军事工业复合体
维基百科,自由的百科全书
军事工业复合体(英语:Military-Industrial Complex,MIC),也称军事工业国会复合体(Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex,MICC),中文简称军工复合体,是指一国军队与军事工业因政治经济利益过于紧密而成的共生关系[1]。军队过分仰赖私营军火企业提供军需,私人国防工业会以政治及经济手段(例如游说国会议员,指支持军工企业发展可为地方带来大量就业机会)确保政府提供足够预算,甚至为推销武器而鼓动政府高层发动战争,令该国的军事开支巨大。此名词最常被用于美国,由第34任美国总统德怀特·戴维·艾森豪威尔在1961年的总统告别演说中首创。
作为一个贬义词,军事工业复合体主要用于美国的情境,这共生关系由国防承包商(军事工业)、五角大厦(军队)以及美国政府(立法部门及行政部门)的要角所构成的联合垄断;此联合垄断关系为发“战争财”来获取暴利,因而常与公众利益相违背,发动或促进不需要(甚至有危害)的战争或军事行动,在国际关系上可能引发不必要的军备竞赛及武器扩散。军事工业复合体的贬义,主要来自于这种联合垄断的政经关系不受民主程序的监督、反省及控制。[2]
《亚洲周刊》专栏作家陈国祥认为,美国军力过度扩张,财政难以支撑,而且“国防军工企业永居优先的主导与分配地位,是两党政治的真正洗牌者”
The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II
https://www.amazon.ca/Long-War-History-National-Security/dp/0231131593?
by Andrew Bacevich ; April 23 2009
Essays by a diverse and distinguished group of historians, political scientists, and sociologists examine the alarms, emergencies, controversies, and confusions that have characterized America's Cold War, the post-Cold War interval of the 1990s, and today's "Global War on Terror." This "Long War" has left its imprint on virtually every aspect of American life; by considering it as a whole, The Long War is the first volume to take a truly comprehensive look at America's response to the national-security crisis touched off by the events of World War II.
Contributors consider topics ranging from grand strategy and strategic bombing to ideology and economics and assess the changing American way of war and Hollywood's surprisingly consistent depiction of Americans at war. They evaluate the evolution of the national-security apparatus and the role of dissenters who viewed the myriad activities of that apparatus with dismay. They take a fresh look at the Long War's civic implications and its impact on civil-military relations.
More than a military history, The Long War examines the ideas, policies, and institutions that have developed since the United States claimed the role of global superpower. This protracted crisis has become a seemingly permanent, if not defining aspect of contemporary American life. In breaking down the old and artificial boundaries that have traditionally divided the postwar period into neat historical units, this volume provides a better understanding of the evolution of the United States and U.S. policy since World War II and offers a fresh perspective on our current national security predicament.
Growing up in the Midwest during the 1950s and early 1960s, I came to understand the narrative of contemporary history and the narrative of the Cold War as one and the same. That the Cold War provided the organizing principle of the age was self-evident, even to a young boy. Catch the headlines on WGN, read the Chicago Tribune, flip through an occasional issue of Time or Life, and the rest was easy: the era’s great antagonisms—the United States vs. the Soviet Union, West vs. East, Free World vs. Communist bloc—told you pretty much everything you needed to...
In September 2002 President George W. Bush’s administration published “The National Security Strategy of the United States” (NSS), an unusually strong ideological statement explaining the U.S. government’s intent to combine American principles and power to effect American goals under the rubric of a new “American internationalism.”¹ The Bush NSS rests on four concepts. First is the belief that America’s unequaled power, sustained by its emphasis on freedom and constitutional government, imposes special responsibility on the United States to move the world toward similar political-economic models. Second is the view that the Cold War security strategies of containment and deterrence of...
During the last third of the twentieth century, military strategists and historians developed the idea that there was a distinctive American strategic culture or “way of war.” There was general agreement that the American way of war was characterized by a reliance upon such American advantages as (1) overwhelming mass, i.e., a pronounced advantage in men and material; (2) wide-ranging mobility, i.e., a pronounced advantage in transportation and communication; and (3) high-technology weapons systems, i.e., a comparative advantage in capital investment versus manpower.¹
Parallel to these three military qualities were a political feature and an international one. The political feature...
