制造商需要面对新一波的中国竞争

制造商需要面对新一波的中国竞争

https://www.ft.com/content/9feb754c-d1c1-4b3b-8e4a-c09c240d1179

后疫情时代的发展步伐给西方企业敲响了警钟 THOMAS HALE

大众汽车在中国安徽省投资建立了一个研发中心 © Qilai Shen/彭博社

托马斯·黑尔 2024 年 4 月 15 日

今年三月，当瑞典投资者和银行家组成的访问代表团自疫情以来首次经过中国的工厂和造船厂时，他们目睹了对他们的系统的震惊。

德国商业银行首席股票策略师马蒂亚斯·桑德林表示，在瑞典制造商长期存在的整个中国大陆，来自中国企业的竞争是“激烈的”，甚至是“可怕的”。 “他们在短短两三年内赶上并发展的方式令我们震惊，”他说。“中国竞争的陈词滥调形象是廉价复制品之一。 我认为这次旅行给我们敲响的警钟是，情况已不再是这样了。”

从高中考试到奶茶特许经营，激烈的国内竞争在中国各地普遍存在。现在，随着电动汽车生产的扩大，这种竞争意识给国际企业带来了越来越大的挑战。

汽车只是更广泛的工业框架的一部分，在这个框架中，几十年来，发达经济体一直依赖中国作为廉价的协作制造中心。瑞典的企业包括世界领先的空气压缩机供应商阿特拉斯·科普柯和采矿设备制造商山特维克等巨头。

合作的气氛并没有消失，尤其是在现在主要由中国公民组成的外国公司。但现在也伴随着越来越大的竞争压力。“普遍的看法是，如果你不是优质产品，那么你绝对会受到打击，”桑德林说。

在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰并因疫情关闭边境后，美国和欧洲各国政府高度重视“降低”供应链风险，远离中国的必要性。 但内地竞争越激烈，国际产业参与者就越难离开。2020年底，大众汽车在安徽省开设了研发中心，并拥有中国电池公司国轩高科的主要股权。

新老工业公司都一再强调进入中国进行研究并进入其广阔市场的必要性。 Windrose Technology是一家电动卡车初创公司，迄今已生产13辆汽车，目标最终在美国上市，但目前依赖中国大陆合作伙伴（包括国有的安徽江淮汽车集团）进行制造。

Windrose 创始人韩文表示：“作为一家电动汽车制造商，如果你与中国没有联系，并且假装自己是电动汽车领域世界上最好的卡车，那么没有人会相信你。”“如果我告诉人们我是一家澳大利亚电动汽车初创公司，人们可能不会相信我。 如果我告诉人们我是一家英国电动汽车初创公司，他们也不会相信我。”

尽管中国在某些方面是竞争的温床，但其产业模式的性质与美国和欧洲有很大不同。 所谓“高质量发展”是2025年“中国制造”政策中自上而下的一部分，也是习近平主席去年的主要口号。

本周，欧盟委员会更新了一份关于中国贸易扭曲的 2017 年政策文件，其中指出能源和金融等多个领域的国内竞争和任何希望扩张的外国企业都受到压制。

但报告也谈到了具有中国特色的竞争。 报告指出，在中国，"各省和主要城市之间似乎在争夺在其地区拥有[电动汽车]生产商，以吸引就业、收入和中央政府的关注”。

中国政府的角色很难轻易地与西方经济体中透明的规范相匹配。 中国企业通常不会回答有关其与政府关系的问题，但由于欧盟报告长达 700 多页，这些关系是广泛存在的。

如果与中国企业的竞争进一步加剧，对中国与国际贸易关系的政治审查也会加剧。 但是，在欧洲和美国，企业已经在急于提高对竞争本质的理解。

在瑞典之行中，大多数参与者甚至没有直接投资中国，但由于持有国内股票市场，他们觉得有必要参加。

“北欧公司，尤其是制造业公司，直接或间接地拥有巨大的风险敞口，”桑德林说。 “我们一回来就 。 。 。 我们已经被各种对话和会议淹没了。”

