《海外校园》充斥左派谎言

本文是针对这篇丑化小布什、重复左派谎言的杂志文章, 以及这篇相关的回应与对话性质的文章而发。原文的荒谬之处举不胜举：例如Valerie Plame 事件还被拿来攻击布什。事实上, 向Robert Novak提供信息、导致她身分爆光的人早被证实是前副国务卿Richard Armitage(有名的“温和派”), 这意味着此事根本不可能是布什一派为报复而授意他做的。反而恰恰说明华盛顿圈内有很多人知道威尔逊太太在CIA工作(Armitage更早告诉了Woodward), 只是想不到她居然在法律上属于什么“秘密特工(Covert Agent)” ——身为一个天天去中情局Langley总部(位于弗吉尼亚)上班的工作人员、如何能掩盖自己跟CIA的关系? 更何况她老公在媒体上闹得沸沸扬扬(这也是为什么Armitage等政府人士会自然而然谈到他太太在CIA工作的事), 这一切像是保护“秘密特工”的样子吗?

华盛顿时报04年这篇报道说她的身分早已泄露给俄国和古巴, 看来多半也是真的, 我没见过左派对此的反驳。不管怎么说, 既然造成她身分爆光的不是利比, 也根本没有理由相信利比是在知道她Covert Agent身分(因为如前所述, 她有这种身分实在令人诧异)的情况下有意透露她的工作单位(否则干嘛不起诉直接犯案的鲍威尔副手, 却要舍近求远? )——因此, 既然司法和常理都没有指控利比在调查前有违法行为^[1] , 布什又哪里违背了对公众的承诺？

以下集中谈讨其中一个话题, 下面先引用一段原文：

振风评议∶ 至於布希政府指控伊拉克内有基地组织成员, 这可以从基地组织头目扎卡维在伊拉克的疯狂屠杀及被杀, 证实布希总统完全正确。 临风回应∶ 阿布·扎卡维是因为不满美国入侵,在2004年加入基地组织,不是伊战事前！ 美国中情局在战前告诉布希政府,伊拉克与基地组织无关,被布希、钱尼、伦斯菲尔德共同排斥,在国防部内另外成立了一个小组,希望证实两者有关。 振风评议∶ 你说∶“阿布·扎卡维是因为不满美国入侵,是在2004年加入基地组织,不是伊战事前！美国中情局在战前告诉布希政府,伊拉克与基地组织无关,被布希 、钱尼、伦斯菲尔德共同驳回,在国防部内另外成立了一个小组,希望证实两者有关。” 我这里有2002年《新闻周刊》杂志, 以封面文章对鲍威尔的演说进行综合报导和评论。当年布希政府明确指控∶阿布·扎卡维, 在伊拉克及阿富汗, 与宾拉登的基地组织有关系。而阿布·扎卡维在阿富汗有其独立性, 以及与宾拉登有矛盾, 以致直到2004年10月, 才在伊拉克公开效忠宾拉登等, 这些事实一点也不能说明, 当年美国对其与基地组织有关系的指控有任何错误。 阿布·扎卡维当时在阿富汗的训练营, 就是接受基地组织的财务资助的（请见《华盛顿邮报》）。他于2001 年在阿富汗与基地组织和塔利班并肩作战、对抗美军时受伤。 临风回应∶ 问题的关键在於∶有没有证据显示, 在2002年时, 他已经与基地组织挂钩, 而且作为基地组织的桥梁, 与萨达姆政权阴谋勾结, 准备进攻美国？ 我想没有这样的证据。

扎卡维(QI.A.131.03. Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalayleh)在伊战前就呆在伊拉克, 这一事实对于反战者是个老大难的问题, 因为他们在辩论中有个大前提, 就是说萨达姆政权是一个“世俗性”政权、跟伊斯兰极端分子是水火不容的, 极端组织成员在萨达姆治下根本不可能有生存空间; 或者说萨达姆在大是大非的问题上是相当理智的, 决不会攻击美国或者资助“原教旨”分子, 因为他知道招惹这个国家的后果是什么。

