美国、中国和中东大国竞争
查斯·弗里曼 2022-11-09
The United States, China, and Great Power Competition in the Middle East
作者：Projects International, Inc. 主席查斯·弗里曼 (Chas Freeman)。他是一位退休的美国国防官员、外交官和口译员，获得过无数崇高荣誉和奖项，也是一位受欢迎的公众演说家，并着有五本书。
对俄克拉荷马大学大卫·L·博伦国际研究学院的致辞
布朗大学沃森国际与公共事务研究所访问学者
视频来自新罕布什尔州埃克塞特，2022 年 11 月 9 日
这是官方的。 拜登政府同意特朗普政府的观点，即世界事务中发生的几乎所有事情都可以用两个相互关联的零和竞赛来解释。 一个是地缘政治的，如“大国竞争”。另一个是意识形态的，如“民主与威权主义”。
所谓“中东”是西亚的一个次区域[1]，占据非洲、亚洲、欧洲交汇的战略空间。 它见证了赫梯人和埃及人之间争夺统治地位的地缘政治竞争。 希腊人和波斯人； 罗马人、希腊罗马人和帕提亚人； 阿拉伯人和波斯人； 阿拉伯人、土耳其人和希腊罗马人； 欧洲人、土耳其人和阿拉伯人； 英国人和法国人； 美国人和苏联人。
它也是世界上最具争议的三种宗教的诞生地，它们之间有着悠久的意识形态战争历史。 印欧多神教和犹太教的基督教分支之间发生了决定性的战斗，基督教世界也派十字军与犹太教的一神论后代伊斯兰教作战。 最近，包括马克思列宁主义在内的欧洲-大西洋治理理想在那里相互斗争，并寻求取代本土伊斯兰和部落传统，但取得了有限的成功。
但在很大程度上，当代中东局势反驳了华盛顿当前的外交政策教条。 该地区现在发生的事情几乎不能用大国竞争或民主与意识形态之间的较量来解释。 独裁主义。 包括美国在内的大国已经失去了对该地区的控制。 没有人再试图对其强加新的治理体系。
令人震惊的是，华盛顿在某种程度上已经与中东所有关键角色疏远了。 除了极少数例外，该地区的国家现在都在做出自己的决定，而不是试图为美国观众粉饰自己的决定。 美国在土耳其失去了大部分影响力，与伊朗不和，现在与沙特阿拉伯关系紧张。 华盛顿与巴勒斯坦建制派不再有富有成效的联系。 由于价值观的分歧、与俄罗斯和中国打交道时对国家利益的不同考量以及美国国内的政治两极分化，美国与以色列的关系变得日益复杂。 与四十年来相比，埃及不再那么尊重美国的观点。 阿拉伯联合酋长国已成为世界级的自私现实政治实践者，确保美国与其之间的关系是赤裸裸的交易性的。 事情就是这样。
失去在该地区影响力的不仅仅是美国。 英国和法国——前欧洲帝国主义列强——曾经在“中东”发号施令。现在，他们觉得有义务服从他们以前的领地，这样他们就可以出售足够的武器和弹药，以保持他们的军火工业生产线的开放。 他们和其他外国供应商试图利用军售向该地区国家施压，结果只是促使他们多样化采购并开始发展自己的军事工业。
在遭到欧盟（EU）的拒绝后，土耳其放弃了长达两个世纪的重新定义其欧洲身份的努力。 安卡拉正在前奥斯曼帝国的空间里与俄罗斯和中国一起寻求独立的、尽管不稳定的路线，并追求泛伊斯兰主义和泛图兰主义。 土耳其与欧盟、北约和美国关系的恶化表明西方在许多领域的影响力显着削弱，而不仅仅是在中东。 西方不能再指望土耳其支持或默许其对以色列-巴勒斯坦问题、叙利亚、伊拉克、伊朗、俄罗斯、高加索、巴尔干、希腊、塞浦路斯、埃及、利比亚、海湾合作委员会国家、阿富汗、伊斯兰合作组织成员国、北约或马格里布的政策。 这对全球和区域都有巨大影响。
在西方长期在该地区的外交目标上，土耳其不再与北约其他国家、华盛顿、伦敦、巴黎或柏林保持一致。 土耳其的政策使保护以色列的任务变得更加复杂； 排除俄罗斯在中东和黑海地区的影响力； 并反对伊朗。 土耳其非但没有加入美国/北约在乌克兰问题上与俄罗斯的代理人战争，而是出于自利的目的发挥了斡旋作用，并利用俄罗斯的困境来提振其经济。
与此同时，美国与伊朗的关系仍然十分敌对。 华盛顿呼应耶路撒冷、利雅得和阿布扎比的政策偏好，而不是从自己的国家利益推断政策。 以色列和海湾阿拉伯国家鼓励并助长了美国在冷战后伊拉克和叙利亚的战略失误。 这些错误促使伊朗在新月沃地建立了势力范围和代理人势力，让以色列和海湾阿拉伯人都感到被包围。
短暂的“联合全面行动计划”解决了以色列对伊朗核计划的近乎歇斯底里的情绪，但没有解决海湾阿拉伯国家对其地区霸权愿望的更直接的担忧。 以色列对伊朗核突破的担忧和海湾阿拉伯国家对包围的焦虑导致美国政界人士施压废除该协议，美国政界人士也这么做了。 不出所料，伊朗现在已经恢复了之前中断的对以色列半秘密核计划的模仿。 具有讽刺意味的是，以色列却让其在其周边地区的核垄断地位受到质疑。
美国当前伊朗政策的特点是无意识的恶意、道貌岸然的制裁以及间歇性的军事对抗和袭击，这无助于削弱伊朗的地区影响力。 美国最新的核态势评估报告判断，伊朗并未寻求核武器，但以色列和拜登政府继续威胁采取军事行动，阻止其获得核武器。 这只会给德黑兰施加压力，要求其拥有核武器。 美国对朝鲜采取的类似政策的结果表明，基于“最大压力”的做法更有可能促使伊朗建造核武器洲际弹道导弹以遏制美国，而不是威慑美国。
与此同时，美国对伊朗在霍尔木兹海峡的挑战的反应始终低于海湾阿拉伯国家的预期。 因此，毫不奇怪的是，在向卡塔尔施压，要求其无视地理因素、限制与伊朗的合作，但无果而终之后，沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋认识到了自己与伊朗打交道的必要性，与其建立了外交对话，并开始与其进行有节制的和解。
近年来，美国与沙特的关系因双方的幻灭以及双方都感觉对方背叛了自己而受到影响。 9/11 事件在美国根深蒂固地仇视伊斯兰教，而沙特阿拉伯则对美国将沙特视为恐怖分子巢穴的刻板印象感到不满。 对沙特版伊斯兰教的批评者不断涌现，经常将沙特的传教活动与本土宗教极端分子联系起来。 沙特阿拉伯的 bedoukratiya 制度——一种基于部落治理规范的政治制度，由酋长或埃米尔致力于通过协商、共识和慈善进行统治——对于民主理论家来说总是难以理解。 现在，它已经被王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼（也称为MbS）的更明显令人反感但改革主义的独裁统治所掩盖。
尽管本·萨勒曼实施了西方长期以来呼吁的改革，但沙特人仍然坚持圣经规范，从而在沙特王国实现了惊人的快速社会自由化。 然而，与此同时，美国价值观已经演变为强调无拘无束的女权主义、对性别复杂性的认可以及接受性自由作为“人权”的核心概念。美国坚持要求外国人遵守这些新制定的美国规范。 与许多其他非西方人民一样，大多数沙特人认为美国最近的“觉醒”做法是不道德的，美国要求他们受到尊重，因为他们是傲慢自大的行为。 尽管沙特王国变得更加“西化”，但沙特价值观与美国价值观之间的差异仍然存在。
期望从一位被你谴责为道德败坏者并试图排斥的外国领导人那里获得政治恩惠是很奇怪的。
过去，出于与美国的友谊，沙特经常会同意做一些违背自身短期利益的事情。 但在缺乏这种友谊的情况下，它坚持把自己的利益放在第一位也就不足为奇了。 拜登总统最近要求沙特阿拉伯调整石油产量水平以降低汽油价格并帮助民主党候选人参加中期选举，这既是无能又是妄想。 [2] 关于沙特应该在与中国和俄罗斯的竞争中支持美国的论点毫无吸引力。 两者都不威胁海湾地区的任何国家。 与欧洲和日本以外的世界上大多数国家一样，沙特认为俄罗斯入侵乌克兰是非法的，而是由北约东扩和美国无能外交挑起的。 他们回顾了以色列对黎巴嫩和叙利亚的侵略、美国对伊拉克的入侵、北约对利比亚的干预以及美国在叙利亚的秘密行动，并淡化了美国对俄罗斯类似不当行为的愤怒。
美国官方指定的大国对手正在主动提出改善与沙特的关系。 发出有助于实现这一目标的威胁在战术上是愚蠢的，在战略上也是毫无意义的。 如果拜登总统兑现了他的威胁，要惩罚穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼拒绝通过降低石油价格来惩罚沙特发展预算，那么沙特有很多报复的选择。
这让我想到了中国及其在中东的作用。 长期以来，中国不太关心与该地区国家的关系。 同样，对于阿拉伯海湾国家和伊朗来说，与中国的关系也不是那么重要。 但近几十年来，情况发生了变化。 中国三分之一的能源进口来自海湾合作委员会，其中最大部分来自沙特阿拉伯。 中国公司购买了海湾合作委员会石油出口的六分之一、伊朗的五分之一和伊拉克的一半。 中国已成为该地区最大的贸易伙伴和外国投资者。
