力而非权威的人更有可能取得成功。毫无例外，如果没有强大的力量支撑，使服从成为必然，那么国家及其法律的权威永远不会被承认。

3. 权力、美德与命运
马基雅维利向读者呈现了一种政治统治的愿景，这种愿景据称已经摆脱了外来的道德影响，并充分认识到有效行使权力是政治的基础。获得服从的方法多种多样，很大程度上取决于君主的远见卓识。因此，成功的统治者需要特殊的训练。最能体现马基雅维利关于成功参与权力政治必须学习的技能的术语是“美德”。虽然意大利语中“virtue”（美德）一词通常会被翻译成英语，并通常传达道德善德的传统含义，但马基雅维利在提及君主的“virtù”（德性）时，显然意味深长。具体而言，马基雅维利使用“virtù”的概念来指君主为了“维护国家”和“成就伟业”（这两者是君主权力的两大标准）而必须具备的一系列个人品质。这毫不留情地表明，传统美德与马基雅维利式的“virtù”之间根本无法等同。因此，马基雅维利对“virtù之人”的理解可以概括为，他建议君主首先必须具备“灵活的性格”。按照马基雅维利的说法，最适合担任公职的统治者能够“根据命运和环境”在善恶之间转换行为（《君主论》66；参见Nederman和Bogiaris 2018）。

马基雅维利在其著作《孙子兵法》中也使用了“美德”（virtù）一词，用来描述将军根据形势变化适应不同战场条件的战略才能，这并非巧合。马基雅维利认为政治是一种不同规模的战场。因此，君主和将军一样，需要具备美德，也就是说，要知道哪些策略和技巧适用于哪些特定情况（Wood 1967）。因此，“美德”最终与马基雅维利的权力概念紧密相关。具有美德的统治者必然善于运用权力；拥有美德（virtù）实际上意味着掌握了与有效运用权力相关的所有规则。美德之于权力政治，就如同传统美德之于那些认为道德良善足以成为合法统治者的思想家：它是政治效力的试金石。

对于马基雅维利来说，美德与权力的有效行使之间有何概念联系？答案在于马基雅维利的另一个核心概念——福尔图纳（Fortuna，通常译为“命运”）。福尔图纳是政治秩序的敌人，是对国家安全保障的终极威胁。马基雅维利对这一概念的运用一直备受争议，但尚未达成令人满意的结论。可以肯定的是，与美德一样，他对福尔图纳的运用也独具特色。传统观念将命运女神视为一位多半仁慈却又反复无常的女神，既是人类福祉的源泉，也是人类邪恶的源泉；而马基雅维利眼中的命运女神，则是邪恶且毫不妥协的源泉，带来人类的苦难、痛苦和灾难。虽然人类的命运女神或许能成就人类的成就，但当女神直接对抗时，任何人都无法有效地行动（《论语 CW》407-408）。

马基雅维利对命运女神最著名的讨论出现在《君主论》第25章，他提出了两个类比来理解人类在面对事件时的处境。首先，他断言命运女神就像

我们毁灭性的河流，当它怒吼时，平原变成湖泊，树木和建筑物被掀翻，泥土从一个地方卷走，又转移到另一个地方；每个人都在洪水面前逃窜；每个人都屈服于它的狂怒，无人能挡。
然而，汹涌河流的狂暴并不意味着它的破坏超出了人类的控制范围：在雨季来临之前，人们可以采取预防措施，转移自然因素带来的最坏后果。“命运女神也面临同样的情况，”马基雅维利观察到，

当美德和智慧尚未做好抵抗的准备时，她便会展现力量；当她知道没有堤坝可以阻挡她时，她便会发泄愤怒。（《君主论》第90页）
命运或许会被人类抵抗，但只有在“美德和智慧”已经为她不可避免的到来做好了准备的情况下。

马基雅维利强调了这种关联

他解释说，政治上的成功取决于对命运女神运作原则的理解，以此来将命运女神与自然的盲目力量联系起来。他自身的经验告诉他，

冲动胜于谨慎，因为命运女神是女人，为了控制她，必须殴打她、折磨她。
换句话说，命运女神要求那些想要控制她的人做出暴力回应。“她更容易被那些使用这种手段的男人打败，而不是被那些冷漠行事的人打败，”马基雅维利继续说道，“因此，她总是像女人一样，是年轻男人的朋友，因为他们更不谨慎，更有活力，也更大胆地控制她。”（《君主论》92）命运女神的放荡行为要求她做出咄咄逼人、甚至暴力的回应，以免她利用那些过于内敛或“女性化”而无法控制她的男人。

马基雅维利的言论指向了关于命运女神及其在他思想世界中地位的几个突出结论。在他的整个著作中，命运女神被描绘成暴力的根源（尤其是针对人类的暴力），并且与理性背道而驰。因此，马基雅维利意识到，只有做好准备，对命运女神的变幻莫测做出极端的回应，才能确保战胜她。这就是美德所提供的：在任何必要时刻，以任何必要方式应对命运的能力。

4. 道德、宗教与政治
马基雅维利思想的这些基本组成部分早在16世纪就在他的读者中引发了相当大的争议，当时他被斥为魔鬼的使徒，但也被那些宣扬“国家理性”理论的作家（和政治家）以同情的态度阅读和运用（Meinecke 1924 [1957]）。争议的主要根源在于马基雅维利对人类行为的传统道德和宗教标准的态度，这主要体现在《君主论》中。对许多人来说，他的教义宣扬的是非道德主义，或者至少是非道德主义。这种解读最极端的版本认为马基雅维利是“邪恶的导师”，用列奥·施特劳斯（1958：9-10）的名言来说，因为他建议领导者远离正义、仁慈、节制、智慧和爱民等普遍价值观，而应选择使用残忍、暴力、恐惧和欺骗。贝内代托·克罗齐（1925）等较为温和的思想流派认为马基雅维利只是一个“现实主义者”或“实用主义者”，主张在政治事务中摒弃普遍的伦理道德。道德价值观在政治领导人必须做出的决策中没有地位，否则就是犯下最严重的范畴错误。或许，最温和的非道德假说版本是由昆汀·斯金纳（Quentin Skinner，1978）提出的，他声称统治者实施被传统视为邪恶的行为是“最后最佳”的选择。斯金纳聚焦于《君主论》中的主张，即国家元首如果能够行善，就应该行善；但如果必须作恶，就必须做好作恶的准备（《君主论》CW 58），并指出，在其他条件不变的情况下，马基雅维利更倾向于顺从而非道德美德。

对伦理问题的漠视也渗透在20世纪早期和中期流行的观点中，即马基雅维利只是采取了科学家的立场——某种“政治界的伽利略”——来区分政治生活的“事实”和道德判断的“价值”（Olschki，1945；Cassirer，1946；Prezzolini，1954[1967]）。因此，他被置于更普遍的科学革命背景中。马基雅维利式“科学”的宗旨并非区分“正义”与“非正义”的政府形式，而是解释政客如何运用权力谋取私利。因此，与亚里士多德那套充斥着古典规范的美德政治学观形成鲜明对比的是，马基雅维利堪称“现代”政治学的奠基人。近年来，将马基雅维利视为科学家的解读已基本失宠（Viroli 1998 1-3），尽管最近有人认为该论题的修订版有其价值（例如 Dyer and Nederman 2016）。

马基雅维利的其他读者并未在他的思想中发现任何不道德或非道德主义的污点。让-雅克·卢梭很久以前就认为，《君主论》的真正教诲在于教导民众君主行为的真相，从而揭露而非颂扬一人统治核心的不道德（引自Connell，2005，178）。近年来，这一论点的各种版本广为流传。一些学者，例如加勒特·马丁利（1958），称马基雅维利是顶尖的讽刺作家，指出君主及其顾问的弱点。马基雅维利后来创作了尖刻的通俗舞台喜剧，这一事实也被引用作为其强烈讽刺倾向的证据。因此，我们不应轻信马基雅维利关于道德行为的言论，而应将其理解为对公共事务的尖锐幽默评论。

玛丽·戴茨（Mary Deitz，1986）则认为，马基雅维利的议程旨在通过提供精心设计的建议（例如武装人民）来“诱捕”君主，而这些建议如果被认真采纳并执行，就能推翻君主。

关于马基雅维利对宗教，尤其是基督教的态度，也存在类似的观点。马基雅维利并不认同他所理解的制度化的基督教教会。《论君主论》明确指出，传统的基督教会削弱了人类积极公民生活所需的活力（《论君主论》228-229，330-331）。而《君主论》对教会及其教皇的当代状况既鄙视又赞赏（《论君主论》29，44-46，65，91-92）。许多学者认为，这些证据表明马基雅维利本人是彻头彻尾的反基督教者，他更倾向于罗马等古代社会的异教公民宗教，认为这些宗教更适合一个拥有美德的城市。安东尼·帕雷尔（1992）认为，马基雅维利的宇宙观受星辰运行和体液平衡的支配，本质上带有异教和前基督教的色彩。对另一些学者而言，马基雅维利或许更适合被描述为一个秉持传统（即便缺乏热情）虔诚的人，他愿意屈从于外在的崇拜，但无论是在灵魂还是精神上，都未曾深深地信奉基督教的教义。少数持不同意见的人，尤其是塞巴斯蒂安·德·格拉齐亚（1989）和毛里齐奥·维罗利（2006 [2010]），试图挽救马基雅维利的声誉，使其免受那些认为他敌视或漠视基督教的人的攻击。《格拉齐亚》展现了圣经的核心主题如何贯穿马基雅维利的著作，并揭示了以神为中心、秩序井然的宇宙观，其中其他力量（“天道”、“命运”等等）都被纳入神的意志和计划之中。卡里·内德曼扩展并系统化了格拉齐亚的洞见，展示了恩典、自由意志和祈祷等基督教神学核心教义如何构成马基雅维利概念框架的重要元素（2009：28-49；内德曼和拉胡德，2023）。相比之下，维罗利则考察了马基雅维利时代佛罗伦萨共和国对基督教的历史态度。

5. 国家与君主：语言与概念
马基雅维利也被认为（最近一次是斯金纳，1978年）首次提出了“现代国家概念”。该概念在韦伯的广义理解下，是指在固定领土边界内拥有强制性权力垄断权的非人格化统治形式。当然，“lo stato”（国家）一词在马基雅维利的著作中广泛出现，尤其是在《君主论》中，与强制权力的获取和运用有关，这使得其含义与其衍生自拉丁语“status”（地位或条件）的含义截然不同。此外，学者们还指出，马基雅维利在塑造早期现代围绕“国家理性”（即国家本身的利益优先于所有其他考虑，无论是道德还是公民的利益）的辩论中发挥了影响，以此证明他被其近同代人视为一位国家理论家（Meineke，1924[1957]）。马基雅维利的名字和学说被广泛援引，以证明专制主义时代国家利益的优先性。

然而，正如哈维·曼斯菲尔德（1996）所指出的，仔细解读马基雅维利在《君主论》及其他著作中对“国家”（lo stato）一词的运用，并不能支持这种解读。马基雅维利的“国家”仍然是个人的遗产，一种更符合中世纪“主权”（dominium）作为统治基础的观念的财产。（Dominium是一个拉丁语词，可以同样有力地翻译为“私有财产”和“政治统治权”。）因此，“国家”实际上归任何恰好控制它的君主所有。此外，治理的性质取决于统治者的个人品质和特质——因此，马基雅维利强调美德（virtù）是君主成功不可或缺的要素。《君主论》中对“国家”一词运用的这些方面，削弱了其思想的“现代性”。正如曼斯菲尔德所总结的那样，马基雅维利充其量只是国家语言在近代早期欧洲兴起过程中的一个过渡人物。

