中国对全球人权体系的影响

 

中国对全球人权体系的影响

China's Influence on the Global Human Rights System

SOPHIE RICHARDSON

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_human_rights_richardson.pdf 

2020 年 9 月 14 日——本文详细介绍了中国当局寻求塑造全球规范和实践的方式，并列出了各国政府和机构可以采取的步骤来扭转……

评估中国在世界上日益增长的作用

执行摘要

中国政府与国际机构的更多接触是否对全球人权体系有益？仔细研究其与联合国人权机制的互动、追求无权利发展以及对全球言论自由的威胁，可以发现事实并非如此。在联合国，中国当局正试图改写规范并操纵现有程序，不仅是为了最大限度地减少对中国政府行为的审查，也是为了实现所有政府的相同目标。发展中尊重人权的新兴规范本可以借鉴中国政府对“一带一路”倡议、亚洲基础设施投资银行和国家开发银行的做法，但中国政府并没有这样做。中国当局现在将国内审查制度扩展到工作周边社区，从学术界到侨民社区再到全球企业。

本文详细介绍了中国当局寻求塑造全球规范和实践的方式，并列出了各国政府和机构可以采取的扭转这些趋势的步骤，包括组建多边、多年的联盟，以平衡中国政府的影响。学术机构不仅应追求更好的披露与中国政府行为者的互动政策，还应紧急优先考虑来自中国的学生和学者的学术自由。公司有人权义务，应拒绝审查。

同样重要的是，拒绝中国政府对人权威胁的策略不应惩罚来自中国各地或世界各地的华裔人士，确保中国境内的人权进步应成为优先事项。论文认为，许多行为者未能采取这些和其他措施，使得中国当局进一步侵蚀现有的普遍人权体系——并越来越享受有罪不罚的感觉。

引言

近年来，中国政府在联合国和其他多边机构中变得更加活跃，包括在全球人权体系中。它批准了几项联合国核心人权条约[1]，担任联合国人权理事会 (HRC) 成员，并派遣中国外交官担任联合国人权系统内的职务。中国发起了许多可能影响人权的举措：它以促进经济发展为口号创建了“一带一路”倡议 (BRI) 和亚洲基础设施投资银行 (AIIB)，并已成为社交媒体平台和学术界的重要全球参与者。

中国是国际体系中最具影响力的参与者之一，如果中国高层领导人能够认真（尽管不太可能）地致力于维护人权，那么从经济到信息等问题上采取这种新的行动，可能会带来变革。但事实却截然相反。[2] 特别是在习近平主席的领导下，中国政府不仅试图消除联合国人权机制对中国的审查，还希望消除该体系追究任何政府对严重侵犯人权行为责任的能力。[3] 北京越来越多地在世界各地追求不考虑人权的发展，并试图利用民主国家机构的开放性来强加其世界观并压制批评者。

重要的是——特别是对于那些生活在民主国家并享有政治参与权、独立司法权、自由媒体和其他正常运作机构权利的人们来说——回顾国际人权体系存在的原因。原因很简单，因为国家往往无法保护和侵犯人权，特别是在缺乏补救和问责制度的国家。人们需要向政府直接控制范围之外的机构求助。

北京不再满足于仅仅拒绝对中国境内的人们进行问责：它现在试图加强其他国家这样做的能力，即使是在旨在在国内受到阻挠时在国际上提供某种正义的国际机构中。[4] 在学术界和新闻界，中国共产党不仅试图剥夺在中国境内进行研究或报道的能力，它还越来越多地试图在世界各地的大学和出版物中进行研究或报道，惩罚那些研究或撰写敏感话题的人。国家所进行的没有权利的发展

在中国国内受到制裁的行为现在已成为一种外交政策工具，并被部署到世界各地。

北京在新冠疫情危机中拒绝遵守全球公共卫生需求和机构[5]，以及在香港问题上公然违反国际法[6]，这些都不应被视为异常现象。这些例子清晰而令人担忧，表明中国政府不仅蔑视国际人权义务，而且还越来越多地试图改写这些规则，这可能会影响世界大部分地区人权的行使，从而给全世界人民带来后果。中国当局担心，在国外行使这些权利可能会直接威胁到党的执政，无论是通过批评党本身，还是根据既定的人权承诺追究北京的责任。

中国与联合国人权体系
6 月，人权理事会成员国以 23 票赞成、16 票反对、8 票弃权的结果通过了中国关于“互利合作”的决议草案[7]。此次投票是两年努力的结束，表明北京的目标和策略是通过既定程序和言论慢慢破坏规范，这对侵犯人权行为的问责产生了重大影响。这一努力在 2018 年显现出来，当时中国政府提出了现在所谓的“双赢”决议[8]，该决议旨在以“对话”承诺取代追究国家责任的想法，并忽略了独立民间社会在人权理事会程序中的作用。当该决议被提出时，一些成员国对其内容表示担忧。北京做了一些小的改进，加上当时人们认为该决议没有实际后果，该决议以 28 比 1 的票数获得通过。美国是唯一投反对票的政府。

中国 6 月份的决议试图将国际人权法重新定位为国与国关系的问题，忽视了国家保护个人权利的责任，将基本人权视为谈判和妥协的对象，并且不认为民间社会将发挥任何有意义的作用。中国 2018 年 3 月的决议涉及利用理事会的咨询委员会，中国预计该委员会将出台一份支持该决议的研究报告。许多代表团对此表示担忧，但对该决议持保留态度，弃权，等待咨询委员会出台研究报告。

中国的意图很快就变得清晰起来：它向咨询委员会提交的提案 [9] 称其自己的决议预示着“新型国际关系的建设”。[10] 提案声称人权被用来“干涉”其他国家的内政，“毒害全球人权治理氛围”。

这绝非巧合：中国一贯反对理事会追究各国对哪怕是最严重的侵犯人权行为的责任，而该提案令人震惊地提到了“所谓的普世人权”。尽管如此，令人鼓舞的是，2020 年 6 月有 16 个国家投票反对这项有害的决议，而 2018 年只有一票反对，这表明全球对中国强硬而咄咄逼人的“合作”方式的担忧日益增加。

该决议仍然通过，反映了中国对联合国人权体系构成的威胁。2017 年，人权观察记录了中国操纵联合国审查程序，骚扰和恐吓不仅针对中国人权捍卫者，还针对联合国人权专家和工作人员，并成功阻止独立民间社会团体（包括不从事中国工作的组织）参与。[11]

2018 年，中国接受了第三次普遍定期审议 (UPR)，即审查所有联合国成员国人权记录的程序。尽管——或许是因为——自上次审议以来，中国当局对人权发起了非同寻常的攻击，但中国外交官并没有诉诸过去的一些做法。这些行为包括在审议中提供明显虚假的信息，在发言者名单中充斥友好国家和政府组织的民间社会团体，并敦促其他国家政府对中国发表正面评价。

这一次，中国还向联合国官员施压，要求他们从普遍定期审议材料中删除一份联合国国家工作队提交的报告（具有讽刺意味的是，这份报告对中国政府的过往记录给予了相当正面的评价），[12] 向伊斯兰合作组织成员国施压，要求他们正面评价中国对待维吾尔族穆斯林的方式，并警告其他国家政府不要参加关于新疆的小组活动。

到目前为止，中国一直拒绝接受人权事务高级专员和人权理事会几个成员国的呼吁，要求对新疆严重侵犯人权行为进行独立调查。

在中国，估计有 100 万维吾尔族和其他突厥穆斯林仍被任意拘留。[13] 通常情况下，如此严重的侵犯行为已经引发了实际的问责程序，但中国的实力如此强大，以至于新疆危机爆发三年后，几乎没有任何进展。

2019 年 7 月，二十多个政府致信人权理事会主席——尽管他们不愿在人权理事会上口头呼吁——敦促进行调查。[14] 中国回应了一封由 37 个国家签署的信，其中大部分是人权记录不佳的发展中国家。11 月，一组类似的政府在联合国第三委员会发表了类似声明；[15] 中国回应了一封由 54 个国家签署的信。[16]

