美联储主席最新讲话，华尔街感激涕零（全文）
原创： Powell 继民财经汇 今天
美联储主席最新讲话，华尔街感激涕零
（全文）
大地 (粤语)
BEYOND - 光辉精选
2018年11月29日周三美国联邦储备委员会主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔（Jerome Powell）表示目前利率接近中性， 此前华尔街一直在等待该讲话；消息公布后，股市周三走高； 而这表明，美联储主席近两个月的言论改变了基调，意味着美联储的加息步骤可能会放缓。美联储难道是在特朗普的压力下转向了？倘若如此，特朗普的底气则会更足了。
此前：
全球狂跌： 谁是幕后罪魁回首？
美联储宣布加息 （公告全文）
美联储出猛招：大潮将退，未来只有加息、加息、加息....
2018 铁定加息，美联储主席国会证词全文（中英文）
今天，华尔街为美联储主席的最新讲话欢呼鼓舞，感激涕零；道琼斯工业平均指数上涨550点至盘中高点，并且有望实现自3月26日以来的最佳日。本周30指数也上涨超过1,000点。标准普尔500指数上涨1.9％， 纳斯达克综合指数上涨2.4％。
以下是美联储主席今天的讲话全文
（中文翻译仅供参考）
November 28, 2018
The Federal Reserve's Framework for Monitoring Financial Stability
美联储监测金融稳定的框架
Chairman Jerome H. Powell 主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔
At The Economic Club of New York, New York, New York 在纽约经济俱乐部，纽约
It is a pleasure to be back at the Economic Club of New York. I will begin by briefly reviewing the outlook for the economy, and then turn to a discussion of financial stability. My main subject today will be the profound transformation since the Global Financial Crisis in the Federal Reserve's approach to monitoring and addressing financial stability. Today marks the publication of the Board of Governors' first Financial Stability Report. Earlier this month, we published our first Supervision and Regulation Report. Together, these reports contain a wealth of information on our approach to financial stability and to financial regulation more broadly. By clearly and transparently explaining our policies, we aim to strengthen the foundation of democratic legitimacy that enables the Fed to serve the needs of the American public. 很高兴回到纽约经济俱乐部。 我将首先简要回顾一下经济前景，然后再讨论金融稳定性。 今天我的主要议题将是全球金融危机以来美联储监测和解决金融稳定问题的方式发生的深刻转变。 今天标志着理事会第一份金融稳定报告的出版。 本月早些时候，我们发布了第一份监督和监管报告。 这些报告共同载有关于我们对金融稳定和更广泛的金融监管方法的大量信息。 通过清晰透明地解释我们的政策，我们的目标是加强民主合法性的基础，使美联储能够满足美国公众的需求。
Outlook and Monetary Policy 展望和货币政策
Congress assigned the Federal Reserve the job of promoting maximum employment and price stability. I am pleased to say that our economy is now close to both of those objectives. The unemployment rate is 3.7 percent, a 49-year low, and many other measures of labor market strength are at or near historic bests. Inflation is near our 2 percent target. The economy is growing at an annual rate of about 3 percent, well above most estimates of its longer-run trend.
国会赋予美联储促进最大就业和价格稳定的工作。 我很高兴地说，我们的经济现在接近这两个目标。当前美国 失业率为3.7％，为49年来的最低点，许多其他劳动力市场强弱指标均达到或接近历史最高水平。 通货膨胀接近我们2％的目标。 经济正以每年约3％的速度增长，远高于其长期趋势的大多数估计。
For seven years during the crisis and its painful aftermath, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) kept our policy interest rate unprecedentedly low--in fact, near zero--to support the economy as it struggled to recover. The health of the economy gradually but steadily improved, and about three years ago the FOMC judged that the interests of households and businesses, of savers and borrowers, were no longer best served by such extraordinarily low rates. We therefore began to raise our policy rate gradually toward levels that are more normal in a healthy economy. Interest rates are still low by historical standards, and they remain just below the broad range of estimates of the level that would be neutral for the economythat is, neither speeding up nor slowing down growth. My FOMC colleagues and I, as well as many private-sector economists, are forecasting continued solid growth, low unemployment, and inflation near 2 percent. 在危机期间的七年及其痛苦的后果中，联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）将我们的政策利率维持在前所未有的低水平 - 实际上接近于零 - 以支持经济，当前经济正在努力恢复。 经济的健康状况逐渐但稳步提升，大约三年前，联邦公开市场委员会认为家庭和企业，储蓄者和借款人的利益不再是这种极低的利率最佳服务。 因此，我们开始逐步将政策利率提高到健康经济中更为正常的水平。 按历史标准衡量，利率仍然很低，而且它们仍然低于对经济中性水平的广泛估计范围 - 即既不加速也不放缓增长。 我的FOMC同事和我以及许多私营经济学家预测，经济将持续稳健增长，保持低失业率，通货膨胀率接近2％。