在评估马基雅维利在《君主论》中的理论的普遍适用性时，必须牢记的另一个因素源于他的“德性君主”所处的境况。这样的统治者并非凭借王朝传承或民众支持而掌权，而是纯粹凭借自身的主动性、技能、才能和/或力量（所有这些词在英语中都与“德性”对应，取决于其在文本中的位置）。因此，如上所述，马基雅维利式的君主不能依赖任何先前存在的合法性结构。因此，为了“维护他的国家”，他只能依靠自己的力量。

君主凭借丰富的个人特质来指导权力的运用，并确立其统治权。这是一个岌岌可危的处境，因为马基雅维利坚持认为，命运的阵痛和他人的阴谋使君主时刻面临失去国家的风险。在马基雅维利的君主政体构想中，反映现代政治思想（和实践）基调的稳定宪政体制的理念却毫无踪影。

事实上，人们或许会怀疑，尽管马基雅维利号称现实主义，但他是否真的相信一位德性十足的君主真的存在？他有时似乎设想，一位成功的君主必须发展出一种与人类迄今为止所知完全不同的心理状态，因为这位“新”君主

准备好随着命运之风和不断变化的环境的约束而改变自己的行为……并且……尽可能不偏离正确的行为，但在必要时也能够走上错误的道路。 (MP 62)
这种灵活性构成了马基雅维利为寻求维护国家统治者提供的“实用”建议的核心：不排除任何不可控的行动方案，但要时刻准备着执行政治环境所需的任何行动。

然而，马基雅维利本人似乎对人类是否能够在心理上产生这种灵活的倾向心存严重怀疑。尽管马基雅维利列举了大量的历史事例，但他在《君主论》中却未能指出任何一位统治者展现出他认为完全掌控命运所必需的那种多变的美德。相反，他对成功统治者的案例研究反复指出，君主的性格特征与其时代相符，但如果环境发生变化，其行为的一致性（例如教皇朱利叶斯二世的情况）“将导致其垮台”（《君主论》CW 92）。即使是马基雅维利所推崇的塞维鲁皇帝，也因其“为巩固权力所采取的必要行动”而成功；然而，他并非人人皆可效仿（《君主论》73）。马基雅维利对塑造一种新的、心理灵活的性格类型的可能性的评估极其谨慎，并且倾向于使用条件句和虚拟语气：“如果一个人能够根据时代和环境改变自己的性格，那么他总是会成功的”（《君主论》91，修订版）。这样的观察不禁让我们怀疑，马基雅维利关于君主应根据环境而获得不同性格的建议是否真的像他所宣称的那样“实用”（即使在他自己看来也是如此）。

6. 《李维史论》：自由与冲突
虽然《君主论》无疑是马基雅维利最广为流传的作品，但《李维史论》或许最真实地表达了马基雅维利的个人政治信仰和承诺，尤其是他对共和主义的同情。《李维史论》无疑借鉴了与《君主论》相同的语言和概念，但前者却引导我们得出与后者截然不同的结论——许多学者认为后者与前者相矛盾。尤其是在这两部作品中，马基雅维利始终如一地清晰地区分了“政治”或“公民”秩序的最低限度概念与完整概念，并由此在其对公共生活的总体论述中构建了一个目标的层级结构。最低限度的宪政秩序是指臣民安居乐业（vivere sicuro），由强大的政府统治，既能抑制贵族（grandi）的欲望，又能通过其他法律和制度机制保持平衡。然而，在完全宪政的政体中，政治秩序的目标是共同体的自由（vivere libero），这种自由是由贵族和人民的积极参与和相互竞争所创造的（Pedullà 2011 [2018]）。正如昆汀·斯金纳（Quentin Skinner，2002，189-212）所论证的，自由构成了马基雅维利政治理论的基石，并指导他对不同类型政体价值的评估。只有在马基雅维利明确表达了偏好的共和国，这一目标才能实现。

马基雅维利采取这一立场既出于务实的考虑，也出于原则性的考量。在佛罗伦萨共和国担任秘书和外交官期间，他积累了丰富的法国政府内部运作经验，这成为他构建“安全”（但非自由）政体的典范。尽管马基雅维利在《君主论》中对法国君主制的评论相对较少，但他在《论法国》中却对法国倾注了大量心血。

为什么马基雅维利会在一部旨在宣扬共和国优越性的著作中，如此热情地赞扬（更遑论分析）世袭君主制？答案在于，马基雅维利的目的是将“君主制”与“君主制”的最佳情况进行对比。

君主政体，却拥有共和政体的制度和组织。在马基雅维利看来，即使是最优秀的君主政体，也缺乏某些显著的特质，而这些特质正是正当的共和政体所特有的，也正是这些特质使得共和政体比君主更可取。

马基雅维利断言，法兰西王国及其国王的最大美德在于对法律的执着。“法兰西王国比我们所知的任何其他王国都更受法律的约束”，马基雅维利宣称（《论语》314，修订版）。马基雅维利对这种情况的解释是高等法院的功能。他指出：“法兰西王国比任何其他王国都更受法律和秩序的约束。这些法律和秩序由高等法院，尤其是巴黎高等法院来维护：每当高等法院对王国的君主采取行动或在其判决中谴责国王时，这些法律和秩序都会得到更新。迄今为止，高等法院一直通过坚持不懈地执行反对贵族的法律来维护自身。（《论辩》CW 422，修订译本）
《论辩》的这些段落表明，马基雅维利对法国的制度安排十分钦佩（Nederman 2023: 52-55）。具体而言，法国国王和贵族的权力之大，足以压迫民众，但他们却受到由独立权威的高等法院强制执行的国内法律的制约。因此，肆无忌惮的暴政行为的机会在很大程度上被消除，使君主制变得温和而“文明”。

然而，无论这样的政体多么井然有序、守法，都与“自由生活”（vivere libero）格格不入。在探讨君主满足人民自由愿望的能力时，马基雅维利评论道：

就……民众恢复自由的愿望而言，君主既然无法满足他们，就必须审视他们渴望自由的原因。（《论语》CW 237）。
他的结论是，少数人渴望自由仅仅是为了指挥他人；他认为，这些人数量足够少，要么被消灭，要么用荣誉收买。相比之下，绝大多数人混淆了自由和安全，以为前者与后者相同：“但所有其他人，他们是无限的，渴望自由是为了安全地生活（vivere sicuro）”（《论语》CW 237）。虽然国王无法赋予大众这种自由，但他可以提供他们渴望的安全：

至于其余的人，只要安全地生活（vivere sicuro）就足够了，他们很容易通过制定命令和法律来满足，这些命令和法律与国王的权力一起，包含了每个人的安全。一旦君主做到了这一点，并且人民看到他从不违反这些法律，他们很快就会开始过上安全而满足的生活（vivere sicuro）（《论语 CW》237）。
马基雅维利随后将这一普遍原则直接应用于法国，他指出：

人民生活安全（vivere sicuro）的唯一原因就是它的国王受制于无数的法律，这些法律涵盖了全体人民的安全。（《论语 CW》237）
法国政??体的守法特征确保了安全，但这种安全虽然令人向往，却绝不能与自由混为一谈。这就是君主制的极限：即使是最好的王国，也只能保证其人民享有安宁有序的政府。

马基雅维利认为，这种“安全生活”的后果之一就是人民的解除武装。他评论说，无论“他的王国多么强大”，法国国王都“过着向外国雇佣兵进贡的生活”。

这一切都源于他解除了人民的武装，并且宁愿……享受掠夺人民的眼前利益，避免想象中的而非真实的危险，而不是去做那些能够保障人民安全、使国家永久幸福的事情。这种混乱，如果能带来一些平静的时期，最终也会导致困境、损害和无法挽回的毁灭（《论语》410）。
一个将安全置于首位的国家无力武装其民众，因为担心民众会用武器对抗贵族（或许是王室）。然而，与此同时，这样的政权也无可挽回地被削弱，因为它必须依靠外国人为其作战。从这个意义上讲，任何以“安全生活”为目标的政府，都不可避免地会导致民众消极无能。从定义上讲，这样的社会永远不可能是马基雅维利所理解的“自由生活”（vivere libero）意义上的自由，因此它只是最低限度的政治或公民社会，而非完全的。

马基雅维利对君主制局限性的这种解读，可以从他在《孙子兵法》中对人民裁军及其影响的进一步探讨中找到佐证。在探讨公民军队是否优于雇佣军的问题时，他

坚持认为，一个国家的自由取决于其臣民的军事准备。马基雅维利承认“（法国）国王解除了人民的武装，以便能够更容易地指挥他们”，但他仍然得出结论：“这种政策……是这个王国的一个缺陷，因为未能处理好这个问题正是使其软弱的唯一原因”（《法国宪法》第584条、第586-587条）。在他看来，剥夺人民的军事角色可能给国家带来的任何好处，都不如这种解除武装必然伴随的自由的丧失重要。问题不仅仅在于一个解除武装国家的统治者受制于外国的军事力量。马基雅维利认为，更重要的是，一支配备武器的民兵队伍，是确保政府或篡位者不会对民众施暴的终极保障：“罗马自由四百年，并拥有武装；斯巴达八百年；许多其他城邦在不到四十年的时间里，手无寸铁，却拥有自由。”（《宪法》第585条）马基雅维利坚信，公民将永远为争取自由而战——反抗内外压迫。事实上，这正是历代法国君主让人民解除武装的原因：他们力求维护公共安全和秩序，对他们而言，这意味着消除臣民任何使用武器的机会。法国政权将安全置于一切之上（无论是人民还是统治者），因此不能允许马基雅维利认为的促进自由的主要手段。

裁军的例子体现了法国等最低限度宪政体制与罗马共和国等完全政治化共同体之间更大的差异，即社会中阶级地位的差异。根据马基雅维利的观察，在法国，人民完全被动，贵族在很大程度上依赖于国王。相比之下，在像罗马这样高度发达的共和国，自由的实现至高无上，人民和贵族都在自治中扮演着积极（有时甚至相互冲突）的角色（McCormick 2011; Holman 2018）。对马基雅维利而言，整体的自由取决于其组成部分的自由。在他著名的《论语》中，他对此主题进行了著名的探讨，并评论道：

在我看来，那些谴责贵族与平民之间骚乱的人，似乎恰恰是在挑剔罗马保留自由的根本原因……他们没有意识到，每个共和国都存在两种不同的倾向：人民的倾向和伟人的倾向，所有有利于自由的立法都是由他们的分歧产生的（《论语 CW》202-203）。
马基雅维利知道自己在这里采取了一种不同寻常的视角，因为罗马共和国的崩溃通常被归咎于最终将其分裂的敌对派系。但马基雅维利认为，正是同样的冲突产生了一种“创造性的张力”，而这种张力正是罗马自由的源泉。因为“那些被许多人轻率谴责的骚乱”直接催生了罗马的良好法律和公民的道德行为（《论语 CW》202）。因此，

人民与元老院之间的敌意应该被视为一种不便，为了罗马的伟大，必须忍受这种不便。（《论语》CW 211）
马基雅维利认为，其他共和模式（例如斯巴达或威尼斯所采用的模式）将产生更弱、更不成功的政治体系，这些体系要么停滞不前，要么在环境变化时容易衰败。

7. 大众自由与大众言论
马基雅维利对人民促进公共自由的能力表现出特别的信心。在《论语》中，他认为民众在各种情况下都拥有相当广泛的能力来为公共利益做出判断和行动，并明确地将普通公民的“审慎和稳定”与君主的不健全判断力进行了对比。简而言之，“人民比君主更审慎、更稳定，判断力也更强”（《论语》CW 316）。这并非马基雅维利个人偏好的任意表达。他认为，人民比君主或贵族更关心自由，也更愿意捍卫自由（《论语》204-205）。后者将自由与统治和控制人民的能力混为一谈，而群众更关心的是保护自己免受压迫，当他们没有受到更强大势力的虐待或威胁时，他们就认为自己是“自由的”（《论语》203）。反过来，当普通公民担心这种压迫的发生时，他们更倾向于反对并捍卫共同自由。人民的这种积极作用，虽然对于维护至关重要的公共自由是必要的，但从根本上来说，与……相悖。