该地区国家希望中国更多而不是更少参与。 随着中国在全球技术创新方面处于领先地位，它已成为以色列高科技公司的重要合作者和客户，以及沙特阿拉伯发展国内军备工业的合作伙伴。 17个阿拉伯国家已加入中国“一带一路”倡议。 伊朗的偏好可能并非如此，但美国的制裁迫使其放弃欧洲，首先转向中国，最近又转向其传统的地缘政治对手俄罗斯。
与一个世纪前的美国一样，中国在中东没有明显的帝国主义或意识形态议程。 与今天的美国不同，中国不会要求该地区国家改变其政治制度和价值观，不会惩罚不这样做的国家，也不会要求与他们建立排他性关系。 这并没有使他们对第三国 — — 比如俄罗斯对乌克兰 — — 的行为的立场成为与他们建立良好关系的试金石。 而且它不会侮辱他们或他们的领导人。
到目前为止，中国一直非常谨慎地将其在西亚的政策重点放在贸易和投资上，并与该地区的政治争端保持距离。 因此，它能够与伊朗、伊拉克、以色列等“中东”国家以及海合会成员国、埃及、约旦、巴勒斯坦、叙利亚等保持友好关系。
尽管美国在该地区政策的重点现在是排除中国的影响力，但中国尚未公开表示反对美国继续参与。 相反，北京建议就安全问题建立多边对话，并在时机成熟时建立区域管理的“海湾集体安全机制”。 简而言之，中国并未强加自己的偏好或选边站队，而是提议帮助弥合伊朗和海湾阿拉伯国家的观点。 与此同时，中国的海湾合作伙伴发现北京的国家资本主义、雄厚的财力和快速现代化的发展具有吸引力。 他们将中国及其“一带一路”视为“2030 年愿景”和其他经济发展计划的潜在贡献者。但美国刚刚将挫败中国重新获得财富和权力的愿望作为其全球国家安全战略的主要目标。 中美关系处于“准战争”状态。 而且由于许多不相关的因素，沙特与美国的关系比以往任何时候都更加不稳定。 现在的问题是，美国和中国之间日益加剧的敌意是否会导致北京扩大其目标，包括减少华盛顿对该地区政府的影响力。
北京在利雅得设有大使。 正如当今主要首都经常发生的情况一样，华盛顿却没有这样做。 中国没有威胁沙特阿拉伯，而美国却在威胁。 日期尚未公布，但广泛报道习近平即将访问利雅得。 在那里，他将会见穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼以及其他阿拉伯领导人。 两位有权势的人对美国政客的妖魔化以及他们的国家面临来自华盛顿的威胁感到愤愤不平，他们即将讨论如何加强合作。 这些领导人和其他将与他们会面的人可以共同产生具有重大全球影响的地缘政治调整。
近期，中国和沙特就很多问题进行了讨论。 其中一些可能会在即将举行的峰会上实现。 他们包括：
货币互换以及使用人民币和其他非美元货币来结算能源和其他大宗商品的国际贸易。
中国对沙特本土军火工业的销售和援助。
中国在沙特阿拉伯和该地区的基础设施项目和其他投资。
沙特是金砖国家和上海合作组织的成员，这两个国家都致力于创建新的货币体系和货币，旨在遏制美国滥用美元主权实施单边非法制裁。
沙特决定将中国语言和文化的学习纳入沙特基础学校课程的一部分，这是教育交流的基础。
后疫情时代的旅游和朝圣。
如果中国和沙特阿拉伯达成战略合作协议，其投资目标与北京在 2021 年与德黑兰达成的投资目标类似，也就不足为奇了。
很明显，正如美国在20世纪勉强取代英国成为中东的主导力量一样，中国最终也将在21世纪超越美国。 中国的利益与最初吸引美国参与中东事务的利益相呼应：
北京对确保可靠地获得波斯湾独特丰富的能源资源有着浓厚的兴趣。
中国将该地区视为亚洲、欧洲和东非之间贸易和旅行的重要转口地和十字路口，使其稳定具有重大战略利益。
对中国企业的工程服务、建筑能力、汽车和电信设备、军备和消费品的需求迅速增长。
到目前为止，北京似乎无意取代美国成为地区稳定与安全的保障者。 但其与海湾阿拉伯国家日益增长的军事关系是美国决定停止出售F-35多用途飞机的一个因素，阿联酋曾承诺说服阿联酋与以色列实现关系正常化。 华盛顿加班加点地限制以色列与中国的技术合作，并阻止中国在那里和该地区其他地方的基础设施项目。
中东没有一个国家认为美国对中国发起的准战争符合其利益。 在他们看来，这是进步的障碍，而且美国对他们与中国的合作感到恼火，这种合作没有任何替代品或替代方案。 美国目前的做法并不是维护美国在中东影响力的可行手段。 除其他外，它表现出一种不合时宜的焦虑，侵蚀了人们对美国智慧和自信的信心。
可悲的是，中美彼此以及地区国家有着许多共同利益。 起草一份互惠互利的合作提案清单是很容易的。 但美国与中国的准战争不允许追求互利的举措。
到目前为止，尽管美国极力阻止，中国还是选择继续做自己的事。 但这种被动抵抗可能即将结束。 美国无能的治国之道为中国创造了加速美国在中东主导地位垮台的机会。 现在会这样做吗？ 我们很快就会知道。
The United States, China, and Great Power Competition in the Middle East
Chas Freeman 2022-11-09
https://chasfreeman.net/the-united-states-china-and-great-power-competition-in-the-middle-east/
Written by Chas Freeman , chairs Projects International, Inc. He is a retired U.S. defense official, diplomat, and interpreter, the recipient of numerous high honors and awards, a popular public speaker, and the author of five books.
The United States, China, and Great Power Competition in the Middle East Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.) It’s official. The Biden administration agrees with the Trump administration that almost everything that happens in world affairs can be explained by two interlocking zero-sum contests. One is geopolitical, as in ‘great power rivalry.’ The other is ideological, as in ‘democracy vs. authoritarianism.’ The so-called ‘Middle East’ is a subregion[1] of West Asia that occupies the strategic space where Africa, Asia, and Europe collide. It has seen geopolitical contests for dominance between Hittites and Egyptians; Greeks and Persians; Romans, Greco-Romans, and Parthians; Arabs and Persians; Arabs, Turks, and Greco-Romans; Europeans, Turks, and Arabs; Britons and Frenchmen; Americans and Soviets. It is also the birthplace of three of the world’s most disputatious religions, with much history of ideological warfare between them. It was where the decisive battles took place between Indo-European polytheism and Judaism’s Christian offshoot, and where Christendom sent crusaders to fight Judaism’s fiercely monotheistic offspring, Islam. More recently, Euro-Atlantic ideals of