蓝月星雨
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通往巴格达之路
理查德·霍尔布鲁克*
《华盛顿邮报》
如果布什政府希望得到事关重大的国际社会的支持，就必须承认这么一个显而易见的事实，安理会是通往巴格达的必经之路。
想要获取支持，一个新的安理会授权使用武力对付萨达姆·侯赛因的决议是必不可少的，如果萨达姆不肯接受一整套严格的武器检验制度，即可以在任何时间对任何目标进行突击检查。这一决议将会给那些支持“倒萨”的国家（土耳其、英国）提供对采取行动而言至关重要的法律依据，同时给那些摇摆不定的、甚或反对的国家（德国、法国、沙特阿拉伯）施加巨大的压力。虽然安理会在很大程度上来讲是美国在二战后一手缔造的，但是当今懂得它巨大的力量的美国人却寥寥无几，它的道德和政治力量在于，一个安理会授权动武的决议可以左右整个世界。这样一个决议可以调动国际舆论，迫使国际社会采取行动并且使不同意见销声匿迹。假如关系到至高无上的国家安全，在不削弱总统直接应对能力的前提下是完全可以取得这种授权的，并且一旦取得了授权美国就将占尽先机。
1991年的布什当局是深明此理的，大约缘于老布什曾任美国常驻联合国代表一职。国务卿詹姆斯·贝克和美国驻联合国大使托马斯·皮克林运用娴熟的技巧，在沙漠风暴行动之前通过安理会的表决取得了国际社会的支持。
今天，不幸的是华盛顿对联合国采取了全然不同的态度。绕过安理会的行为显然体现出除鲍威尔之外的整个政府企图对联合国采取视若无睹的态度，而因此被在细枝末节上的无谓争执和周期性的自取其辱所削弱。
没有同盟是无法进行一场推翻萨达姆的运动的，从英国到土耳其，美国及所有的政府最需要的就是国内反伊声势的壮大。上个月布莱尔政府的一名资深顾问辛酸地告诉笔者，布莱尔对华盛顿的无私支持“没有得到任何回报”，甚至使得不列颠内部对布莱尔亲美姿态的反感情绪与日俱增。
有人可能会认为现存的安理会1991年的决议已经被萨达姆明白无误地违反了，现在已经有了，用布莱尔的话说，“足够的法律依据”来用武力制裁伊拉克当局。
这种看法或许还存在着一丝法律上的不足，但是从政治和务实的角度来看的确无伤大雅。正如贝克最近所说，由现有的安理会决议来预见推翻萨达姆的行动是远远不够的。
当华盛顿的决策者们讨论通过安理会的途径时，他们最关心的是三个问题：第一，伊拉克将同意武器检验然后（再次）使用欺骗手段；第二，俄国和法国会把决议搞得面目全非；第三，决议绝口不提改朝换代而是仅仅停留在次要问题诸如销毁大规模杀伤武器。
从第一点来看，俄国、法国和中国是关键性的国家，其中任何一个都可以动用否决权否掉安理会的决议。如果说新的布什－普金关系物有所值的话，莫斯科是会支持这样一个强硬的政策的，事实上莫斯科在私下里已经做出了相应的表示。作为法国，它无疑会一如既往地扮演难以相处的、异议伙伴的角色，但是最终不会阻碍英美一致的决心。如果英国义无反顾地支持华盛顿，那么一个强硬到足以为采取行动铺平道路的决议就有可能形成。那时，中国尽管疑虑重重，但终不会运用否决去对抗整个国际社会。
这里的赌注是美国的外交，包括总统的直接介入，正如老布什本人引人注目地亲自演绎过的建立私人关系，以使安理会通过强硬到伊拉克稍有不从－事实上伊拉克以往在这个问题上屡教不改，就可以立刻采取行动的决议。假使，当局竭尽全力也无法在安理会达成这样的决议，那么无论是在国内或是在国际上我们的获取的支持也都会远远多于根本不做这样的尝试。
关于美国的目标，本届政府意在使伊拉克改朝换代。不幸的是，当今世界，特别是在中东地区公开附和此说的国家屈指可数。其他国家多半都是在寻求把决议限制在大规模杀伤武器的问题范围内。
无论如何，这个问题也比先前的问题要简单得多。一旦对巴格达的军事打击开始，事实就会证明不改朝换代就不可能销毁大规模杀伤性武器。
试想伊拉克军队规模只有上次战争前的三分之一，而美国军队却远为强大，这种差别倾向于美国的胜利。但是一旦开仗，没有人可以清楚地预见，是否会产生暗杀、反叛、伊拉克军队的崩溃，速战速决或伊拉克抢先导弹攻击以色列，战事长期拖延，或许还有比这更糟的情况？无论发生何事，战事一经拉开反对萨达姆·侯赛因的努力就不能半途而废一定要达到目使美国压倒一切的力量获胜。
总统在他难以做出决定时定将得到美国人民的支持，但如果他牢记运用一切非军事的手段来获取国际社会的支持，必将使他获益非浅。这一切都始于联合国安理会。
*作者理查德·霍尔布鲁克为前美国克林顿政府驻联合国大使
By Richard C. Holbrooke *
Washington Post
August 27, 2002
The road to Baghdad runs through the United Nations Security Council. This simple truth must be recognized by the Bush administration if it wants the international support that is essential for success in Iraq.