北京还寻求确保更广泛地讨论人权问题只通过日内瓦的人权机构进行，而不是其他联合国机构，特别是安理会。中国认为，只有人权理事会才有权审查这些案件——这是一种试图限制讨论最严重暴行的便捷方式。2018 年 3 月，中国反对时任人权事务高级专员扎伊德·拉阿德·侯赛因向安理会通报叙利亚问题[17]，2020 年 2 月，中国阻止了安理会就缅甸罗兴亚族的困境通过一项决议。[18]

联合国人权专家通常被称为“特别报告员”，他们是审查和问责联合国成员国人权问题的关键。他们常用的工具之一是访问各国，但中国拒绝安排许多特别报告员访问，包括那些负责任意拘留、处决或言论自由问题的特别报告员。[19]

中国允许专家就其认为会取得良好进展的问题进行访问：2012 年的食物权问题、2014 年妇女歧视问题工作组以及 2016 年外债影响问题独立专家的访问。[20] 2016 年，中国允许时任极端贫困与人权问题特别报告员的菲利普·奥尔斯顿访问，但由于当局跟踪他并恐吓与他交谈过的人，奥尔斯顿提前结束了访问。[21] 此后，中国只允许老年人权利问题独立专家在 2019 年底访问。

中国还继续阻止联合国人权事务高级专员办事处在中国设立办事处。虽然中国还有二十多个其他联合国机构，但它们很少援引其促进人权的授权。

6 月底，50 名联合国现任和前任特别程序（联合国人权系统中最著名的独立专家组）对中国的人权记录发出了严厉的谴责，并呼吁立即采取行动。[22] 专家们谴责中国政府对新疆和西藏的宗教和少数民族进行“集体镇压”，镇压抗议活动，香港警方过度使用武力却不受惩罚，对记者、医务工作者和其他在 COVID-19 疫情爆发后试图发声的人进行审查和报复，以及针对全国各地的人权捍卫者。专家们呼吁召开一次关于中国的特别会议，任命一位专门的中国问题专家，并要求联合国机构和各国政府敦促中国履行其人权义务。联合国秘书长、人权事务高级专员和人权理事会是否会以及如何回应，还有待观察。

尽管中国国内人权记录糟糕，对联合国人权体系构成严重威胁，但中国仍有望于 10 月再次当选人权理事会成员。如果没有足够多的有关国家致力于平衡这两个问题，中国各地的人民和依赖该系统寻求补救和问责的人们将面临严重风险。

中国推动人权自由发展
在过去几十年里，活动家、发展专家和经济学家在制定法律和规范义务方面取得了进展，以确保经济发展中尊重和问责人权。到 2010 年中国成为世界第二大经济体时，包括世界银行集团和国际货币基金组织在内的主要多边机构已经通过了关于社区协商、透明度和其他关键人权问题的标准和保障政策。2011 年，联合国通过了《工商企业与人权指导原则》。综合起来，这些新兴的全球规范本应为北京提供一个模板，使其在发展过程中明确尊重人权，但中国的开发银行和“一带一路”都没有表现出这样做的迹象。[23]

北京耗资数万亿美元的“一带一路”基础设施和投资计划促进了中国进入 70 个国家的市场和自然资源

尝试。由于替代投资者的频繁缺席，“一带一路”倡议为中国政府赢得了发展中国家的相当多的善意，尽管北京已经能够将许多成本转嫁给它声称要帮助的国家。

中国的运作方式似乎有助于加强“受益”国家的威权主义，即使民主国家和独裁国家都利用了中国的“一带一路”投资或监控出口。[24] 以“无附加条件”贷款而闻名的“一带一路”项目在很大程度上忽视了人权和环境标准。[25] 它们几乎不允许任何可能受到伤害的人提供意见，不允许使用任何大众咨询方法。几内亚苏阿皮蒂大坝和柬埔寨塞桑河下游二号大坝都存在许多违规行为，这两个大坝主要由中国国有银行和公司资助和建造。[26]

为了修建水坝，数千名村民被迫离开祖传的家园和农田，失去了食物和生计。许多重新安置的家庭没有得到足够的补偿，也没有获得新土地的合法所有权。居民们给地方和国家当局写了很多信，讲述他们的处境，但大多毫无成效。一些项目是在容易滋生腐败的幕后交易中谈判的。有时，它们让统治精英受益并巩固统治地位，而让该国人民背负巨额债务。

一些“一带一路”项目臭名昭著：斯里兰卡的汉班托塔港，由于无法偿还债务，中国收回了该港 99 年；或者肯尼亚修建蒙巴萨-内罗毕铁路的贷款，政府试图通过强迫货运商使用该铁路来偿还这笔贷款，尽管有更便宜的替代方案。一些政府——包括孟加拉国、马来西亚、缅甸、巴基斯坦和塞拉利昂的政府——已经开始放弃“一带一路”项目，因为它们看起来不合经济合理。[27]在大多数情况下，陷入困境的债务国都渴望得到北京的好感。在新冠疫情爆发后，中国就债务减免发表了一些声明，但目前尚不清楚这在实际操作中将如何发挥作用。[28]

“一带一路”贷款还为北京提供了另一个金融杠杆，以确保在主要国际论坛上支持中国的反人权议程，受援国有时会在主要论坛上与北京站在一起投票。面对中国国内的镇压，以及对北京破坏国际人权机构的援助，其结果是，最好的结果是沉默，最坏的结果则是掌声。例如，巴基斯坦总理伊姆兰·汗的政府是“一带一路”的主要接受国，他在访问北京时对新疆的穆斯林同胞只字未提，而他的外交官却对“中国为照顾穆斯林公民所做的努力”大加赞扬。[29]

同样，在北京免除喀麦隆数百万债务后不久，喀麦隆也对中国发表了奉承的赞美之词：提到新疆，喀麦隆称赞北京“充分保护少数民族行使合法权利”，包括“正常的宗教活动和信仰”。[30] 中国的国家开发银行，如中国国家开发银行和中国进出口银行，在全球的影响力日益扩大，但缺乏关键的人权保障。中国创办的多边亚投行也好不到哪里去。它的政策要求其资助的项目透明、负责，并包括社会和环境标准，但不要求银行识别和解决人权风险。[31]该银行的 74 个成员国中，有许多政府声称尊重人权：包括法国、德国、荷兰和瑞典在内的大部分欧盟国家，以及英国、加拿大、澳大利亚和新西兰。

中国政府对全球言论自由的威胁

北京在中国境内的审查制度是有据可查的，其通过国家媒体在世界各地传播宣传的努力也是众所周知的。但中国当局似乎不再满足于这些努力，并正在扩大其野心。在习近平的领导下，中国当局越来越多地寻求限制或压制被认为具有批判性的有关中国的讨论，并确保他们的观点和分析被世界各地的各种群体所接受，即使这意味着通过全球平台进行审查。

中国当局长期以来一直在监视和监控来自中国的学生和学者以及在世界各地校园研究中国的学生和学者。中国外交官还向大学官员抱怨，他们邀请达赖喇嘛等中国政府认为“敏感”的演讲者来大学演讲。过去十年，由于澳大利亚、加拿大、英国和美国对高等教育的政府资助减少，大学

大学在经济上越来越依赖大量自费的中国学生，以及中国政府和企业实体。这使得大学容易受到中国政府的影响。

最终结果是什么？2019 年，一系列严谨的报告记录了一些不想惹恼中国当局的管理人员和学者的审查和自我审查。[32] 中国学生报告说，这些学生在课堂上说的话威胁了他们在中国的家人。

中国学者详细描述了在国外被中国官员直接威胁不要在课堂讲座或其他谈话中批评中国政府的情况。

其他人描述说，中国学生在课堂上保持沉默，担心他们的言论受到其他中国学生的监控并向中国当局报告。美国一所大学的一名中国学生总结了他对课堂监控的担忧，他指出：“这不是一个自由的空间。”昆士兰大学学生德鲁·帕夫洛一直批评该校与中国政府的关系，他因自己的活动违反了大学的行为准则而面临停学处罚。[33]