当民主党的那些重量级政客(如克里、戈尔以及Nancy Pelosi)也纷纷加入这一大合唱时, 人们就有理由对他们的前后不一感到震惊了, 因为：

1）他们在战前都坚决(比布什还坚决)声称萨达姆政权对美国安全构成重大威胁。
2）更要命的是, 他们在小布什还没上台(甚至老布什还没下台)的时侯就屡屡公开发表这样的言论, 不是说说而已, 1998年轰炸苏丹的希法制药厂, 克林顿对国会解释说伊政权和基地组织在那里合伙制“药”(当时的国防部长William S. Cohen在911委员会的听证会上声称"the owner of the plant had traveled to Baghdad to meet with the father of the VX program")。不是说他们在意识形态上水火不容、极不可能合作吗? 萨达姆不是把伊斯兰极端组织看作自己的“最大威胁”吗? 布什和切尼不是必须通过对情报的扭曲和高度选择性的“使用”(我不知道主导报告的民主党人用这个词表达什么含义)才能得出违背常识的结论吗? 那么克林顿政府又是中了什么邪? 看样子小布什不仅仅是刚上任就把伊拉克的油田分好了, 他本事大到在1999年以前就能强迫克林顿睁眼说瞎话, 还一直说到2004年接受《时代》专访的时侯——

On whether Bush was right to invade Iraq You know, I have repeatedly defended President Bush against the left on Iraq, even though I think he should have waited until the U.N. inspections were over. I don't believe he went in there for oil. We didn't go in there for imperialist or financial reasons. We went in there because he bought the Wolfowitz-Cheney analysis that the Iraqis would be better off, we could shake up the authoritarian Arab regimes in the Middle East, and our leverage to make peace between the Palestinians and Israelis would be increased. At the moment the U.N. inspectors were kicked out in '98, this is the proper language: there were substantial quantities of botulinum and aflatoxin, as I recall, some bioagents, I believe there were those, and VX and ricin, chemical agents, unaccounted for. Keep in mind, that's all we ever had to work on. We also thought there were a few missiles, some warheads, and maybe a very limited amount of nuclear laboratory capacity. After 9/11, let's be fair here, if you had been President, you'd think, Well, this fellow bin Laden just turned these three airplanes full of fuel into weapons of mass destruction, right? Arguably they were super-powerful chemical weapons. Think about it that way. So, you're sitting there as President, you're reeling in the aftermath of this, so, yeah, you want to go get bin Laden and do Afghanistan and all that. But you also have to say, Well, my first responsibility now is to try everything possible to make sure that this terrorist network and other terrorist networks cannot reach chemical and biological weapons or small amounts of fissile material. I've got to do that. That's why I supported the Iraq thing. There was a lot of stuff unaccounted for. So I thought the President had an absolute responsibility to go to the U.N. and say, "Look, guys, after 9/11, you have got to demand that Saddam Hussein lets us finish the inspection process." You couldn't responsibly ignore [the possibility that] a tyrant had these stocks. I never really thought he'd [use them]. What I was far more worried about was that he'd sell this stuff or give it away. Same thing I've always been worried about North Korea's nuclear and missile capacity. I don't expect North Korea to bomb South Korea, because they know it would be the end of their country. But if you can't feed yourself, the temptation to sell this stuff is overwhelming. So that's why I thought Bush did the right thing to go back. When you're the President, and your country has just been through what we had, you want everything to be accounted for. On whether the Iraq war was worth the costs It's a judgment that no one can make definitively yet. I would not have done it until after Hans Blix finished his job. Having said that, over 600 of our people have died since the conflict was over. We've got a big stake now in making it work. I want it to have been worth it, even though I didn't agree with the timing of the attack. I think if you have a pluralistic, secure, stable Iraq, the people of Iraq will be better off, and it might help the process of internal reform in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. I think right now, getting rid of Saddam's tyranny, ironically, has made Iraq more vulnerable to terrorism coming in from the outside. But any open society is going to be more vulnerable than any tyranny to that.

当年转述这一访谈的华语媒体也是别具匠心, 例如北京青年报这篇, 把中间的那三段话(关于伊拉克的违禁武器等相关问题)全部省略, 最后一句(关于文明社会比专制社会更难防范危险)的感情色彩也被扭曲了。但是跟新谎社比起来, 这篇已经够客观了。

05年另一件克林顿的新闻又被热炒, 这里的题目是“克林顿称美国入侵伊拉克犯下巨大错误”, 不过看了文章内容, 又令人不免怀疑克林顿的本意只是说伊战的执行过程、或者说战后重建过程犯了错误。按照华盛顿邮报的叙述：

Clinton cited the lack of planning for what would happen after Saddam Hussein was overthrown. "Saddam is gone. It's a good thing, but I don't agree with what was done," Clinton told students at a forum at the American University of Dubai. "It was a big mistake. The American government made several errors ... one of which is how easy it would be to get rid of Saddam and how hard it would be to unite the country." 。。。 Clinton said the United States had done some good things in Iraq: the removal of Saddam, the ratification of a new constitution and the holding of parliamentary elections. "The mistake that they made is that when they kicked out Saddam, they decided to dismantle the whole authority structure of Iraq. ... We never sent enough troops and didn't have enough troops to control or seal the borders," Clinton said. 。。。 Clinton said it would have been better if the United States had left Iraq's "fundamental military and social and police structure intact."

