风萧萧_Frank
以文会友
拜登的中国战略根本没用，上了重要一课？
文章称，几十年来，美国一直为贸易和资本的全球化而欢呼，这在提高效率和降低消费者成本方面带来了巨大的好处。但在一个危险的世界里，仅仅提高效率是不够的。在美国和整个西方，中国的崛起正把其他目标带到了前台。可以理解的是，官员们希望通过限制中国获得可能增强其军事实力的尖端技术来保护国家安全，并在中国保持控制的领域建立替代供应链。
结果是针对中国的关税、投资审查和出口管制铺天盖地，先起初先由前任总统川普执政期间发起，现在拜登继续这些政策。美国财政部长耶伦已前往德里和河内宣传“友岸外包”的好处，向公司老板们发出信号，表示从中国转移是明智的。尽管这种“降低风险”的措施会降低效率，但这种想法认为，坚持对敏感产品进行限制会限制损害。额外的成本是值得的，因为美国将会更安全。
文章称，这种新思维的后果现在正变得清晰起来。不幸的是，它既没有带来弹性，也没有带来安全性。在适应新规则的过程中，供应链变得更加复杂和不透明。而且，如果你仔细观察，就会发现美国对中国关键投入的依赖依然存在。更令人担忧的是，这一政策产生了反常的效果，促使美国的盟友与中国走得更近。
这一切可能会让人感到意外，因为乍一看，这些新政策似乎取得了巨大的成功。中美之间的直接经济联系正在萎缩。2018年，美国从一组“低成本”亚洲国家进口的产品中，有三分之二来自中国;去年，数据降至仅超过一半。相反，美国转向了印度、墨西哥和东南亚。
投资流动也在调整。2016年，中国公司在美国投资了惊人的480亿美元;6年后，这一数字已缩水至仅31亿美元。25年来，中国首次不再是中国美国商会(American Chamber of Commerce in China)大多数会员的三大投资目的地之一。在过去20年的大部分时间里，中国声称在亚洲新外资项目中占有最大份额。去年，它收到的外资比印度和越南还少。
然而，深入挖掘，你会发现美国对中国的依赖仍然没有改变。美国可能正在将其需求从中国转移到其他国家。但这些地区的生产现在比以往任何时候都更加依赖中国的投入。例如，随着东南亚对美国出口的增加，其从中国进口的中间投入品也呈爆炸式增长。中国对墨西哥的汽车零部件出口在过去五年中翻了一番，墨西哥是另一个受益于美国降低风险的国家。国际货币基金组织(IMF)发表的研究发现，即使在美国最渴望从中国转移的先进制造业领域，那些打入美国市场最多的国家也是那些与中国工业联系最密切的国家。供应链变得更加复杂，贸易变得更加昂贵。但中国的主导地位并未减弱。
发生了什么?在最令人震惊的情况下，中国商品只是被重新包装，然后通过第三国运往美国。2022年底，美国商务部发现，东南亚的四家主要太阳能供应商对中国产品进行小规模加工，实际上是在规避对中国商品的关税。在稀土金属等其他领域，中国继续提供难以替代的投入。
但更多时候，这种机制是良性的。自由市场只是在适应，以找到最便宜的方式向消费者提供商品。在许多情况下，中国凭借其庞大的劳动力和高效的物流，仍然是最便宜的供应商。美国的新规则有能力改变自己与中国的贸易方向，但他们无法摆脱中国对整个供应链的影响。
因此，脱钩在很大程度上是虚假的。更糟糕的是，拜登的做法还加深了中国与其他出口国之间的经济联系。这样做，会使他们的利益与美国的利益对立起来。尽管有些国家的政府对中国日益强硬的姿态感到担忧，但它们与亚洲最大经济体的商业关系正在加深。《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》(RCEP)是许多东南亚国家和中国于2020年11月签署的一项贸易协定，它为近年来贸易蓬勃发展的中间产品创造了一种单一市场。
对许多较贫穷的国家来说，接受中国的投资和中间产品，并向美国出口制成品，是就业和繁荣的源泉。美国不愿支持新的贸易协定是他们有时视其为不可靠伙伴的原因之一。如果要他们在中国和美国之间做出选择，他们可能不会站在山姆大叔一边。
将风险转化为去风险
所有这些都给美国官员上了重要的一课。他们表示，他们希望精确地使用“小院高墙”来防范中国。但是，如果对关税和限制的取舍没有清晰的认识，风险就在于，每一次安全恐慌都让院子变得更大，篱笆变得更高。到目前为止，激光聚焦的好处是虚幻的，而成本比预期的要高，这一事实强调了激光聚焦的必要性。
此外，这种方法越有选择性，就越有可能说服贸易伙伴在真正重要的领域减少对中国的依赖。没有它，去风险化不会让世界变得更安全，反而会让世界变得更危险。
Joe Biden's China strategy is not working
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/08/10/joe-bidens-china-strategy-is-not-working
Supply chains are becoming more tangled and opaque
On august 9th President Joe Biden unveiled his latest weapon in America’s economic war with China. New rules will police investments made abroad by the private sector, and those into the most sensitive technologies in China will be banned. The use of such curbs by the world’s strongest champion of capitalism is the latest sign of the profound shift in America’s economic policy as it contends with the rise of an increasingly assertive and threatening rival.