There is a great deal to like about this outlook. But we know that things often turn out to be quite different from even the most careful forecasts. For this reason, sound policymaking is as much about managing risks as it is about responding to the baseline forecast. Our gradual pace of raising interest rates has been an exercise in balancing risks. We know that moving too fast would risk shortening the expansion. We also know that moving too slowly--keeping interest rates too low for too long--could risk other distortions in the form of higher inflation or destabilizing financial imbalances. Our path of gradual increases has been designed to balance these two risks, both of which we must take seriously. 关于这种观点有很多值得关注的地方。 但我们知道事情往往与最谨慎的预测完全不同。 出于这个原因，健全的政策制定与管理风险一样，都与回应基线预测有关。 我们逐步加息的步伐一直是平衡风险的一种做法。 我们知道，移动太快会有缩短扩张的风险。 我们也知道，行动过于缓慢 - 将利率维持在太低的时间 - 可能会以通胀上升或不稳定的金融失衡的形式面临其他扭曲风险。 我们逐步增加的道路旨在平衡这两种风险，我们必须认真对待这两种风险。
We also know that the economic effects of our gradual rate increases are uncertain, and may take a year or more to be fully realized. While FOMC participants' projections are based on our best assessments of the outlook, there is no preset policy path. We will be paying very close attention to what incoming economic and financial data are telling us. As always, our decisions on monetary policy will be designed to keep the economy on track in light of the changing outlook for jobs and inflation. 我们也知道，逐步加息的经济影响是不确定的，可能需要一年或更长时间才能完全实现。 虽然FOMC参与者的预测是基于我们对前景的最佳评估，但没有预设的政策路径。 我们将密切关注最新的经济和金融数据告诉我们的情况。 与往常一样，我们的货币政策决策将旨在根据就业和通胀前景的变化保持经济走势。
Under the dual mandate, jobs and inflation are the Fed's meat and potatoes. In the rest of my comments, I will focus on financial stability--a topic that has always been on the menu, but that, since the crisis, has become a more integral part of the meal. 在双重使命下，就业和通胀是美联储的肉和土豆。 在我的其他评论中，我将重点关注金融稳定性 - 这个话题一直都在议题上，但是，自危机以来，这已成为这顿饭不可或缺的一部分。
Historical Perspective on Financial Stability 金融稳定的历史回顾
The term "financial stability" has a particular meaning in this context. A stable financial system is one that continues to function effectively even in severely adverse conditions. A stable system meets the borrowing and investment needs of households and businesses despite economic turbulence. An unstable system, in contrast, may amplify turbulence and prolong economic hardship in the face of stress by failing to provide these essential services when they are needed most. “金融稳定”一词在这方面具有特殊含义。 稳定的金融体系即使在严峻的不利条件下也能继续有效运作。 尽管经济动荡，但稳定的系统可满足家庭和企业的借贷和投资需求。 相反，不稳定的系统可能会在最需要时提供这些必要的服务，从而放大湍流，并在面临压力时延长经济困难。
For Economic Club of New York trivia buffs, I will note that the second ever presentation to this club by a Federal Reserve official was about this very topic. The date was March 18, 1929. Weeks before, the Fed had issued a public statement of concern over stock market speculation, and had provided guidance frowning on bank funding of such speculation. William Harding, a former Fed Chair and then president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, defended the Fed's actions in his talk. He argued that, while the Fed should not act as the arbiter of correct asset prices, it did have a primary responsibility to protect the banking system's capacity to meet the credit needs of households and businesses. At the meeting, critics argued that public statements about inflated asset prices were "fraught with danger;" that the nation's banks were so well managed that they should not "face public admonition"; and, more generally, that the Fed was "out of its sphere."1 Of course, Harding spoke just a few months before the 1929 stock market crash, which signaled the onset of the Great Depression.2 对于纽约经济俱乐部的琐事爱好者，我会注意到美联储官员第二次向这个俱乐部发表的演讲是关于这个话题。这个日期是1929年3月18日。几周之前，美联储发布了一份关于股市投机的公开声明，并提供了对此类投机的银行资金不屑一顾的指引。前美联储主席，波士顿联邦储备银行行长威廉•哈丁（William Harding）为他的谈话中的美联储行动辩护。他认为，虽然美联储不应该作为正确资产价格的仲裁者，但它确实负有保护银行系统满足家庭和企业信贷需求的能力的主要责任。在会议上，批评人士认为，有关虚增资产价格的公开声明“充满了危险”;这个国家的银行管理得如此之好，以至于他们不应该“面对公众的劝告”;而且更一般地说，美联储“走出了它的领域。”1当然，哈丁在1929年股市崩盘前几个月发表讲话，这标志着大萧条的开始。
