慕容青草的博客
哲学园地
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我在上中学哲学课时用的课本上说哲学是关于世界观和方法论的学问，这其实是西方近代哲学史上很多哲学家的共识，至今我也认为这种说法是成立的，只不过世界观的涵义不一定就是课本上所说的意思。另外也可以这样来说，所谓方法论就是强调要用科学的方法（这里的科学并不特指自然科学或实证主义的科学意义）来做事，因此哲学可以分为关于世界观的学问以及所谓的科学性的哲学这两部分。当然在最广义的世界观的前提下，所谓方法论本身就应该是世界观的一部分或直接推论，所以哲学根本上来说就是关于世界观的学问。但是，存在主义大师海德格尔显然不喜欢上述任何一种说法，他花了很大的篇幅[1]论证了哲学不应该是关于世界观的学问，而应该是单单地关于存在（being）的学问，或者说哲学就是本体论。
海德格尔对哲学的这一定义（及相关论述）有几个妙处。首先，为了要改变“哲学是关于世界观的学问”这个至少是自康德以来（海德格尔认为世界观这个概念是康德提出的，其实这样的说法是存在问题的）在人们心目中已经根深蒂固的观念，并用哲学是关于存在的学问来取而代之，他不但需要重新界定哲学的对象，而且要把他新界定的哲学对象与人们心目中原有的哲学对象分离开。具体地说，他所采取的措施是：1）先论证世界观包括的是杂七杂八的对象，而哲学根本不应该涉及杂七杂八的具体对象；2）指出存在一个不是杂七杂八的纯物种，那就是他的（或者说黑格尔的）那个纯存在；3）但是，考虑到哲学是世界观这一观念在人们心目中的根基，所以要想改变它的定义并不能随意的指鹿为马，还要对原有的观念进一步否认。否则的话，考虑到世界观一词常被用来表示对甚至包括超自然概念在内的一切存在的认识，如果他只是武断地告诉大家哲学不应该涉及除了他的那个抽象的存在以外的内容的而不对世界观进行重新定义的话，一旦人们确定了世界观本身就包含了对于他所说的存在的认识，人家很容易会问他“凭什么要听你的把哲学窄化了？”所以他采取的另一个措施便是把世界观的涵义窄化，使得它不包括他所说的那个抽象存在。在海德格尔那里，世界观是一个有着具体的界定的，甚至是有确定的结构的概念，而不是“包含了人们对客观的一切认识”这样一个最广义的概念，因而对于抽象存在的认识就可以不在世界观之内。
一般地，当我们想把两个有着交集的概念分离开来，最基本的做法就是把两者所涵盖的范围都窄化，从而使得两个缩小了集合之间不再存在交集。而海德格尔做的正是这样一件事。上面的第1）步中他大大地窄化了自古希腊以来的传统中的哲学概念，而第3）步中窄化了世界观的涵义，从而首先使得哲学与世界观脱离了关系，然后再通过上面的第2）步确立了哲学就是关于他的（或者说黑格尔的）那个抽象存在的定义。但是，一个不论海德格尔如何重新定义世界观，一个完全脱离了世界观的哲学听起来就有违人们的常识。为此，海德格尔作了一个很妙的补救：虽然对于抽象存在的认识不在世界观的涵盖之内，而且哲学就是研究这抽象存在的学问，但是哲学本身却是世界观的重要组成部分。也就是说世界观不包含哲学研究的对象却包含了哲学得出的结论，这就好比是一个包含整鸡却不包含鸡毛的集合------这就是海德格尔的论证逻辑，而且大家好象也都没有觉得这个逻辑有什么不对劲的。德格尔为了做到上述几点而进行的论述相当长，本文后面有选择地摘抄一些典型的相关的英译文选段。反正经过了大段大段的论述和一系列的窄化措施之后，海德格尔对哲学做出了让很多人认同的重新定义。我这里不打算对以科学的名义来随便改变常用词汇的涵义这样的做法进行深究，之所以把它提出来是因为有必要指出海德格尔得以宣称哲学就是本体论的一个前提是要先窄化哲学和世界观的涵义，并把关于他的那个抽象存在的认识排斥在世界观之外。第二个妙处是把亚里士多德[2]所说的第一哲学是“关于存在”的学问的说法用来支持他的“哲学就是关于存在的学问”的说法。这里的关键还不在于把亚里士多德的第一哲学与哲学这两个表面上看起来并不一样的概念等同起来，因为我们知道亚里士多德的第一哲学与后来的笛卡尔和黑格尔的第一哲学的意思并不完全一样，它是与物理学和数学并列在一起作为哲学议题的，因此把它解释为一般的哲学意义也不为过。但是，这里的关键是亚里士多德所说的存在的涵义与海德格尔这里所说的存在的涵义并不完全等价。虽然亚里士多德的“关于存在的学问”中的存在也不是具体的存在而是一般的抽象存在（being