For decades America cheered on the globalisation of trade and capital, which brought vast benefits in terms of enhanced efficiency and lower costs for consumers. But in a dangerous world, efficiency alone is no longer enough. In America, and across the West, China’s rise is bringing other aims to the fore. Understandably, officials want to protect national security, by limiting China’s access to cutting-edge technology that could enhance its military might, and to build alternative supply chains in areas where China maintains a vice-like grip.
The result is a sprawl of tariffs, investment reviews and export controls aimed at China, first under the previous president, Donald Trump, and now Mr Biden. Janet Yellen, America’s treasury secretary, has travelled to Delhi and Hanoi to tout the benefits of “friendshoring”, signalling to company bosses that shifting away from China would be wise. Although such “de-risking” measures would lower efficiency, the thinking goes, sticking to sensitive products would limit the damage. And the extra cost would be worth it, because America would be safer.
All this may come as a surprise, because, at first glance, the new policies look like a smashing success. Direct economic links between China and America are shrivelling. In 2018 two-thirds of American imports from a group of “low-cost” Asian countries came from China; last year just over half did. Instead, America has turned towards India, Mexico and South-East Asia.
Investment flows are adjusting, too. In 2016 Chinese firms invested a staggering $48bn in America; six years on, the figure had shrunk to a mere $3.1bn. For the first time in a quarter of a century, China is no longer one of the top three investment destinations for most members of the American Chamber of Commerce in China. For the best part of two decades, China claimed the lion’s share of new foreign-investment projects in Asia. Last year it received less than India or Vietnam.
Dig deeper, though, and you find that America’s reliance on China remains intact. America may be redirecting its demand from China to other countries. But production in those places now relies more on Chinese inputs than ever. As South-East Asia’s exports to America have risen, for instance, its imports of intermediate inputs from China have exploded. China’s exports of car parts to Mexico, another country that has benefited from American de-risking, have doubled over the past five years. Research published by the imf finds that even in advanced-manufacturing sectors, where America is keenest to shift away from China, the countries that have made most inroads into the American market are those with the closest industrial links to China. Supply chains have become more complex, and trade has become more expensive. But China’s dominance is undiminished.
What is going on? In the most egregious cases, Chinese goods are simply being repackaged and sent via third countries to America. At the end of 2022, America’s Department of Commerce found that four major solar suppliers based in South-East Asia were doing such minor processing of otherwise Chinese products that they were, in effect, circumventing tariffs on Chinese goods. In other areas, such as rare-earth metals, China continues to provide inputs that are hard to replace.
More often, though, the mechanism is benign. Free markets are simply adapting to find the cheapest way to supply goods to consumers. And in many cases China, with its vast workforce and efficient logistics, remains the cheapest supplier. America’s new rules have the power to redirect its own trade with China. But they cannot rid the entire supply chain of Chinese influence.
Much of the decoupling, then, is phoney. Worse, from Mr Biden’s perspective, his approach is also deepening the economic links between China and other exporting countries. In so doing, it perversely pits their interests against America’s. Even where governments are worried about the growing assertiveness of China, their commercial relationships with the biggest economy in Asia are deepening. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a trade deal signed in November 2020 by many South-East Asian countries and China, creates a sort of single market in precisely the intermediate goods in which trade has boomed in recent years.
For many poorer countries, receiving Chinese investment and intermediate goods and exporting finished products to America is a source of jobs and prosperity. America’s reluctance to support new trade agreements is one reason why they sometimes see it as an unreliable partner. If asked to choose between China and America, they might not side with Uncle Sam.
Putting the risk into de-risking
All this carries important lessons for American officials. They say that they want to be precise in how they guard against China using a “small yard and high fence”. But without a clear sense of the trade-offs from their tariffs and restrictions, the risk is that each security scare makes the yard bigger and the fence taller. The fact that the benefits have so far been illusory and the costs greater than expected underscores the need for laser focus.
Moreover, the more selective the approach, the greater the likelihood that trading partners can be persuaded to reduce their reliance on China in the areas that really matter. Without it, de-risking will make the world not safer, but more dangerous. ■
For subscribers only: to see how we design each week’s cover, sign up to our weekly Cover Story newsletter. For more coverage of Joe Biden’s presidency, visit our dedicated hub and follow along as we track shifts in his approval rating. For exclusive insight and reading recommendations from our correspondents in America, sign up to Checks and Balance, our weekly newsletter.
This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "Costly and dangerous"