Fast forwarding, a host of Depression-era reforms helped avoid, for the next three-quarters of a century, a systemic financial crisis and the associated severe economic dislocationthe longest such period in American history. Those decades saw many advances in monetary policy and in bank regulatory policy, but the appropriate role for government in managing threats to the broader financial system remained unresolved. Periodic bouts of financial stress during this period--such as the Latin American debt crisis, the savings and loan crisis, and the Russian debt default--were met with improvised responses. Policymakers conjured fixes from a mixture of private-sector rescues, emergency liquidity, occasional implicit or explicit bailouts, and monetary accommodation. Outside of these crisis responses, however, systemic issues were not a central focus of policy.紧接着事情得到快速发展，一系列萧条时期的改革有助于避免在接下来的四分之三个世纪内出现系统性金融危机和相关的严重经济混乱 - 这是美国历史上最长的时期。 几十年来，货币政策和银行监管政策取得了许多进展，但政府在管理对更广泛金融体系的威胁方面的适当作用仍未得到解决。 这一时期的金融压力定期发生 - 例如拉丁美洲债务危机，储蓄和贷款危机以及俄罗斯债务违约 - 都得到了即兴的回应。 政策制定者从混合的私营部门救助，紧急流动性，偶尔的隐性或明确救助以及货币宽松等方面得到了修复。 然而，在这些危机应对之外，系统性问题不是政策的核心焦点。
The Global Financial Crisis demonstrated, in the clearest way, the limits of this approach. Highly inventive and courageous improvisation amid scenes of great drama helped avoid another Great Depression, but failed to prevent the most severe recession in 75 years. The crisis made clear that there can be no macroeconomic stability without financial stability, and that systemic stability risks often take root and blossom in good times.3 Thus, as the emergency phase of the crisis subsided, Congress, the Fed, and the other financial regulators began developing a fundamentally different approach to financial stability. Instead of relying on improvised responses after crises strike, policymakers now constantly monitor vulnerabilities and require firms to plan in advance for financial distress, in a framework that lays out solutions in advance during good times. 全球金融危机以最清晰的方式证明了这种方法的局限性。 在戏剧性场面中极具创造性和勇敢的即兴创作帮助避免了另一次大萧条，但未能阻止75年来最严重的经济衰退。 危机清楚地表明，没有金融稳定就没有宏观经济稳定，而且系统性稳定风险往往在经济繁荣时期生根发芽.3因此，随着危机的紧急阶段平息，国会，美联储和其他金融危机 监管机构开始制定一种根本不同的金融稳定方法。 危机发生后，政策制定者不再依赖即兴应对措施，而是不断监测脆弱性，并要求企业提前计划财务困境，并在经济繁荣时期提前提出解决方案。
The New Approach to Financial Stability 实现金融稳定的新途径
This new approach can be divided into three parts. First, build up the strength and resilience of the financial system. Second, develop and apply a broad framework for monitoring financial stability on an ongoing basis. And third, explain the new approach as transparently as possible, so that the public and its representatives in Congress can provide oversight and hold us accountable for this work. Although I'll focus mainly on the stability efforts of the Federal Reserve, a number of federal regulatory agencies have responsibilities in this area. All of these agencies are represented on the Financial Stability Oversight Council, or FSOC, which is chaired by the Treasury Secretary and which provides a forum for interagency cooperation in responding to emerging risks. 这种新途径（方法）可分为三个部分。 首先，增强金融体系的实力和弹性。 第二，制定并应用广泛的框架，持续监测金融稳定性。 第三，尽可能透明地解释新方法，以便公众及其在国会的代表能够提供监督并让我们对这项工作负责。 虽然我将主要关注美联储的稳定性努力，但一些联邦监管机构在这方面负有责任。 所有这些机构都在金融稳定监督委员会（FSOC）中有代表，该委员会由财政部长担任主席，并为应对新出现的风险提供机构间合作的论坛。
Building Resilience of the Financial System 建立金融体系的弹性
After 10 years of concentrated effort in the public and private sectors, the system is now much stronger, with greater capacity to function effectively in stressful times. In the banking system, we have implemented a post-crisis regulatory framework based on robust capital and liquidity requirements, a strong stress-testing regime, and mandatory living wills for the largest firms. As a result, banks now have much more high quality capital than before (figure 1). The most recent stress tests indicate that, even after a severe global recession, capital levels at the largest banks would remain above regulatory minimums, and above the levels those banks held in good times before the crisis.4 The most systemically important financial institutions also now hold roughly 20 percent of their assets in the form of high quality liquid assets--that is, safe assets that could be readily sold at short notice (figure 2). The share of these assets is about four times its pre-crisis level. 经过公共和私营部门10年的集中努力，该系统现在变得更加强大，在压力时期有更大的有效运作能力。 在银行系统中，我们实施了基于强大的资本和流动性要求的危机后监管框架，强大的压力测试制度以及最大公司的强制性生前遗嘱。 因此，银行现在拥有比以前更高质量的资本（图1）。 最近的压力测试表明，即使在严重的全球经济衰退之后，最大银行的资本水平仍将高于监管最低标准，并高于银行在危机前的良好时期所持有的水平.4现在最具系统重要性的金融机构 以高质量流动资产的形式持有大约20％的资产 - 也就是说，可以在短时间内随时出售的安全资产（图2）。 这些资产的份额大约是危机前水平的四倍。