君主制“安全生活”（vivere sicuro）所依赖的等级服从与统治结构。“自由生活”（vivere libero）的前提条件根本不利于君主立宪制所追求的安全。

马基雅维利认为安全与自由最终无法兼容——而后者更受青睐——的主要原因之一无疑可以追溯到其共和主义的“修辞”特征。马基雅维利明确地将言论视为解决共和公共领域冲突最合适的方法；在《论辩》中，辩论被提升为人民确定最明智行动方针和最合格领导者的最佳手段。他显然熟悉古典修辞学的传统，这种传统将公开演讲与争论直接联系在一起：在法庭和协商式修辞领域，言语的恰当运用是在对抗性的环境中进行的，每位演讲者都试图说服听众相信自身立场的有效性以及对手立场的无力。中世纪晚期的意大利修辞学实践者和理论家也探讨了这一主题，他们强调修辞学的主题是“轻盈”（冲突）。因此，马基雅维利坚持将争论作为自由的先决条件，也反映了他的修辞偏好（Viroli 1998）。相比之下，君主政体——即使是像法国这样最安全的君主制——也会排除或限制公开话语，从而使自身处于明显的劣势。说服一位统治者采取灾难性或错误的行动，远比说服众多民众容易得多。公众讨论的不确定性自由所引发的明显“骚动”，最终使得比宫廷的闭门谈话更有利于公共利益的决策。

这与《罗马政治论》中的主张相呼应，即社会中的民众构成了公民自由的最佳保障，也是公共利益决策的最可靠来源。马基雅维利对人民在维护共和国中所发挥的作用的赞扬，源于他对公共言论对公民群体普遍具有启发性影响的信心。在《罗马政治论》第一卷开篇，他指出，有些人可能会反对罗马人民享有的广泛集会、抗议和否决法律和政策的自由。但他回应说，罗马人之所以能够

维持自由和秩序，是因为人民在公共利益展现于他们面前时，能够辨别它。当普通罗马公民错误地认为某项法律或制度旨在压迫他们时，他们可以通过集会来说服自己，承认自己的信念是错误的……（通过）集会的补救措施，在集会上，一些有影响力的人会站起来发表演讲，指出他们是如何自欺欺人的。正如塔利所说，人民虽然无知，但能够理解真理，并且当一个值得信赖的人说出真相时，他们很容易屈服（《论语》CW 203）。
塔利，即西塞罗（《论语》中为数不多的西塞罗之一），证实了马基雅维利在此想到的是古典共和主义的一个关键特征：当才华横溢的演说家真诚地谈论公共福祉时，人民有能力回应并支持他的言论。

马基雅维利在《论语》第一卷的结尾再次谈到了这个主题，并进行了更深入的探讨。在旨在论证民治优于君主制的章节中，他指出，只要在共同体中留有公开演讲和商议的空间，人民就能井然有序，因此“审慎、稳定、感恩”。马基雅维利引用“民之声，天之声”这一说法，坚称

舆论的预测极其准确……就舆论的判断而言，当听到两位技艺高超的演说家分别主张不同的方案时，人们很少会发现民众没有采纳更好的观点，或无法理解其所听到内容的真相（《论语》第316页）。
在马基雅维利看来，当演说家们提出相互竞争的方案时，民众不仅能够辨别最佳行动方案，而且实际上比君主更有资格做出决策。例如，

人民永远无法被说服，任命一个臭名昭著或腐败的人担任公职是件好事，而君主却可以轻易地、以各种各样的方式被说服这样做。（《论语》第316页）
同样，如果人民背离守法之路，他们也很容易被说服恢复秩序：

对于一个不受控制、动荡不安的人民来说，一个好人可以轻易地引导他们回到正道。但没有人能与一个邪恶的君主对话，唯一的解药就是钢铁……要治愈人民的弊病，言语就足够了。（《论语》第317页）
马基雅维利的对比是鲜明的。一个由言语和人统治的共和国

总而言之，以公共言论为主导的说服力几乎肯定能够实现其公民的共同利益；即使它犯了错误，也始终可以通过进一步的讨论寻求帮助。非共和政体由于排除或限制了话语实践，最终依赖于强制性统治，只能通过暴力手段来纠正。

8. 共和领袖的性格
马基雅维利支持共和政体的论证也诉诸于他对任何个人获得美德的怀疑态度，因此也暗示了一个真正稳定的君主国可能永远无法实现。马基雅维利式的二分法，即对灵活性的需求与不可避免的性格恒常性，其效果在于揭示单一统治者政体固有的实践局限性。读者很容易得出这样的结论：正因为人类行为根植于坚定不移的性格，所以单人统治本质上是不稳定的、岌岌可危的。在《论语》中，马基雅维利提供了一个心理学案例，即人类性格的现实往往有利于共和国而非君主国，因为前者“由于公民的多样性，比君主更能适应不同的环境”（《论语》253）。

马基雅维利以罗马对抗汉尼拔的军事战略演变为例，阐述了这一观点。在迦太基将军在意大利取得初步胜利之后，罗马的形势需要一位审慎谨慎的领导者，他不会让军团在毫无准备的情况下采取激进的军事行动。这样的领导力体现在法比乌斯·马克西姆斯身上，“他凭借自己的缓慢和谨慎，将敌人挡在了海湾。他所遇到的情况也再适合不过了”（《论语》452）。然而，当需要采取更具进攻性的姿态来击败汉尼拔时，罗马共和国却选??择了西庇阿作为领导，他的个人品质更符合当时的时代特征。法比乌斯和西庇阿都未能摆脱“其行事方式和习惯”（《论语》452），但罗马能够在适当时机调动他们的力量，这在马基雅维利看来，表明了共和体制的内在力量。

如果法比乌斯是罗马国王，他很可能输掉这场战争，因为他无法根据形势变化调整策略。然而，由于他出生在一个公民构成多元、性格各异的共和国，正如共和国拥有一个在形势需要时能够维持战争的最佳人选法比乌斯一样，后来共和国也拥有一个在适合战争胜利的时期能够胜任的西庇阿（《论语》452）。
不断变化的事件需要灵活的应对方式，而从心理学角度来看，人的性格不可能随着时代而改变，因此共和国提供了一种可行的替代方案：不同品质的人能够适应不同的紧急情况。公民政体的多样性特征曾被马基雅维利的前辈们所诟病，但事实证明，这恰恰是共和国相较于君主国的持久优势。

这并不意味着马基雅维利对共和政府能够弥补人类性格中政治缺陷的能力抱有十足的信心。毕竟，他并没有真正揭示共和国是如何甄别并授权那些与时俱进的领导人的。观察到共和国内部存在这种多样性是一回事，而证明这是共和体制的必要或本质特征则是另一回事。因此，马基雅维利充其量只是为我们提供了一种经验性的概括，其理论基础他并未深入探讨。而《论君主》则指出，共和国在应对命运所需的灵活性方面，存在着其自身的内在局限性。正如个人一样，改变其个性特征即使并非不可能，也十分困难，

共和国的制度也不会随着时代而变迁……而是缓慢地变化，因为改变制度更加痛苦，必须等到整个共和国都陷入动荡；而单凭一人之力改变自身的程序是不够的。（《君主论》CW 453）

如果说君主制的衰落源于人类性格的固有结构，那么共和国的衰败则源于对过时制度安排的执着追求。《君主论》并未直接探讨，与要求君主个人特质灵活变通相比，对建立更具响应能力的共和制度抱有希望是否更为合理。

因此，马基雅维利似乎坚持一种真正的共和立场。但我们如何才能将这一点与他在《君主论》中的论述相协调呢？人们很容易将《君主论》视为马基雅维利“真实”观点的虚假表达。

以及他的偏好，这些著作都是在短时间内写成的，目的是向佛罗伦萨归来的美第奇家族大师们证明他的政治价值。（这与《论王论》漫长的创作过程形成了鲜明对比。）然而，马基雅维利从未否定过《君主论》，事实上，他在《论王论》中对《君主论》的引用方式表明，他视前者为后者的姊妹篇。尽管关于马基雅维利究竟是君主和暴君的朋友，还是共和国的朋友，以及因此我们是否应该将他作品的某一方面视为辅助或边缘，存在诸多争论，但这些问题似乎无法解答。因此，马克·胡利翁（Mark Hulliung）认为“两位”马基雅维利都应该得到同等重视，这颇具道理（Hulliung 1983）。

9. 马基雅维利在西方思想中的地位
在马基雅维利的思想中，什么是“现代”或“原创”？马基雅维利在西方思想史上的“地位”又是什么？探讨这一问题的文献数量，尤其是与《君主论》和《论辩》相关的文献，已发展到令人咋舌的程度。例如，约翰·波考克（1975）追溯了马基雅维利共和思想在所谓的大西洋世界的传播，特别是影响了指导美国宪法制定者的思想。保罗·拉赫（2008）则认为存在着类似的影响，但其思想实质和意义与波考克不同。在波考克看来，马基雅维利的共和主义属于公民人文主义，其根源可追溯至古典时代；而在拉赫看来，马基雅维利的共和主义则完全是新颖而现代的。“新罗马”思想家（其中最著名的是佩蒂特、斯金纳和维罗利）将马基雅维利作为其“自由即非支配”原则的源泉，而他也被运用到捍卫民主准则和价值观的活动中（McCormick 2011）。同样，也有人认为马基雅维利的政治道德观、国家观念、宗教观点以及其著作的许多其他特征是其贡献独创性的独特基础。

然而，学术界尚未得出确切的结论。（Johnston 等人 2017 年的论文很好地体现了当前马基雅维利研究中悬而未决的局面。）对于这些“现代性”与“独创性”问题无法解决，一个合理的解释是，马基雅维利在某种意义上陷入了创新与传统、古老道路与现代道路（借用 Janet Coleman 1995 年的说法）之间的困境，这导致他的思想整体乃至个别文本内部都产生了概念上的张力（Nederman 2009）。这种历史的模糊性使得学者们能够对关于他基本立场的矛盾主张提出同样令人信服的论证，而不会显得对其学说进行了过分的破坏。这一点与某些学者的指责不同，他们指责马基雅维利从根本上自相矛盾（参见Black 2022）或仅仅受“地方”议程驱使（Celenza 2015）。更确切地说，马基雅维利独特的政治方法的显著特征应该归因于历史环境与思想可能性之间的不协调。马基雅维利之所以成为一位令人不安却又发人深省的思想家，是因为他试图得出与受众普遍期望不同的结论，同时又融入了他所挑战的那些传统观念的重要特征。尽管他一再宣称自己的独创性（例如，《君主论》第10卷，第57-58页），但他对既有传统的谨慎关注意味着他始终无法完全摆脱自身思想的局限。因此，马基雅维利实际上不应被归类为纯粹的“古代”或“现代”，而应被定位于两者之间的夹缝之中（佩杜拉（Pedullà）2023 最近强调了这一点，他认为“马基雅维利就像神话中的雅努斯，罗马神话中掌管开始和结束的神……”[xi]）。