克林顿是左派的宠儿, 他这些以往的言行让某些人很难处理。戈尔长期指责萨达姆跟恐怖组织勾结, 却在伊战陷入困境之后一举变成歇斯底里的反战狂人, 但如果指控布什说谎, 自己几乎也没有可能脱身。然而想象力的作用是无穷的, 例如轰炸苏丹药厂一事——

The Sudanese method of producing VX was indeed of Iraqi provenance. But remember, the plant belonged to Sudan. Osama Bin Laden invested in the regime's Military Industrial Company, as he did in many, many other companies, farms, real estate, trading firms, etc. I've never been able to find evidence of contact between Bin Laden and the Iraqis or to demonstrate that Baghdad knew of al-Qaida's involvement in the VX project. BY Daniel Benjamin

也就是说, 萨达姆不知道自己的合伙人是基地组织, 而拉登也不知道对方是伊政权, 双方都被蒙在鼓里, 只有美国间谍知道实情。

类似的, 关于扎卡维, 柿油派也找到一个宝贝, 因而大喜过望
http://thinkprogress.org/2006/09/10/phase-ii-report- conclusion/
据这份06年的报告所言, 萨达姆没有包庇扎卡维(虽然扎卡维的确在他的地盘上呆着, 而且时间长度不是04年以前所认为的2个月, 是6个月, 见截图), 而是致力于搜捕这位恐怖活动家, 为世界和平默默奉献。那为什么没抓到呢? 大概是因为那个美国捣乱。。。就好比说, 当年蒋校长他老人家剿匪(Party), 据说因为同时要应对外患, 以致屡次功败垂成, 后来忍痛签了个“卖国协定”, 才真正腾出手来, 把Party赶去北上抗日了——可惜美国铁了心要灭掉老萨, 不跟他签什么协议。

总之, 我以前从来没有想过：对“窝藏扎卡维”这一开战借口还可以像临风先生这样驳——不在萨达姆跟扎卡维的恩怨情仇上纠缠, 直接否认扎卡维在伊战前是恐怖分子好了。或许他去伊拉克本是为了修桥铺路、或者还为了关怀那里的儿童、也有可能是去打酱油的。不过不管怎么说, 我后面要贴的两副截图(剪自临风先生眼中最客观、最中立的那份参院报告)跟“布什说谎”的口号还是有不小的距离。

——（临风先生称参院小组的报告“虽然是以民主党为多数,但也刊登个别参议员提出的异议,笔者文章引用的是该报告的论点,不只是‘世俗媒体’的宣传 ”——这给人一种印象, 好像报告里那些指责布什的部分是双方意见折衷的产物, 事实上, 你自己读报告就可以发现：多数派报告和少数派报告在空间、理由和结论上都是高度分隔的, 基本上是各说各话, 多数派部分完全不采纳也不谈论少数派的任何意见 ——而少数派对多数派有关“布什说谎”的那些结论逐条驳斥、无一认可^[2]。少数派报告自第101页开始, 为了有效辩论, 本文不会引用少数派的任何结论)。

背景资料已经说了不少, 现在回到直接争论的那个话题——扎卡维在伊战前是什么身分。当看到临风先生义愤填膺地强调

阿布·扎卡维是因为不满美国入侵, 在2004年加入基地组织, 不是伊战事前！ 美国中情局在战前告诉布希政府, 伊拉克与基地组织无关, 被布希、钱尼、伦斯菲尔德共同排斥, 在国防部内另外成立了一个小组, 希望证实两者有关。