目前，美国一些大学正面临联邦当局的压力，要求其披露学校或个别学者与中国政府机构之间的任何关系，其明确目标是打击中华人民共和国的影响力和骚扰以及技术盗窃。澳大利亚、英国和美国的大学和学者因与涉嫌侵犯人权的中国科技公司或政府机构的关系被曝光而感到尴尬。2020 年 4 月，麻省理工学院在制定了更严格的合作准则后，与中国语音识别公司科大讯飞断绝了合作关系，人权观察记录了科大讯飞侵犯人权的行为。[34]

其他学校也面临着批评中国政府的学生和捍卫中国政府的学生之间的紧张关系。2019 年 3 月，在加州大学伯克利分校举办的一场活动中，来自大陆的学生试图大声呵斥正在讨论新疆人权危机的演讲者；9 月，香港民主活动家罗冠聪抵达耶鲁大学攻读研究生时，不明身份的人威胁他。[35]

但很少有大学（如果有的话）采取措施，保??证来自中国的学生和学者享有与其他大学相同的学术自由。[36] 未能解决这些问题意味着，对于一些大学来说，有关中国的辩论和研究被任意限制。

中国当局对侨民社区的监视和骚扰也不是一个新问题，但很明显，获得外国护照并不能保证言论自由权。甚至离开中国也变得更加困难：近年来，北京一直努力阻止某些群体离开中国，采取的手段包括拒绝或没收他们的护照、加强边境安全以防止藏人和突厥穆斯林逃亡，以及向柬埔寨和土耳其等国政府施压，要求他们违反国际法义务强制遣返寻求庇护者。[37]

自 2017 年初以来，一些维吾尔人前往中国境外后返回，或只是与国外的家人和朋友保持联系，中国当局认为这些行为是犯罪行为。[38]

因此，即使是那些设法离开中国并在尊重人权的民主国家获得公民身份的人也报告说，他们与仍在中国境内的家人断绝了联系，受到中国政府官员的监视和骚扰，并且由于害怕遭到报复，他们不愿批评中国的政策或当局。有些人觉得自己无法参加公开集会，比如有关中国政治的讲座或国会听证会，因为害怕被拍照或以其他方式被人注意到自己出席了这些活动。另一些人则表示，他们接到中国当局的电话或 WhatsApp 或短信，告诉他们，如果他们公开批评中国政府，他们在中国的家人就会遭殃。

一名在欧洲获得公民身份的维吾尔人说：“无论我在哪里，无论我持有什么护照。[中国当局] 都会在任何地方恐吓我，而我对此毫无抵抗之力。” 即使是移民到加拿大等国家的汉族人也表示对中国政府深感恐惧，他们表示，虽然他们对中国侵犯人权的行为感到愤怒，但他们担心，如果公开批评政府，他们的工作前景、商业机会和回国的机会将受到影响，或者他们的家人会因此受到伤害。

留在中国的家人将面临危险。[39]

鉴于此类骚扰主要源自中国，政府反击此类骚扰的手段相对较弱。2018 年，美国联邦调查局加强了对曾遭受中国政府骚扰的美国维吾尔族人的调查，2020 年 6 月通过的《维吾尔人权法案》将这项工作扩展到来自中国的各个侨民社区。[40]

中国当局还试图通过审查全球平台上的对话来限制中国境外的言论自由。6 月，总部位于加州的公司 Zoom 承认，应中国当局的要求，该公司暂停了曾组织有关 1989 年天安门大屠杀的在线讨论的美国活动人士的账户。[41] 虽然该公司恢复了美国人士的账户，但它表示无法拒绝中国当局要求其遵守“当地法律”的要求。

其他全球平台也启用了审查制度。微信是中国的一个社交媒体平台，在全球拥有约 10 亿用户，其中 1 亿来自中国境外，由中国公司腾讯拥有。[42] 中国政府和腾讯定期审查该平台上的内容，扭曲观众可以看到的内容。带有“刘晓波”或“天安门大屠杀”字样的帖子无法上传，批评中国政府的帖子会被迅速删除——即使那些试图发布此类消息的人在国外。微信因其便捷的功能而广受欢迎，但它也是中国当局控制全球用户可以看到的内容的一种非常有效的方式。

这也影响到中国境外的政客可以对自己的选民说些什么。世界各地的政客越来越多地使用微信与选区的中文使用者交流。 2017 年 9 月，加拿大国会议员 Jenny Kwan 就香港雨伞运动发表声明，赞扬年轻的抗议者“为自己的信仰和社会的改善而站起来并奋斗”。该声明随后发布在她的微信账户上，但后来被删除。[43]

目前尚不清楚民主国家的政客是否或如何跟踪北京审查其言论的努力。随着中国在全球事务中发挥越来越重要的作用，各国政府需要迅速采取行动，确保民选代表与选民沟通的能力不受北京的左右。

人们再也不能假装中国对独立声音的压制止步于其边境。
最后，北京还利用进入其市场的机会来审查从万豪到梅赛德斯奔驰等公司。[44]中国国家电视台 CCTV 和腾讯（美国职业篮球联赛的媒体合作伙伴，与该联赛签订了价值 15 亿美元的五年流媒体协议）表示，在休斯顿火箭队总经理发推文支持香港民主抗议者后，他们不会转播该队的比赛。[45] 在北京的压力下，大型跨国公司对自己或员工进行了审查。其他公司则解雇了那些表达了公司认为批评北京观点的员工。公司在中国境内运营时遵守审查限制已经够糟糕了。对全球员工和客户实施这种审查则更糟糕。人们再也不能假装中国对独立声音的压制只停留在其边境了。

如果中国的政策不逆转会发生什么
——以及该怎么做

未能阻止中国对国际人权体系、尊重权利发展的法律和实践以及言论自由的攻击，其后果简单而严重。如果这些趋势继续不减，联合国安理会将更不可能对严重的人权危机采取行动；一个为独立行为者提供空间的普世人权体系的基本基础将进一步削弱；中国当局（及其盟友）的有罪不罚现象将只会增加。

严重侵犯人权的政府将知道他们可以无条件地依赖北京的投资和贷款。世界各地的人们将越来越需要谨慎批评中国当局，即使他们是尊重人权的民主国家的公民，或者在学术界等鼓励辩论的环境中。

中国政府在 2020 年上半年的行为——拖延对 COVID-19 疫情的独立调查，公然拒绝国际法决定对香港实施国家安全立法，甚至操纵美国人民的天安门纪念活动——似乎已经激发了反击的势头。许多国家的议会成员呼吁

任命联合国香港问题特使、各国政府就掩盖新冠疫情向北京施压、企业屈服于中国审查压力等新闻屡见不鲜。

但这远未形成遏制北京议程所必需的平衡力量，而北京的威胁现在已经清晰可见。为了保护联合国人权系统免受中国政府的侵蚀，尊重人权的各国政府应紧急组建一个多年期联盟，不仅要确保跟踪这些威胁，还要做好准备，抓住一切机会予以反击。这意味着提名联合国专家职位的候选人，并指出认证制度中的障碍。

这意味着要征集和组织反对破坏规范的决议的反对意见，并动员盟友提名自己为人权理事会或区域集团选出的其他职位的候选人。中国的优势在于资金雄厚，而且没有周期性的政府更迭来妨碍其规划能力；民主国家在这两方面都会遇到困难。但这里的风险再高不过了——不仅仅是对中国 14 亿人民，对全世界人民也是如此。

各国政府，特别是那些已经加入亚投行的政府，应该利用他们的联合影响力，推动该机构采用完善的人权和环境原则和做法，以确保无滥用的发展。而加入“一带一路”伙伴关系的各国政府应该仔细考虑后果，并确保他们做中国不愿做的事情：提供充分的公众咨询，充分透明地说明对该国的财务影响，以及受影响人口拒绝这些发展项目的能力。