qua being），但是海德格尔所说的存在是比亚里士多德所说的抽象存在更抽象的黑格尔[3]的纯存在（pure
being）。也正是因为这一改变，海德格尔才能郑重其事地宣称哲学就是本体论（亚里士多德显然不会同意这一点。实际上，从某种意义上来说黑格尔的纯存在由于意义上的单纯反而不具备亚里士多德的抽象存在所具有的一般性了。当然这又牵涉到了如何看待存在的角度的问题了）。第三个妙处也是最关键的妙处就是干脆把原本属于认识的问题巧妙地转化为关于基本存在的问题。他从这样两个方面来做到这一点的：
1）他通过论述哲学是关于存在的学问来把哲学与源自古希腊的本体论（ontology）一汇等同起来。虽然古希腊的本体论是关于宇宙的基本存在的学问的意思，而海德格尔在论述“哲学是关于存在的学问”过程中所针对的都是他的那个抽象的一般（纯）存在，是一个是从认识的角度推出的抽象概念，但是一旦把这两者连在一起，海德格尔就已经将他所谓的关于（纯）存在的学问塑造成了宇宙的基本存在（这种存在原本是一种宇宙构成的意义）层次上的问题了（因而也就把一般的读者带入了云山雾罩之中了），与此同时他在“要明确哲学的意义”的名义下，将本体论的含义也在人们不知不觉中进行了改写。
2）更妙的是他巧妙地直接了当地把人们的认识纳入到本体存在之中而让不知所以然的读者们欣然地就接受了他这个原本属于是人们的认识上的议题变成了听上去是非常客观的本体存在的议题。尽管他在这一点上的相关论述比较繁复，但是可以简单地归纳为下面这样一个推导逻辑：
哲学是关于存在（being）的学问（这是他前面已经论述了的），而一切存在（being）之所以有意义是因为一个叫做“大幸（Dasien）”的特殊存在（being），只有有了这样一个存在（a
being），一切存在才得以存在，所以“大幸”这一具体的存在就是关于抽象存在的本体论（也就是哲学）的基础。而相应地，要想了解本体论（即哲学）的科学性，首先要向人们表明它是以（大幸这个）具体存在为基础的并要指出这一基础本身的特点（Consequently, in clarifying the scientific character of ontology, the first task is the demonstration of its ontical foundation and the characterisation of this foundation itself.）。
being），一切存在才得以存在，所以“大幸”这一具体的存在就是关于抽象存在的本体论（也就是哲学）的基础。而相应地，要想了解本体论（即哲学）的科学性，首先要向人们表明它是以（大幸这个）具体存在为基础的并要指出这一基础本身的特点（Consequently, in clarifying the scientific character of ontology, the first task is the demonstration of its ontical foundation and the characterisation of this foundation itself.）。
而这里所谓的大幸就是我们人类的自我意识和对世界的认识。。。。。。
你看，就这样海德格尔就堂而皇之地把关于人们的认识纳入到了（宇宙间）一切存在的基本的范畴之中，并由此将哲学定义为一个关于抽象存在而不是关于（对于一切存在的）认识的学问。（当然，那种抽象的存在也实在是贫瘠到了没有多少油水可以挤的地步，所以他海德格尔很快也就只有宣布哲学的死亡了，这是另话。）
。。。。。。
看了海德格尔这种对于语言文字的娴熟玩弄之后我不禁只能用一个字来表达自己的感慨：妙！
哲学作为一门学问一旦沦入文字游戏那是人类文明的不幸。但实在不幸的是，哲学与文字诡辩之间的界限是很模糊，所以历史上和现实中从布衣到专家达人都常把哲学的论述变成文字游戏，更不幸的是这种游戏的主导者常常是象海德格尔这样的大师。
海德格尔对于西方近代哲学的一大影响恐怕就是把自古以来可能就存在于西方哲学界的皇帝的新衣闹剧推向了一个前所未有的高潮，值得注意的是近几年来这个高高的潮涌才传到中国大陆，也在那里兴起了一股海德格尔热。这股热潮的基本特点就是人人都说海德格尔厉害，而他厉害的前提是人人都读不懂海德格尔的哲学。妙啊！