To build such support, a new Security Council resolution is necessary, one that authorizes the use of force if Saddam Hussein refuses to allow an airtight weapons inspection regime -- no-notice inspections anywhere, anytime. Such a resolution would provide those nations (Turkey, Britain) that want to support an effort to remove Hussein a vital legitimizing cover for action, and put great pressure on those (Germany, France, Saudi Arabia) that are wavering or opposed. Although the Security Council was in large part a creation of U.S. efforts at the end of World War II, few Americans today understand the enormous force, both moral and political, that a Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention carries in the rest of the world. Such a resolution mobilizes international opinion, forces concerted action and can mute much criticism. It can be sought without any weakening of the president's ability to act directly if vital national security interests are at stake; if achieved, it greatly strengthens America's hand.
The first Bush administration understood this perfectly in 1991, perhaps partly because George Herbert Walker Bush had once served as the American ambassador to the United Nations. Secretary of State James Baker and the American ambassador to the United Nations, Thomas Pickering, skillfully built international support through votes in the Security Council before Operation Desert Storm.
Today, unfortunately, Washington has a different attitude toward the United Nations. Bypassing the Security Council is obviously tempting for an administration that, with the exception of Secretary of State Colin Powell, shows little respect for the United Nations and has weakened it by unnecessary fights over secondary issues and periodic gratuitous insults.
But a campaign against Saddam Hussein cannot be waged without allies, and from Britain to Turkey the governments the United States needs most are facing growing domestic opposition over Iraq. Last month a senior adviser to British Prime Minister Tony Blair told me bitterly that Washington 'was giving Blair nothing' in return for Blair's unstinting support, even as British domestic opposition to Blair's pro-American position was growing.
Some will argue that because existing Security Council resolutions dating back to 1991 have been clearly violated by Hussein, there is already, in Baker's phrase, 'sufficient legal authority' to sanction the use of force against the Iraqi regime.
This argument may have some merit in legal circles, but it has none in political or practical terms. As Baker himself recently noted, predicating action against Hussein solely on existing Security Council resolutions will not be enough.
Washington policymakers have three core concerns when they discuss the Security Council route: first, that Iraq will agree to inspections and then cheat (again); second, that Russia or France will water down any resolution to the point of meaninglessness; third, that the resolution will not authorize regime change but only some lesser goal such as the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.
On the first point, Russia, France and China are the key countries; any one of them could block Security Council action by using its veto power. But if the new Bush-Putin relationship is worth anything, Moscow should support a tough regime; it has already indicated readiness to do so in private. As for France, it will undoubtedly play its normal role as a difficult and contentious ally, but in the end, it will not stop the concerted will of America and Britain. If London aggressively supports Washington, a resolution strong enough to lay the basis for action will be achievable. China will have its qualms, but it will not use the veto against the rest of the international community.
So the betting here is that effective American diplomacy -- including the direct involvement of the president, as was famously illustrated by the personal coalition-building efforts of the senior President Bush -- would result in a Security Council resolution strong enough to lay the basis for immediate military action if Iraq violated it, as it has violated previous resolutions. If, however, such a resolution cannot be achieved, the administration, having made a best-faith effort in the Security Council, will be in a much stronger position to garner international and domestic support for action than if it had never tried at all.
On the issue of American objectives, this administration has (rightly) called for regime change. Unfortunately, few other nations in the world, and especially in the region, will openly subscribe to such a goal. Other nations will probably seek to limit any resolution to the issue of weapons of mass destruction.
This is, however, less of a problem than it initially may appear. If military action against Baghdad begins, it will soon become evident that it is impossible to eliminate weapons of mass destruction without a change in regime.
Given that the Iraqi military is only one-third the size it was before the last war, and American forces far stronger, the odds favor an American success. But no one can foresee clearly what will occur once a war starts. Will there be an assassination, a rebellion, a crumbling of the Iraqi military, a quick victory that preempts Iraqi missile attacks on Israel, a protracted struggle, or something worse? Whatever happens, once launched, the effort against Saddam Hussein cannot be stopped until its goal is achieved and the overwhelming power of the United States has prevailed.
The president will have American support for the difficult decisions he will soon have to make, but it would strengthen his position greatly if he remembered the importance of using every nonmilitary tool
at his disposal to build international support -- starting with the U.N. Security Council.
* The writer was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations under President Clinton