读者的第一感觉是：临风先生是在否认扎卡维此前跟恐怖组织的关系(尤其是那句“因为不满美国入侵”)。因为倘若扎卡维做的事与“基地”(本身就是个松散的网络)无异, 同样致力于攻击美国的盟友(如沙特、埃及和约旦政权), 否认以色列的存在权、并以恐怖主义手段达成目标, 那么争论他何时表态加入基地组织有何意义? 例如看我几年来的言论, 一贯都是蛮不讲理、狭隘自义、“石蕊试纸(litmus test)”的, 那么就算我没有正式表态加入“ 宗教右翼”又能说明什么问题？

小布什本来在911后的公共演说(文字记录)中就已声明：窝藏恐怖分子的国家就形同向美国宣战。这也是当时达成的国际共识, 请回去看安理会1368和1373号决议精神：(1)恐怖袭击被定性为军事攻击(而不仅是刑事犯罪), 成员国拥有独立或集体自卫权("Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter"-后者是针对盟友受攻击而言)。(2)成员国有义务在本土镇压“一切形式的”恐怖主义。(3)窝藏恐怖分子者与之同罪。

顺便提一下, 萨达姆对沙特可是一直掂记着。(ISGP-2003-00010366）

当然, 根据上下文而言, 临风先生并不是否认扎卡维的恐怖分子身分, 但他的本意和逻辑依然很难辩识。

问题的关键在於∶有没有证据显示, 在2002年时, 他已经与基地组织挂钩, 而且作为基地组织的桥梁, 与萨达姆政权阴谋勾结, 准备进攻美国？

下面粗略提出两种可能

（1）哪怕扎卡维本身已经构成正当的开战理由, 布什还是说了谎, 因为他说伊拉克跟基地组织有联系, 而实际上没有这种联系。
或者——
（2）扎卡维既然不属基地组织, 也无法证明他“近期”会攻击美国(“准备”), 因此该人不构成美国对伊动武的理由。

下面我将先回应（2）, 再回到（1）。

关于（2）,其实有一个潜台词,就是说美国必须把恐怖组织跟国家政权同等看待 ——正如你不能因为伊拉克的侵略行为而连带惩罚叙利亚(尽管两国都是复兴党执政), 所以美国也不能因为受过基地组织的攻击、而一并打击其它的恐怖组织。也就是说, 尽管扎卡维是恐怖组织头目, 但他的组织没有攻击过美国(其实这一点也可疑,因有美国外交人员遇刺一事), 布什政府就没有向该组织及其庇护国开战的法理依据。
（关于这一点, 前面对布什演讲及联合国决议的探讨已经足以说清道理了, 不再重复^[3] ）

关于（1）, 我们可以看参议院今年六月出产的那个指责布什“ 说谎”的报告。里面的十几条结论中, 有的说布什在某一问题上的言论不受当时情报支持；有的则是虽有情报依据, 但没有反映情报群体中的少数派异议；有的是有误导之嫌：例如情报的确支持伊拉克与基地保持“联系”的结论, 但小布什转述这一结论时, 给人造成错误印象, 让公众以为这种“联系”已经到了“联合行动”的程度(真的吗?), 等等。

但恰恰是有关扎卡维的内容, 布什以及鲍威尔等人的言论跟情报部门的主流观点完全一致。

Conclusion 11: Statements that Iraq provided safe haven for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other al-Qa'ida-related terrorist members were substantiated by intelligence assessments. Intelligence assessments noted Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq and his ability to travel and operate within the country. The intelligence community generally believed that Iraq intelligence must have known about, and therefore at least tolerated, Zarqawi's presence in the country.

这里对布什没有任何异议。自己去读, 好好想想。

“美国中情局在战前告诉布希政府,伊拉克与基地组织无关”的说法大概是源于华盛顿邮报的一个类似谎言, 读者至少应该先看看白宫的辩解再作判断(空口说白话当然你不信, 但那里引用的是CIA局长的证词。场合? 参议员情报委员会)——注意 ！又提到了亲爱的扎卡维同志。：

• In February 2003, CIA Director George Tenet Testified That Iraq Had Links To Al Qaeda. TENET: "Iraq is harboring senior members of a terrorist network led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a close associate of al Qaeda. ... Iraq has in the past provided training in document forgery and bomb-making to al Qaeda. It has also provided training in poisons and gases to two al Qaeda associates. One of these associates characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful. ... I know that part of this - and part of this Zarqawi network in Baghdad are two dozen Egyptian Islamic jihad which is indistinguishable from al Qaeda - operatives who are aiding the Zarqawi network, and two senior planners who have been in Baghdad since last May. Now, whether there is a base or whether there is not a base, they are operating freely, supporting the Zarqawi network that is supporting the poisons network in Europe and around the world. So these people have been operating there. And, as you know - I don't want to recount everything that Secretary Powell said, but as you know a foreign service went to the Iraqis twice to talk to them about Zarqawi and were rebuffed. So there is a presence in Baghdad that is beyond Zarqawi." (George Tenet, Select Committee On Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Hearing, 2/11/03)