其实，这种读不懂而夸之的现象本身并不是一个很可怕的事。客观地说，读不懂而夸之是人们自古以来对于高深学问的普遍做法。虽然这种做法听起来有些可笑，但实际上也很合理。这是因为真正高深的好学问并不容易懂，而那些学问之所以为高的一个特点是它们的切入点和方向都相当精准所以他们所涵盖的道理往往会如一杯满水一样地四溢而使得即便不很懂的人也受益。这种现象发生在老子身上过，在亚里士多德身上过，在黑格尔和其他一些大哲学家身上过（有机会的话可能还会就这个议题另写一篇），当然，也发生在了海德格尔身上。
但是，并非所有的被不懂而夸之的学问都具有同等的价值，它们各自被夸的原因本身还可能会有很大的不同。与老子，亚里士多德，及黑格尔相比，海德格尔的特点是他的学问中真正有价值的并不是他个人的首创。比如，他的存在的概念来自黑格尔，他的时间的概念（海德格尔的成名作就是他的“存在与时间”一书）其实还是来自黑格尔，因为黑格尔的第一哲学的出发点由三点构成：无（nothing），存在（being），和变化（becoming），而变化本身就含有了时间的概念；如果还想再往前推，人们还可以推到古希腊的赫拉克利特的那句“人不能两次走进同一条河流”的名言，说的还是变化。没有时间就没有变化，而没有变化人们也无法体会到时间。至于说海德格尔的“大幸（Dasien）”的概念与包括黑格尔以及他自己的老师胡塞尔还有海德格尔同时代的其他存在主义哲学家们关于人的意识和自我意识的独特性概念一样都是源自笛卡尔的“我思故我在”。
所以，海德格尔作品之高深恐怕主要是他所继承的前人的理论之高深，这一点显然与老子，亚里士多德，黑格尔等人的高深不同。当然，海德格尔可能对前人的理论学得比较好，而且作了大量的论述。但是如果后人普遍认为海德格尔的理论很难懂，那可以说在很大程度上已经把他辛辛苦苦地作了大量的论述的功劳抹掉了。当然，或许在他的论述过程中对于自古以来就有的哲学的还原，建构，以及解构的方法有所发展（还有人说他是第一个提出解构的人因而是后现代解构主义的创始人），但是，至少海德格尔不是象老子，亚里士多德，黑格尔那样非常突出地提出了自己的很难在同时代里找出相同点的观点，学说和方法来。但是另一方面，一部分由于海德格尔自身在思维或写作文风上的问题（如本文所挑出的文字游戏现象），一部分也由于人类的皇帝新衣情结却使得海德格尔关于哲学的一些不正确的看法为世界哲学的发展带来了无法忽视的负面影响。因此，今天让世界的哲学有所突破的关键不是一波接一波地上演读不懂海德格尔仍推崇他的理论的皇帝新衣闹剧，而恰恰是要对他所造成的一些负面的影响有较清楚的认识。。。。。。
下面是本文讨论中所针对的海德格尔的论述的英译文选段：
A world-view is not a matter of theoretical knowledge, either
in respect of its origin or in relation to its use. It is not simply retained
in memory like a parcel of cognitive property. Rather, it is a matter of a
coherent conviction which determines the current affairs of life more or less
expressly and directly. A world-view is related in its meaning to the
particular contemporary Dasein at any
given time. In this relationship to the Dasein the
world-view is a guide to it and a source of strength under pressure. Whether
the world-view is determined by superstitions and prejudices or is based purely
on scientific knowledge and experience or even, as is usually the case, is a
mixture of superstition and knowledge, prejudice and sober reason it all comes
to the same thing; nothing essential is changed.