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Manufacturers need to face up to new wave of Chinese competition

https://www.ft.com/content/9feb754c-d1c1-4b3b-8e4a-c09c240d1179

Pace of post-pandemic development a wake-up call for western companies THOMAS HALE

Volkswagen has invested in a research and development centre in China’s Anhui province © Qilai Shen/Bloomberg 

Thomas Hale APRIL 15 2024

In March, as a visiting delegation of Swedish investors and bankers passed through China’s factories and shipyards for the first time since the pandemic, what they witnessed was a shock to their systems.

Across the mainland, where Sweden’s manufacturers have a long-standing presence, competition from Chinese firms was “ferocious”, even “monstrous”, according to Mattias Sundling, chief equity strategist at Handelsbanken. “The way they have caught up and developed in just two or three years was just stunning to us,” he said. “The cliched image of Chinese competition was one of cheap copies. I think the wake-up call for us when we were on this trip is that this is no longer the case.”

From high school examinations to bubble tea franchises, intense domestic competition is pervasive across China. Now, as embodied in expanding electric-vehicle production, that sense of competition poses a growing challenge to international businesses.

Autos are just one part of a wider industrial framework within which, for decades, developed economies have relied on China as an inexpensive and collaborative manufacturing hub. The Swedish presence includes giants such as Atlas Copco, the world’s leading provider of air compressors, and Sandvik, which makes mining equipment.

An air of collaboration, especially at foreign companies now largely staffed by Chinese nationals, has not disappeared. But it is now accompanied by mounting competitive pressure. “The general take is if you are not a premium product, you are getting absolutely hammered,” said Sundling.

Governments in the US and Europe have focused heavily on the need to “de-risk” supply chains away from China after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and border closures under the pandemic. But the more competitive the mainland becomes, the harder it is for international industrial players to leave. At the end of 2020 Volkswagen opened a research and development centre in Anhui province, and owns a major stake in Guoxuan, a Chinese battery firm.

Both old and new industrial companies repeatedly emphasise the need to be in China for research purposes as well as to access its vast market. Windrose Technology, an electric truck start-up that has so far produced 13 vehicles, aims to eventually list in the US but currently relies on mainland China partners, including state-owned Anhui Jianghuai Automobile Group, for manufacturing.

“As an EV maker, if you are not linked to China and you pretend to be the world’s best truck in the EV space, no one’s going to believe you,” said Wen Han, Windrose founder. “If I told people I was an Australian EV start-up, people would just probably not believe me. If I told people I’m a British EV start-up, they would also not believe me.”

While China is in some respects a hotbed of competition, the nature of its industrial model differs profoundly from the US and Europe. The need for so-called “high quality development” is part of a top-down approach set out in the 2025 “Made in China” policy and has become President Xi Jinping’s main refrain in the past year.

This week, the European Commission updated a 2017 policy document on Chinese trade distortions that identifies various areas, such as energy and finance, in which competition is suppressed both domestically and for any foreign firms hoping to expand.

But the report also touches on competition with Chinese characteristics. In China, it notes, “the provinces and the main cities appear to be in competition among them to have [electric-vehicle] producers in their area, in order to attract employment, revenues and the attention of the central government”.

The role of the state in China is difficult to easily map on to transparently-codified norms in western economies. Chinese companies do not typically engage with questions on their relationship to the government, but, as the EU report establishes over 700 pages, those relationships are widespread.

If competition with Chinese companies rises further, so will political scrutiny of China’s relationship with international trade. But, across Europe and the US, businesses are already rushing to upgrade their understanding of the nature of that competition.

On the Swedish trip, most of the participants did not even directly invest in China but felt they needed to attend because of their holdings on the domestic stock market.

“Nordic companies, particularly in manufacturing, have a huge exposure, directly or indirectly,” says Sundling. “The minute we got back . . . we’ve been absolutely swamped with conversations and meetings.”

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