各国政府应紧急考虑北京对本国言论自由的威胁。他们应该追踪对公民的威胁，并通过定向制裁等工具最大限度地追究责任。学术机构不应仅仅满足于制定更好的与中国政府行为者互动的披露政策，他们迫切需要确保校园里的每个人都有平等的言论自由——任何低于这一标准的政策都是对其责任的严重拒绝。

公司在拒绝审查方面应发挥作用。他们应该认识到，他们无法在北京的游戏中取胜，特别是考虑到他们根据《联合国工商企业与人权指导原则》负有尊重人权的责任。他们应该起草和推广与中国打交道的行为准则，禁止参与或协助侵犯言论自由、信息自由、隐私权、结社权或其他国际公认的人权。强有力的共同标准将使北京更难排斥那些捍卫基本权利和自由的人。消费者和股东也将更有能力坚持要求公司不要屈服于审查制度作为在中国做生意的代价，并且他们永远不应该从侵权行为中获益或助长侵权行为。

最后，至关重要的是，这些限制中国政府对人权威胁的努力都不能反弹到中国各地或世界各地的华裔人士身上。 COVID-19 的迅速蔓延引发了一波种族主义反亚裔骚扰和袭击，令人震惊的是，许多政府、政客和政策都落入了北京的陷阱，将中国政府、中国共产党和中国人民混为一谈。[46] 它们并不相同，中国人民的人权应继续成为未来政策的核心。

参考文献

“联合国条约机构数据库：中国”，联合国人权高级专员办事处，https:// tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=36&Lang=EN。
Kenneth Roth，“中国对人权的全球威胁”，（华盛顿特区：人权观察，2020 年），https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global。
《国际倡导的代价：中国干涉联合国人权机制》（纽约：人权观察，2017 年 9 月 5 日），https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/costs- international-advocacy/chinas-interference-united-nations-human-rights；Ted Piccone，“中国在联合国人权领域的长期博弈”（华盛顿特区：布鲁金斯学会，2018 年 9 月），https:// www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-long-game-on-human-rights-at-the-united-nations/。
Ted Piccone，“中国在联合国人权领域的长期博弈。”
Sarah Zheng，“中国为何抵制对疫情起源进行独立调查？”，《南华早报》，2020 年 5 月 16 日，https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3084602/why-china- resisting-independent-inquiry-how-pandemic-started。
“香港：北京威胁采取严厉措施

“各国应反对中国关于‘互利合作’的不诚实决议”，人权观察，2020 年 6 月 16 日，https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/16/states-should-oppose-chinas-disingenuous-resolution-mutually-beneficial-cooperation。
约翰·费舍尔，“中国的‘双赢’决议绝非如此”，人权观察，2018 年 3 月 5 日，https://www. hrw.org/news/2018/03/05/chinas-win-win-resolution-anything。
“技术援助和能力建设在促进和保护人权的互利合作中的作用”，联合国人权理事会，https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/AdvisoryCommittee/Pages/TheRoleTechnicalAssistance.aspx。
安德里亚·沃登，“中国在联合国人权理事会的双赢：不仅仅是人权”，Sinopsis，2020 年 5 月 28 日，https://sinopsis.cz/en/worden-win-win/。
“联合国：中国封锁活动人士、骚扰专家”，人权观察，2017 年 9 月 5 日，https://www.hrw. org/news/2017/09/05/un-china-blocks-activists-harasses-experts。
“联合国：中国以威胁回应人权审查”，人权观察，2019 年 4 月 1 日，https://www.hrw。 org/news/2019/04/01/un-china-responds-rights-review-threats。
“联合国：人权机构需要加强对新疆侵犯人权行为的调查”，人权观察，2020 年 3 月 12 日，https:// www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/12/un-rights-body-needs-step-xinjiang-abuses。
“联合国：前所未有的联合呼吁中国结束对新疆的侵犯人权行为”，人权观察，2019 年 7 月 10 日，https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/10/un-unprecedented-joint-call-china-end-xinjiang-abuses。
索菲·理查森，“联合国对中国新疆政策的史无前例的批评”，人权观察，2019 年 11 月 14 日，https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/14/unprecedented-un-critique-chinas-xinjiang-policies。

路易斯·夏博诺，“中国在新疆的虚假信息长城倒塌”，人权观察，2019 年 11 月 20 日，https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/20/chinas-great-misinformation-wall-crumbles- xinjiang。

“程序性投票阻止安理会举行关于叙利亚人权状况的会议，高级专员通报情况”，联合国，2018 年 3 月 19 日，https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13255.doc.htm。
联合国未按照命令对缅甸罗兴亚人采取行动”，半岛电视台，2020 年 2 月 4 日，https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/fails-action-order-myanmar-rohingyas-200205020402316.html。
“查看 1998 年以来人权理事会特别程序的国家访问：中国”，联合国人权事务高级专员办事处，https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=all&country=CHN&Lang=en；“专题任务”，联合国人权事务高级专员办事处，https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM&lang=en。
“各国人权状况：中国”，联合国人权事务高级专员办事处，https:// www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/CNIndex.aspx。
“极端贫困与人权问题特别报告员访华报告”，联合国人权事务高级专员办事处，https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/35/26/Add.2；菲利普·奥尔斯顿，“访华结束声明”，联合国人权事务高级专员办事处，2016 年 8 月 23 日，https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20402&LangID=E。
“联合国专家呼吁采取果断措施保护中国的基本自由”，联合国人权事务高级专员办事处，2020 年 6 月 26 日，https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006&LangID=E。
“中国：‘一带一路’项目应尊重人权”，人权观察，2019 年 4 月 21 日，https://www. hrw.org/news/2019/04/21/china-belt-and-road-projects-should-respect-rights。
Sheena Chestnut Greitens，“应对中国全球监控出口需求”，（华盛顿特区：布鲁金斯学会，2020 年 4 月），https://www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-demand-for-chinas- global-surveillance-exports/。
索菲·理查森 (Sophie Richardson) 和休·威廉姆森 (Hugh Williamson)，“中国：一带一路，诸多义务”，人权观察，2017 年 5 月 12 日，https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/12/china-one-belt-one-road-lots-obligations。
“‘我们抛弃一切’：几内亚苏阿皮蒂大坝对流离失所社区的影响”，（纽约：人权观察，2020 年 4 月），https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/04/16/were-leaving-everything- behind/impact-guineas-souapiti-dam-displaced-communities。
尼拉姆·迪奥 (Neelam Deo) 和阿米特·班达里 (Amit Bhandari)，“对一带一路的强烈反对”，Gateway House，2018 年 5 月 31 日，https://www.gatewayhouse.in/bri-debt-backlash/。
孙云，“中国对非洲的债务减免：新兴审议”，布鲁金斯学会，2020 年 6 月 9 日，https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/06/09/chinas-debt-relief-for-africa-emerging- deliberations/。

China's Influence on the Global Human Rights System

SOPHIE RICHARDSON

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_human_rights_richardson.pdf

 

Sep 14, 2020 — This paper details the ways Chinese authorities seek to shape norms and practices globally, and sets out steps governments and institutions can take to reverse ...

Assessing China's Growing Role in the World

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Is the Chinese government’s greater engagement with international institutions a gain for the global human rights system? A close examination of its interactions with United Nations human rights  mechanisms,  pursuit of rights-free development, and threats to the freedom of expression worldwide suggests  it  is  not. At the United Nations, Chinese authorities are trying   to rewrite norms and manipulate existing procedures not only to minimize scrutiny of the Chinese government’s conduct, but also to achieve the same  for all governments. Emerging norms on respecting human rights in development could have informed the Chinese government’s approach to the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and national development banks, but they have not. Chinese authorities now extend domestic censorship to communities around the work, ranging from academia to diaspora communities to global businesses.