in respect of its origin or in relation to its use. It is not simply retained
in memory like a parcel of cognitive property. Rather, it is a matter of a
coherent conviction which determines the current affairs of life more or less
expressly and directly. A world-view is related in its meaning to the
particular contemporary Dasein at any
given time. In this relationship to the Dasein the
world-view is a guide to it and a source of strength under pressure. Whether
the world-view is determined by superstitions and prejudices or is based purely
on scientific knowledge and experience or even, as is usually the case, is a
mixture of superstition and knowledge, prejudice and sober reason it all comes
to the same thing; nothing essential is changed.
。。。。。。
A world-view, as we saw, springs in every case from a
factical Dasein in accordance with its
factical possibilities, and it is what it is always for this particular Dasein. This in no way asserts a
relativism of world-views. What a world-view fashioned in this way says can be
formulated in propositions and rules which are related in their meaning to a
specific really existing world, to the particular factically existing Dasein. Every world-view and
life-view posits; that is to say, it is related being-ly to some being or
beings. It posits a being, something that is; it is positive. A world-view
belongs to each Dasein and, like this Dasein, it is always in fact
determined historically. To the world-view there belongs this multiple
positivity that it is always rooted in a Dasein which is
in such and such a way; that as such it relates to the existing world and
points to the factically existent Dasein. It is
just because this positivity - that is, the relatedness to beings, to world
that is, Dasein that is - belongs to the
essence of the world-view, and thus in general to the formation of the
world-view, that the formation of a world-view cannot be the task of
philosophy. To say this is not to exclude but to include the idea that
philosophy itself is a distinctive primal form of world-view. Philosophy can
and perhaps must show, among many other things, that something like a
world-view belongs to the essential nature of the Dasein.
Philosophy can and must define what in general constitutes the structure of a
world-view. But it can never develop and posit some specific world-view qua
just this or that particular one. Philosophy is not essentially the formation
of a world-view; but perhaps just on this account it has an elementary and
fundamental relation to all world-view formation, even to that which is not
theoretical but factually historical.
factical Dasein in accordance with its
factical possibilities, and it is what it is always for this particular Dasein. This in no way asserts a
relativism of world-views. What a world-view fashioned in this way says can be
formulated in propositions and rules which are related in their meaning to a
specific really existing world, to the particular factically existing Dasein. Every world-view and
life-view posits; that is to say, it is related being-ly to some being or
beings. It posits a being, something that is; it is positive. A world-view
belongs to each Dasein and, like this Dasein, it is always in fact
determined historically. To the world-view there belongs this multiple
positivity that it is always rooted in a Dasein which is
in such and such a way; that as such it relates to the existing world and
points to the factically existent Dasein. It is
just because this positivity - that is, the relatedness to beings, to world
that is, Dasein that is - belongs to the
essence of the world-view, and thus in general to the formation of the
world-view, that the formation of a world-view cannot be the task of
philosophy. To say this is not to exclude but to include the idea that
philosophy itself is a distinctive primal form of world-view. Philosophy can
and perhaps must show, among many other things, that something like a
world-view belongs to the essential nature of the Dasein.
Philosophy can and must define what in general constitutes the structure of a
world-view. But it can never develop and posit some specific world-view qua
just this or that particular one. Philosophy is not essentially the formation
of a world-view; but perhaps just on this account it has an elementary and
fundamental relation to all world-view formation, even to that which is not
theoretical but factually historical.
