Daniel Cloud of
Some people in
We, in the West, all think seem to think that a sovereign debt crisis is a problem that can be deferred for a few years. We aren’t going to default or inflate quite yet, not for a little while still, and we think our creditors should be as insouciantly untroubled about what might happen a little later on as we are. To anyone, like China’s central bank, who is irrevocably committed to holding large amounts of our sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt to maturity, however, default or restructuring in ‘a few years’ is default or restructuring that will occur while he is still holding many of the same bonds he has now. It is money he has already lent us that will not end up being repaid.
We aren’t even trying very hard to pretend that we intend to pay it. We’re more or less at the point of no return now, yet a comprehensive reform of Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security, the only thing that could save the
The rational thing for an investor to do under these circumstances is to price sovereign debt on the basis of its actual risk of effective default. We can debate whether the yields of treasury bills are adequate compensation for the risks associated with holding them. If Europe and/or the
The apparent plan, in both Europe and the US, has been to recapitalize the banking system through the ‘carry’ trade, by encouraging banks to borrow short (partly from government) and lend long (largely to government.) Thus, the banks were to be recapitalized by the difference between the rate at which the government lent and the rate at which government borrowed. The government, however, was somehow supposed to not go broke in the process, though it certainly sounds like a bad deal to a naïve ear. (Of course, they are going broke…)
Analyzing the transaction a bit further, we can see that the money the governments lent to the banks, being fungible, was in fact the same money lent to the governments by the banks, so the banks were essentially lending themselves money via the government. This was supposed to recapitalize them, somehow, and to shift the risk of their bad assets to someone else. But who? Who ended up holding the risk? In
The same sort of story could be told about every recent government intervention in markets. Risk has systematically been shifted from the banking system to the banking system. It is hard to believe that many banks will actually turn out to have been successfully recapitalized in this way, once the system equilibrates. Without any significant cuts in government spending or increases in taxes (in fact most governments are actually spending more, in the name of stimulus) the only new money available to the government comes from financial markets themselves, so using it to try to rescue financial markets on more than a short-term basis is probably futile.
Simply endlessly printing more money is more likely to lead to catastrophic failure – devaluation, inflation, default, or all three – than to any permanent rescue of the situation. That, in an open economy with large cross-border trade and capital flows, debasing your currency is not a long term solution to any real economic problem is something we’ve known for a rather long time. A one-off devaluation is sometimes useful, but the endless abuse of segniorage has not traditionally been viewed in a very favorable light. Someone will pay in the end; now we are beginning to see who it is. Anyone who holds a lot of sovereign debt is at risk of eventually discovering that it is fairy gold, ghost money, mere joss paper that didn’t ever correspond to any pile of goods and services actually available in this world. (Imagine an endless stream of ships leaving America full of cargo and returning from China empty, as if we were paying war reparations, individual Americans making terrible personal sacrifices to make sure the debt was paid…. The scenario is just so implausible.)
Macroeconomic policy in the developed world makes equally little sense. Ben Bernanke apparently only knows one trick, Keynesian stimulus with quantitative easing, which he advocates as the proper response to any situation – terrorism, a tech bubble, a banking crisis, a currency crisis, fiscal insolvency, Y2K, a Martian invasion, you name it. The problem is that, this time, we also apparently only ever seem to have considered one scenario, one possible world. The stimulus was supposed to work. The developed economies were supposed to bounce back strongly in a year or two. Apparently the probability weighting we attached to this particular scenario was one hundred and one percent.
Historically, many economists have been skeptical of the efficacy of Keynesian stimulus. Certainly, it’s no magic bullet. If there is something fundamentally wrong with your economy, if there are unsustainable imbalances or supply-side shocks, Keynesian stimulus can’t magically cancel all the pain you need to go through to correct the real-world problem. If you’re already spending more than you have, Keynesian stimulus will only make things worse. If your problem is that new technology has made many workers’ skills obsolete, Keynesian stimulus will not make the technological change go away. The idea that Keynesian stimulus could have prevented the Great Depression is a science-fiction story about parallel worlds; there’s no real-world evidence for it at all, we should take it just as seriously as any other plausible fiction. So it would have made sense to give some weight to the possibility that the stimulus might not work, the possibility that the depression would drag on.
In that possible world, the world that, as it now turns out, happens to be the actual one, borrowing as much as we have in the last two years to ‘tide us over’ will turn out to have been a very dangerous thing to do. Without a strong recovery in employment and tax receipts, large deficits will continue into the indefinite future, even though we’re already rapidly approaching a level of debt that is unsustainable. Default, devaluation, inflation, or all three are becoming inevitable. And a world in which the
It was unbelievably reckless to bet the future of the whole world on the forlorn hope that state policy could overcome economic reality, but that’s what we’ve all done, and the current Treasury Secretary seems desperate to have us continue. Presumably the decision was made on a business-as-usual basis, by consulting constituencies and considering appearances. Suicide, but sober, responsible, thoroughly canvassed suicide, with all the stakeholders having a finger on the trigger. The rapidly approaching catastrophe should finally allow Bernanke to definitively displace Victor Geraschenko, who presided over the agonizing collapse of the Soviet economy, as the worst central banker in history.
The main Western response to all this – to the fact that we’ve borrowed vast sums of money from the Chinese and other people, some of whom are much poorer than ourselves, and don’t actually have a plan that would let us pay all of it back – seems to be to feel anger at China for having put us in the position of being able to default on them. Somehow, we all manage to construe this situation as them having nefariously acquired power over us while we weren’t paying attention, even though in fact it’s the creditor, not the debtor, who gets hurt most in a default. But that’s idiotic, it’s the sort of justification people used to give for persecuting Jews.