参考书目
意大利语主要资料
马基雅维利，《歌剧》，科拉多·维万蒂编，三卷本，都灵：艾诺第-伽利玛出版社，1997年。
英文译本主要资料
[CW] 马基雅维利：《主要著作及其他》，艾伦·H·吉尔伯特编，三卷本，连续页码，北卡罗来纳州达勒姆：杜克大学出版社，1965年。
《君主论》（第一卷，第10-96页）
《论提图斯·李维的第一个十年》（第一卷，第175-532页）
《孙子兵法》（第二卷，第561-726页）
[MP] 《君主论》，昆汀·斯金纳和罗素·普莱斯编，（《剑桥政治思想史文本》），剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1988年。
[MF] 马基雅维利《马基雅维利和他的朋友们：他们的私人通信》，詹姆斯·B·阿特金森和戴维·西斯编，伊利诺伊州迪卡尔布：北伊利诺伊大学出版社，1996年。
二手文献
Anglo出版社，悉尼，2005年，《马基雅维利：公元一世纪》（牛津-沃伯格研究），牛津：牛津大学出版社。
Baluch, Faisal，2018年，《作为哲学家的马基雅维利》，《政治评论》，80(2): 289–300。doi:10.1017/S0034670517001097
埃里卡·本纳，2009，《马基雅维利的伦理学》，普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社。
–––，2013，《马基雅维利的君主论：新解读》，牛津：牛津大学出版社。doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653638.001.0001
纪尧姆·博贾里斯，2021，《马基雅维利的柏拉图问题：新柏拉图主义、爱欲、神话构建和马基雅维利思想中的哲学》，马里兰州兰纳姆：列克星敦出版社。
罗伯特·布莱克，2022，《马基雅维利：从激进到反动》，伦敦：Reaktion出版社。
查尔斯·F·布里格斯 (Charles F. Briggs) 和卡里·J·内德曼 (Cary J. Nederman)，2022年，《基督教西方君主的镜像（12-15世纪）》，载《“君主的镜像”文学指南》，诺埃尔-莱蒂西亚·佩雷 (Noëlle-Laetitia Perret) 和斯特凡·佩基尼奥 (Stéphane Péquignot) 编，莱顿：布里尔出版社，160-196页。
尼科洛·卡波尼 (Niccolò Capponi)，2010年，《一位不太可能的君主：马基雅维利的生平与时代》，马萨诸塞州剑桥：达卡波出版社。
恩斯特·卡西尔 (Ernst Cassirer)，1946年，《国家的神话》，康涅狄格州纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社。
克里斯托弗·S·塞伦扎 (Christopher S. Celenza)，2015年，《马基雅维利：肖像》，马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社。
Coleman, Janet，1995，《马基雅维利的现代之路：中世纪与文艺复兴时期的历史态度》，《尼科洛·马基雅维利的君主论：新的跨学科论文集》，Martin Coyle主编，英国曼彻斯特：曼彻斯特大学出版社，40-64页。
Connell, William（主译），2005，《尼科洛·马基雅维利著《君主论》及相关文献集》，波士顿：贝德福德/圣马丁出版社。
Croce, Benedetto，1925，《政治要素》，巴里：Laterza & Figli出版社。
Dietz, Mary G.，1986，《诱捕君主：马基雅维利与欺骗政治》，《美国政治学评论》，80(3)：777-799页。 doi:10.2307/1960538
Dyer, Megan K. 和 Cary J. Nederman，2016，《马基雅维利与方法论：保罗·费耶阿本德的反理性主义与马基雅维利式的政治‘科学’》，《欧洲思想史》，42(3): 430–445。doi:10.1080/01916599.2015.1118335
Femia, Joseph V.，2004，《重温马基雅维利》，威尔士卡迪夫：威尔士大学出版社。
Fischer, Markus，2000，《井然有序的许可：论马基雅维利思想的统一性》，马里兰州兰纳姆：列克星敦图书公司。
Grazia, Sebastian de，1989，《地狱中的马基雅维利》，普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社。
Holman, Christopher，2018年，《马基雅维利与民主创新政治》，多伦多：多伦多大学出版社。
Hörnqvist, Mikael，2004年，《马基雅维利与帝国》，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社。doi:10.1017/CBO9780511490576
Hulliung, Mark，1983年，《公民马基雅维利》，新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社。
Johnston, David、Nadia Urbanati 和 Camila Vergara 编，2017年，《马基雅维利论自由与冲突》，芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社。
Lee, Alexander，2020年，《马基雅维利：他的生平与时代》，伦敦：Picador 出版社。
Mansfield, Harvey C.，1996年，《马基雅维利的美德》，芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社。
加勒特·马丁利，1958，“马基雅维利的王子：政治学还是政治讽刺？”，《美国学者》，27(4)：482-491。
约翰·P·麦考密克，2011 年，《马基雅维利民主》，芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社。
Meinecke, Friedrich，1924 [1957]，Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte，慕尼黑-柏林：Druck und Verlag von R. Oldenbourg。译为《马基雅维利主义：国家存在理由及其在现代历史中的地位》，道格拉斯·斯科特（译），纽黑文，康涅狄格州：耶鲁大学出版社。
Najemy, John M.（主编），2010 年，《马基雅维利剑桥指南》，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社。 doi:10.1017/CCOL9780521861250
Nederman, Cary J.，2009，《马基雅维利》，牛津：Oneworld出版社。
–––，2023，《绳索与锁链：马基雅维利的早期思想及其演变》，马里兰州兰纳姆：列克星敦图书/罗曼与利特菲尔德出版社。
Nederman, Cary J. 和 Guillaume Bogiaris，2018，《尼科洛·马基雅维利》，《近代早期的邪恶史：1450-1700》，Daniel M. Robinson、Chad Meister 和 Charles Taliaferro 编，（《邪恶史》，3），伦敦：劳特利奇出版社，53-68页。
Nederman, Cary J. 和 Nellie Lahoud，2023，《‘这就是我祈祷的方式’：尼科洛·马基雅维利著作中的祈愿语》，《思想史评论》15(1): 161-182。
Olschki, Leonardo，1945，《科学家马基雅维利》，加州伯克利：吉利克出版社。
Parel, Anthony J.，1992，《马基雅维利式的宇宙》，康涅狄格州纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社。
Patapan, Haig，2006，《恋爱中的马基雅维利：爱与恐惧的现代政治》，马里兰州兰纳姆：列克星敦出版社。
Pedullá，Gabriele，2011 [2018]，马基雅维利在骚乱中：Conquista, cittadinanza e conflitto nei «Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio»，罗马：Bulzoni Editore。译为《骚乱中的马基雅维利：关于李维的论述和政治冲突主义的起源》，修订和更新，帕特里夏·加博里克和理查德·尼巴肯（译），剑桥：剑桥大学出版社。
–––，2023 年，《论尼科洛·马基雅维利：政治的纽带》，纽约：哥伦比亚大学出版社。
菲利普·佩蒂特，1997 年，《共和主义：自由与政府理论》，牛津：牛津大学出版社。 doi：10.1093/0198296428.001.0001。
皮特金，汉娜·费尼切尔，1984，《财富是女人：思想中的性别与政治》尼科洛·马基雅维利著作，伯克利：加州大学出版社。
朱塞帕·普雷佐利尼，1954 [1967]，《反基督的马基雅维利》，罗马：盖拉尔多·卡西尼编辑；译为《乔孔达·萨维尼·马基雅维利》（译），纽约：法勒、斯特劳斯和吉鲁出版社。
约翰·波科克，1975，《马基雅维利时刻：佛罗伦萨政治思想与大西洋共和传统》，普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社。
保罗·A·拉赫，2008，《反对王座与祭坛：马基雅维利与英国共和国的政治理论》，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社。doi:10.1017/CBO9780511509650
昆汀·斯金纳，1978，《现代政治思想基础》，第一卷：文艺复兴时期，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社。
–––，1998年，《自由主义之前的自由》，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社。doi:10.1017/CBO9781139197175
–––，2002年，《政治愿景》，第二卷：文艺复兴的美德》，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社。
Sorensen, Kim A.，2006年，《论施特劳斯：列奥·施特劳斯及其对马基雅维利的批判研究中的启示与理性》，印第安纳州圣母大学出版社。
施特劳斯，Leo，1958年，《论马基雅维利》，伊利诺伊州格伦科：自由出版社。
Vatter, Miguel E.，2000年，《形式与事件之间：马基雅维利的政治自由理论》，多德雷赫特：施普林格荷兰出版社。第二版，纽约：福特汉姆大学出版社，2014 年。
–––，2013 年，马基雅维利的《王子》：读者指南，伦敦：布卢姆斯伯里。
Viroli，Maurizio，1998 年，Machiavelli，牛津：牛津大学出版社。 doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198780885.001.0001
–––，1999 [2002]，Repubblicanesimo，罗马-巴里：Laterza。译为共和主义，安东尼·舒加尔（Anthony Shugaar）（译），纽约：希尔和王
–––, 2006 [2010], Dio di Machiavelli e il Problemamorale dell’Italia, 罗马-巴里：Laterza。译作《马基雅维利的上帝》，安东尼·舒加尔（Antony Shugaar）译，普林斯顿，新泽西州：普林斯顿大学出版社，2010年。
–––，2014年，《救赎君主：马基雅维利杰作的意义》，普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社。
维万蒂，科拉多，2013年，《尼科洛·马基雅维利：一部思想家传记》，普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社。
冯·瓦卡诺，迭戈·A.，2007年，《权力的艺术：马基雅维利、尼采与美学政治理论的形成》，马里兰州兰纳姆：列克星敦图书公司。
温特，伊夫，2018年，《马基雅维利与暴力秩序》，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社。
尼尔·伍德 (Neal Wood)，1967 年，《马基雅维利的美德概念再思考》，《政治研究》，15(2): 159–172。doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1967.tb01842.x
凯瑟琳·H·祖克特 (Catherine H. Zuckert)，2017 年，《马基雅维利的政治学》，芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社。
–––，2018 年，《马基雅维利：一个苏格拉底式的人物？》，《政治学视角》，47(1): 27–37。doi:10.1080/10457097.2017.1385358
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《君主论》，W.K. Marriott 译，伦敦：J.M. Dent，1908 年。
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《孙子兵法》
《论提图斯·李维的第一个十年》
《佛罗伦萨史及意大利事务：从远古时代到洛伦佐大帝之死》
《马基雅维利著作的意大利语译本》，可在 IntraText CT 中找到。
相关条目
公民人文主义 | 腐败 | 肮脏之手的问题 | 政治现实主义：在国际关系中 | 共和主义 | 主权

Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niccol%C3%B2_Machiavelli

(1469 – 1527) was a Florentine diplomat, author, philosopher, and historian who lived during the Italian Renaissance. He is best known for his political treatise The Prince (Il Principe), written around 1513 but not published until 1532, five years after his death.[6] He has often been called the father of modern political philosophy and political science.[7]

For many years he served as a senior official in the Florentine Republic with responsibilities in diplomatic and military affairs. He wrote comedies, carnival songs, and poetry. His personal correspondence is also important to historians and scholars of Italian correspondence.[8] He worked as secretary to the second chancery of the Republic of Florence from 1498 to 1512, when the Medici were out of power.

After his death Machiavelli's name came to evoke unscrupulous acts of the sort he advised most famously in his work, The Prince.[9] He concerned himself with the ways a ruler could survive in politics, and knew those who flourished engaged in deception, treachery, and crime.[10] He advised rulers to engage in evil when political necessity requires it, at one point stating that successful founders and reformers of governments should be excused for killing other leaders who would oppose them.[11][12][13] Machiavelli's Prince has been surrounded by controversy since it was published. Some consider it to be a straightforward description of political reality. Many view The Prince as a manual, teaching would-be tyrants how they should seize and maintain power.[14] Even into recent times, some scholars, such as Leo Strauss, have restated the traditional opinion that Machiavelli was a "teacher of evil".[15]

Even though Machiavelli has become most famous for his work on principalities, scholars also give attention to the exhortations in his other works of political philosophy. While less well known than The Prince, the Discourses on Livy (composed c. 1517) has been said to have paved the way for modern republicanism.[16] His works were a major influence on Enlightenment authors who revived interest in classical republicanism, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and James Harrington.[17] Machiavelli's political realism has continued to influence generations of academics and politicians, and his approach has been compared to the Realpolitik of figures such as Otto von Bismarck.[18]

Niccolò Machiavelli

First published Tue Sep 13, 2005; substantive revision Wed Dec 6, 2023

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli/

Why Machiavelli? That question might naturally and legitimately occur to anyone encountering an entry about him in an encyclopedia of philosophy. Certainly, Machiavelli contributed to a large number of important discourses in Western thought—political theory most notably, but also history and historiography, Italian literature, the principles of warfare, and diplomacy. But Machiavelli never seems to have considered himself a philosopher—indeed, he often overtly rejected philosophical inquiry as beside the point—nor do his credentials suggest that he fits comfortably into standard models of academic philosophy. His writings are maddeningly and notoriously unsystematic, inconsistent and sometimes self-contradictory. He tends to appeal to experience and example in the place of rigorous logical analysis. Yet there are good reasons to include Machiavelli among the greatest of political philosophers, some of which are internal to his writings. In spite of the temptation to emphasize his political pragmatism, a lively scholarly debate rages about the presence of a coherent and original philosophy, addressed to topics of concern to philosophers, at the core of his thought (Benner 2009; Zuckert 2017, 2018; Baluch 2018; Bogiaris 2021).