。。。。。。
The thesis that world-view formation does not belong to the
task of philosophy is valid, of course, only on the presupposition that
philosophy does not relate in a positive manner to some being qua this or that
particular being, that it does not posit a being. Can this presupposition that
philosophy does not relate positively to beings, as the sciences do, be
justified? What then is philosophy supposed to concern itself with if not with
beings, with that which is, as well as with the whole of what is? What is not,
is surely the nothing. Should philosophy, then, as absolute science, have the
nothing as its theme? What can there be apart from nature, history, God, space,
number? We say of each of these, even though in a different sense, that it is.
We call it a being. In relating to it, whether theoretically or practically, we
are comporting ourselves toward a being. Beyond all these beings there is
nothing. Perhaps there is no other being beyond what has been enumerated, but
perhaps, as in the German idiom for "there is,"es gibt [literally, it gives],
still something else is given, something else which indeed is not but which
nevertheless, in a sense yet to be determined, is given. Even more. In the end
something is given which must be given if we are to be able to make beings
accessible to us as beings and comport ourselves toward them, something which,
to be sure, is not but which must be given if we are to experience and understand
any beings at all. We are able to grasp beings as such, as beings, only if we
understand something like being. If we did not understand, even though at first
roughly and without conceptual comprehension, what actuality signifies, then
the actual would remain hidden from us. If we did not understand what reality
means, then the real would remain inaccessible. If we did not understand what
life and vitality signify, then we would not be able to comport ourselves
toward living beings. If we did not understand what existence and
existentiality signify, then we ourselves would not be able to exist as Dasein.
task of philosophy is valid, of course, only on the presupposition that
philosophy does not relate in a positive manner to some being qua this or that
particular being, that it does not posit a being. Can this presupposition that
philosophy does not relate positively to beings, as the sciences do, be
justified? What then is philosophy supposed to concern itself with if not with
beings, with that which is, as well as with the whole of what is? What is not,
is surely the nothing. Should philosophy, then, as absolute science, have the
nothing as its theme? What can there be apart from nature, history, God, space,
number? We say of each of these, even though in a different sense, that it is.
We call it a being. In relating to it, whether theoretically or practically, we
are comporting ourselves toward a being. Beyond all these beings there is
nothing. Perhaps there is no other being beyond what has been enumerated, but
perhaps, as in the German idiom for "there is,"es gibt [literally, it gives],
still something else is given, something else which indeed is not but which
nevertheless, in a sense yet to be determined, is given. Even more. In the end
something is given which must be given if we are to be able to make beings
accessible to us as beings and comport ourselves toward them, something which,
to be sure, is not but which must be given if we are to experience and understand
any beings at all. We are able to grasp beings as such, as beings, only if we
understand something like being. If we did not understand, even though at first
roughly and without conceptual comprehension, what actuality signifies, then
the actual would remain hidden from us. If we did not understand what reality
means, then the real would remain inaccessible. If we did not understand what
life and vitality signify, then we would not be able to comport ourselves
toward living beings. If we did not understand what existence and
existentiality signify, then we ourselves would not be able to exist as Dasein.
。。。。。。
[1]
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology，by Heidegger. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/heidegge.htm.
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology，by Heidegger. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/heidegge.htm.
[3] The
Science of Logic, by Hegel. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlconten.htm
Science of Logic, by Hegel. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlconten.htm
yfz9465:
谢谢你的来访评论。。。你说我是误读，不知你的那个“不误读”是哪里来的，我的这个你说的“误读”是这里来的：“We assert now that being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy. This is not our own invention; it is a way of putting the theme which comes to life at the beginning of philosophy in antiquity, and it assumes its most grandiose form in Hegel's logic. ”---引自本博文第一篇参考文献（海德格尔的原文英译版）。。。。如果你觉得海德格尔这句话还不够明确的话，到那篇参考文献里，还能找出很多相同的论断来。。。。。。。所以，如果你的“不误读”也是来自海德格尔的原话的话，不妨拿来比较一下，也可以子（海德格尔）之矛攻子之盾。。。。。。。谢谢
实际上，康德，黑格尔（其它的先贤）都有与海德格尔相同的意思，但他们倾向自身特有的表述。这是因为每个人的意识习性不同，所以选择的参照坐标也不同。对本体，这是言语道断之处；却是精神开启之途。