• Tenet Testified That Iraq Was Providing Safe Haven To Al Qaeda. SEN. CARL LEVIN (D-MI): "Would you say, Mr. Tenet, that the Zarqawi terrorist network is under the control or sponsorship of the Iraqi government?" TENET: "I don't know that, sir, but I know that there's a safe haven that's been provided to this network in Baghdad." LEVIN: "So you're not - well, you're saying that you don't know if they're under the support - that they are under the control or direction?" TENET: "Yes, sir. We have said - what we've said is Zarqawi and this large number of operatives are in Baghdad. They say the environment is good. And it is inconceivable to us that the Iraqi intelligence service doesn't know that they live there or what they're doing." (George Tenet, Select Committee On Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Hearing, 2/11/03)

• In March 2002, Tenet Testified On Iraq's Links To Al Qaeda. TENET: "We continue to watch Iraq's involvement in terrorists' activities. Baghdad has a long history of supporting terrorism, altering its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals. It has also had contacts with Al Qaeda." (George Tenet, Committee On Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Hearing, 3/19/02)

Tenet另有一次表演(2002-10-07)也值得一提, 他在给国会的回信里说：

Regarding Senator Bayh's question of Iraqi links to al- Qa'ida, Senators could draw from the following points for unclassified discussions: 。。。 Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qa'ida have discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression. Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-Qa'ida members, including some that have been in Baghdad. We have credible reporting that al-Qa'ida leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qa'ida members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs. Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians, coupled with growing indications of a relationship with al- Qa'ida, suggest that Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent US military action.

有人说, 情报有误, 总统也该明察秋毫, 否则仍难逃失职之罪。这是胡扯。总统的义务不是去质疑专业群体的工作成果, 那叫外行指挥内行。发明这种谬论的朋友大概不知道, 布什(以及议员们)收到的“情报”是一份份经过了专业部门层层审核的分析报告, 并不是某个心腹爪牙的几句耳语。事实上, 甚至布什的讲话稿都必须先经过情报部门的检查, 确定没有冲突才能照着演讲。像这个National Intelligence Estimate, 里面列出不同等级的结论, 下面这几条属于High Confidence:

Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions. Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles.

小布什凭怎么不接受这些结论? 这不仅是CIA的主流意见, 就连临风先生津津乐道的国务院(还有能源部)也对这些结论(至少是化学、生物武器的部分)没有异议(所以就算如临风先生坚持的那样,小布什选择性地公布情报,事实上对开战与否也并无实质影响)。难不成布什应该亲自审查原始数据、拷问犯人？

当然, 如果你硬要坚持, 要精神胜利, 别人也没办法。你尽可以把布什想象成一个播音员, 接到纸条(“ 情报”)后不辩真伪就开始“本台刚刚收到的消息。嗨,伙计！你牙上有片卷心菜叶。”

如果还是想多了解一点儿实质性的信息, 推荐下载这个Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism看看(或者看这里), 尤其是文档第62页(原书第43页)^[4] 。自己判断萨达姆有没有支持那些从属于基地的恐怖组织。你会发现萨达姆在本土为国外恐怖分子设立训练营(我说的不是那个“劫机场”, 请看ISGZ-2004-032673), 招募人弹, 甚至竭力跟库尔德区的伊斯兰极端组织建立联系。

Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organisations it knew to be part of al- Qa'ida, as long as that organisation's near-term goals supported Saddam's longterm vision.

不承认这个研究报告的权威性? 很好, 那为什么主流媒体要从中抽出“these documents do not reveal direct coordination and assistance between the Saddam regime and the al Qaeda network”这句话大作文章呢？

事实上, 根据Duelfer Report, 伊拉克情报部门的确在Salman Pak开办训练营, 招募的志愿者来自苏丹、埃及甚至也门等国家(你尽可以相信这都是些“世俗化”的家伙)!