Compared with other economies, lending and borrowing in the United States depend less on bank loans and more on funds flowing through a wide array of capital market channels. The crisis revealed that this capital market centric system, despite its many benefits, also provides more places where systemic risks can emerge. In response, Congress and the regulatory agencies have made many stability-enhancing changes outside of the banking system. For example, many derivatives transactions are now required to be centrally cleared, which, through netting, has reduced exposures and enabled better management of counterparty risk. Tri-party repurchase agreement (repo) reforms have substantially improved the resilience of that marketplace, in particular by limiting intraday loans. Before the crisis, prime institutional money market funds were permitted to report a constant, $1 share price so long as the value of the underlying assets remained near $1. This reporting convention, combined with the implicit support of the plans' sponsors, led investors to treat those funds like bank deposits, even though they were not likewise insured. These funds are now required to report floating net-asset values, and after this reform investors chose to migrate to government-only funds, which are safer and less susceptible to runs (figure 3).5 These and other measures have reduced the risk that key non-bank parts of the system would freeze up in the face of market stress. 与其他经济体相比，美国的贷款和借款较少依赖银行贷款，而更多依赖于流经各种资本市场渠道的资金。危机表明，这个以资本市场为中心的体系虽然有很多好处，但也提供了更多可能出现系统性风险的地方。作为回应，国会和监管机构在银行系统之外进行了许多稳定性增强的变革。例如，现在需要集中清算许多衍生品交易，这些交易通过净额结算减少了风险敞口，并能够更好地管理交易对手风险。三方回购协议（回购）改革大大提高了该市场的弹性，特别是通过限制日内贷款。危机前，只要相关资产的价值保持在1美元附近，主要机构货币市场基金就可以报告恒定的1美元股票价格。该报告惯例，加上计划赞助商的暗示支持，导致投资者将这些资金视为银行存款，即使他们没有同样投保。这些资金现在需要报告浮动净资产价值，在这次改革之后，投资者选择迁移到政府专用基金，这些基金更安全，更不易受到影响（图3）.5这些和其他措施一起共同降低了风险面对市场压力，该系统的主要非银行部分将冻结。
A New Framework for Monitoring Systemic Risks 系统风险监控的新框架
Innovation and risk-taking contribute to the dynamism of our financial system and our economy. As Hyman Minsky emphasized, along with the many benefits of dynamism comes the reality that the financial system will sometimes evolve toward excess and dangerous imbalances.6 This reality underscores the vital importance of the second part of post-crisis reform: monitoring for emerging vulnerabilities. 创新和风险承担有助于我们的金融体系和经济的活力。 正如海曼明斯基所强调的那样，伴随着动力的诸多好处，金融系统有时会演变为过度和危险的不平衡.6这一现实强调了危机后改革第二部分的重要性：监测新出现的脆弱性。
As laid out in our new Financial Stability Report, we have developed a framework to help us monitor risks to stability in our complex and rapidly evolving financial system. The framework distinguishes between shocks, that is, trigger events that can be hard to predict or influence, and vulnerabilities, defined as features of the financial system that amplify shocks. The report is organized around four broad vulnerabilities that have been prominent in financial crises through the centuries. Each of these vulnerabilities is often found to some degree even in healthy market-based systems, and there is not, at present, any generally accepted standard for assessing at what level the vulnerabilities begin to pose serious stability risks. In lieu of such a standard, we flag cases in which the vulnerabilities rise well beyond historical norms, and then form judgments about the stability risks those cases present.
