黑白碎片 2025年8月22日
2025.5 澳大利亚知名的国防与战略专家休.怀特在这一段访谈中谈到以下几个方面:
1,即使中国人口下降经济放缓,也不会改变全球权力格局的根本转变。
2,中美如果在东亚和西太发生军事对抗,中国有四大优势:制造业、地理位置、作战专注度、信心与决心。
3,虽然同为现实主义者,其观点和米尔斯海默有根本不同。
4,台湾问题是个非常敏感且危险的领域,不小心处理就会酿成大祸。完整视频链接:
The Graph That Explains Most of Geopolitic...
The Graph That Explains Most of Geopolitics Today | Professor Hugh White
80,000 Hours 2025年6月12日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0WOLSBzc7k&t=7458s
这张图表揭示了当今地缘政治的大部分内容 | 休·怀特教授
80,000 小时 2025年6月12日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0WOLSBzc7k&t=7458s
几十年来,美国的盟友们一直在美国强大军事力量的保护下安然无恙。唐纳德·特朗普——他威胁要退出北约、占领格陵兰岛并放弃台湾——似乎一心要打破这种局面。
但休·怀特——世界领先的战略思想家之一、澳大利亚国立大学荣休教授、《艰难的新世界:我们的后美国未来》一书的作者——认为,特朗普并没有摧毁美国的霸权。他只是在表明,美国的霸权已经消亡了。
“特朗普几乎毫不犹豫地接受其他大国与他平起平坐,”休解释道。这恰好与外交政策建制派极力忽视的一个战略现实完美契合:全球力量的根本性转变使得维持美国主导的霸权的成本高得令人望而却步。
即使在拜登执政期间,当俄罗斯入侵乌克兰时,美国也派遣了武器,但明确排除了直接介入的可能性。乌克兰对俄罗斯的重要性远超美国,这种“决心的不对称”使得普京的核威胁可信,而美国的反威胁则根本不可信。休悲观地预测:“欧洲人最终会向俄罗斯做出任何他们无法说服俄罗斯人愿意打一场核战争来阻止他们的事情。”
太平洋地区的情况也大体如此。尽管奥巴马提出了“重返亚洲”的战略,拜登也发表了关于“赢得21世纪竞争”的强硬言论,但美国在太平洋的实际军事能力却几乎没有变化,而中国的经济实力却飙升——以购买力衡量,中国的经济规模现已超过美国。遏制中国和保卫台湾需要美国将GDP的8%用于国防(而目前这一比例为3.5%),并说服北京接受洛杉矶被“蒸发”。与冷战时期不同,任何一位总统——无论是特朗普还是其他总统——都无法向选民证明这一点。
那么接下来会发生什么?休的预测是严峻的:
• 台湾处境艰难。
• 韩国、日本以及欧盟或波兰中的一个国家将不得不发展核武器来保卫自己。
• 特朗普可能会真的吞并巴拿马和格陵兰岛——但可能不会吞并加拿大。
• 澳大利亚可以抵御中国的攻击,但需要一支完全不同的军队来做到这一点。
我们新的“多极化”未来,被美国、中国、俄罗斯、印度和欧洲的势力范围瓜分,是一个比美国统治的黄金时代“更加黑暗的世界”。但休的信息直截了当:无论好坏,美国35年的霸权时代已经结束。现在的挑战是如何和平地管理这一过渡。
在今天的对话中,休和罗布探讨了为什么即使人工智能占据主导地位也可能无法恢复美国的主导地位(剧透:中国仍然拥有核武器),为什么日本可以自卫而台湾却不能,以及为什么新总统无法扭转局势。
了解更多信息:https://80k.info/hw
录制于2025年5月30日。
告诉我们您的想法!https://forms.gle/AM91VzL4BDroEe6AA
章节:
• 冷开场 (00:00:00)
• 休·怀特是谁? (00:00:43)
• 美国霸权已不复存在,并且多年来一直在消退 (00:01:25)
• 单极主导地位是一种反常现象 (00:03:26)
• 为什么美国在冷战后仍坚持参与其中? (00:13:08)
• 美国认为自己正在接受多极化的全球秩序吗?(00:23:25)
• 特朗普如何显著地提前了不可避免的结果 (00:36:41)
• 特朗普和卢比奥是否明确支持这种多极化结果?(00:43:21)
• 特朗普关于美国被剥削的说法只说对了一半 (00:45:42)
• 下一任总统的想法是否不同并不重要 (00:50:14)
• 中国人口正在减少,但这并没有太大变化 (00:56:17)
• 休为何不同意米尔斯海默等其他现实主义者的观点 (01:06:07)
• 美国能否被说服将国防开支增加一倍以保持主导地位? (01:10:52)
• 多极世界固然不好,但总比核战争要好 (01:16:22)
• 美国会入侵巴拿马、格陵兰岛还是加拿大?!(01:21:46)
• 美国会加大压力,开始剥削邻国吗?(01:28:54)
• 在这个新世界中,其他人应该如何保护自己? (01:32:01)
• 欧洲实力足以对抗俄罗斯,但缺乏核威慑力 (01:39:41)
• 欧盟可能会建造欧洲核武器 (01:44:03)
• 取消部分美国战斗机订单 (01:48:34)
• 即使拥有人工智能芯片,台湾也无力自拔 (01:53:40)
• 韩国必须发展核武 (02:04:12)
• 日本将发展核武,但无法成为地区领导者 (02:08:08)
• 澳大利亚具备防御能力,但需要一支完全不同的军队 (02:11:44)
• 通用人工智能 (AGI) 或许能够克服现有的核威慑力,也或许无法克服 (02:17:19)
• 现实主义的正确性如何? (02:34:24)
• 一个国家是否曾因纯粹的道德原因发动战争? (02:40:17)
• 休给美国人的寄语 (02:44:45)
• 附录:美国为何暂时停止孤立主义 (02:47:12)
视频剪辑:西蒙·蒙苏尔
音频工程
Zhè zhāng túbiǎo jiē shì liǎo dàng jīn dìyuán z
The Graph That Explains Most of Geopolitics Today | Professor Hugh White
80,000 Hours 2025年6月12日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0WOLSBzc7k&t=7458s
For decades, US allies have slept soundly under the protection of America’s overwhelming military might. Donald Trump — with his threats to ditch NATO, seize Greenland, and abandon Taiwan — seems hell-bent on shattering that arrangement.