M14, Directorate of Special Operations M14, directed by Muhammad Khudayr Sabah Al Dulaymi, was responsible for training and conducting special operations missions. It trained Iraqis, Palestinians, Syrians, Yemeni, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Sudanese operatives in counterterrorism, explosives, marksmanship, and foreign operations at its facilities at Salman Pak. Additionally, M14 oversaw the “Challenge Project,” a highly secretive project regarding explosives. Sources to date have not been able to provide sufficient details regarding the “Challenge Project.”

大概有的人又要说了, 人家萨达姆只是在训练特种部队嘛("Iraqi special forces training camp"), 只是为了“反恐”嘛----那就请他们看看这个全球独一无二的“反恐”训练科目：

The “Tiger Group” was similar to Special Operations, except that it was primarily comprised of suicide bombers.

继续引用前述那部由USJFCOM于07年底完成的报告(原官方站点已失效, 请看Internet Archive上的永久存档, 支国朋友可看这里), 看看什么叫断章取义

Saddam's interest in, and support for, non-Iraqi non-state actors was spread across a wide variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. For years, Saddam maintained training camps for foreign "fighters" drawn from these diverse groups. In some cases, particularly for Palestinians, Saddam was also a strong financial supporter. Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al Qaeda (such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led at one time by bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri) or that generally shared al Qaeda's stated goals and objectives.

Some aspects of the indirect cooperation between Saddam's regional terror enterprise and al Qaeda's more global one are somewhat analogous to the Cali and Medellin drug cartels. Both drug cartels (actually loose collections of families and criminal gangs) were serious national security concerns to the United States. Both cartels competed for a share of the illegal drug market. However, neither cartel was reluctant to cooperate with the other when it came to the pursuit of a common objective-expanding and facilitating their illicit trade. The wellpublicized and violent rise of the Medellin cartel temporarily obscured and overshadowed the rise of, and threat posed by, the Cali cartel. Recognizing Iraq as a second, or parallel, "terror cartel" that was simultaneously threatened by and somewhat aligned with its rival helps to explain the evidence emerging from the detritus of Saddam's regime. Based on captured recordings and documents, this paper illustrates in part how Saddam Hussein ran his "cartel."

In the years between the two Gulf Wars, UN sanctions reduced Saddam's ability to shape regional and world events, steadily draining his military, economic, and military powers. The rise of Islamist fundamentalism in the region gave Saddam the opportunity to make terrorism, one of the few tools remaining in Saddam's "coercion" toolbox, not only cost effective but a formal instrument of state power.. Saddam nurtured this capability with an infrastructure supporting (1)his own particular brand of state terrorism against internal and external threats, (2)the state sponsorship of suicide operations, and (3) organizational relationships and "outreach programs" for terrorist groups. Evidence that was uncovered and analyzed attests to the existence of a terrorist capability and a willingness to use it until the day Saddam was forced to flee Baghdad by Coalition forces.

要是没空或者不耐烦读这么冗长的东西, 我只好贴一副图完事儿(也是出自临风先生看作至宝的那个“非世俗”的参院小组报告——不是少数派狡辩的部分)：

Conclusion 10: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq's support for terrorist groups other than al - Qa'ida were substantiated by intelligence information.
The intelligence community reported regularly on Iraq's safe harbor and financial support for Palestine Rejectionist groups, the Abu Nidal Organization, and others. The February 2002 NIE fully supported the claim that Iraq had, and would continue, to support terrorist groups.

如果你认定了只有“基地”分支才算恐怖组织,请看这一有关阿布萨耶夫武装的缴获文件(ISGP-2003-00014100)：

前述的库尔德区恐怖组织叫HAMAS(跟我们通常所说的哈玛斯不是一回事)。

In addition to establishing and maintaining ties to existing Islamist organizations, Saddam's intelligence services were always watchful for emerging movements. In December 1998, the IIS developed a new resource in the form of a small, radical Kurdish-based Islamic movement. In a series of memoranda, the IIS reported being impressed with the new terrorist organization's "readiness to target foreign organizations.. .Iranian border posts, and Kurdish parties ... However, based on the size of the movement (only sixty-two members at the time), the IIS decided it was better to establish individual contacts within the organization and to provide them "financial and moral support." The document goes on to note that "if their will [becomes] linked to their capabilities," then the IIS will establish an organizational relationship.