governance, including Marxism-Leninism, have struggled with each other there and sought with limited success to supplant indigenous Islamic and tribal traditions. But to a remarkable degree, the situation in the contemporary Middle East refutes Washington’s current foreign policy dogma. Very little that now occurs in the region can be explained by either great power rivalry or ideological contests between democracy and. authoritarianism. The great powers, notably including the United States, have lost their grip on the place. And no one is trying to impose new systems of governance on it anymore. It is striking that Washington has become, to one extent or another, estranged from all the key actors in the Middle East. With few exceptions, countries in the region now make their own decisions, without trying to sugarcoat them for American audiences. The United States has lost most of its influence in Turkey, it is at odds with Iran, and it now has strained relations with Saudi Arabia. Washington no longer has productive links to the Palestinian establishment. Its relations with Israel are increasingly complicated by diverging values, differing calculations of national interest with respect to dealings with Russia and China, and domestic American political polarization. Egypt is less deferential to U.S. views than it has been for four decades. The United Arab Emirates has emerged as a world-class practitioner of self-interested Realpolitik, ensuring that U.S. relations with it are nakedly transactional. And so it goes. It isn’t just America that has lost its clout in the region. Britain and France – former European imperialist powers –– once called the shots in the ‘Middle East.’ Now they feel obliged to defer to their former satrapies so they can sell enough weapons and ammunition to keep their armaments industries’ production lines open. Attempts by them and other foreign vendors to use arms sales to pressure the countries of the region have simply pushed them to diversity their purchases and begin to develop their own military industries. Having been rebuffed by the European Union (EU), Turkey has abandoned its two-century-long drive to redefine its identity as European. Ankara is pursuing an independent, if erratic, course in the former Ottoman space, with Russia and China, and in pursuit of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. The deterioration in Turkish relations with the EU, NATO, and U.S. represents a very significant weakening of Western influence in many arenas, not just the Middle East. The West can no longer count on Turkey to support or acquiesce in its policies toward the Israel-Palestine issue, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Libya, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Afghanistan, the members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, NATO, or the Maghreb. This has huge implications globally as well as regionally. Turkey is no longer aligned with the rest of NATO, Washington, London, Paris, or Berlin on longstanding Western diplomatic objectives in the region. Turkish policies complicate the tasks of safeguarding Israel; excluding Russian influence in both the Middle East and Black Sea regions; and opposing Iran. Far from joining in the US / NATO proxy war with Russia in Ukraine, Turkey has self-interestedly played a mediating role and exploited Russian distress to boost its economy. Meanwhile, U.S. relations with Iran remain profoundly antagonistic. Washington echoes policy preferences from Jerusalem, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi rather than extrapolating policies from its