This paper details the ways Chinese authorities seek to  shape  norms  and  practices  globally,  and   sets  out steps governments and institutions can take to reverse these trends, including forming multilateral, multi-year coalitions to serve as a counterweight to Chinese government influence. Academic institutions should not just pursue better  disclosure  policies  about interactions with Chinese government actors, they should also urgently prioritize the academic freedom of students and scholars from and of China. Companies have human rights obligations and should reject censorship.

Equally important, strategies to reject the Chinese government’s threats to human rights should not penalize people from across China or of Chinese descent around the world, and securing human rights gains inside China should be a priority. The paper argues that many actors’ failure to take these and other steps allows Chinese authorities to further erode the existing universal human rights system — and to enjoy a growing sense of impunity.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Chinese government has become considerably more active in a wide range of United Nations and other multilateral  institutions,  including in the global human rights system. It has ratified several  core  U.N.  human  rights  treaties,[1] served  as  a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council  (HRC), and seconded Chinese diplomats to positions within the U.N. human rights system. China has launched a number of initiatives that can affect human rights: It has created the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) under the mantra of promoting economic development, and it has become a significant global actor in social media platforms and academia.

This new activism on issues from economics to information by one of the most consequential actors   in the international system, if underpinned by  a serious (albeit unlikely) commitment among senior Chinese leaders to uphold human rights, could have been transformative. But the opposite has happened.[2] Particularly under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, the Chinese government does not merely seek to neutralize U.N.  human  rights  mechanisms’  scrutiny  of China, it also aspires to neutralize  the  ability  of  that system to hold any government accountable for serious human rights violations.[3] Increasingly Beijing pursues rights-free development worldwide, and tries to exploit the openness of institutions in democracies to impose its world view and silence its critics.

It is crucial — particularly for people who live in democracies and enjoy the rights to political participation, an independent judiciary, a free media, and other functioning institutions —  to  recall  why  the international human rights system exists. Quite simply, it is because often states fail to protect and violate human rights, particularly in countries that lack systems for redress and  accountability.  People  need to appeal to institutions beyond their government’s immediate control.

Beijing is no longer content simply denying people accountability inside China: It now seeks to bolster other countries’ ability to do so even in the international bodies designed to deliver some semblance of justice internationally when it is blocked domestically.[4] Within academia and journalism, the Chinese Communist Party seeks not only to deny the ability to conduct research or report from inside China, it increasingly seeks to do so at universities and publications around the world, punishing those who study or write on sensitive topics. The rights-free development the state has sanctioned inside China is now a  foreign  policy  tool being deployed around the world.

Beijing’s resistance to complying with global public health  needs  and  institutions  in  the  COVID-19 crisis,[5] and its blatant violation of international  law  with respect to Hong Kong,[6] should not be seen as anomalies. They are clear and concerning examples of the consequences for people worldwide not only of a Chinese government disdainful of international human rights obligations but, increasingly, also seeking to rewrite those rules in ways that may affect the exercise of human rights around much of the world. Chinese authorities fear that the exercise of these rights abroad can directly threaten the party’s hold on power, whether through criticism of the party itself or as a result of holding Beijing accountable under established human rights commitments.

 

 

CHINA AND THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM

In June, Human Rights Council member states adopted China’s proposed resolution on “mutually beneficial cooperation” by avoteof 23-16, with eight abstentions.[7] This vote capped a two-year effort that is indicative of Beijing’s goals and tactics of slowly undermining norms through established procedures and rhetoric, which have had significant consequences on  accountability for human rights violations. The effort became visible in 2018 when the Chinese government proposed what is now known as its “win-win” resolution,[8] which set out to replace the idea of holding states accountable with a commitment to “dialogue,” and which omitted a role for independent civil society in HRC proceedings. When it was introduced, some member states expressed concern at its contents. Beijing made minor improvements and, along with the perception at the time that the  resolution  had  no  real  consequences,  it was adopted 28-1. The United States was the only government to vote against it.

China’s June resolution seeks to reposition international human rights law as a matter of state-to-state relations, ignores the responsibility of states to protect the rights of the individual, treats fundamental human rights as subject to negotiation and compromise, and foresees no meaningful role for civil society. China’s March  2018 resolution involved using the council’s Advisory Committee, which China expected would produce a study supporting the resolution. Many delegations expressed concern, but gave the resolution the benefit of the doubt, abstaining so they could wait to see what the Advisory Committee produced.

China’s  intentions soon became clear: Its submission [9] to  the Advisory Committee hailed its own resolution  as heralding “the construction of a new type of international relations.”[10] The submission claims that human rights are used to “interfere” in other countries’ internal affairs, “poisoning the global atmosphere of human rights governance.”

This is hardly a coincidence: China has routinely opposed efforts at the council to hold states responsible for even the gravest rights violations, and the submission alarmingly speaks of “so-called universal human rights.” It is nonetheless encouraging that 16 states voted against this harmful resolution in June 2020, compared with only one vote against in 2018, signaling increasing global concern with China’s heavy-handed and aggressive approach to “cooperation.”

That the resolution nonetheless passed reflects the threat China poses to the U.N. human rights system. In 2017, Human Rights Watch documented China’s manipulation of U.N. review processes, harassment, and intimidation of not only human rights defenders from China but also  U.N.  human  rights  experts and staff, and its successful efforts to block the participation of independent civil society groups, including organizations that do not work on China.[11]

In 2018, China underwent its third Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the process for reviewing all U.N. member states’ human rights records. Despite — or perhaps because — Chinese authorities had since China’s previous review opened an extraordinary assault on human rights, Chinese diplomats did  not just resort to some of its past practices. These had included providing blatantly false information at the review, flooding the speakers’ list with friendly states and government-organized civil society groups, and urging other governments to speak positively about China.

This time around China also pressured U.N. officials to remove a U.N. country team submission from the UPR materials (ironically that report was reasonably positive about the government’s track record),[12] pressured Organisation of Islamic  Cooperation  member  states  to speak positively about China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims, and warned other governments not to attend a panel event about Xinjiang.

 

China has so far fended off calls by the high commissioner for human rights and several HRC member states for an independent investigation into gross human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the region in China where an estimated one million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims remain arbitrarily detained.[13] Typically, violations of this magnitude would have already yielded actual accountability proceedings, but China’s power is such that three years into the Xinjiang crisis there is little forward movement.

In July 2019, two dozen governments sent a letter to the Human Rights Council president — though they were unwilling to make the call orally on the floor of the HRC — urging an investigation.[14] China responded with a letter signed by 37 countries, mostly developing states with poor human rights records. In November, a similar group of governments delivered a similar statement at the Third Committee of the U.N.;[15] China responded with a letter signed by 54 countries.[16]

Beijing also seeks to ensure that discussions about human rights more broadly take place only through the human rights bodies in Geneva, and not other

U.N. bodies, particularly the Security Council. China contends that only the HRC has a mandate to examine them — a convenient way of trying to limit discussions even on the gravest atrocities. In March 2018, it opposed a briefing by then-High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein to the Security Council on Syria,[17]   and in February 2020 it blocked   a resolution at the Security Council on the plight of Myanmar’s ethnic Rohingya.[18]

U.N.  human  rights   experts,   typically   referred   to   as “special rapporteurs,” are key to reviews and accountability of U.N. member states on human rights issues. One of their common tools is  to  visit  states, but China has declined to schedule visits by numerous special rapporteurs, including those  with  mandates  on arbitrary detention, executions, or freedom of expression.[19]

It has allowed visits by experts on issues where it thought it would fare well: the right to food in 2012, a working group on discrimination against women  in 2014, and an independent expert on the effects   of foreign debt in 2016.[20] In 2016, China allowed a visit by Philip Alston, then the special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, who ended his visit early when authorities followed him and intimidated people he had spoken to.[21 ] Since that time, China has only allowed a visit by the independent expert on the rights of older people in late 2019.

China also continues to block the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights from having a presence in China. While there are two dozen other U.N. agencies in China, they have rarely invoked their mandate to promote human rights.