相关文件号:ISGQ-2005-00118681。

另一与此有关的缴获文件是:ISGQ-2005-00016212。该文件夹第10页(Page 10)指出——这个HAMAS是Ansar Al-Islam的前身之一。

提醒一下, IPP作者所引用的这些文件中, 有一个编号为ISGP-2003-00300189的文挡不可不看, 因它对破除神话最有直接效果——里面列举了受萨达姆支持的各路恐怖组织(包括很多“原教旨”团伙)。文档第14页提及萨达姆在索马里的动作。相关的还有该文档的第26页。

顺便说一句,临风先生为了证明布什有罪,宁可相信小道消息,真令人惊讶

2002年9月18日, 美国中央情报局向布希报告, 伊拉克并没有大规模杀伤性武器

这就让人摸不着头脑了。且不说2002年10月的National Intelligence Estimate明确说伊拉克拥有化学武器和生物武器, 今年那个民主党攻击布什的报告虽然竭力在鸡蛋里面挑骨头, 也讲不出这种话来。连德维尔潘在回应鲍威尔的时侯, 也承认

- Right now, our attention has to be focused as a priority on the biological and chemical domains. It is there that our presumptions about Iraq are the most significant: regarding the chemical domain, we have evidence of its capacity to produce VX and yperite; in the biological domain, the evidence suggests the possible possession of significant stocks of anthrax and botulism toxin, and possibly a production capability; - Today the absence of long-range delivery systems reduces the potential threat of these weapons. But we have disturbing signs of Iraq's continued determination to acquire ballistic missiles beyond the authorized 150-km range.

总之, 看看02年十月的NIE, 就可以发现在伊拉克藏有生物、化学武器的问题上, 任何部门都没有异议。在Aluminum Tube的问题上, CIA和绝大多数部门都认为那是用于核项目离心机的; 国务院引用能源部的分析, 不同意这一论点; 但是能源部跟其它部门都认为伊拉克的核武重建工作已经展开, 只有国务院不同意这一点——然而, 国务院绝不认为伊拉克的一切所为跟核武不沾边：

The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR) believes that Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities.

读读多数派报告的前九条结论(分别在文档的第16、29、38、39、50、51、58、59和72页),这不是“2002年918”,而是2008年民主党搞出来的东西。读完以后,想想CIA可不可能“在战前告诉布什伊拉克没有WMDs”。(有必要回忆一下1998年国务院的白皮书)

友情链接：普京同志有话说

[1]纠缠这个问题实在是太无聊了, 临风先生既然这么崇拜维基百科, 何不先看完这个CIA leak scandal timeline, 再来发表宏论? Robert Novak跟Armitage的谈话发生在7月8日, Libby同一天向Judith Miller谈及此事——结果Armitage就是无心之失(虽然他实际造成了Plame身分的“泄露”), 而Libby就一定是包藏祸心(虽然他约见Miller是按照政府的命令、向媒体公布2002年NIE的Key Judgments)。更不要说Armitage在6月中旬就告知了Woodward(见录音)。甚至在6月27日跟利比作访谈时、Woodward的提问纲要中就包括Joe Wilson's wife这一条, 然而Libby在如此有利的场合下竟没有顺势“泄密”。)

指控卡尔·罗夫就更是无理取闹了。因为诺瓦克在从Armitage那里得到消息后, 就是向罗夫求证的, 后者因此知道威尔逊太太的CIA身分已经被“泄露”了(而且是政府高官所为), 那么他在数日后跟Matt Cooper的谈话当然跟“报复威尔逊”是一点儿边都不沾了。(倘若他知道Plame是“Covert Agent”, 而又有意泄密, 那么既然如今从Novak那里得知事情已被别人办好, 并且Plame的身分也将被Novak公开, 为什么还要在7月11日再向记者泄密、拖自己下水呢？)

[2]举个很有代表性的例子：请看参院报告文档的102页, 在那里(有关核武器的问题), 少数派反对“布什掩盖了情报群体中存在的异议”这一结论, 他们指出当布什发表相关言论时、这一“异议”所在的分析报告尚未付印, 多数派的逻辑等于是要求布什施展读心术。(事实上, 民主党议员们的发言反而是在读过这一“包含异议”的报告之后。)

[3]与此类似的一个问题——有些对伊战背景毫无了解的网友, 他们常常嘲笑布什以“子虚乌有”的WMD作为侵伊理由。这些人多半不知道1441号决议是什么东西, 更不要说遥远的安理会687号决议了。极左分子们声称萨达姆只要接受联合国检查团入境、就已经算作遵守了安理会1441号决议;只要这次检查中没有发现WMD, 萨达姆就应被视作无罪。