But according to Hugh White — one of the world's leading strategic thinkers, emeritus professor at the ANU, and author of Hard New World: Our Post American Future — Trump isn't destroying American hegemony. He's simply revealing that it's already gone.
“Trump has very little trouble accepting other great powers as co-equals,” Hugh explains. And that happens to align perfectly with a strategic reality the foreign policy establishment desperately wants to ignore: fundamental shifts in global power have made the costs of maintaining a US-led hegemony prohibitively high.
Even under Biden, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the US sent weapons but explicitly ruled out direct involvement. Ukraine matters far more to Russia than America, and this “asymmetry of resolve” makes Putin’s nuclear threats credible where America’s counterthreats simply aren’t. Hugh’s gloomy prediction: “Europeans will end up conceding to Russia whatever they can’t convince the Russians they’re willing to fight a nuclear war to deny them.”
The Pacific tells the same story. Despite Obama’s “pivot to Asia” and Biden’s tough talk about “winning the competition for the 21st century,” actual US military capabilities there have barely budged while China’s have soared, along with its economy — which is now bigger than the US’s, as measured in purchasing power. Containing China and defending Taiwan would require America to spend 8% of GDP on defence (versus 3.5% today) — and convince Beijing it’s willing to accept Los Angeles being vaporised. Unlike during the Cold War, no president — Trump or otherwise — can make that case to voters.
So what’s next? Hugh’s prognoses are stark:
• Taiwan is in an impossible situation.
• South Korea, Japan, and one of the EU or Poland will have to go nuclear to defend themselves.
• Trump might actually follow through and annex Panama and Greenland — but probably not Canada.
• Australia can defend itself from China but needs an entirely different military to do it.
Our new “multipolar” future, split between American, Chinese, Russian, Indian, and European spheres of influence, is a “darker world” than the golden age of US dominance. But Hugh’s message is blunt: for better or worse, 35 years of American hegemony are over. The challenge now is managing the transition peacefully.
In today’s conversation, Hugh and Rob explore why even AI supremacy might not restore US dominance (spoiler: China still has nukes), why Japan can defend itself but Taiwan can’t, and why a new president won’t be able to reverse the big picture.
Learn more: https://80k.info/hw
Recorded May 30, 2025.
Tell us what you thought! https://forms.gle/AM91VzL4BDroEe6AA
Chapters:
• Cold open (00:00:00)
• Who's Hugh White? (00:00:43)
• US hegemony is already gone and has been fading for years (00:01:25)
• Unipolar dominance is the aberration (00:03:26)
• Why did the US bother to stay involved after the Cold War? (00:13:08)
• Does the US think it's accepting a multipolar global order? (00:23:25)
• How Trump has significantly brought forward the inevitable (00:36:41)
• Are Trump and Rubio explicitly in favour of this multipolar outcome? (00:43:21)
• Trump is half-right that the US was being ripped off (00:45:42)
• It doesn't matter if the next president feels differently (00:50:14)
• China's population is shrinking, but that doesn't change much (00:56:17)
• Why Hugh disagrees with other realists like Mearsheimer (01:06:07)
• Could the US be persuaded to spend 2x on defence to stay dominant? (01:10:52)
• A multipolar world is bad, but better than the alternative: nuclear war (01:16:22)
• Will the US invade Panama? Greenland? Canada?! (01:21:46)
• Will the US turn the screws and start exploiting nearby countries? (01:28:54)
• What should everyone else do to protect themselves in this new world? (01:32:01)
• Europe is strong enough to take on Russia, except it lacks nuclear deterrence (01:39:41)
• The EU will probably build European nuclear weapons (01:44:03)
• Cancel some orders of US fighter planes (01:48:34)
• Taiwan is screwed, even with its AI chips (01:53:40)
• South Korea has to go nuclear (02:04:12)
• Japan will go nuclear, but can't be a regional leader (02:08:08)
• Australia is defensible but needs a totally different military (02:11:44)
• AGI may or may not overcome existing nuclear deterrence (02:17:19)
• How right is realism? (02:34:24)
• Has a country ever gone to war over pure morality? (02:40:17)
• Hugh's message for Americans (02:44:45)
• Addendum: Why America temporarily stopped being isolationist (02:47:12)
Video editing: Simon Monsour
Audio engineering: Ben Cordell, Milo McGuire, Simon Monsour, and Dominic Armstrong
Music: Ben Cordell
Transcriptions and web: Katy Moore