When you borrow a lot of money from someone, if you’re a certain unpleasant sort of person, when they ask for it back, you find some excuse to not pay them, some reason why the whole situation is an unreasonable imposition on your patience, thereby absolving yourself from the guilt you ought to feel for having cheated someone who trusted you. Apparently that’s what the West has become, a whining, self-righteous deadbeat who thinks everyone else ought to pay for his luxuries and throws a temper tantrum when he is asked to give back any of the money he’s borrowed. We’ve all become Homer Simpson, and we don’t know whether to resent or laugh at the pitiful schmucks who actually expect us to take responsibility for our own choices.
Should the Chinese people be angry about all this? Yes, probably, but not at the West. These things happen, and it’s not the job of the American voter to take care of ordinary people in
What were they thinking when they did it? Contemptible things.
Everyone in
What the Chinese Communist Party is trying now is a little better, but not much. Having first tried the thirteen-year-old’s method of completely ignoring everything everyone knows about how economic development is done and making up some imaginary way of doing it on the basis that it’s emotionally satisfying, they’ve now moved on to the seventeen-year-old’s method of taking a casual glance at what the other people are doing and supposing you’ve mastered it because you’ve seen a tiny part of it, without ever really bothering to find out how hard it actually is or whether the methods you’ve seen are appropriate ones for your situation. Actually, your reckless teenage way is better… until it kills you, that is.
Having failed definitively with Maoism, the CCP decided it ought to blindly imitate whatever it was that had worked for the other Asian economies. If export-led growth with the developed world as the primary market had worked for
Export-led growth works well in a world where the price elasticity of demand for the exported goods is effectively infinite, where any decrease in costs will always lead to an expansion in sales. Even in a world like that, though, sooner or later the very development it brings about will put upward pressure on export prices. So even in a world where the first condition continues to hold indefinitely, sooner or later it will be necessary to switch to growth driven at least partly by domestic demand. But large countries like
Once you get to this point, it should be obvious to the exporter that he is never going to get paid back at today’s prices. (Where would the money come from?) The importer is likely to try to avoid bankruptcy by forcing a revaluation on the exporter, which is politically easier for him than persuading his own voters to adopt the necessary austerity measures would be. The exporter, seeing this risk, will frantically try to switch over to an economy based on domestic demand. Whether or not he can do this depends on the condition of his political system.
If, in the course of the economic development that has already ensued, a rising middle class has already forced or is in the process of forcing meaningful democratic reform, there is some hope for a successful transition to a fully developed economy, because then there is the right setup for a consumer society with things like actual independent trade unions to force wages up in the face of resistance by employers, and a real social safety net that meets the needs of actual, powerful voters.
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The Chinese government has trouble seeing all this. People in the Party think they understand the modern West, because they’ve visited the Louvre and met a few western people, but actually they don’t, they don’t know it at all, any more than most Westerners do. They don’t seem to know very much of its actual history, for one thing. Their laws are supposed to prevent them from even inquiring into that, to force them to blindly believe whatever Marx and Mao believed. Consequently, Chinese leaders have a one-sided, partial, idiosyncratic, obsolete, shallow understanding of the modern West. They are all physiocrats, but don’t even know that there is such a word. They don’t really seem to understand what modernity is, or what it requires, or how it is connected to freedom. That’s a significant weakness, because it means that they haven’t actually bothered to inquire very deeply at all into the thing that’s most material to their country’s ultimate fate.
If they had, they would know that the project of developing economically without acquiring any unwanted human rights in the process is an inherently self-contradictory one. In the history of the West, the rights came first, and much of the scientific and economic progress was a consequence of those rights. Places like
We Westerners tend to coddle and patronize people outside the West, telling them comfortable, multi-cultural, relativistic lies, humoring their Marxism or Ming restorationism or whatever crazy obsolete thing it is they are working with because we don’t expect anything better from barbarians. Let me now violate this quaint custom by being perfectly clear with the Chinese people. You’re no threat to us, in fact you deserve our pity. We both seem to be in trouble now, but the difference between us is that we will adapt and recover, and you will not. We will throw our current leaders out, eventually, and replace them with less incompetent ones, but you can’t do that. Your leaders have failed you once again, yet you have no more ability to get replace them than you did with the Dowager Empress or Chairman Mao. You will never make it to the point of being a serious rival for
This difference is not one between Chinese and Western culture, though that’s what your masters want you to think - it is the difference between free people and serfs. (Chinese culture involves playing the gu qin and writing poetry with a brush; the single-party Leninist state has nothing at all to do with Chinese traditions, being a recent Western invention.) It is simply impossible to both ban the teaching of Plato and Locke and have a truly developed economy or a genuinely modern society. That can work for a little while, a decade or two, but not for the generations and centuries required to really catch up. People who pretend otherwise are not really your friends. The West got to where it is by being what it is, and many revolutions against the dead hand of tradition were required in the process. Ideas matter, so freedom matters. To believe in a third way between freedom and slavery is nothing but a form of cowardice, a failure to come to grips with what’s really necessary. Freedom is frightening. So are you men, or mice? Do you really expect that a timid, trembling, obedient mouse will ever rule the world, will ever take real power away from the people who dared to tame the lightning, and travel to the Moon?
In fact, despite its façade of capitalism and modernity, the Party is still making Mao’s mistake of acting first and thinking later. Lending a lot of money to people who will never pay you back is only a symptom of the underlying folly – you have to believe in something that isn’t true to believe that such an insane project is going to work out in the way you want it to, and any fixed untrue belief will eventually injure you somehow. It’s easy for the Party to maintain that sort of belief in the face of inconvenient evidence, because anyone who advances another point of view can be sent to a work-camp. So modern