Moreover, succeeding thinkers who more obviously qualify as philosophers of the first rank did (and still do) feel compelled to engage with his ideas, either to dispute them or to incorporate his insights into their own teachings. Even if Machiavelli grazed at the fringes of philosophy, the impact of his extensive musings has been widespread and lasting. The terms “Machiavellian” or “Machiavellism” find regular purchase among philosophers concerned with a range of ethical, political, and psychological phenomena, regardless of whether or not Machiavelli himself invented “Machiavellism” (a term apparently coined by Pierre Bayle in the seventeenth century) or was in fact a “Machiavellian” in the sense commonly ascribed to him. Machiavelli’s critique of utopian philosophical schemes (such as those of Plato) challenges an entire tradition of political philosophy in a manner that commands attention and demands consideration and response. Finally, a new generation of so-called “neo-Roman” political theorists (such as Philip Pettit [1997], Quentin Skinner [1998] and Maurizio Viroli [1999 [2002]]) finds inspiration in Machiavelli’s version of republicanism. Thus, Machiavelli deserves a place at the table in any comprehensive survey of political philosophy.

1. Biography

Relatively little is known for certain about Machiavelli’s early life in comparison with many important figures of the Italian Renaissance (the following section draws on Capponi 2010; Vivanti 2013; Celenza 2015; Lee 2020) He was born 3 May 1469 in Florence and at a young age became a pupil of a renowned Latin teacher, Paolo da Ronciglione. It is speculated that he attended the University of Florence, and even a cursory glance at his corpus reveals that he received an excellent humanist education. It is only with his entrance into public view, with his appointment in 1498 as the Second Chancellor of the Republic of Florence, however, that we begin to acquire a full and accurate picture of his life. For the next fourteen years, Machiavelli engaged in a flurry of diplomatic activity on behalf of Florence, traveling to the major centers of Italy as well as to the royal court of France and to the imperial curia of Maximilian.

Florence had been under a republican government since 1494, when the leading Medici family and its supporters had been driven from power. After four years under Savonarola’s leadership (and eventual downfall), the Florentine Republic sought more stable government and reformed its institutions accordingly. During this time, Machiavelli entered public service and thrived under the patronage of the city’s gonfaloniere (or chief administrator) for life, Piero Soderini, who was elected to that position in 1502. In his official capacities, Machiavelli travelled considerably, producing a large body of dispatches (known as the Legations) reporting on events across Europe. He also composed personal correspondence, poetic works, and short political analyses (Nederman 2023). In 1512, however, with the assistance of Spanish and papal troops, the Medici defeated the republic’s civic militia (which Machiavelli had organized) and dissolved its government. Machiavelli was a direct victim of the regime change: he was immediately dismissed from office and, when he was (wrongly) suspected of conspiring against the Medici, was imprisoned and tortured for several weeks in early 1513. His retirement thereafter to his family farm outside of Florence afforded the occasion and the impetus for him to turn to intellectual pursuits.

The first of his writings in a more reflective vein was also ultimately the one most commonly associated with his name, The Prince. Penned at the end of 1513 (and perhaps early 1514), but only published posthumously in 1532, The Prince was composed in haste by an author who, among other things, sought to regain his status in Florentine political affairs. (Many of his colleagues in the previous republican government were quickly rehabilitated and returned to service under the Medici.) Originally written for presentation to Giuliano de’Medici (who may well have appreciated it), the dedication was changed, upon Giuliano’s death, to Lorenzo de’Medici (the Younger), who almost certainly did not read it when it came into his hands in 1516.

Meanwhile, Machiavelli’s retirement from politics led him to other literary activities. He wrote verse, plays, and short prose, authored a study of The Art of War (published in 1521), and produced biographical and historical sketches. Most importantly, he composed his other major contribution to political thought, the Discourses on the Ten Books of Titus Livy, an exposition of the principles of republican rule masquerading as a commentary on the work of the famous historian of the Roman Republic. Unlike The Prince, the Discourses was written over a long period of time (commencing perhaps in 1514 or 1515 and completed in 1518 or 1519, although again only published posthumously in 1531). The book may have been shaped by informal discussions attended by Machiavelli among some of the leading Florentine intellectual and political figures under the sponsorship of Cosimo Rucellai.

Near the end of his life, and probably as a result of the aid of well-connected friends whom he never stopped badgering for intervention, Machiavelli began to return to the favor of the Medici family. In 1520, he was commissioned by Cardinal Giulio de’Medici to compose a history of Florence (the so-called Florentine Histories), an assignment completed in 1525 and presented to the Cardinal, who had since ascended to the papal throne as Clement VII, in Rome. Other small tasks were forthcoming from the Medici government, but before the opportunity arose for him to return fully to public life, he died on 21 June 1527.

2. The Prince: Analyzing Power

Traditionally, political philosophers of the past posited a special relationship between moral goodness and legitimate authority. Many authors (especially those who composed mirror-of-princes books or royal advice books during the Middle Ages and Renaissance) believed that the use of political power was only rightful if it was exercised by a ruler whose personal moral character was strictly virtuous. Thus rulers were counseled that if they wanted to succeed—that is, if they desired a long and peaceful reign and aimed to pass their office down to their heirs—they must be sure to behave in accordance with conventional ethical standards, that is, the virtues and piety. In a sense, it was thought that rulers did well when they did good; they earned the right to be obeyed and respected on account of their moral and religious rectitude (see Briggs and Nederman 2022).

Machiavelli criticized at length precisely this moralistic view of authority in his best-known treatise, The Prince. For Machiavelli, there is no moral basis on which to judge the difference between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power. Rather, authority and power are essentially coequal: whoever has power has the right to command; but goodness does not ensure power and the ruler has no more authority on account of being good. Thus, in direct opposition to morally derived theories of politics, Machiavelli says that the only real concern in politics is the acquisition and maintenance of power (although he talks less about power per se than about “maintaining the state”). In this sense, Machiavelli presents a trenchant criticism of the concept of authority by arguing that the notion of legitimate rights of rulership adds nothing to the actual possession of power. The Prince purports to reflect the self-conscious political realism of an author who is fully aware—on the basis of direct experience in the service of the Florentine government—that goodness and right are not sufficient to win and maintain political supremacy. Machiavelli thus seeks to learn and teach the rules of political power. For him, it is necessary for any successful ruler to know how to use power effectively. Only by means of its proper application, Machiavelli believes, can individuals be brought to obey and will the ruler be able to maintain the state in safety and security.

Machiavelli’s political theory, then, excludes issues of moral authority and legitimacy from consideration in the discussion of political decision-making and political judgment. Nowhere does this come out more clearly than in his treatment of the relationship between law and force. Machiavelli acknowledges that good laws and good arms constitute the dual foundations of a well-ordered political system. But he immediately adds that since coercion creates legality, he will concentrate his attention on force. He says, “Since there cannot be good laws without good arms, I will not consider laws but speak of arms” (Prince CW 47). In other words, valid law rests entirely upon the threat of coercive force; authority is impossible for Machiavelli as a right apart from the power to enforce it. Machiavelli is led to conclude that fear is always preferable to affection in subjects, just as violence and deception are superior to legality in effectively controlling them. He observes that

one can say this in general of men: they are ungrateful, disloyal, insincere and deceitful, timid of danger and avid of profit…. Love is a bond of obligation which these miserable creatures break whenever it suits them to do so; but fear holds them fast by a dread of punishment that never passes. (Prince CW 62; translation revised)

As a result, Machiavelli cannot really be said to have a theory of obligation separate from the imposition of power; people obey only because they fear the consequences of not doing so, whether the loss of life or of privileges. And of course, power alone cannot bind one, inasmuch as obligation is voluntary and assumes that one can meaningfully do otherwise. Someone can choose not to obey only if he possesses the power to resist the ruler or is prepared to risk the consequences of the state’s superiority of coercive force.

Machiavelli’s argument in The Prince is thus designed to demonstrate that politics can only properly be defined in terms of the effective employment of coercive power, what Yves Winter (2018) has termed “the orders of violence.” Authority as a right to command has no independent status. He substantiates this assertion by reference to the observable realities—historical and contemporary—of political affairs and public life as well as by arguments revealing the self-interested tendencies of all human conduct. For Machiavelli it is meaningless and futile to speak of any claim to the authority to command detached from the possession of superior political power. The ruler who lives by his supposed rights alone will surely wither and die by those same rights, because in the rough-and-tumble of political conflict those who prefer power to authority are more likely to succeed. Without exception the authority of states and their laws will never be acknowledged when they are not supported by a show of power which renders obedience inescapable.

3. Power, Virtù, and Fortune

Machiavelli presents to his readers a vision of political rule allegedly purged of extraneous moralizing influences and fully aware of the foundations of politics in the effective exercise of power. The methods for achieving obedience are varied and depend heavily upon the foresight that the prince exercises. Hence, the successful ruler needs special training. The term that best captures Machiavelli’s vision of skill that must be learned in order to engage successfully in power politics is virtù. While the Italian word would normally be translated into English as “virtue”, and would ordinarily convey the conventional connotation of moral goodness, Machiavelli obviously means something very different when he refers to the virtù of the prince. In particular, Machiavelli employs the concept of virtù to refer to the range of personal qualities that the prince will find it necessary to acquire in order to “maintain his state” and to “achieve great things”, the two standard markers of power for him. This makes it brutally clear there can be no equivalence between the conventional virtues and Machiavellian virtù. Machiavelli’s sense of what it is to be a person of virtù can thus be summarized by his recommendation that the prince above all else must possess a “flexible disposition”. That ruler is best suited for office, on Machiavelli’s account, who is capable of varying her/his conduct from good to evil and back again “as fortune and circumstances dictate” (Prince CW 66; see Nederman and Bogiaris 2018).

Not coincidentally, Machiavelli also uses the term virtù in his book The Art of War in order to describe the strategic prowess of the general who adapts to different battlefield conditions as the situation dictates. Machiavelli sees politics to be a sort of a battlefield on a different scale. Hence, the prince just like the general needs to be in possession of virtù, that is, to know which strategies and techniques are appropriate to what particular circumstances (Wood 1967). Thus, virtù winds up being closely connected to Machiavelli’s notion of the power. The ruler of virtù is bound to be competent in the application of power; to possess virtù is indeed to have mastered all the rules connected with the effective application of power. Virtù is to power politics what conventional virtue is to those thinkers who suppose that moral goodness is sufficient to be a legitimate ruler: it is the touchstone of political efficacy.