正如我们新的“金融稳定报告”所述，我们已经制定了一个框架，帮助我们监控复杂且快速发展的金融体系中的稳定风险。 该框架区分了冲击，即可能难以预测或影响的触发事件，以及被定义为放大冲击的金融系统特征的漏洞。 该报告围绕四个广泛的脆弱性进行组织，这些脆弱性在几个世纪以来一直在金融危机中占据突出地位。 即使在健康的基于市场的系统中，这些漏洞中的每一个通常都会在某种程度上被发现，并且目前还没有任何普遍接受的标准来评估漏洞在何种程度上开始构成严重的稳定性风险。 代替这样的标准，我们识别出哪些漏洞远远超出历史规范的案例，然后对这些案例中存在的稳定性风险做出判断。
The first vulnerability is excessive leverage in the financial sector.7 If a highly leveraged segment of the financial system is buffeted by adverse events, the affected entities may all need to deleverage at the same time by selling assets, leading to what is called a "fire sale." Both the resulting decline in asset prices and the impaired ability of the segment to play its role in the economy can amplify the effects of a downturn. We saw this chain of events play out repeatedly in various parts of the financial sector in the weeks following the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008. 第一个漏洞是金融部门的过度杠杆.7如果金融体系的高杠杆部分受到不利事件的冲击，受影响的实体可能都需要通过出售资产同时去杠杆化，从而导致所谓的“ 甩卖。” 由此导致的资产价格下跌以及该部门在经济中发挥作用的能力受损都会加剧经济衰退的影响。 在雷曼兄弟2008年失败后的几周内，我们看到这一系列事件在金融部门的各个部门反复出现。
In our surveillance, we examine leverage across many types of financial institutions, including banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, and various funding vehicles. Currently, we do not detect a broad-based buildup of abnormal or excessive leverage. As with banks, capital levels at insurance companies and broker-dealers appear robust. In addition, securitization levels are far below their pre-crisis levels, and those structures that do exist rely on more stable funding (see figure 4). Our view into leverage and risk-taking outside the banking sector is admittedly incomplete, however, and we are always working to get a better view of emerging leverage excesses.8 在我们的监督中，我们检查了许多类型金融机构的杠杆率，包括银行，保险公司，对冲基金和各种融资工具。 目前，我们没有发现基于广泛的异常或过度杠杆积累。 与银行一样，保险公司和经纪自营商的资本水平看似强劲。 此外，证券化水平远低于危机前的水平，而那些确实存在的结构依赖于更稳定的资金（见图4）。 然而，我们对银行业以外的杠杆和风险承担的看法是不完整的，我们一直在努力更好地了解新兴的杠杆率过剩.8
The second vulnerability is funding risk, which arises when banks or nonbank financial entities rely on funding that can be rapidly withdrawn. If depositors or market participants lose faith in the soundness of an institution or the system as a whole, unstable funding can simply vanish in what is called a "run." During the crisis, we saw widespread runs, including at broker-dealers, some segments of the repo market, and money market mutual funds. These runs did severe damage, contributing to a generalized panic at the time. Had the authorities not stepped in, the damage could have been even more severe. 第二个漏洞是融资风险，当银行或非银行金融实体依赖可以迅速撤回的资金时就会产生融资风险。 如果存款人或市场参与者对一个机构或整个系统的稳健性失去信心，那么不稳定的资金就会在所谓的“竞选”中消失。 在危机期间，我们看到了广泛的运行，包括经纪自营商，回购市场的一些部分以及货币市场共同基金。 这些运行造成严重损害，导致当时的普遍恐慌。 如果当局没有介入，损害可能会更加严重。
Today we view funding-risk vulnerabilities as low. Banks hold low levels of liabilities that are able and likely to run, and they hold high levels of liquid assets to fund any outflows that do occur. Money market mutual fund reforms have greatly reduced the run risk in that sector. More generally, it is short-term, uninsured funding that would be most likely to run in a future stress event, and the volume of such funding is now significantly below pre-crisis peaks. 今天，我们认为融资风险漏洞很低。 银行持有能够和可能运行的低负债水平，并持有高水平的流动资产，以资助任何确实发生的资金流出。 货币市场共同基金改革大大降低了该部门的经营风险。 更一般地说，它是短期的，没有保险的资金，最有可能在未来的压力事件中运行，而且这种资金的数量现在大大低于危机前的峰值。
Taken together, the evidence on these first two vulnerabilities strongly supports the view that financial institutions and markets are substantially more resilient than they were before the crisis. Indeed, the American financial system has successfully weathered some periods of significant stress over the past several years.9 简而言之，前两个漏洞的证据强烈支持金融机构和市场比危机前更具弹性的观点。 实际上，美国金融体系在过去几年中已成功度过了一些重大压力期。
The third vulnerability is excessive debt loads at households and businesses. Credit booms have often led to credit busts and sometimes to painful economic downturns. When the bust comes, those who have overborrowed tend to sharply reduce their spending. Defaults typically rise faster than had been expected, which may put financial institutions into distress. These effects may combine to bring a serious economic downturn. 第三个漏洞是家庭和企业的过度债务负担。 信贷繁荣经常导致信贷危机，有时甚至导致经济下滑。 当萧条来临时，那些过度借贷的人倾向于大幅减少开支。 违约率通常上升速度超过预期，这可能使金融机构陷入困境。 这些影响可能会带来严重的经济衰退。