In late June, 50 U.N. current and former special procedures — the most prominent group of independent experts in the U.N. human rights system — issued a searing indictment of China’s human rights record and call for urgent action.[22] The  experts  denounced the Chinese government’s “collective repression” of religious and ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and  Tibet, the repression of protest and impunity for excessive use of force by police in Hong Kong, censorship and retaliation against journalists, medical workers, and others who sought to speak out following the COVID-19 outbreak, and the targeting of human rights defenders across the country. The experts called for convening a special session on China, creating a dedicated expert on China, and asking U.N. agencies and governments  to press China to meet its human rights obligations. It remains to be seen whether and how the U.N. secretary-general, the high commissioner for human rights, and the Human Rights Council will respond.

Despite its poor human rights record at home, and a serious threat to the U.N. human rights system, China is expected to be reelected to the Human Rights Council in October. Absent a critical mass of concerned states committed to serving as a counterweight to  both problems, people across China and people who depend on this system for redress and accountability are at serious risk.

 

CHINA’S PUSH FOR RIGHTS- FREE DEVELOPMENT

For the last several decades, activists, development experts, and economists have made gains in creating legal and normative obligations  to  ensure  respect  and accountability for human rights in economic development. By the time China became the world’s second-largest economy in 2010, major multilateral institutions including the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund had already adopted standards and safeguards policies on community consultation, transparency, and other key human rights issues. In 2011, the United Nations adopted the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Taken together, these emerging global norms should have afforded Beijing a template to pursue development with clear respect for human rights, but neither China’s development banks nor BRI shows signs of doing so.[23]

Beijing’s trillion-dollar BRI infrastructure and investment program facilitates Chinese access to markets and natural resources across 70 countries. Aided by the frequent absence of alternative investors, the BRI has secured the Chinese government considerable good- will among developing countries, even though Beijing has been able to foist many of the costs onto the countries that it is purporting to help.

China’s methods of operation appear to have the  effect of bolstering authoritarianism in “beneficiary” countries, even if both democracies and autocracies alike avail themselves of China’s BRI investments or surveillance exports.[24] BRI projects — known for their “no strings” loans — largely ignore human rights and environmental standards.[25] They allow little if any  input from people who might be harmed, allowing for no popular consultation methods. There have been numerous violations associated with the Souapiti Dam in Guinea and the Lower Sesan II Dam in Cambodia, both financed and constructed mainly by Chinese state-owned banks and companies.[26]

To build the dams, thousands of villagers were forced out of their ancestral homes and farmlands, losing access to food and their livelihoods. Many resettled families are not adequately compensated and do not receive legal title to their new land. Residents have written numerous letters about their situation to local and national authorities, largely to no avail. Some projects are negotiated in backroom deals that are prone to corruption. At times they benefit and entrench ruling elites while burying the people of the country under mountains of debt.

Some BRI projects are notorious: Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, which China repossessed for 99 years when debt repayment became impossible,  or  the loan to build Kenya’s Mombasa-Nairobi railroad, which the government is trying to repay by forcing cargo transporters to use it despite cheaper alternatives. Some governments — including those of Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sierra  Leone  —  have begun backing away from BRI projects because they do not look economically sensible.[27] In  most  cases, the struggling debtor is eager to stay in Beijing’s good graces. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, China has made some pronouncements on debt relief, yet it remains unclear on how that will actually work in practice.[28]

BRI loans also provide Beijing another financial lever to ensure support for China’s anti-rights agenda in key international forums, with recipient states sometimes voting alongside Beijing  in  key  forums.  The  result   is at best silence, at worst applause, in the face of China’s domestic repression, as well as assistance to Beijing as it undermines international human rights institutions. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, for example, whose government is a major BRI recipient, said nothing about his fellow  Muslims  in  Xinjiang  as he visited Beijing, while his diplomats offered over-the- top praise for “China’s efforts in providing care to its Muslim citizens.”[29]

Similarly, Cameroon delivered fawning statements of praise for China shortly after Beijing forgave it millions in debt: Referencing Xinjiang, it lauded Beijing for  “fully protect[ing] the exercise of lawful rights of ethnic minority populations” including “normal religious activities and beliefs.”[30] China’s national development banks, such as the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, have a growing global reach but lack critical human rights safeguards. The China-founded multilateral AIIB is not much better.  Its policies call for transparency and accountability in the projects it finances and include social and environmental standards, but do not require the bank to identify and address human rights risks.[31] Among the bank’s 74 members are many governments that claim to respect rights: much of the European Union including France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, along  with and the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

 

 

CHINESE GOVERNMENT THREATS TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION WORLDWIDE

Beijing’s censorship inside China is well documented, and its efforts to disseminate propaganda through state media worldwide are well known. But Chinese authorities no longer appear content with these efforts and are expanding their ambitions. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, Chinese  authorities  increasingly  seek to limit or silence discussions about China that are perceived to be critical, and to ensure that their views and analyses are accepted by various constituencies around the world, even when that entails censoring through global platforms.

Chinese authorities have long monitored and conducted surveillance on students and academics from China and those studying China on campuses around the world. Chinese diplomats have also complained to university officials about hosting speakers  — such as the Dalai Lama — whom the Chinese government considers “sensitive.” Over the past decade, as a result of decreasing state funding to higher education in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, universities are increasingly financially dependent on the large number of fee-paying students from China, and on Chinese government and corporate entities. This has made universities susceptible to Chinese government influence.

The net result? In 2019, a series of rigorous reports documented censorship of and self-censorship by some administrators and academics who did not want to irk Chinese authorities.[32] Students from China have reported threats to their families in China in response to what those students had said in the classroom.

Scholars from China detailed being directly threatened outside the country by Chinese officials  to  refrain  from criticizing the Chinese government in classroom lectures or other talks.

Others described students from China remaining silent in their classrooms, fearful that their speech was being monitored and reported to Chinese authorities by other students from China. One student from China at a university in the United States summed up his concerns about classroom surveillance, noting: “This isn’t a free space.” Drew Pavlou, a student at the University of Queensland who has been critical of the school’s ties to the Chinese government, is facing suspension on the grounds that his activism breached the university’s code of conduct.[33]

Some universities in the  United  States  are  now  under pressure from federal authorities to  disclose  any ties between the schools or individual  scholars  and Chinese government agencies, with the stated objective of countering People’s Republic of China influence efforts and harassment as well as the theft   of technology. Universities and scholars in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United  States  have   been embarrassed by revelations over their ties to Chinese technology firms or government agencies implicated in human rights abuses. In April 2020 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology broke off a relationship with Chinese voice recognition firm iFlytek— whose complicity in human rights violations Human Rights Watch documented — after adopting tighter guidelines on partnerships.[34]

Other schools have grappled with tensions between students who are critical of the Chinese government and those who defend it. Students from the mainland tried to shout down speakers at a March 2019 event   at the University of California at Berkeley who were addressing the human rights crisis in Xinjiang, or in September when unidentified individuals threatened the Hong Kong democracy activist Nathan Law as he arrived for graduate studies at Yale.[35]

But few — if any — universities have taken steps to guarantee students and scholars from China the same access to academic freedom as others.[36] The failure to address these problems means that for some debates and research about China are arbitrarily curtailed.

 

Surveillance and harassment of diaspora communities by Chinese authorities is also not a new problem, but   it is clear that securing a foreign passport does not guarantee the right to freedom of expression. Even leaving  China  has  become  more  difficult:  Beijing  has worked hard in recent years to prevent certain communities from leaving the country through tactics such as denying or confiscating their passports, tightening border security to prevent Tibetans and Turkic Muslims from fleeing, and pressuring other governments from Cambodia to Turkey to forcibly return asylum seekers in violation of their obligations under international law.[37]

Since early 2017, some Uyghurs who have traveled outside China and returned, or simply remained in contact with family and friends outside the country, have found that Chinese authorities deem that conduct criminal.[38]

As  a  result,  even   individuals who have managed to leave China and obtain citizenship in rights- respecting democracies report that they are cut off from family members still inside China, are monitored and  harassed   by Chinese government officials, and are reluctant to criticize Chinese policies or authorities for fear of reprisals. Some feel they cannot attend public gatherings, such as talks on Chinese politics or Congressional hearings, for fear of being photographed or otherwise having their presence at those events noted. Others describe being called or receiving WhatsApp or text messages from authorities inside China telling them that if they publicly criticize the Chinese government their family members inside China will suffer.