What is the conceptual link between virtù and the effective exercise of power for Machiavelli? The answer lies with another central Machiavellian concept, Fortuna (usually translated as “fortune”). Fortuna is the enemy of political order, the ultimate threat to the safety and security of the state. Machiavelli’s use of the concept has been widely debated without a very satisfactory resolution. Suffice it to say that, as with virtù, Fortuna is employed by him in a distinctive way. Where conventional representations treated Fortuna as a mostly benign, if fickle, goddess, who is the source of human goods as well as evils, Machiavelli’s fortune is a malevolent and uncompromising fount of human misery, affliction, and disaster. While human Fortuna may be responsible for such success as human beings achieve, no man can act effectively when directly opposed by the Goddess (Discourses CW 407–408).

Machiavelli’s most famous discussion of Fortuna occurs in Chapter 25 of The Prince, in which he proposes two analogies for understanding the human situation in the face of events. Initially, he asserts that fortune resembles

one of our destructive rivers which, when it is angry, turns the plains into lakes, throws down the trees and buildings, takes earth from one spot, puts it in another; everyone flees before the flood; everyone yields to its fury and nowhere can repel it.

Yet the furor of a raging river does not mean that its depredations are beyond human control: before the rains come, it is possible to take precautions to divert the worst consequences of the natural elements. “The same things happen about Fortuna”, Machiavelli observes,

She shows her power where virtù and wisdom do not prepare to resist her and directs her fury where she knows that no dykes or embankments are ready to hold her. (Prince CW 90)

Fortune may be resisted by human beings, but only in those circumstances where “virtù and wisdom” have already prepared for her inevitable arrival.

Machiavelli reinforces the association of Fortuna with the blind strength of nature by explaining that political success depends upon appreciation of the operational principles of Fortuna. His own experience has taught him that

it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because Fortuna is a woman and it is necessary, in order to keep her under, to beat and maul her.

In other words, Fortuna demands a violent response of those who would control her. “She more often lets herself be overcome by men using such methods than by those who proceed coldly”, Machiavelli continues, “therefore always, like a woman, she is the friend of young men, because they are less cautious, more spirited, and with more boldness master her” (Prince CW 92). The wanton behavior of Fortuna demands an aggressive, even violent response, lest she take advantage of those men who are too retiring or “effeminate” to dominate her.

Machiavelli’s remarks point toward several salient conclusions about Fortuna and her place in his intellectual universe. Throughout his corpus, Fortuna is depicted as a primal source of violence (especially as directed against humanity) and as antithetical to reason. Thus, Machiavelli realizes that only preparation to pose an extreme response to the vicissitudes of Fortuna will ensure victory against her. This is what virtù provides: the ability to respond to fortune at any time and in any way that is necessary.

4. Morality, Religion, and Politics

These basic building blocks of Machiavelli’s thought have induced considerable controversy among his readers going back to the sixteenth century, when he was denounced as an apostle of the Devil, but also was read and applied sympathetically by authors (and politicians) enunciating the doctrine of “reason of state” (Meinecke 1924 [1957]). The main source of dispute concerned Machiavelli’s attitude toward conventional moral and religious standards of human conduct, mainly in connection with The Prince. For many, his teaching endorses immoralism or, at least, amoralism. The most extreme versions of this reading find Machiavelli to be a “teacher of evil”, in the famous words of Leo Strauss (1958: 9–10), on the grounds that he counsels leaders to avoid the common values of justice, mercy, temperance, wisdom, and love of their people in preference to the use of cruelty, violence, fear, and deception. A more moderate school of thought, associated with Benedetto Croce (1925), views Machiavelli as simply a “realist” or a “pragmatist” advocating the suspension of commonplace ethics in matters of politics. Moral values have no place in the sorts of decisions that political leaders must make, and it is a category error of the gravest sort to think otherwise. Perhaps the mildest version of the amoral hypothesis has been proposed by Quentin Skinner (1978), who claims that the ruler’s commission of acts deemed vicious by convention is a “last best” option. Concentrating on the claim in The Prince that a head of state ought to do good if he can but must be prepared to commit evil if he must (Prince CW 58), Skinner argues that Machiavelli prefers conformity to moral virtue ceteris paribus.

Disinterest in ethical concerns also permeates the claim, popular in the early- and mid-twentieth century, that Machiavelli simply adopts the stance of a scientist—a kind of “Galileo of politics”—in distinguishing between the “facts” of political life and the “values” of moral judgment (Olschki 1945; Cassirer 1946; Prezzolini 1954 [1967]). He is thereby set into the context of the scientific revolution more generally. The point of Machiavellian “science” is not to distinguish between “just” and “unjust” forms of government, but to explain how politicians deploy power for their own gain. Thus, Machiavelli rises to the mantle of the founder of “modern” political science, in contrast with Aristotle’s classical norm-laden vision of a political science of virtue. More recently, the Machiavelli-as-scientist interpretation has largely gone out of favor (Viroli 1998 1–3), although some have recently found merit in a revised version of the thesis (e.g., Dyer and Nederman 2016).

Other of Machiavelli’s readers have found no taint of immorality or amoralism in his thought whatsoever. Jean-Jacques Rousseau long ago held that the real lesson of The Prince is to teach the people the truth about how princes behave and thus to expose, rather than celebrate, the immorality at the core of one-man rule (quoted in Connell 2005, 178). Various versions of this thesis have been disseminated more recently. Some scholars, such as Garrett Mattingly (1958), have pronounced Machiavelli the supreme satirist, pointing out the foibles of princes and their advisors. The fact that Machiavelli later wrote biting popular stage comedies is cited as evidence in support of his strong satirical bent. Thus, we should take nothing Machiavelli says about moral conduct at face value, but instead should understand his remarks as sharply humorous commentary on public affairs. Alternatively, Mary Deitz (1986) asserts that Machiavelli’s agenda was driven by a desire to “trap” the prince by offering carefully crafted advice (such as arming the people) designed to undo the ruler if taken seriously and followed.

A similar range of opinions exists in connection with Machiavelli’s attitude toward religion in general, and Christianity in particular. Machiavelli was no friend of the institutionalized Christian Church as he knew it. The Discourses makes clear that conventional Christianity saps from human beings the vigor required for active civil life (CW 228–229, 330–331). And The Prince speaks with equal parts disdain and admiration about the contemporary condition of the Church and its Pope (CW 29, 44–46, 65, 91–92). Many scholars have taken such evidence to indicate that Machiavelli was himself profoundly anti-Christian, preferring the pagan civil religions of ancient societies such as Rome, which he regarded to be more suitable for a city endowed with virtù. Anthony Parel (1992) argues that Machiavelli’s cosmos, governed by the movements of the stars and the balance of the humors, takes on an essentially pagan and pre-Christian cast. For others, Machiavelli may best be described as a man of conventional, if unenthusiastic, piety, prepared to bow to the externalities of worship but not deeply devoted in either soul or mind to the tenets of Christian faith. A few dissenting voices, most notably Sebastian de Grazia (1989) and Maurizio Viroli (2006 [2010]), have attempted to rescue Machiavelli’s reputation from those who view him as hostile or indifferent to Christianity. Grazia demonstrates how central biblical themes run throughout Machiavelli’s writings, finding there a coherent conception of a divinely centered and ordered cosmos in which other forces (“the heavens”, “fortune”, and the like) are subsumed under a divine will and plan. Cary Nederman extends and systematizes Grazia’s insights by showing how such central Christian theological doctrines as grace, free will and prayer form important elements of Machiavelli’s conceptual framework (2009: 28–49; Nederman and Lahoud 2023). Viroli considers, by contrast, the historical attitudes toward the Christian religion as manifested in the Florentine republic of Machiavelli’s day.

5. The State and the Prince: Language and Concepts

Machiavelli has also been credited (most recently by Skinner 1978) with formulating for the first time the “modern concept of the state”, understood in the broadly Weberian sense of an impersonal form of rule possessing a monopoly of coercive authority within a fixed territorial boundaries. Certainly, the term lo stato appears widely in Machiavelli’s writings, especially in The Prince, in connection with the acquisition and application of power in a coercive sense, which renders its meaning distinct from the Latin term status (condition or station) from which it is derived. Moreover, scholars cite Machiavelli’s influence in shaping the early modern debates surrounding “reason of state”—the doctrine that the good of the state itself takes precedence over all other considerations, whether morality or the good of citizens—as evidence that he was received by his near-contemporaries as a theorist of the state (Meineke 1924 [1957]). Machiavelli’s name and doctrines were widely invoked to justify the priority of the interests of the state in the age of absolutism.

Yet, as Harvey Mansfield (1996) has shown, a careful reading of Machiavelli’s use of lo stato in The Prince and elsewhere does not support this interpretation. Machiavelli’s “state” remains a personal patrimony, a possession more in line with the medieval conception of dominium as the foundation of rule. (Dominium is a Latin term that may be translated with equal force as “private property” and as “political dominion”.) Thus, the “state” is literally owned by whichever prince happens to have control of it. Moreover, the character of governance is determined by the personal qualities and traits of the ruler—hence, Machiavelli’s emphasis on virtù as indispensable for the prince’s success. These aspects of the deployment of lo stato in The Prince mitigate against the “modernity” of his idea. Machiavelli is at best a transitional figure in the process by which the language of the state emerged in early modern Europe, as Mansfield concludes.

Another factor that must be kept in mind when evaluating the general applicability of Machiavelli’s theory in The Prince stems from the very situation in which his prince of virtù operates. Such a ruler comes to power not by dynastic inheritance or on the back of popular support, but purely as a result of his own initiative, skill, talent, and/or strength (all words that are English equivalents for virtù, dependent upon where it occurs in the text). Thus, the Machiavellian prince can count on no pre-existing structures of legitimation, as discussed above. In order to “maintain his state”, then, he can only rely upon his own fount of personal characteristics to direct the use of power and establish his claim on rulership. This is a precarious position, since Machiavelli insists that the throes of fortune and the conspiracies of other men render the prince constantly vulnerable to the loss of his state. The idea of a stable constitutional regime that reflects the tenor of modern political thought (and practice) is nowhere to be seen in Machiavelli’s conception of princely government.

Indeed, one might wonder whether Machiavelli, for all of his alleged realism, actually believed that a prince of complete virtù could in fact exist. He sometimes seems to imagine that a successful prince would have to develop a psychology entirely different from that known hitherto to mankind, inasmuch as this “new” prince is

prepared to vary his conduct as the winds of fortune and changing circumstances constrain him and … not deviate from right conduct if possible, but be capable of entering upon the path of wrongdoing when this becomes necessary. (MP 62)

This flexibility yields the core of the “practical” advice that Machiavelli offers to the ruler seeking to maintain his state: exclude no course of action out of hand, but be ready always to perform whatever acts are required by political circumstance.

Yet Machiavelli himself apparently harbored severe doubts about whether human beings were psychologically capable of generating such flexible dispositions within themselves. In spite of the great number of his historical examples, Machiavelli can point in The Prince to no single ruler who evinced the sort of variable virtù that he deems necessary for the complete control of fortune. Rather, his case studies of successful rulers repeatedly point to the situation of a prince whose characteristics suited his times but whose consistency of conduct (as in the case of Pope Julius II) “would have brought about his downfall” if circumstances had changed (Prince CW 92). Even the Emperor Severus, whose techniques Machiavelli lauds, succeeded because he employed “the courses of action that are necessary for establishing himself in power”; he is not, however, to be imitated universally (Prince CW 73). Machiavelli’s evaluation of the chances for creating a new, psychologically flexible type of character is extremely guarded, and tends to be worded in conditional form and in the subjunctive mood: “If it were possible to change one’s nature to suit the times and circumstances, one would always be successful” (Prince CW 91, translation revised). Such observations must make us wonder whether Machiavelli’s advice that princes acquire dispositions which vary according to circumstance was so “practical” (even in his own mind) as he had asserted.