This boom-bust pattern was clear in measures of household debt around the crisis period, with mortgage debt rising far above its historical trend and then contracting sharply (see figure 5). After the contraction, household debt has grown only moderately. The net increase in mortgage debt has been among borrowers with higher credit scores. While heavily indebted households always suffer in a downturn, all of this suggests that household debt would not present a systemic stability threat if the economy sours. 在危机时期的家庭债务衡量指标中，这种繁荣 - 萧条模式是明确的，抵押贷款债务远远高于其历史趋势，然后急剧收缩（见图5）。 收缩后，家庭债务只是适度增长。抵押贷款债务的净增长一直是来自那些信用评分较高的借款人。 虽然负债累累的家庭总是处于低迷状态，但所有这些都表明，如果经济恶化，家庭债务不会构成系统性稳定性威胁。
Nonfinancial business borrowing presents a subtler story. With corporate debt, the United States has not faced a massive credit boom like that experienced with residential mortgages before the recent crisis. Instead, after controlling for its trend, business borrowing relative GDP has risen during expansions, no doubt reflecting business optimism, and then fallen when the cycle turned, as some of that optimism proved unfounded (see figure 6). By this measure, the ratio of corporate debt to GDP is about where one might expect after nearly a decade of economic expansion: it is well above its trend, but not yet at the peaks hit in the late 1980s or late 1990s. Further, the upward trend in recent years appears broadly consistent with the growth in business assets relative to GDP. 非金融业务借贷呈现出一个更微妙的故事。 在公司债务方面，美国并未面临像最近危机前住宅抵押贷款那样的大规模信贷繁荣。 相反，在控制其趋势之后，商业借贷相对GDP在扩张期间上升，无疑反映了商业乐观情绪，然后在周期转变时下降，因为一些乐观情绪证明是没有根据的（见图6）。 通过这一衡量标准，公司债务与GDP的比率大约是经过近十年经济扩张后人们可能预期的水平：它远高于其趋势，但尚未达到20世纪80年代末或90年代末的峰值。 此外，近年来的上升趋势似乎与企业资产相对于GDP的增长大体一致。
There are reasons for concern, however. Information on individual firms reveals that, over the past year, firms with high leverage and interest burdens have been increasing their debt loads the most (see figure 7). In addition, other measures of underwriting quality have deteriorated, and leverage multiples have moved up. Some of these highly leveraged borrowers would surely face distress if the economy turned down, leading investors to take higher-than-expected losses--developments that could exacerbate the downturn. The question for financial stability is whether elevated business bankruptcies and outsized losses would risk undermining the ability of the financial system to perform its critical functions on behalf of households and businesses. For now, my view is that such losses are unlikely to pose a threat to the safety and soundness of the institutions at the core of the system and, instead, are likely to fall on investors in vehicles like collateralized loan obligations with stable funding that present little threat of damaging fire sales.10 Of course, we will continue to monitor developments in this sector carefully. 然而，有理由担心。有关个别公司的信息显示，在过去一年中，具有高杠杆率和利息负担的公司一直在增加其债务负担（见图7）。此外，其他承保质量指标已经恶化，杠杆倍数上升。如果经济下滑，这些高杠杆借款人中的一些肯定会面临困境，导致投资者承受高于预期的损失 - 这些发展可能会加剧经济衰退。金融稳定性的问题在于，高企业破产和超额亏损是否有可能破坏金融系统代表家庭和企业履行其关键职能的能力。就目前而言，我认为这种损失不大可能对系统核心机构的安全性和稳健性构成威胁，也不会对有稳定资金来源的担保贷款债务的投资者构成威胁。10 当然，我们会继续仔细监察这个行业的发展。
The fourth and final vulnerability arises when asset values rise far above conventional, historically observed valuation benchmarks--a phenomenon popularly referred to as a "bubble." The contentious term "bubble" does not appear in our work, however.11 Instead, we focus is on the extent to which an asset's price is high or low relative to conventional benchmarks based on expected payoffs and current economic conditions. Historically, when asset prices soar far above standard benchmarks, sharp declines follow with some regularity, and those declines may bring economic misery reaching far beyond investors directly involved in the speculative boom. We therefore pay close attention when valuations get to the extreme ends of what we have seen in history. 当资产价值远高于传统的，历史上观察到的估值基准时出现第四个也是最后一个脆弱性 - 这种现象通常被称为“泡沫”。 然而，有争议的术语“泡沫”并未出现在我们的工作中.11相反，我们关注的是资产价格相对于基于预期收益和当前经济状况的传统基准的高或低程度。 从历史上看，当资产价格飙升至远高于标准基准时，大幅下跌伴随着一些规律性，而这些下跌可能会带来经济上的痛苦，远远超出直接参与投机热潮的投资者。 因此，当估值达到我们历史所见的极端时，我们会密切关注。
Looking across the landscape of major asset classes, we see some classes for which valuations seem high relative to history. For example, even after standard adjustments for economic conditions, valuations on riskier forms of corporate debt and commercial properties are in the upper ends of their post-crisis distributions, although they are short of the levels they hit in the pre-crisis credit boom. We see no major asset class, however, where valuations appear far in excess of standard benchmarks as some did, for example, in the late 1990s dot-com boom or the pre-crisis credit boom. 纵观主要资产类别的情况，我们看到一些估值与历史相关的类别。 例如，即使在对经济状况进行标准调整之后，风险较高的公司债务和商业地产的估值也处于其危机后分布的上限，尽管它们没有达到危机前信贷繁荣时期的水平。 然而，我们认为没有重要的资产类别，其估值似乎远远超过标准基准，例如，在20世纪90年代末的网络繁荣或危机前的信贷繁荣时期。