own national interests. Israel and the Gulf Arabs encouraged and enabled U.S. strategic blunders in post-Cold War Iraq and Syria. These blunders facilitated Iran’s establishment of a sphere of influence and proxy forces in the Fertile Crescent that have left both Israel and the Gulf Arabs feeling encircled. The short-lived ‘JCPOA’ addressed Israel’s near hysteria about Iran’s nuclear programs but not the more immediate concerns of the Gulf Arabs about its aspirations for regional hegemony. Israel’s fears of Iranian nuclear breakout and Gulf Arab anxieties about encirclement led both to press U.S. politicians to scrap the agreement, which they did. Iran has now predictably resumed its previously interrupted emulation of Israel’s semi-clandestine nuclear program. Israel has ironically helped put its nuclear monopoly in its environs in doubt. The mixture of mindless malevolence, sanctimonious sanctioneering, and intermittent military confrontations and attacks that characterizes current U.S. Iran policy does nothing to curtail Iranian regional influence. The latest U.S. Nuclear Posture Review judges that Iran is not pursing a nuclear weapon, but Israel and the Biden administration continue to threaten military action to prevent it from acquiring one. This just puts pressure on Tehran to go nuclear. The outcome of similar U.S. policies applied to North Korea suggests that an approach based on “maximum pressure” is more likely to motivate Iran to build nuclear-armed ICBMs to hold the U.S. at bay than to deter it. For now, America's lack of a working relationship with Tehran leaves it unable to craft a regional balance of power or bring influence to bear on a major actor in the region by measures short of war. The United States has fallen into the bad habit of framing its interactions with other countries in terms of obsessions with'great power rivalry' and 'democracy vs. autocracy,' rather than engaging with them about their expressed interests and concerns. Meanwhile, American reactions to Iranian challenges in the Strait of Hormuz have consistently fallen short of Gulf Arab expectations. So, it is not surprising that, after fruitlessly pressuring Qatar to ignore geography by curtailing cooperation with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have recognized their own need to deal with Iran, instituted a diplomatic dialogue with it, and begun a measured rapprochement with it. In recent years, US-Saudi relations have suffered from mutual disillusionment and a sense by each country that the other has betrayed it. 9/11 entrenched Islamophobia in the United States and resentment in Saudi Arabia of American stereotyping of the Kingdom as a den of terrorists. Critics of the Saudi version of Islam piled on, drawing often fanciful connections between Saudi proselytizing and homegrown religious extremists. Saudi Arabia’s ????????? [bedoukratiya] – a political system based on tribal norms of governance by a sheikh or amir committed to rule through consultation, consensus, and charity – was always offensively incomprehensible to democratic ideologues. Now it has been eclipsed by the even more clearly objectionable but reformist autocracy of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also known as MbS. Saudis have clung to scriptural norms even as MbS has implemented reforms long called for by the West, yielding astonishingly rapid social liberalization in the Kingdom. Meanwhile, however, American values have evolved to emphasize unbridled feminism, approval of gender complexity, and acceptance of sexual freedom as central concepts of ‘human rights.’ The U.S. insists that foreigners conform to these newly established U.S. norms. Like many other non-Western peoples, most Saudis regard recent American “woke” practices as immoral and the U.S. demand that they be respected as arrogantly presumptuous. Even as the Kingdom has become more ‘westernized,’ the differences between Saudi values and those in the United States persist. The Biden administration’s American First policy version 2.0 has generated reciprocal selfishness abroad, including in Saudi Arabia. Political posturing and churlishly condescending public diplomacy by the United States have nailed the estrangement between Washington and Riyadh in place. It is bizarre to expect political favors from a foreign leader you have condemned as a moral reprobate and sought to ostracize. In the past, the Kingdom would often agree to do things against its own short-term interests out of friendship with the United States. But in the absence of such friendship, it not surprisingly insists on placing its own interests first. The recent demand by President Biden that Saudi Arabia adjust its oil production levels to lower the price of gas at the pump and help Democratic Party candidates in the mid-term elections was both inept and delusional.[2] The argument that the Kingdom should line up behind the United States in its rivalry with China and Russia has no appeal. Neither threatens any country in the Gulf. The Saudis, like most of the world beyond Europe and Japan, see the Russian invasion of Ukraine as illegitimate but provoked by NATO enlargement and inept U.S. diplomacy. They recall Israeli aggression in Lebanon and Syria and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, NATO’s intervention in Libya, and U.S. covert operations in Syria and discount American outrage at analogous Russian misbehavior. The officially designated great power adversaries of the United States are offering to improve relations with the Kingdom. Issuing threats that facilitate this is tactically idiotic and strategically senseless. If President Biden makes good on his threats to punish MbS for declining to penalize the Saudi development budget by lowering the price of oil, the Kingdom has plenty of options for retaliation. This brings me to China and its role in the Middle East. Ties with the countries of the region were long of minor concern to China. Similarly, relations with China were a low priority for the Arab Gulf countries and Iran. But over recent decades, that has changed. One-third of China’s energy imports are from the GCC, with the largest portion from Saudi Arabia. Chinese companies buy one-sixth of GCC oil exports, one-fifth of Iran’s, and half of Iraq’s. China has become the region’s largest trading partner and foreign investor. The states of the region want more, not less Chinese engagement. As China takes a lead in global technological innovation, it has become a significant collaborator and customer for Israel’s high-tech companies and a partner in Saudi Arabia’s efforts to develop a domestic armaments industry. Seventeen Arab states have joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Iran’s preferences might have been otherwise, but U.S. sanctions have forced it to turn away from Europe, first to China, and more recently to its traditional geopolitical adversary, Russia. Most countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, have been trying to dilute what they now believe has been excessive reliance on the United States. To this end, they have reached out to countries like China, India, and Russia. They are not seeking to abandon their ties with the United States