World War II set the stage for the evolution of American conventional war thinking in two very different ways. The first was the way in which it had been fought, with an unprecedented reliance on air power and on amphibious operations, with each of these innovations inevitably changing how Americans and anyone else thought about normal or “conventional” war.¹ The second was the way it was so abruptly ended, when in August of 1945 American atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, producing a surrender that most had not have expected until 1947 at the earliest.²
The Second World War ineluctably altered the position of the United States in the world. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States was still a careful and often reluctant player in international politics; by 1945 the Americans had taken a major role in the defeat of Germany, had brought Japan to its knees, and had developed the most daunting military arsenal the world had ever seen. The preeminent symbol of America’s new role was the long-range bomber coupled with the atomic bomb. This pairing, which enabled monstrous destructive power to be delivered anywhere...
History, the American statesman Henry L. Stimson once observed, “is often not what actually happened but what is recorded as such.” This difference between reality and record does not emerge by accident. It reflects the interests of those in a position to influence the recording.
When it comes to the history of U.S. civil-military relations since the end of World War II, the gap between actual events and the story woven from those events looms especially large. It does so because that gap has served and continues to serve an important function. What we might term the approved interpretation of...
The national security state was created by the Cold War, sustained and enlarged by that war, and further refined by the Gulf War in the Middle East. It is now the handmaiden of the “war” on terrorism, using the structure created by the Cold War more than fifty years ago to fight terrorism. The national security state has grown even more pervasive in recent years, tainting our republican institutions, defying congressional oversight, and alienating our former allies.
In the national security state the perceived need for security from the nation’s enemies, known or unknown, influences every part of national life....
Americans today take it for granted that the United States maintains a vast array of agencies and entities that collect, process, and disseminate information, and carry out such other activities as are ordered by the president. In fact, the origins of this so-called “intelligence community” are relatively recent. It grew like topsy under pressure of war—World War II that is. Many analysts trace the beginnings of the U.S. intelligence community to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, to our determination never again to be taken by surprise as we were on that Sunday morning in December 1941. Another school...
The military-industrial complex was both a historical phenomenon and a political trope. The phenomenon was a lobby that campaigned intensely in the United States to promote increased military spending and arms production. It flourished for a quarter of a century during the Cold War. The trope gained currency in the antiwar movement of the Vietnam era. It, too, is best understood in a Cold-War context.¹
Both meanings of the term are captured by the Oxford English Dictionary. It defines “military industrial” as
(orig. U.S.), of or relating to a nation’s armed forces and to its industries (esp. those producing military...
In the summer and fall of 1950 the administration of President Harry S Truman entered into uncharted fiscal territory, committing the United States to very high levels of military spending on an open-ended basis. The rationale for this move was set forth in NSC 68, one of the foundational documents of U.S. postwar national security policy, completed just a few months before the start of the Korean War. In spite of the undeclared war in Korea, both military planners and their critics understood that the successive supplemental spending proposals that nearly quadrupled the fiscal 1951 military budget were not short-term...
Military service is sometimes thought of in instrumental terms. Service members receive the “king’s shilling” and in exchange the state may use them as soldiers to fight wars. Once enrolled for pay, as Thomas Hobbes observed, soldiers are obliged to go into battle and not run away, at least not without the state’s permission, no matter how much they may want to do so.¹ Put in the language of current social science, the instrumentalist view thinks about military service in terms of a “principalagent” model, in which the state is the principal and those in the military are the principal’s...
American leaders have always prided themselves on seeing the United States as a beacon to civilization. Early in their experience, however, Americans came down from their City on a Hill and pressed across the continent, then beyond the seas and around the globe. Relentlessly they carried forward the distinctive forms of political democracy and market economy with which they rationalized their achievement and elevated it to a Cause, imbued with liberty and justice for all.
Interest and principle have ever been entwined in U.S. policy and rhetoric. Foreign policy has been both advanced and challenged on practical and principled grounds;...
This essay is concerned mainly with how the mass media—and especially film and television—treat war and the military. Although popular music and fiction have exercised considerable influence, no song, however widely played, and no book, regardless of sales, has anything like the reach and impact of the moving image. War movies have been an important genre since 1942, when Hollywood signed up for the duration, and became ubiquitous with the advent of cable television. TV shows on World War II, especially service comedies, are almost as old as the medium itself. Since cable channels began multiplying in the...