The asset class that gets the most attention day-to-day is, of course, the stock market. Today, equity market prices are broadly consistent with historical benchmarks such as forward price-to-earnings ratios (see figure 8). It is important to distinguish between market volatility and events that threaten financial stability. Large, sustained declines in equity prices can put downward pressure on spending and confidence. From the financial stability perspective, however, today we do not see dangerous excesses in the stock market. 当然，日常受关注的资产类别是股票市场。 今天，股票市场价格与远期市盈率等历史基准大体一致（见图8）。 区分市场波动和威胁金融稳定的事件非常重要。 股票价格大幅持续下跌可能会给支出和信心带来下行压力。 然而，从金融稳定的角度来看，今天我们看不到股市的过度危险。
Monitoring Likely Triggers for Financial Distress 监控金融危机的可能触发因素
I mentioned the distinction between vulnerabilities and shocks, or triggers. In addition to monitoring vulnerabilities under our four-part framework, we also consult a broad range of contacts regarding sources of risk that might trigger distress at any given time. For example, discussions with contacts currently point to risks emanating from the normalization of monetary policy in the United States and elsewhere, the unsettled state of trade negotiations, Brexit negotiations, budget discussions between Italy and the European Union, and cyber-related disruptions.12 我提到了漏洞和冲击或触发因素之间的区别。 除了监控我们的四部分框架下的漏洞之外，我们还咨询了有关风险来源的广泛联系，这些风险可能在任何特定时间引发危机。 例如，美国和其他地方货币政策正常化所带来的风险，贸易谈判未解决的状况，英国脱欧谈判，意大利与欧盟之间的预算讨论以及与网络有关的破坏。
Having identified possible triggers, we can assess how a particular trigger is likely to interact with known vulnerabilities. A good current example is that of Brexit. U.S. banks and broker-dealers participate in some of the markets most likely to be affected by Brexit. The Fed and other regulators have been working with U.S. financial institutions that have operations in the European Union or the United Kingdom to prepare for the full range of possible outcomes to the negotiations. In addition, the scenarios used in the stress tests routinely feature severe global contractions and show that U.S. banks have the capital to weather even highly disruptive events. 确定了金融危机可能的触发因素后，我们可以评估特定触发因素如何与已知漏洞进行交互发生作用。 目前最好的例子是英国退欧。 美国的银行和经纪自营商参与了一些最有可能受英国退欧影响的市场。 美联储和其他监管机构一直在与在欧盟或英国开展业务的美国金融机构合作，为谈判的各种可能结果做好准备。 此外，压力测试中使用的情景通常以严重的全球收缩为特征，并表明美国银行有资金来应对高度破坏性的事件。
Bottom Line: Financial Stability Risks Are Moderate 底线：金融稳定风险适中
I have reviewed a few of the key facts that inform our thinking about financial stability, and you will find a great deal more detail in our new report. You will also find that the report does not come to a bottom line conclusion. As I noted earlier, we have limited experience with this monitoring, and there is no widely accepted basis for reaching a bottom line. Thus, the purpose of the report is to provide a common platform and set of readings from which policymakers and other interested parties can form their own views. Individual policymakers will sometimes differ in their assessments and on the relative weight they put on particular vulnerabilities. My own assessment is that, while risks are above normal in some areas and below normal in others, overall financial stability vulnerabilities are at a moderate level.13 我已经回顾了一些关于金融稳定性的关键事实，你会在我们的新报告中找到更多细节。 您还会发现报告没有得出底线结论。 正如我前面提到的，我们对这种监测的经验有限，并没有广泛接受的基础来达到底线。 因此，报告的目的是提供一个共同的平台和一套阅读材料，政策制定者和其他相关方可以从中形成自己的观点。 个别政策制定者有时会在评估和他们对特定脆弱性的相对权重方面有所不同。我自己的评估是，虽然某些地区的风险高于正常水平，而其他地区的风险低于正常水平，但整体金融稳定性脆弱性处于中等水平。
In my view, the most important feature of the stability landscape is the strength of the financial system. The risks of destabilizing runs are far lower than in the past. The institutions at the heart of the financial system are more resilient. The stress tests routinely feature extremely severe downturns in business credit, and the largest banks have the capital and liquidity to continue to function under such circumstances. Because this core resilience is so important, we are committed to preserving and strengthening the key improvements since the crisis, particularly those in capital, liquidity, stress testing, and resolution. 在我看来，稳定性格局最重要的特征是金融体系的优势。 破坏稳定的风险远低于过去。 金融体系核心的机构更具弹性。 压力测试通常会导致商业信贷严重下滑，大银行在这种情况下有资本和流动性继续发挥作用。 由于这种核心弹性如此重要，我们致力于保护和加强自危机以来的关键改进，特别是资本，流动性，压力测试和解决方案。
Conclusion 结论