or to replace them with ties to others. They are acting in their own interests, not taking sides to rebalance their international relations. They have not wanted to be forced to choose between China and the United States, and they do not react well to American insistence that they curb their relations with China, especially as the United States offers them no compensation or incentives to do so. Like America a century ago, China has had no apparent imperial or ideological agenda in the Middle East. Unlike today’s United States, China does not ask countries in the region to change their political systems and values, punish them for failing to do so, or demand exclusive relationships with them. It does not make their stance on the behavior of third countries – like Russia in Ukraine – a litmus test for good relations with them. And it does not insult them or their leaders. To this point, China has been very careful to focus its policies in West Asia on trade and investment and to keep its distance from the region’s political disputes. As a result, it has been able to maintain cordial ties with every ‘Middle Eastern’ country, including Iran, Iraq, and Israel as well the member states of the GCC, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, and Syria. While the focus of American policy in the region is now the exclusion of Chinese influence, China has yet to profess opposition to continuing American involvement. Instead, Beijing has suggested the formation of a multilateral dialogue on security issues and, when the time is ripe, a regionally managed “collective security mechanism for the Gulf.” In short, rather than impose its own preferences or take sides, China has proposed to help bridge Iranian and Gulf Arab views. Meanwhile, China’s Gulf partners have found Beijing’s state capitalism, deep pockets, and rapid rise to modernity appealing. They see China and its BRI as a potential contributor to Vision 2030 and other economic development plans. But the United States has just made the defeat of China’s aspirations for renewed wealth and power the main goal of its global national security strategy. Sino-American relations are in a state of “quasi-war.” And because of many unrelated factors, Saudi relations with the United States are more precarious than they have ever been. The question now is whether the sharpening hostility between the United States and China will lead Beijing to expand its objectives to include the reduction of Washington’s influence on the region’s governments. Beijing has an ambassador in Riyadh. As is all too often the case in major capitals these days, Washington does not. China is not threatening Saudi Arabia, while the United States is. No dates have been announced, but it is widely reported that Xi Jinping is soon to visit Riyadh. There he will meet Mohammed bin Salman as well as other Arab leaders. Two powerful men, aggrieved by their demonization by American politicians and the threats their countries face from Washington, are about to discuss how they can bolster their cooperation. Together, these leaders and others who will meet with them can produce geopolitical realignments with major global impact. China and Saudi Arabia have recently been discussing many issues. Some of these may come to fruition at the forthcoming summit. They include: Currency swaps and the use of the Chinese yuan and other non-dollar currencies to settle international trade in energy and other commodities. Saudi investment in Chinese refineries and oil storage facilities. Chinese arms sales and assistance in the development of an indigenous armaments industry in the Kingdom. Chinese infrastructure projects and other investment in Saudi Arabia and the region. Saudi membership in the BRICS and the SCO, both of which are engaged in creating new monetary systems and currencies designed to outflank U.S. abuse of dollar sovereignty to impose unilateral and therefore illegal sanctions. Educational exchanges that build on the Saudi decision to make the study of Chinese language and culture part of the basic school curriculum in the Kingdom. Tourism and pilgrimages to follow the post-pandemic era. It would not be surprising to see China and Saudi Arabia conclude a strategic cooperation agreement with investment targets like those that Beijing agreed with Tehran in 2021. There is a distinct possibility that, just as the United States reluctantly succeeded Britain as the dominant power in the Middle East in the 20th century, China will eventually end up eclipsing America there in the 21st. China’s interests echo those that first drew America into engagement with the Middle East: Beijing has a compelling interest in securing reliable access to the uniquely rich energy resources of the Persian Gulf. China sees the region as a crucial entrepôt and crossroads for trade and travel between Asia, Europe, and East Africa, making its stability a matter of great strategic interest. There is rapidly growing demand for Chinese companies’ engineering services, construction capabilities, automotive and telecommunications equipment, armaments, and consumer products. China’s citizens and entrepreneurs are establishing an ever-larger presence in the region. (There are now many hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the Gulf Arab countries and Iran.) To this point, Beijing appears to have had no interest in supplanting the United States as the guarantor of regional stability and security. But its growing military relationship with the Gulf Arab states was a factor in the U.S. decision to kill the sale of F-35 multirole aircraft that the UAE had been promised to persuade it to normalize relations with Israel. And Washington has worked overtime to curtail Israeli technological cooperation with China, as well as to block Chinese infrastructure projects there and elsewhere in the region. There is not a single country in the Middle East that sees the quasi-war the United States has initiated with China as in its interest. From their point of view, it is an obstacle to progress accompanied by annoying American peevishness about their cooperation with China that offers no substitute or alternative to such cooperation. The current U.S. approach is not a viable means of preserving U.S. influence in the Middle East. Among other things, it shows an unseemly anxiety that erodes faith in American wisdom and self-confidence. The sad thing is that China and the United States share many common interests with each other and the countries of the region. It would be easy to draw up a list of proposals for cooperation to mutual advantage. But the U.S. Quasi-War with China will not allow the pursuit of mutually advantageous initiatives. Until now, China has chosen to get on with its business despite American efforts to stop it. But this passive resistance may be about to end. Inept U.S. statecraft has created an opportunity for China to accelerate the demise of U.S. dominance in the Middle East. Will it now do so? We will soon know. [1] The ‘Middle East’ is usually defined as the area between the natural barriers of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus mountains, the Iranian and Libyan deserts, and the Black, Caspian, Red, and Arabian Seas.