6. The Discourses on Livy: Liberty and Conflict

While The Prince is doubtless the most widely read of his works, the Discourses on the Ten Books of Titus Livy perhaps most honestly expresses Machiavelli’s personal political beliefs and commitments, in particular, his republican sympathies. The Discourses certainly draw upon the same reservoir of language and concepts that flowed into The Prince, but the former treatise leads us to draw conclusions quite different from—many scholars have said contradictory to—the latter. In particular, across the two works, Machiavelli consistently and clearly distinguishes between a minimal and a full conception of “political” or “civil” order, and thus constructs a hierarchy of ends within his general account of communal life. A minimal constitutional order is one in which subjects live securely (vivere sicuro), ruled by a strong government which holds in check the aspirations of both nobility (grandi) and people (Popolo), but is in turn balanced by other legal and institutional mechanisms. In a fully constitutional regime, however, the goal of the political order is the freedom of the community (vivere libero), created by the active participation of, and contention between, the nobility and the people (Pedullà 2011 [2018]). As Quentin Skinner (2002, 189–212) has argued, liberty forms a value that anchors Machiavelli’s political theory and guides his evaluations of the worthiness of different types of regimes. Only in a republic, for which Machiavelli expresses a distinct preference, may this goal be attained.

Machiavelli adopted this position on both pragmatic and principled grounds. During his career as a secretary and diplomat in the Florentine republic, he came to acquire vast experience of the inner workings of French government, which became his model for the “secure” (but not free) polity. Although Machiavelli makes relatively little comment about the French monarchy in The Prince, he devotes a great deal of attention to France in the Discourses.

Why would Machiavelli effusively praise (let alone even analyze) a hereditary monarchy in a work supposedly designed to promote the superiority of republics? The answer stems from Machiavelli’s aim to contrast the best-case scenario of a monarchic regime with the institutions and organization of a republic. Even the most excellent monarchy, in Machiavelli’s view, lacks certain salient qualities that are endemic to properly constituted republican government and that make the latter constitution more desirable than the former.

Machiavelli asserts that the greatest virtue of the French kingdom and its king is the dedication to law. “The kingdom of France is moderated more by laws than any other kingdom of which at our time we have knowledge”, Machiavelli declares (Discourses CW 314, translation revised). The explanation for this situation Machiavelli refers to the function of the Parlement. “The kingdom of France”, he states,

lives under laws and orders more than any other kingdom. These laws and orders are maintained by Parlements, notably that of Paris: by it they are renewed any time it acts against a prince of the kingdom or in its sentences condemns the king. And up to now it has maintained itself by having been a persistent executor against that nobility. (Discourses CW 422, translation revised)

These passages of the Discourses suggest that Machiavelli has great admiration for the institutional arrangements that obtain in France (Nederman 2023: 52–55). Specifically, the French king and the nobles, whose power is such that they would be able to oppress the populace, are checked by the laws of the realm which are enforced by the independent authority of the Parlement. Thus, opportunities for unbridled tyrannical conduct are largely eliminated, rendering the monarchy temperate and “civil”.

Yet such a regime, no matter how well ordered and law-abiding, remains incompatible with vivere libero. Discussing the ability of a monarch to meet the people’s wish for liberty, Machiavelli comments that

as far as the … popular desire of recovering their liberty, the prince, not being able to satisfy them, must examine what the reasons are that make them desire being free. (Discourses CW 237).

He concludes that a few individuals want freedom simply in order to command others; these, he believes, are of sufficiently small number that they can either be eradicated or bought off with honors. By contrast, the vast majority of people confuse liberty with security, imagining that the former is identical to the latter: “But all the others, who are infinite, desire liberty in order to live securely (vivere sicuro)” (Discourses CW 237). Although the king cannot give such liberty to the masses, he can provide the security that they crave:

As for the rest, for whom it is enough to live securely (vivere sicuro), they are easily satisfied by making orders and laws that, along with the power of the king, comprehend everyone’s security. And once a prince does this, and the people see that he never breaks such laws, they will shortly begin to live securely (vivere sicuro) and contentedly (Discourses CW 237).

Machiavelli then applies this general principle directly to the case of France, remarking that

the people live securely (vivere sicuro) for no other reason than that its kings are bound to infinite laws in which the security of all their people is comprehended. (Discourses CW 237)

The law-abiding character of the French regime ensures security, but that security, while desirable, ought never to be confused with liberty. This is the limit of monarchic rule: even the best kingdom can do no better than to guarantee to its people tranquil and orderly government.

Machiavelli holds that one of the consequences of such vivere sicuro is the disarmament of the people. He comments that regardless of “how great his kingdom is”, the king of France “lives as a tributary” to foreign mercenaries.

This all comes from having disarmed his people and having preferred … to enjoy the immediate profit of being able to plunder the people and of avoiding an imaginary rather than a real danger, instead of doing things that would assure them and make their states perpetually happy. This disorder, if it produces some quiet times, is in time the cause of straitened circumstances, damage and irreparable ruin (Discourses CW 410).

A state that makes security a priority cannot afford to arm its populace, for fear that the masses will employ their weapons against the nobility (or perhaps the crown). Yet at the same time, such a regime is weakened irredeemably, since it must depend upon foreigners to fight on its behalf. In this sense, any government that takes vivere sicuro as its goal generates a passive and impotent populace as an inescapable result. By definition, such a society can never be free in Machiavelli’s sense of vivere libero, and hence is only minimally, rather than completely, political or civil.

Confirmation of this interpretation of the limits of monarchy for Machiavelli may be found in his further discussion of the disarmament of the people, and its effects, in The Art of War. Addressing the question of whether a citizen army is to be preferred to a mercenary one, he insists that the liberty of a state is contingent upon the military preparedness of its subjects. Acknowledging that “the king [of France] has disarmed his people in order to be able to command them more easily”, Machiavelli still concludes “that such a policy is … a defect in that kingdom, for failure to attend to this matter is the one thing that makes her weak” (Art CW 584, 586–587). In his view, whatever benefits may accrue to a state by denying a military role to the people are of less importance than the absence of liberty that necessarily accompanies such disarmament. The problem is not merely that the ruler of a disarmed nation is in thrall to the military prowess of foreigners. More crucially, Machiavelli believes, a weapons-bearing citizen militia remains the ultimate assurance that neither the government nor some usurper will tyrannize the populace: “So Rome was free four hundred years and was armed; Sparta, eight hundred; many other cities have been unarmed and free less than forty years” (Art CW 585). Machiavelli is confident that citizens will always fight for their liberty—against internal as well as external oppressors. Indeed, this is precisely why successive French monarchs have left their people disarmed: they sought to maintain public security and order, which for them meant the elimination of any opportunities for their subjects to wield arms. The French regime, because it seeks security above all else (for the people as well as for their rulers), cannot permit what Machiavelli takes to be a primary means of promoting liberty.

The case of disarmament is an illustration of a larger difference between minimally constitutional systems such as France and fully political communities such as the Roman Republic, namely, the status of the classes within the society. In France, the people are entirely passive and the nobility is largely dependent upon the king, according to Machiavelli’s own observations. By contrast, in a fully developed republic such as Rome’s, where the actualization of liberty is paramount, both the people and the nobility take an active (and sometimes clashing) role in self-government (McCormick 2011; Holman 2018). The liberty of the whole, for Machiavelli, depends upon the liberty of its component parts. In his famous discussion of this subject in the Discourses, he remarks,

To me those who condemn the tumults between the Nobles and the Plebs seem to be caviling at the very thing that was the primary cause of Rome’s retention of liberty…. And they do not realize that in every republic there are two different dispositions, that of the people and that of the great men, and that all legislation favoring liberty is brought about by their dissension (Discourses CW 202–203).

Machiavelli knows that he is adopting an unusual perspective here, since customarily the blame for the collapse of the Roman Republic has been assigned to warring factions that eventually ripped it apart. But Machiavelli holds that precisely the same conflicts generated a “creative tension” that was the source of Roman liberty. For “those very tumults that so many inconsiderately condemn” directly generated the good laws of Rome and the virtuous conduct of its citizens (Discourses CW 202). Hence,

Enmities between the people and the Senate should, therefore, be looked upon as an inconvenience which it is necessary to put up with in order to arrive at the greatness of Rome. (Discourses CW 211)

Machiavelli thinks that other republican models (such as those adopted by Sparta or Venice) will produce weaker and less successful political systems, ones that are either stagnant or prone to decay when circumstances change.

7. Popular Liberty and Popular Speech

Machiavelli evinces particular confidence in the capacity of the people to contribute to the promotion of communal liberty. In the Discourses, he ascribes to the masses a quite extensive competence to judge and act for the public good in various settings, explicitly contrasting the “prudence and stability” of ordinary citizens with the unsound discretion of the prince. Simply stated, “A people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a prince” (Discourses CW 316). This is not an arbitrary expression of personal preference on Machiavelli’s part. He maintains that the people are more concerned about, and more willing to defend, liberty than either princes or nobles (Discourses CW 204–205). Where the latter confuse their liberty with their ability to dominate and control the popolo, the masses are more concerned with protecting themselves against oppression and consider themselves “free” when they are not abused by the more powerful or threatened with such abuse (Discourses CW 203). In turn, when they fear the onset of such oppression, ordinary citizens are more inclined to object and to defend the common liberty. Such an active role for the people, while necessary for the maintenance of vital public liberty, is fundamentally antithetical to the hierarchical structure of subordination-and-rule on which monarchic vivere sicuro rests. The preconditions of vivere libero simply do not favor the security that is the aim of constitutional monarchy.

One of the main reasons that security and liberty remain, in the end, incompatible for Machiavelli—and that the latter is to be preferred—may surely be traced to the “rhetorical” character of his republicanism. Machiavelli clearly views speech as the method most appropriate to the resolution of conflict in the republican public sphere; throughout the Discourses, debate is elevated as the best means for the people to determine the wisest course of action and the most qualified leaders. The tradition of classical rhetoric, with which he was evidently familiar, directly associated public speaking with contention: the proper application of speech in the realms of forensic and deliberative genres of rhetoric is an adversarial setting, with each speaker seeking to convince his audience of the validity of his own position and the unworthiness of his opponents’. This theme was taken up, in turn, by late medieval Italian practitioners and theorists of rhetoric, who emphasized that the subject matter of the art was lite (conflict). Thus, Machiavelli’s insistence upon contention as a prerequisite of liberty also reflects his rhetorical predilections (Viroli 1998). By contrast, monarchic regimes—even the most secure monarchies such as France—exclude or limit public discourse, thereby placing themselves at a distinct disadvantage. It is far easier to convince a single ruler to undertake a disastrous or ill-conceived course of action than a multitude of people. The apparent “tumult” induced by the uncertain liberty of public discussion eventually renders more likely a decision conducive to the common good than does the closed conversation of the royal court.

This connects to the claim in the Discourses that the popular elements within the community form the best safeguard of civic liberty as well as the most reliable source of decision-making about the public good. Machiavelli’s praise for the role of the people in securing the republic is supported by his confidence in the generally illuminating effects of public speech upon the citizen body. Near the beginning of the first Discourses, he notes that some may object to the extensive freedom enjoyed by the Roman people to assemble, to protest, and to veto laws and policies. But he responds that the Romans were able to

maintain liberty and order because of the people’s ability to discern the common good when it was shown to them. At times when ordinary Roman citizens wrongly supposed that a law or institution was designed to oppress them, they could be persuaded that their beliefs are mistaken … [through] the remedy of assemblies, in which some man of influence gets up and makes a speech showing them how they are deceiving themselves. And as Tully says, the people, although they may be ignorant, can grasp the truth, and yield easily when told what is true by a trustworthy man (Discourses CW 203).

The reference to Tully, that is, Cicero (one of the few in the Discourses) confirms that Machiavelli has in mind here a key feature of classical republicanism: the competence of the people to respond to and support the words of the gifted orator when he speaks truly about the public welfare.