I'd like to conclude by putting financial stability and our two new reports in a longer-term context. To paraphrase a famous line, "eternal vigilance is the price of financial stability." We will publish these reports regularly as part of our vigilance. 最后，我想将金融稳定性和我们的两份新报告置于更长远的背景下。 用一句名言来解释，“永恒的警惕是金融稳定的代价”。 我们将定期发布这些报告，作为我们警惕的一部分。
Over time, some may be tempted to dismiss the reports entirely or to overdramatize any concerns they raise. Instead, these reports should be viewed as you might view the results of a regular health checkup. We all hope for a report that is not very exciting. Many baby boomers like me are, however, reaching an age where a good report is, "Well, there are a number of things we should keep an eye on, but all things considered you are in good health." That is how I view the Financial Stability Report out today. 随着时间的推移，有些人可能会试图完全反驳这些报告，或者过度夸大他们提出的任何问题。 相反，应该查看这些报告，因为您可能会查看常规健康检查的结果。 我们都希望报告不是很令人兴奋。 然而，像我这样的许多婴儿潮一代正在达到一个好报告的年龄，“好吧，我们应该关注一些事情，但所有事情都表明你身体健康。” 这就是我今天看待金融稳定报告的方式。
We hope that this report and the Supervision and Regulation Report will be important tools, sharing Federal Reserve views and stimulating public dialogue regarding the stability of the financial system. 我们希望本报告和监管规范报告将成为重要工具，有助于分享美联储的观点，促进有关金融体系稳定性的公众对话。
1. See remarks of W.P.G. Harding at a dinner of the Economic Club of New York on March 18, 1929, as reported in "Clash on Policies of Reserve Board" by the New York Times on March 19, 1929, p. 52; and in "Reserve Policy Upheld and Hit" by the Wall Street Journal on March 19, 1929, p. 21. Also see "Wall Street News and Comment," Special Dispatch to the [Daily Boston] Globe, on March 24, 1929, p. A60. Return to text
2. Many factors after the initial crash, including what are now seen as major policy errors, contributed to the Great Depression. See Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz (1963), A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press); and Ben S. Bernanke (1983), "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review, vol. 73 (June), pp. 257-76. Return to text
3. Hyman Minsky had long emphasized this point. For instance, see Hyman P. Minsky (1991), "Financial Crises: Systemic or Idiosyncratic (PDF)," Working Paper 51, prepared for presentation at "Crisis in Finance," a conference of the Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, April. Return to text
4. See the Federal Reserve's November 2018 Supervision and Regulation Report, available on the Board's website. Return to text
5. Given that government money fund asset holdings are limited to safe assets, they are allowed to maintain a $1 share price. Return to text
6. See Minsky, "Financial Crises," in note 3. Return to text
7. A more highly leveraged sector is one that relies more heavily on borrowed money. Return to text
8. Sometimes we look to bank lending for information. Data from the stress tests suggest that the nation's largest banks have committed about $1 trillion in lines of credit to nonbanks. Return to text
9. Examples include episodes of intensified concerns over euro-area fiscal challenges, the discontinuous and large appreciation of the Swiss franc in January 2015, and the market volatility associated with global growth concerns in late 2015. Return to text
10. See Jerome H. Powell (2015), "Financial Institutions, Financial Markets, and Financial Stability," speech delivered at the Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, N.Y., February 18. Return to text
11. Analysts differ over how to define the term "bubble," and debate continues about the degree to which economic fundamentals might explain even the most famous apparent bubble cases from history. On the topic of tulip mania, for example, see Peter M. Garber (1989), "Tulipmania," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 97 (June), pp. 535-60." Return to text
12. The Financial Stability Report does not currently have a standard set of metrics for determining the resiliency of critical financial systems to cyber disruptions. Nonetheless, cyber risks are the subject of ongoing policy efforts at that Federal Reserve and other relevant agencies, and these entities are working to develop resiliency expectations and measures, which may be part of future discussions in the stability report. Return to text
13. The staff have also assessed financial stability vulnerabilities as moderate. For instance, see the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee meeting, July 31-August 1, 2018, available on the Board's website. Return to text
不过，有评论认为， 华尔街的最大不确定性并非仅仅是美联储的加息步伐，而是本周末的G20 峰会结果。7
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