One Uyghur who had obtained citizenship in Europe said: “It doesn’t matter where I am, or what passport I hold. [Chinese authorities] will terrorize me anywhere, and I have no way to fight that.” Even Han Chinese immigrants to countries like Canada described deep fear of the Chinese government, saying that while they are outraged by the human rights abuses in China,  they worry that if they criticize the government openly, their job prospects, business opportunities, and chances of going back to China would be affected or that their family members who remain in China would be in danger.[39]

Governments have relatively weak means to push back against this kind of harassment, given that it originates largely in China. In 2018, the Federal Bureau of Investigation stepped up its outreach to Uyghurs in the United States who had been targets of Chinese government harassment, and the Uyghur Human Rights Act, adopted in June 2020, expands that work across various diaspora communities from China.[40]

Chinese authorities also seek to limit freedom of expression beyond China’s borders by censoring conversations on global platforms. In June, Zoom, a California-based company, admitted that it had — at the request of Chinese authorities — suspended the accounts of U.S.-based activists who had organized online discussions about the 1989 Tiananmen massacre.[41] While the company reinstated the accounts of people based in the United States, it said it could not refuse Chinese authorities’ demands that it obey “local law.”

Other global platforms have also enabled censorship. WeChat, a Chinese social media platform with about  one billion users worldwide, 100 million of them outside China, is owned by the Chinese company Tencent.[42] The Chinese government and Tencent regularly censor content on the platform, skewing what viewers can see. Posts  with  the  words  “Liu  Xiaobo” or “Tiananmen massacre” cannot be uploaded, and criticisms of the Chinese government are swiftly removed — even if those trying to post such messages are outside the country. WeChat is wildly popular for its easy functionality, but it is also a highly effective  way for Chinese authorities to control what its users worldwide can see.

It also affects what politicians outside China can say to their own constituents. Politicians around the world increasingly use WeChat to communicate with Chinese speakers in their electorates. In September 2017, Jenny Kwan, a member of the Canadian parliament, made a statement regarding the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong in which she praised the young protesters who “stood up and fought for what they believe in, and for the betterment of their society”; that statement was subsequently posted on her WeChat account — only to be deleted.[43]

 

It is unclear whether or how politicians in democracies are tracking Beijing’s efforts to  censor  their  speech. As China plays an ever-more prominent role in global affairs, governments need to move swiftly to ensure that elected representatives’ ability to communicate with their constituents is not subject to Beijing’s whims.

One can no longer pretend that China’s suppression of independent voices stops at its borders.

Finally, Beijing also leverages access to its market to censor companies ranging from Marriott to Mercedes Benz.[44] Chinese state television, CCTV, and Tencent, a media partner of the National Basketball Association with a five-year streaming deal worth $1.5 billion, said they would not broadcast Houston Rockets games  after the team’s general manager tweeted in support of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protesters.[45] Under pressure from Beijing, major international companies have censored themselves or staff members. Others have  fired  employees  who  have  expressed  views  the companies perceive as  critical  of  Beijing. It is bad enough for companies to abide by censorship restrictions when operating inside China. It is much worse to impose that censorship on their employees and customers around the world. One can no longer pretend that China’s suppression of independent voices stops at its borders.

 

WHAT HAPPENS IF CHINA’S POLICIES ARE NOT REVERSED

— AND WHAT TO DO

The consequences for failing to  stop  China’s  assault on the international human rights system, and on law and practice around rights-respecting development  and on the freedom of expression are simple and  stark. If these trends continue unabated, the U.N. Security Council will become even less likely to take action on grave human rights crises; the fundamental underpinnings of a universal human  rights  system  with room for independent actors will further erode; and Chinese authorities’ (and their allies’)  impunity  will only grow.

Serious rights-violating governments will know they can rely on Beijing for investment and loans with no conditions. People around the world will increasingly have to be careful whether they criticize Chinese authorities, even if they are citizens of rights-respecting democracies or in environments like academia, where debate is meant to be encouraged.

Chinese government conduct over the first half  of 2020 — its stalling into an independent investigations into the COVID-19 pandemic, its blatant rejection of international law in deciding to impose national security legislation on Hong Kong, even its manipulation of Tiananmen commemorations for people in the United States — appears to have galvanized momentum to push back. Members of parliaments from numerous countries are calling for the appointment of a U.N. special envoy on Hong Kong, governments are pressuring Beijing over a COVID-19 cover up, and companies’ capitulation to Chinese pressure to censor are regular news items.

But this is far from creating the kind of counterweight necessary  to  curb  Beijing’s  agenda,  whose  threat can now be seen clearly. To protect the U.N. human rights system from Chinese government erosions, rights-respecting governments  should  urgently  form  a multi-year coalition not only to ensure that they are tracking these threats, but also to prepare themselves to respond to them at every opportunity  to  push  back. This means nominating candidates for U.N. expert positions and calling out obstructions in the accreditation system.

This means canvassing and organizing objections to norm-eroding resolutions,  and  mobilizing allies to put themselves forward as candidates for the HRC or other selections made by regional blocs. China has the advantages of deep pockets and no periodic changes in government to encumber its ability to plan; democracies will struggle with both. But here the stakes could not be higher — not just for the 1.4 billion people in China, but for people around the world.

Governments, especially those that have joined the AIIB, should use their joint leverage to push the institution to adopt well-established  human  rights and environmental principles and practices to ensure abuse-free development. And governments entering into BRI partnerships should carefully consider the consequences and ensure that they do  what  China  will not: provide adequate public  consultation,  and  full transparency about the financial implications for the country, and the ability of affected populations to reject these development projects.

Governments should urgently consider Beijing’s threats to the freedom of expression in their own countries. They should track threats to citizens, and pursue accountability to the fullest extent through tools like targeted sanctions. Academic institutions should not content themselves merely with better disclosure policies about interactions with Chinese government actors, they need urgently to ensure that everyone on their campuses has equal access to freedom of expression — any less is a gross rejection of their responsibilities.

Companies have a role to play in rejecting censorship. They should recognize that they cannot win playing Beijing’s game,  especially  given  their  responsibility  to respect human rights under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human  Rights.  They should  draft  and  promote  codes  of  conduct  for dealing with China that  prohibit  participation  in  or facilitation of infringements of the right to free expression,  information,  privacy,  association,  or  other internationally recognized human rights. Strong common standards would make it more difficult for Beijing to ostracize those who stand up for basic rights and freedoms. Consumers and shareholders would  also be better placed to insist that the companies not succumb to censorship as the price of doing business  in China, and that they should never benefit from or contribute to abuses.

Finally, it is critical that none of these efforts to limit the Chinese government’s threats to human rights rebound on people across China or of Chinese descent around the world. The rapid spread of COVID-19 triggered a wave of racist anti-Asian harassment and assaults, and an alarming number of governments, politicians, and policies are falling  into  Beijing’s  trap of conflating the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist Party, and people from China.[46] They are not the same, and the human rights of people in China should remain at the core of future policies.