Machiavelli returns to this theme and treats it more extensively at the end of the first Discourse. In a chapter intended to demonstrate the superiority of popular over princely government, he argues that the people are well ordered, and hence “prudent, stable and grateful”, so long as room is made for public speech and deliberation within the community. Citing the formula vox populi, vox dei, Machiavelli insists that

public opinion is remarkably accurate in its prognostications…. With regard to its judgment, when two speakers of equal skill are heard advocating different alternatives, very rarely does one find the people failing to adopt the better view or incapable of appreciating the truth of what it hears (Discourses CW 316).

Not only are the people competent to discern the best course of action when orators lay out competing plans, but they are in fact better qualified to make decisions, in Machiavelli’s view, than are princes. For example,

the people can never be persuaded that it is good to appoint to an office a man of infamous or corrupt habits, whereas a prince may easily and in a vast variety of ways be persuaded to do this. (Discourses CW 316)

Likewise, should the people depart from the law-abiding path, they may readily be convinced to restore order:

For an uncontrolled and tumultuous people can be spoken to by a good man and easily led back into a good way. But no one can speak to a wicked prince, and the only remedy is steel…. To cure the malady of the people words are enough. (Discourses CW 317)

The contrast Machiavelli draws is stark. The republic governed by words and persuasion—in sum, ruled by public speech—is almost sure to realize the common good of its citizens; and even should it err, recourse is always open to further discourse. Non-republican regimes, because they exclude or limit discursive practices, ultimately rest upon coercive domination and can only be corrected by violent means.

8. The Character of Republican Leaders

Machiavelli’s arguments in favor of republican regimes also appeal to his skeptical stance toward the acquisition of virtù by any single individual, and hence the implication that a truly stable principality may never be attainable. The effect of the Machiavellian dichotomy between the need for flexibility and the inescapable constancy of character is to demonstrate an inherent practical limitation in single-ruler regimes. For the reader is readily led to the conclusion that, just because human conduct is rooted in a firm and invariant character, the rule of a single man is intrinsically unstable and precarious. In the Discourses, Machiavelli provides a psychological case that the realities of human character tend to favor a republic over a principality, since the former “is better able to adapt itself to diverse circumstances than a prince owing to the diversity found among its citizens” (Discourses CW 253).

Machiavelli illustrates this claim by reference to the evolution of Roman military strategy against Hannibal. After the first flush of the Carthaginian general’s victories in Italy, the circumstances of the Roman required a circumspect and cautious leader who would not commit the legions to aggressive military action for which they were not prepared. Such leadership emerged in the person of Fabius Maximus, “a general who by his slowness and his caution held the enemy at bay. Nor could he have met with circumstances more suited to his ways” (Discourses CW 452). Yet when a more offensive stance was demanded to defeat Hannibal, the Roman Republic was able to turn to the leadership of Scipio, whose personal qualities were more fitted to the times. Neither Fabius nor Scipio was able to escape “his ways and habits” (Discourses CW 452), but the fact that Rome could call on each at the appropriate moment suggests to Machiavelli an inherent strength of the republican system.

If Fabius had been king of Rome, he might easily have lost this war, since he was incapable of altering his methods according as circumstance changed. Since, however, he was born in a republic where there were diverse citizens with diverse dispositions, it came about that, just as it had a Fabius, who was the best man to keep the war going when circumstances required it, so later it had a Scipio at a time suited to its victorious consummation (Discourses CW 452).

Changing events require flexibility of response, and since it is psychologically implausible for human character to change with the times, the republic offers a viable alternative: people of different qualities fit different exigencies. The diversity characteristic of civic regimes, which was so reviled by Machiavelli’s predecessors, proves to be an abiding advantage of republics over principalities.

This does not mean that Machiavelli’s confidence in the capacity of republican government to redress the political shortcomings of human character was unbridled. After all, he gives us no real indication of how republics manage to identify and authorize the leaders whose qualities are suited to the circumstances. It is one thing to observe that such variability has occurred within republics, quite another to demonstrate that this is a necessary or essential feature of the republican system. At best, then, Machiavelli offers us a kind of empirical generalization, the theoretical foundations of which he leaves unexplored. And the Discourses points out that republics have their own intrinsic limitation in regard to the flexibility of response needed to conquer fortune. For just as with individual human beings, it is difficult (if not impossible) to change their personal characteristics, so

institutions in republics do not change with the times … but change very slowly because it is more painful to change them since it is necessary to wait until the whole republic is in a state of upheaval; and for this it is not enough that one man alone should change his own procedure. (Discourses CW 453)

If the downfall of principalities is the fixed structure of human character, then the failing of republics is a devotion to the perpetuation of institutional arrangements whose time has passed. Whether it is any more plausible to hold out hope for the creation of more responsive republican institutions than to demand flexibility in the personal qualities of princes is not directly examined by the Discourses.

Machiavelli thus seems to adhere to a genuinely republican position. But how are we to square this with his statements in The Prince? It is tempting to dismiss The Prince as an inauthentic expression of Machiavelli’s “real” views and preferences, written over a short period in order to prove his political value to the returned Medici masters of Florence. (This is contrasted with the lengthy composition process of the Discourses.) Yet Machiavelli never repudiated The Prince, and indeed refers to it in the Discourses in a way that suggests he viewed the former as a companion to the latter. Although there has been much debate about whether Machiavelli was truly a friend of princes and tyrants or of republics, and hence whether we should dismiss one or another facet of his writing as ancillary or peripheral, the questions seems irresolvable. Mark Hulliung’s suggestion that “both” Machiavellis need to be lent equal weight thus enjoys a certain plausibility (Hulliung 1983).

9. Machiavelli’s Place in Western Thought

What is “modern” or “original” in Machiavelli’s thought? What is Machiavelli’s “place” in the history of Western ideas? The body of literature debating this question, especially in connection with The Prince and Discourses, has grown to truly staggering proportions. John Pocock (1975), for example, has traced the diffusion of Machiavelli’s republican thought throughout the so-called Atlantic world and, specifically, into the ideas that guided the framers of the American constitution. Paul Rahe (2008) argues for a similar set of influences, but with an intellectual substance and significance different from Pocock. For Pocock, Machiavelli’s republicanism is of a civic humanist variety whose roots are to be found in classical antiquity; for Rahe, Machiavelli’s republicanism is entirely novel and modern. The “neo-Roman” thinkers (most prominently, Pettit, Skinner and Viroli) appropriate Machiavelli as a source of their principle of “freedom as non-domination”, while he has also been put to work in the defense of democratic precepts and values (McCormick 2011). Likewise, cases have been made for Machiavelli’s political morality, his conception of the state, his religious views, and many other features of his work as the distinctive basis for the originality of his contribution.

Yet few firm conclusions have emerged within scholarship. (The unsettled state of play in current research on Machiavelli is well represented in Johnston et al. 2017.) One plausible explanation for the inability to resolve these issues of “modernity” and “originality” is that Machiavelli was in a sense trapped between innovation and tradition, between via antiqua and via moderna (to adopt the usage of Janet Coleman 1995), in a way that generated internal conceptual tensions within his thought as a whole and even within individual texts (Nederman 2009). This historical ambiguity permits scholars to make equally convincing cases for contradictory claims about his fundamental stance without appearing to commit egregious violence to his doctrines. This point differs from the accusation made by certain scholars that Machiavelli was fundamentally inconsistent (see Black 2022) or simply driven by “local” agendas (Celenza 2015). Rather, salient features of the distinctively Machiavellian approach to politics should be credited to an incongruity between historical circumstance and intellectual possibility. What makes Machiavelli a troubling yet stimulating thinker is that, in his attempt to draw different conclusions from the commonplace expectations of his audience, he still incorporated important features of precisely the conventions he was challenging. In spite of his repeated assertion of his own originality (for instance, Prince CW 10, 57–58), his careful attention to preexisting traditions meant that he was never fully able to escape his intellectual confines. Thus, Machiavelli ought not really to be classified as either purely an “ancient” or a “modern”, but instead deserves to be located in the interstices between the two (a point recently underscored by Pedullà 2023, for whom “Machiavelli resembles the mythical Janus, the Roman god of openings and ending …” [xi]).

Bibliography

Primary Sources in Italian

Machiavelli, Opere, Corrado Vivanti (ed.), 3 volumes, Turin: Einaudi-Gallimard, 1997.

Primary Sources in English Translation

[CW] Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others, Alan H. Gilbert (ed. and trans.), 3 volumes, continuous pagination, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1965.
- The Prince (in Volume 1, pp. 10–96)
- Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius (in Volume 1, pp. 175–532)
- The Art of War (in Volume 2, pp. 561–726)
[MP] The Prince, Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (eds.), (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
[MF] Machiavelli and His Friends: Their Personal Correspondence, James B. Atkinson and David Sices (eds.), Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996.

Secondary Literature

Anglo, Sydney, 2005, Machiavelli: The First Century, (Oxford-Warburg Studies), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baluch, Faisal, 2018, “Machiavelli as Philosopher”, The Review of Politics, 80(2): 289–300. doi:10.1017/S0034670517001097
Benner, Erica, 2009, Machiavelli’s Ethics, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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Bogiaris, Guillaume, 2021, Machiavelli’s Platonic Problems: Neoplatonism, Eros, Mythmaking, and Philosophy in Machiavellian Thought, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Black, Robert, 2022, Machiavelli: From Radical to Reactionary, London: Reaktion Books.
Briggs, Charles F. and Cary J. Nederman, 2022, “Mirrors of Princes in the Christian Occident (12th-15th Century)”, in A Companion to the “Mirrors of Princes” Literature, Noëlle-Laetitia Perret and Stéphane Péquignot (eds.), Leiden: Brill, 160–196.
Capponi, Niccolò, 2010, An Unlikely Prince: The Life and Times of Machiavelli, Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.
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Coleman, Janet, 1995, “Machiavelli’s Via Moderna: Medieval and Renaissance Attitudes to History”, Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince: New Interdisciplinary Essays, Martin Coyle (ed.), Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 40–64.
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Dietz, Mary G., 1986, “Trapping the Prince: Machiavelli and the Politics of Deception”, American Political Science Review, 80(3): 777–799. doi:10.2307/1960538
Dyer, Megan K. and Cary J. Nederman, 2016, “Machiavelli against Method: Paul Feyerabend’s Anti-Rationalism and Machiavellian Political ‘Science’”, History of European Ideas, 42(3): 430–445. doi:10.1080/01916599.2015.1118335
Femia, Joseph V., 2004, Machiavelli Revisited, Cardiff, Wales: University of Wales Press.
Fischer, Markus, 2000, Well-Ordered License: On the Unity of Machiavelli’s Thought, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Grazia, Sebastian de, 1989, Machiavelli in Hell, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Holman, Christopher, 2018, Machiavelli and the Politics of Democratic Innovation, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Hörnqvist, Mikael, 2004, Machiavelli and Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511490576
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Johnston, David, Nadia Urbanati, and Camila Vergara (eds.), 2017, Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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Other Internet Resources

The Prince, translation by W.K. Marriott, London: J.M. Dent, 1908.
- available at Medieval Sourcebook, Fordham University.
- available at Project Gutenberg
English translations of Machiavelli’s other works at Project Gutenberg
Italian Translations of Machiavelli’s works, at IntraText CT.

	How to cite this entry.
	Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society.
	Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
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风萧萧_Frank

Niccolò Machiavelli 尼科洛·马基雅维利

Niccolò Machiavelli

1. Biography

2. The Prince: Analyzing Power

3. Power, Virtù, and Fortune

4. Morality, Religion, and Politics

5. The State and the Prince: Language and Concepts

6. The Discourses on Livy: Liberty and Conflict

7. Popular Liberty and Popular Speech

8. The Character of Republican Leaders

9. Machiavelli’s Place in Western Thought

Bibliography

Primary Sources in Italian

Primary Sources in English Translation

Secondary Literature

Academic Tools

Other Internet Resources

Related Entries