事实上, 这种解读完全是一派胡言。萨达姆政权作为1991年吞并邻国的罪犯, 本应遭到审判和清算(正如当初的纽伦堡审判), 只是它比纳粹政权走运, 得到了宽大处理的机会。根据687号决议,它要销毁全部WMD、呈交流程记录、服从调查, 使国际社会能够确信它不再构成威胁, 才可以被免予追究。

因此, 当1441号决议给它“最后机会”、勒令它立即全面合作, 这是要求它主动交待它曾经拥有的WMD的下落——也就是说,（1）如果尚有藏匿的违禁武器, 当然应该向检查团坦白（2）如果坚称WMD已被全部销毁, 那就必须完整呈报销毁工作的细节, 说明相应的时间、地点、方法, 拿出相关流程的记录文件, 以及展示某些化学武器被销毁后所专有的遗迹, 等等("Such supporting evidence, in the form of documentation, testimony by individuals who took part, or physical evidence, for example, destroyed warheads, is required to give confidence that Iraq’s Declaration is indeed accurate, full and complete.")——如果这一切信息能够让检查团感到满意、萨达姆政权才算是没有违反1441号决议, 并免于安理会多次警告的“严重后果”。那么布里克斯先生的报告是怎么说的？一个脑子正常的人会不会相信1441号决议没有被违反？

再总结一下1441号决议的要点：

[1] 服从687号决议是伊拉克享有和平的前提

[2] 指出伊拉克已经屡次实质性违反(material breach) 其义务, 并且已经多次受到警告(即这种行为将使其面临“严重后果”)

[3] 目前的决议给予它“最后机会”, 命令其“立即、全面、无条件合作”

[4] 接受检查期间若有任何欺瞒或阻挠行为, 将被视为对687号决议条款进一步的“material breach” 。

Holding Iraq in “material breach” of its obligations under previous resolutions, the Security Council this morning decided to afford it a “final opportunity to comply” with its disarmament obligations, while setting up an enhanced inspection regime for full and verified completion of the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) 。。。 The Council demanded that Iraq confirm, within seven days, its intention to comply fully with the resolution. It further decided that, within 30 days, Iraq, in order to begin to comply with its obligations, should provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA and the Council a complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, including chemical, biological and nuclear programmes it claims are for purposes not related to weapons production or material. Any false statement or omission in the declaration will be considered a further material breach of Iraq's obligations, and will be reported to the Council for assessment.

因此, 只要萨达姆没有全面合作——例如漏交相关文件、禁止伊拉克的相关科学家与调查人员单独会谈, 等等(更不要说隐瞒生化实验室的存在,或者掩盖运载工具的相关信息), 就构成了对停火协议的实质性违反(不要装作没看见这句“all aspects ...including ...programmes it claims are for purposes not related to weapons”)----就失去了“最后机会”, 就必须面临被一再警告的“严重后果”----何为“严重后果”不该有什么异议吧。(顺便提一下：在1998年分别有安理会1154号决议和1205号决议, 前者宣称“any violation would have severest consequences for Iraq”, 后者则谴责伊方的行为构成“a flagrant violation of resolution 687”)

关于这一切, 鲍威尔同志的表述简练精当(该同志后来声称自己被布什骗了。但他所指的只是关于情报的部分, 至于1441号决议的含义, 联合国检查团的报告, 相信Powell不会把这些东西也赖到布什的头上)。

Last November 8, this Council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years. Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime this Council has repeatedly convicted over the years. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No Council member present and voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply. And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA. We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do their job. This Council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm, and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives. I asked for this session today for two purposes. First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this Council on January 27, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it." And as Dr. ElBaradei reported, Iraq's declaration of December 7 "did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998."

愤青们或许想不到, 以下的发言出自当时的法国代表之口

But Iraq must cooperate actively. The country must comply immediately with the demands of Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei, in particular by: - permitting meetings with Iraqi scientists without witnesses; - agreeing to the use of U2 observer flights; - adopting legislation to prohibit the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction; - handing over to the inspectors immediately all relevant documents on unresolved disarmament questions, in particular in the biological and chemical domains; those handed over on January 20 do not constitute a step in the right direction. The 3000 pages of documents discovered at the home of a researcher show that Baghdad must do more. Absent documents, Iraq must be able to present credible testimony.

[4]该研究小组在06年发表了另一份报告, 探讨萨达姆同志的领导艺术, 文档的第72 页也提及恐怖活动的训练和招募工作。