 

REFERENCES

1. “UN Treaty Body Database: China,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https:// tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=36&Lang=EN.
2. Kenneth Roth, “China’s global threat to human rights,” (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global.
3. “The Costs of International Advocacy: China’s Interference in United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 5, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/costs- international-advocacy/chinas-interference-united-nations-human-rights; Ted Piccone, “China’s long game on human rights at the United Nations,” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, September 2018), https:// www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-long-game-on-human-rights-at-the-united-nations/.
4. Ted Piccone, “China’s long game on human rights at the United Nations.”
5. Sarah Zheng, “Why is China resisting an independent inquiry into how the pandemic started?,” South China Morning Post, May 16, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3084602/why-china- resisting-independent-inquiry-how-pandemic-started.
6. “Hong Kong: Beijing threatens draconian security law,” Human Rights Watch, May 2, 2020, https://www.hrw. org/news/2020/05/22/hong-kong-beijing-threatens-draconian-security-law.
7. “States should oppose China’s disingenuous resolution on ‘mutually beneficial cooperation,’” Human Rights Watch, June 16, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/16/states-should-oppose-chinas-disingenuous- resolution-mutually-beneficial-cooperation.
8. John Fisher, “China’s ‘win-win’ resolution is anything but,” Human Rights Watch, March 5, 2018, https://www. hrw.org/news/2018/03/05/chinas-win-win-resolution-anything.
9. “The role of technical assistance and capacity-building in fostering mutually beneficial cooperation in promoting and protecting human rights,” United Nations Human Rights Council, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ HRBodies/HRC/AdvisoryCommittee/Pages/TheRoleTechnicalAssistance.aspx.
10. Andrea Worden, “China’s win-win at the UN Human Rights Council: Just not for human rights,” Sinopsis, May 28, 2020, https://sinopsis.cz/en/worden-win-win/.
11. “UN: China blocks activists, harasses experts,” Human Rights Watch, September 5, 2017, https://www.hrw. org/news/2017/09/05/un-china-blocks-activists-harasses-experts.
12. “UN: China responds to rights review with threats,” Human Rights Watch, April 1, 2019, https://www.hrw. org/news/2019/04/01/un-china-responds-rights-review-threats.
13. “UN: Rights body needs to step up on Xinjiang abuses,” Human Rights Watch, March 12, 2020, https:// www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/12/un-rights-body-needs-step-xinjiang-abuses.
14. “UN: Unprecedented joint call for China to end Xinjiang abuses,” Human Rights Watch, July 10, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/10/un-unprecedented-joint-call-china-end-xinjiang-abuses.
15. Sophie Richardson, “Unprecedented UN critique of China’s Xinjiang policies,” Human Rights Watch, November 14, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/14/unprecedented-un-critique-chinas-xinjiang- policies.

16. Louis Charbonneau, “China’s great misinformation wall crumbles on Xinjiang,” Human Rights Watch, November 20, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/20/chinas-great-misinformation-wall-crumbles- xinjiang.
17. “Procedural vote blocks holding of Security Council meeting on human rights situation in Syria, briefing by High Commissioner,” United Nations, March 19, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13255.doc.htm.
18. UN fails to take action on order against Myanmar on Rohingya,” Al Jazeera, February 4, 2020, https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/fails-action-order-myanmar-rohingyas-200205020402316.html.
19. “View country visits of special procedures of the Human  Rights  Council  since  1998:  China,”  United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits. aspx?visitType=all&country=CHN&Lang=en; “Thematic Mandates,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM&lang=en.
20. “Human rights by country: China,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https:// www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/CNIndex.aspx.
21. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights on his mission to China,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/ HRC/35/26/Add.2; Philip Alston, “End-of-mission statement on China,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, August 23, 2016, https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. aspx?NewsID=20402&LangID=E.
22. “UN experts call for decisive measures to protect fundamental freedoms in China,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, June 26, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006&LangID=E.
23. “China: ‘Belt and Road’ projects should respect rights,” Human Rights Watch, April 21, 2019, https://www. hrw.org/news/2019/04/21/china-belt-and-road-projects-should-respect-rights.
24. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Dealing with demand for China’s global surveillance exports,” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, April 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-demand-for-chinas- global-surveillance-exports/.
25. Sophie Richardson and Hugh Williamson, “China: One belt, one road, lots of obligations,” Human Rights Watch, May 12, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/12/china-one-belt-one-road-lots-obligations.
26. “’We’re Leaving Everything Behind’: The Impact of Guinea’s Souapiti Dam on Displaced Communities,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 2020), https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/04/16/were-leaving-everything- behind/impact-guineas-souapiti-dam-displaced-communities.
27. Neelam Deo and Amit Bhandari, “The intensifying backlash against BRI,” Gateway House, May 31, 2018, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/bri-debt-backlash/.
28. Yun Sun, “China’s debt relief for Africa: Emerging deliberations,” The Brookings Institution, June 9, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/06/09/chinas-debt-relief-for-africa-emerging- deliberations/.
29. Maya Wang, “Pakistan Cares About the Rights of All Muslims—Except Those Oppressed by its Ally, China,” Newsweek, April 17, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/china-muslims-pakistan-imran-khan-1399044.
30. Nick Cumming-Bruce, “China Rebuked by 22 Nations Over Xinjiang Repression,” The New York Times, July 10, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-rights.html.

31. “China: New bank’s projects should respect rights,” Human Rights Watch, June 24, 2016, https://www.hrw. org/news/2016/06/24/china-new-banks-projects-should-respect-rights.
32. “China: Government threats to academic freedom abroad,” Human Rights Watch, March 21, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/21/china-government-threats-academic-freedom-abroad; Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Rory Truex, “Repressive experiences among China scholars: New evidence from survey data,” The China Quarterly 242, (June 2020): 349-375, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ china-quarterly/article/repressive-experiences-among-china-scholars-new-evidence-from-survey-data/ C1CB08324457ED90199C274CDC153127.
33. Tim Swanston, “Drew Pavlou, critic of University of Queensland’s links to Chinese Government bodies, suspended for two years,” ABC News (Australia), May 29, 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-29/ drew-pavlou-suspended-university-queensland/12302350.
34. Will Knight, “MIT cuts ties with a Chinese AI firm amid human rights concerns,” Wired, April 21, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/mit-cuts-ties-chinese-ai-firm-human-rights/; “China: Voice biometric collection threatens privacy,” Human Rights Watch, October 22, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/22/china- voice-biometric-collection-threatens-privacy.
35. Sophie Richardson, “The Chinese Government Cannot Be Allowed to Undermine Academic Freedom,” Human Rights Watch, November 8, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/08/chinese-government- cannot-be-allowed-undermine-academic-freedom.
36. “Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad: A Code of Conduct for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide,” Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/supporting_resources/190321_china_academic_freedom_coc_0.pdf.
37. “One passport, two systems,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, July 2015), https://www.hrw.org/ report/2015/07/13/one-passport-two-systems/chinas-restrictions-foreign-travel-tibetans-and-others; “Thailand: More Uighurs face forced return to China,” Human Rights Watch, March 21, 2014, https://www.hrw. org/news/2014/03/21/thailand-more-uighurs-face-forced-return-china.
38. “’Eradicating Ideological Viruses’: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological- viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs.
39. Yaqiu Wang, “Why Some Chinese Immigrants Living in Canada Live in Silent Fear,” Human Rights Watch, March 4, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/04/why-some-chinese-immigrants-living-canada-live- silent-fear.
40. Edward Wong, “Uighur Americans Speak Against China’s Internment Camps. Their Relatives Disappear,” The New York Times, October 18, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/world/asia/uighur-muslims-china- detainment.html.
41. Yaqiu Wang, “China’s Zoom bomb,” Human Rights Watch, June 16, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2020/06/16/chinas-zoom-bomb.
42. Yaqiu Wang, “How China’s censorship machine crosses borders — and into Western politics,” Human Rights Watch, February 20, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/20/how-chinas-censorship-machine-crosses- borders-and-western-politics.
43. Ibid.
44. Kenneth Roth, “China’s global threat to human rights.”

45. Kenneth Roth, “For NBA’s quandary over China, stand with human rights,” Human Rights Watch, October 8, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/08/nbas-quandary-over-china-stand-human-rights.
46. “Covid-19 Fueling Anti-Asian Racism and Xenophobia Worldwide,” Human Rights Watch, May 12, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/covid-19-fueling-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwide