John Mearsheimer 将乌克兰危机归咎于美国

为什么约翰·米尔斯海默将乌克兰危机归咎于美国

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine

多年来，这位政治学家一直声称普京对乌克兰的侵略是西方干预造成的。 最近发生的事情改变了他的想法吗？

作者：艾萨克·乔蒂纳 (Isaac Chotiner)，《纽约客》特约撰稿人 2022 年 3 月 1 日

“他不会征服整个乌克兰”米尔斯海默谈到普京时说道。"试图这样做将是一个巨大的错误。"

政治学家约翰·米尔斯海默是冷战结束以来美国外交政策最著名的批评者之一。 米尔斯海默最著名的作品可能是他与斯蒂芬·沃尔特合着的《以色列游说集团和美国外交政策》，他是大国政治的支持者，这是一个现实主义国际关系学派，它认为，出于自利的目的，要保护以色列的利益。为了国家安全，各国将针对对手的预期采取先发制人的行动。多年来，米尔斯海默一直认为，美国推动北约东扩并与乌克兰建立友好关系，增加了核武国家之间发生战争的可能性，并为弗拉基米尔·普京对乌克兰的侵略立场奠定了基础。事实上，2014年俄罗斯吞并克里米亚后，米尔斯海默写道，"美国及其欧洲盟友对这场危机负有大部分责任。”

目前对乌克兰的入侵重新引发了有关美俄关系的一些长期争论。 尽管普京的许多批评者认为，无论西方是否参与，他都会在前苏联共和国奉行侵略性外交政策，但米尔斯海默坚持自己的立场，认为美国对挑衅他有过错。我最近通过电话与米尔斯海默进行了交谈。 在我们的谈话中，我们讨论了当前的战争是否可以避免，将俄罗斯视为帝国强国是否有意义，以及普京对乌克兰的最终计划。谈话内容经过了长度和清晰度的编辑。

看看现在俄罗斯和乌克兰的局势，你认为世界现在怎么样了？

我认为这起事件的所有麻烦真正开始于2008年4月在布加勒斯特举行的北约峰会，随后北约发表声明称乌克兰和格鲁吉亚将成为北约的一部分。俄罗斯人当时明确表示，他们认为这是一种生存威胁，并划清了界限。然而，随着时间的推移，我们已经将乌克兰纳入西方，使乌克兰成为俄罗斯边境上的西方堡垒。当然，这不仅仅包括北约的扩张。北约扩张是该战略的核心，但它包括欧盟。扩张也是如此，其中包括将乌克兰转变为亲美的自由民主国家，从俄罗斯的角度来看，这是一个生存威胁。

你说这是为了“把乌克兰变成一个亲美的自由民主国家”。我对美国将地方"转变”为自由民主国家并没有太多的信任或信心。如果乌克兰、乌克兰人民想要生活在亲美的自由民主国家怎么办？

如果乌克兰成为亲美的自由民主国家、北约成员和欧盟成员，俄罗斯人将认为这是绝对不可接受的。 如果没有北约扩张和欧盟 扩张，而乌克兰刚刚成为一个自由民主国家，并且与美国和西方国家更友好，它可能会逃脱惩罚。 您想了解这里有一个三管齐下的策略在发挥作用：欧盟、扩张、北约扩张以及将乌克兰转变为亲美的自由民主国家。

你一直在说“把乌克兰变成一个自由民主国家”，这似乎是乌克兰人需要决定的问题。 北约可以决定接纳谁，但我们在2014年看到，许多乌克兰人似乎希望被视为欧洲的一部分。告诉他们他们不能成为自由民主国家，这似乎几乎是某种帝国主义。

这不是帝国主义，而是帝国主义。 这就是大国政治。 当你是像乌克兰这样的国家，并且住在像俄罗斯这样的大国的隔壁时，你必须仔细注意俄罗斯人的想法，因为如果你拿棍子戳他们的眼睛，他们就会 进行报复。 西半球国家对美国非常了解这一点。

本质上是门罗主义。

当然。 我们不会允许西半球任何国家邀请遥远的大国向该国派遣军事力量。

是啊，但是说美国不允许西半球的国家，大部分是民主国家，自己决定什么样的外交政策，你可以说好，也可以说坏，但这就是帝国主义，对吗？ 我们本质上是说，我们对民主如何运作有某种发言权。

untries 经营他们的生意。

我们确实有这个发言权，事实上，我们在冷战期间推翻了西半球民主选举的领导人，因为我们对他们的政策不满意。 这就是大国的行事方式。

我们当然这样做了，但我想知道我们是否应该这样做。 当我们考虑外交政策时，我们是否应该考虑努力创造一个美国和俄罗斯都不会这样做的世界？

世界不是这样运作的。 当你试图创造一个这样的世界时，你最终会得到美国在单极时期奉行的灾难性政策。 我们走遍世界，试图建立自由民主国家。 当然，我们的主要关注点是大中东地区，你知道效果如何。 不是很好。

我认为，很难说美国在二战结束后七十五年，或者冷战结束后三十年的中东政策是创造自由主义。 中东的民主国家。

我认为这就是单极时期布什主义的含义。

在伊拉克。 但不是在巴勒斯坦领土、沙特阿拉伯、埃及或其他任何地方，对吗？

不——嗯，不是在沙特阿拉伯，也不是在埃及。 首先，布什主义基本上说，如果我们能够在伊拉克建立一个自由民主国家，就会产生多米诺骨牌效应，叙利亚、伊朗等国家，最终沙特阿拉伯和埃及将变成民主国家。 这就是布什主义背后的基本理念。 布什主义的目的不仅仅是将伊拉克变成一个民主国家。 我们心里有一个更宏伟的计划。

我们可以讨论布什政府的掌权者到底有多想把中东变成一堆民主国家，并且真的认为这将会发生。 我的感觉是，对于将沙特阿拉伯变成民主国家并没有太多的实际热情。

嗯，我认为从你的角度来看，关注沙特阿拉伯是最简单的情况。 从美国的角度来看，这是最困难的情况，因为沙特阿拉伯因为石油而对我们有很大的影响力，而且它当然不是一个民主国家。 但是，如果你看看我们当时所说的话，布什主义的基础是我们可以使大中东民主化。 这可能不会在一夜之间发生，但最终会发生。

我想我的观点是行动胜于雄辩，而且，无论布什的华丽演讲怎么说，我不认为美国在其近代历史上的任何时候的政策都是试图确保世界各地的自由民主 。

美国在单极时刻的表现与其在历史进程中的表现存在很大差异。 当你在更广泛的历史进程中谈论美国外交政策时，我同意你的观点，但单极时刻是一个非常特殊的时刻。 我相信，在单极时期，我们坚定地致力于传播民主。

对于乌克兰，了解这一点非常重要：直到 2014 年，我们都没有设想过北约扩张和欧盟扩张。 扩张是一项旨在遏制俄罗斯的政策。 2014 年 2 月 22 日之前，没有人认真认为俄罗斯是威胁。北约扩张、欧盟。 扩张，以及将乌克兰和格鲁吉亚以及其他国家转变为自由民主国家，都是为了建立一个遍布整个欧洲（包括东欧和西欧）的巨大和平区。 其目的并不是为了遏制俄罗斯。 发生的事情是，这场重大危机爆发了，我们必须归咎于我们，当然我们永远不会责怪我们自己。 我们本来打算责怪俄罗斯人。 所以我们编造了俄罗斯一心要侵略东欧的故事。 普京有兴趣创建一个更大的俄罗斯，甚至可能重建苏联。

让我们回顾一下当时和克里米亚的吞并。 我读过一篇旧文章，你写道：“根据西方普遍的看法，乌克兰危机几乎完全可以归咎于俄罗斯的侵略。 有人认为，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京出于复兴苏联帝国的长期愿望而吞并了克里米亚，他最终可能会针对乌克兰其他地区以及东欧其他国家。 然后你说：“但是这个说法是错误的。” 过去几周发生的事情是否让您认为该报道比您想象的更接近事实？

哦，我想我是对的。 我认为证据很清楚，我们在 2014 年 2 月 22 日之前并不认为他是侵略者。这是我们编造的故事，以便我们可以责怪他。 我的观点是，西方，特别是美国，应对这场灾难负主要责任。 但没有一个美国政策制定者，而且在美国外交政策机构中几乎没有任何一个人愿意这样做。

如果他们想要承认这一论点，他们就会说俄罗斯人应对此负责。

你的意思是因为俄罗斯人进行了吞并和入侵？

是的。

我对那篇文章感兴趣，因为你说普京最终可能会攻击乌克兰其他地区以及东欧其他国家的想法是错误的。 考虑到他现在似乎正在追击乌克兰其他地区，事后看来，你是否认为这个论点可能更正确，即使我们当时并不知道？

很难说他是否会去攻击乌克兰的其他地区，因为——我并不是想在这里吹毛求疵——但这意味着他想征服整个乌克兰，然后他将转向波罗的海国家，而他的目标 是创造一个更大的俄罗斯或者苏联的转世。 目前我还没有看到证据证明这是真的。 看看当前冲突的地图，很难判断他究竟在做什么。 在我看来，很明显他将占领顿巴斯，顿巴斯要么成为两个独立国家，要么成为一个大的独立国家，但除此之外，还不清楚他会做什么。 我的意思是，很明显他没有触及乌克兰西部。

他的炸弹正在触碰它，对吗？

但这不是关键问题。 关键问题是：你要征服什么领土，你要守住什么领土？ 前几天我正在和某人谈论这些从克里米亚出来的部队将会发生什么，那个人告诉我，他认为他们会转向西方并占领敖德萨。 我最近和其他人交谈过，他说这不会发生。 我知道会发生什么吗？ 不，我们谁都不知道会发生什么。

你不认为他对基辅有企图吗？

不，我不认为他对基辅有什么企图。 我认为他有兴趣至少占领顿巴斯，或许还有更多领土和乌克兰东部，第二，他想在基辅建立一个亲俄罗斯政府，一个符合莫斯科利益的政府。

我以为你说过他对占领基辅不感兴趣。

不，他有兴趣占领基辅以实现政权更迭。 好的。？

相对于什么？

而不是永久征服基辅。

这将是一个对俄罗斯友好的政府，他想必对此有一定的发言权，对吗？

对，就是这样。 但重要的是要明白，这与征服并坚守基辅有着根本的不同。 你明白我所说的吗？

我们都可以想到帝国的财产，即使祖国实际上控制着那里发生的事情，但某种名义上的领袖被推上王位，对吗？ 我们仍然会说那些地方已经被征服了，对吗？

我对你使用“帝国”这个词有疑问。 我不知道有谁会从帝国主义的角度谈论整个问题。 这是大国政治，俄罗斯人想要的是一个符合俄罗斯利益的基辅政权。 最终，俄罗斯人可能会愿意与中立的乌克兰共存，而莫斯科则没有必要对基辅政府进行任何有意义的控制。 也许他们只是想要一个中立而不是亲美的政权。

当你说没有人将其视为帝国主义时，普京在讲话中特别提到了“前俄罗斯帝国的领土”，他对失去它感到遗憾。 所以看起来他正在谈论这件事。

我认为这是错误的，因为我认为你引用了前半句话，就像大多数西方人所做的那样。 他说：“谁不怀念苏联，谁就没有心”。 然后他说：“谁想拿回来，谁就没有脑子。”

他还说乌克兰本质上是一个虚构的国家，而他似乎正在入侵它，不是吗？

好吧，但是把这两件事放在一起并告诉我这意味着什么。 我只是不太确定。 他确实相信这是一个虚构的国家。 我要向他指出，所有国家都是组成的。 任何研究民族主义的学生都可以告诉你这一点。 我们发明了这些国家认同的概念。 它们充满了各种各样的神话。 所以他对乌克兰的看法是正确的，就像他对美国或德国的看法是正确的一样。 更重要的一点是：他明白他无法征服乌克兰并将其纳入更大的俄罗斯或前苏联的转世。 他不能那样做。 他在乌克兰所做的事情完全不同。 他显然正在砍掉一些领土。 除了 2014 年克里米亚事件之外，他还将从乌克兰夺走一些领土。此外，他肯定对政权更迭感兴趣。 除此之外，很难确切地说这一切会导致什么，除了他不会征服整个乌克兰这一事实。 试图这样做将是一个巨大的错误。

我假设你认为如果他尝试这样做，那将会改变你对我们所目睹的事情的分析。

绝对地。 我的观点是，他不会重建苏联或试图建立一个更大的俄罗斯，他对征服乌克兰并将其纳入俄罗斯不感兴趣。 重要的是要明白，我们编造了这样一个故事：普京极具攻击性，他对乌克兰的这场危机负有主要责任。 美国以及更广泛的西方外交政策机构所发明的论点围绕着他有兴趣创建一个更大的俄罗斯或前苏联的转世。 有人认为，当他征服乌克兰后，他将转向波罗的海国家。 他不会转向波罗的海国家。 首先，波罗的海国家是北约成员国，并且——

那是件好事儿吗？

不。

你说他不会入侵他们，部分原因是他们是北约的一部分，但他们不应该成为北约的一部分。

是的，但这是两个截然不同的问题。 我不确定你为什么要连接它们。 我是否认为他们应该成为北约的一部分与他们是否是北约的一部分无关。 他们是北约的一部分。 他们有第 5 条的保证——这才是最重要的。 此外，他从未表现出任何证据表明他有兴趣征服波罗的海国家。 事实上，他从未表现出任何证据表明他有兴趣征服乌克兰。

在我看来，如果他想带回什么，那就是早于苏联的俄罗斯帝国。 他似乎对苏联很批评，对吗？

好吧，我不知道他是否批评。

他在去年写的长篇文章中说了这一点，并在最近的一次演讲中表示，他本质上指责苏联的政策允许乌克兰等苏维埃共和国享有一定程度的自治权。

但他也说过，正如我之前读给你们听的那样，“谁不怀念苏联，谁就没有心。” 这和你刚才说的有些矛盾。 我的意思是，他实际上是在说他想念苏联，对吧？ 这就是他所说的。 我们在这里谈论的是他的外交政策。 你要问自己的问题是你是否认为这是一个有能力做到这一点的国家。 你意识到这是一个拥有国民生产总值的国家。 比德克萨斯州还小。

各国总是试图做一些他们没有能力做的事情。 你可以对我说：“谁认为美国能让伊拉克电力系统快速运转？ 我们在美国面临所有这些问题。” 你是对的。 但我们仍然认为我们能做到，我们仍然尝试去做，但我们失败了，对吗？ 美国在越南期间无法做它想做的事，我相信你会说这是不打这些不同战争的一个理由——我同意——但这并不意味着我们对我们的能力是正确或理性的。

我说的是俄罗斯的原始实力潜力——它拥有的经济实力。 军事实力是建立在经济实力之上的。 你需要经济基础来建立一支真正强大的军队。 出去征服乌克兰、波罗的海国家等国家，重建前苏联，或者在东欧重建前苏联帝国，需要一支庞大的军队，而这需要一个当代俄罗斯所不具备的经济基础。 接近拥有。 没有理由担心俄罗斯将成为欧洲的地区霸主。 俄罗斯对美国来说并不是严重威胁。 我们确实面临国际体系中的严重威胁。 我们面临着一个同行的竞争对手。 那就是中国。 我们在东欧的政策正在削弱我们应对当今面临的最危险威胁的能力。

您认为我们现在对乌克兰的政策应该是什么？您担心我们正在做的哪些事情会破坏我们的对华政策？

第一，我们应该把重心从欧洲转移出去，以激光般的方式与中国打交道。 第二，我们应该加班加点地与俄罗斯建立友好关系。 俄罗斯是我们对抗中国的平衡联盟的一部分。 如果你生活在一个有三个大国——中国、俄罗斯和美国——的世界，而其中一个大国中国是一个同等的竞争对手，那么如果你是美国，你想做的就是 俄罗斯站在你这一边。 相反，我们在东欧的愚蠢政策所做的只是将俄罗斯人推入中国人的怀抱。 这违反了权力政治平衡101。

我回去重读了你2006年在《伦敦书评》上发表的关于以色列游说团体的文章。你在谈论巴勒斯坦问题，你说了一些我非常同意的话，那就是：“存在道德层面 这里也一样。 由于美国的游说，它已成为以色列占领被占领土的事实上的推动者，使其成为对巴勒斯坦人犯下的罪行的同谋。” 我很高兴

读这篇文章是因为我知道你认为自己是一个坚强、脾气暴躁的老家伙，不谈论道德，但在我看来，你似乎在暗示这里存在道德维度。 我很好奇你对乌克兰目前正在发生的事情的道德层面有何看法（如果有的话）。

我认为国际政治中的几乎每个问题都涉及战略和道德层面。 我认为有时这些道德和战略维度是相互一致的。 换句话说，如果你在 1941 年至 1945 年间与纳粹德国作战，你就会知道接下来的故事。 在其他情况下，这些箭头指向相反的方向，做战略上正确的事情在道德上是错误的。 我认为如果与苏联结盟来对抗纳粹德国，这是一个战略上明智的政策，但在道义上却是一个错误的政策。 但你这样做是因为出于战略原因你别无选择。 换句话说，艾萨克，我要对你说的是，当紧要关头，战略考虑压倒了道德考虑。 在理想的世界中，如果乌克兰人能够自由选择自己的政治制度和外交政策，那就太好了。

但在现实世界中，这是不可行的。 认真关注俄罗斯人对他们的要求符合乌克兰人的既得利益。 如果从根本上疏远俄罗斯人，他们将面临严重风险。 如果俄罗斯认为乌克兰因为与美国及其西欧盟友结盟而对俄罗斯构成生存威胁，那么这将对乌克兰造成巨大损害。 这当然正是现在正在发生的事情。 所以我的观点是：对乌克兰来说，明智的策略是断绝与西方特别是美国的密切关系，并尽力迁就俄罗斯。 如果没有决定将北约东移包括乌克兰，克里米亚和顿巴斯今天将成为乌克兰的一部分，乌克兰也不会有战争。

这个建议现在看来有点难以置信。 尽管我们从实地看到的情况如此，乌克兰还有时间以某种方式安抚俄罗斯吗？

我认为乌克兰很有可能与俄罗斯达成某种临时解决办法。 原因是俄罗斯人现在发现占领乌克兰并试图操纵乌克兰政治会带来大麻烦。

所以你是说占领乌克兰将是一个艰难的过程？

绝对的，这就是为什么我对你说，我不认为俄罗斯人会长期占领乌克兰。 但是，要非常明确的是，我确实说过他们将至少占领顿巴斯，希望不会更多地占领乌克兰最东部地区。 我认为俄罗斯人太聪明了，不会参与对乌克兰的占领。

Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine

 

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine

For years, the political scientist has claimed that Putin’s aggression toward Ukraine is caused by Western intervention. Have recent events changed his mind?

 

By Isaac Chotiner is a staff writer at The New Yorker  March 1, 2022

“He is not going to conquer all of Ukraine,” Mearsheimer says, of Putin. “It would be a blunder of colossal proportions to try to do that.”

The political scientist John Mearsheimer has been one of the most famous critics of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Perhaps best known for the book he wrote with Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Mearsheimer is a proponent of great-power politics—a school of realist international relations that assumes that, in a self-interested attempt to preserve national security, states will preëmptively act in anticipation of adversaries. For years, Mearsheimer has argued that the U.S., in pushing to expand nato eastward and establishing friendly relations with Ukraine, has increased the likelihood of war between nuclear-armed powers and laid the groundwork for Vladimir Putin’s aggressive position toward Ukraine. Indeed, in 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea, Mearsheimer wrote that “the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for this crisis.”

The current invasion of Ukraine has renewed several long-standing debates about the relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Although many critics of Putin have argued that he would pursue an aggressive foreign policy in former Soviet Republics regardless of Western involvement, Mearsheimer maintains his position that the U.S. is at fault for provoking him. I recently spoke with Mearsheimer by phone. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed whether the current war could have been prevented, whether it makes sense to think of Russia as an imperial power, and Putin’s ultimate plans for Ukraine.

Looking at the situation now with Russia and Ukraine, how do you think the world got here?

I think all the trouble in this case really started in April, 2008, at the nato Summit in Bucharest, where afterward nato issued a statement that said Ukraine and Georgia would become part of nato. The Russians made it unequivocally clear at the time that they viewed this as an existential threat, and they drew a line in the sand. Nevertheless, what has happened with the passage of time is that we have moved forward to include Ukraine in the West to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. Of course, this includes more than just nato expansion. nato expansion is the heart of the strategy, but it includes E.U. expansion as well, and it includes turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy, and, from a Russian perspective, this is an existential threat.

You said that it’s about “turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.” I don’t put much trust or much faith in America “turning” places into liberal democracies. What if Ukraine, the people of Ukraine, want to live in a pro-American liberal democracy?

If Ukraine becomes a pro-American liberal democracy, and a member of nato, and a member of the E.U., the Russians will consider that categorically unacceptable. If there were no nato expansion and no E.U. expansion, and Ukraine just became a liberal democracy and was friendly with the United States and the West more generally, it could probably get away with that. You want to understand that there is a three-prong strategy at play here: E.U. expansion, nato expansion, and turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.

You keep saying “turning Ukraine into a liberal democracy,” and it seems like that’s an issue for the Ukrainians to decide. nato can decide whom it admits, but we saw in 2014 that it appeared as if many Ukrainians wanted to be considered part of Europe. It would seem like almost some sort of imperialism to tell them that they can’t be a liberal democracy.

It’s not imperialism; this is great-power politics. When you’re a country like Ukraine and you live next door to a great power like Russia, you have to pay careful attention to what the Russians think, because if you take a stick and you poke them in the eye, they’re going to retaliate. States in the Western hemisphere understand this full well with regard to the United States.

The Monroe Doctrine, essentially.

Of course. There’s no country in the Western hemisphere that we will allow to invite a distant, great power to bring military forces into that country.

Right, but saying that America will not allow countries in the Western hemisphere, most of them democracies, to decide what kind of foreign policy they have—you can say that’s good or bad, but that is imperialism, right? We’re essentially saying that we have some sort of say over how democratic countries run their business.

We do have that say, and, in fact, we overthrew democratically elected leaders in the Western hemisphere during the Cold War because we were unhappy with their policies. This is the way great powers behave.

Of course we did, but I’m wondering if we should be behaving that way. When we’re thinking about foreign policies, should we be thinking about trying to create a world where neither the U.S. nor Russia is behaving that way?

That’s not the way the world works. When you try to create a world that looks like that, you end up with the disastrous policies that the United States pursued during the unipolar moment. We went around the world trying to create liberal democracies. Our main focus, of course, was in the greater Middle East, and you know how well that worked out. Not very well.

I think it would be difficult to say that America’s policy in the Middle East in the past seventy-five years since the end of the Second World War, or in the past thirty years since the end of the Cold War, has been to create liberal democracies in the Middle East.

I think that’s what the Bush Doctrine was about during the unipolar moment.

In Iraq. But not in the Palestinian territories, or Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, or anywhere else, right?

No—well, not in Saudi Arabia and not in Egypt. To start with, the Bush Doctrine basically said that if we could create a liberal democracy in Iraq, it would have a domino effect, and countries such as Syria, Iran, and eventually Saudi Arabia and Egypt would turn into democracies. That was the basic philosophy behind the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine was not just designed to turn Iraq into a democracy. We had a much grander scheme in mind.

We can debate how much the people who were in charge in the Bush Administration really wanted to turn the Middle East into a bunch of democracies, and really thought that was going to happen. My sense was that there was not a lot of actual enthusiasm about turning Saudi Arabia into a democracy.

Well, I think focussing on Saudi Arabia is taking the easy case from your perspective. That was the most difficult case from America’s perspective, because Saudi Arabia has so much leverage over us because of oil, and it’s certainly not a democracy. But the Bush Doctrine, if you go look at what we said at the time, was predicated on the belief that we could democratize the greater Middle East. It might not happen overnight, but it would eventually happen.

I guess my point would be actions speak louder than words, and, whatever Bush’s flowery speeches said, I don’t feel like the policy of the United States at any point in its recent history has been to try and insure liberal democracies around the world.

There’s a big difference between how the United States behaved during the unipolar moment and how it’s behaved in the course of its history. I agree with you when you talk about American foreign policy in the course of its broader history, but the unipolar moment was a very special time. I believe that during the unipolar moment, we were deeply committed to spreading democracy.

With Ukraine, it’s very important to understand that, up until 2014, we did not envision nato expansion and E.U. expansion as a policy that was aimed at containing Russia. Nobody seriously thought that Russia was a threat before February 22, 2014. nato expansion, E.U. expansion, and turning Ukraine and Georgia and other countries into liberal democracies were all about creating a giant zone of peace that spread all over Europe and included Eastern Europe and Western Europe. It was not aimed at containing Russia. What happened is that this major crisis broke out, and we had to assign blame, and of course we were never going to blame ourselves. We were going to blame the Russians. So we invented this story that Russia was bent on aggression in Eastern Europe. Putin is interested in creating a greater Russia, or maybe even re-creating the Soviet Union.

Let’s turn to that time and the annexation of Crimea. I was reading an old article where you wrote, “According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine Crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian president Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a longstanding desire to resuscitate the Soviet Empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine as well as other countries in Eastern Europe.” And then you say, “But this account is wrong.” Does anything that’s happened in the last couple weeks make you think that account was closer to the truth than you might have thought?

Oh, I think I was right. I think the evidence is clear that we did not think he was an aggressor before February 22, 2014. This is a story that we invented so that we could blame him. My argument is that the West, especially the United States, is principally responsible for this disaster. But no American policymaker, and hardly anywhere in the American foreign-policy establishment, is going to want to acknowledge that line of argument, and they will say that the Russians are responsible.

You mean because the Russians did the annexation and the invasion?

Yes.

I was interested in that article because you say the idea that Putin may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in Eastern Europe, is wrong. Given that he seems to be going after the rest of Ukraine now, do you think in hindsight that that argument is perhaps more true, even if we didn’t know it at the time?

It’s hard to say whether he’s going to go after the rest of Ukraine because—I don’t mean to nitpick here but—that implies that he wants to conquer all of Ukraine, and then he will turn to the Baltic states, and his aim is to create a greater Russia or the reincarnation of the Soviet Union. I don’t see evidence at this point that that is true. It’s difficult to tell, looking at the maps of the ongoing conflict, exactly what he’s up to. It seems quite clear to me that he is going to take the Donbass and that the Donbass is going to be either two independent states or one big independent state, but beyond that it’s not clear what he’s going to do. I mean, it does seem apparent that he’s not touching western Ukraine.

His bombs are touching it, right?

But that’s not the key issue. The key issue is: What territory do you conquer, and what territory do you hold onto? I was talking to somebody the other day about what’s going to happen with these forces that are coming out of Crimea, and the person told me that he thought they would turn west and take Odessa. I was talking to somebody else more recently who said that that’s not going to happen. Do I know what’s going to happen? No, none of us know what’s going to happen.

You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?

No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests.

I thought you said that he was not interested in taking Kyiv.

No, he’s interested in taking Kyiv for the purpose of regime change. O.K.?

As opposed to what?

As opposed to permanently conquering Kyiv.

It would be a Russian-friendly government that he would presumably have some say over, right?

Yes, exactly. But it’s important to understand that it is fundamentally different from conquering and holding onto Kyiv. Do you understand what I’m saying?

We could all think of imperial possessions whereby a sort of figurehead was put on the throne, even if the homeland was actually controlling what was going on there, right? We’d still say that those places had been conquered, right?

I have problems with your use of the word “imperial.” I don’t know anybody who talks about this whole problem in terms of imperialism. This is great-power politics, and what the Russians want is a regime in Kyiv that is attuned to Russian interests. It may be ultimately that the Russians would be willing to live with a neutral Ukraine, and that it won’t be necessary for Moscow to have any meaningful control over the government in Kyiv. It may be that they just want a regime that is neutral and not pro-American.

When you said that no one’s talking about this as imperialism, in Putin’s speeches he specifically refers to the “territory of the former Russian Empire,” which he laments losing. So it seems like he’s talking about it.

I think that’s wrong, because I think you’re quoting the first half of the sentence, as most people in the West do. He said, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” And then he said, “Whoever wants it back has no brain.”

He’s also saying that Ukraine is essentially a made-up nation, while he seems to be invading it, no?

O.K., but put those two things together and tell me what that means. I’m just not too sure. He does believe it’s a made-up nation. I would note to him, all nations are made up. Any student of nationalism can tell you that. We invent these concepts of national identity. They’re filled with all sorts of myths. So he’s correct about Ukraine, just like he’s correct about the United States or Germany. The much more important point is: he understands that he cannot conquer Ukraine and integrate it into a greater Russia or into a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. He can’t do that. What he’s doing in Ukraine is fundamentally different. He is obviously lopping off some territory. He’s going to take some territory away from Ukraine, in addition to what happened with Crimea, in 2014. Furthermore, he is definitely interested in regime change. Beyond that, it’s hard to say exactly what this will all lead to, except for the fact that he is not going to conquer all of Ukraine. It would be a blunder of colossal proportions to try to do that.

I assume that you think if he were to try to do that, that would change your analysis of what we’ve witnessed.

Absolutely. My argument is that he’s not going to re-create the Soviet Union or try to build a greater Russia, that he’s not interested in conquering and integrating Ukraine into Russia. It’s very important to understand that we invented this story that Putin is highly aggressive and he’s principally responsible for this crisis in Ukraine. The argument that the foreign-policy establishment in the United States, and in the West more generally, has invented revolves around the claim that he is interested in creating a greater Russia or a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. There are people who believe that when he is finished conquering Ukraine, he will turn to the Baltic states. He’s not going to turn to the Baltic states. First of all, the Baltic states are members of nato and—

Is that a good thing?

No.

You’re saying that he’s not going to invade them in part because they’re part of nato, but they shouldn’t be part of nato.

Yes, but those are two very different issues. I’m not sure why you’re connecting them. Whether I think they should be part of nato is independent of whether they are part of nato. They are part of nato. They have an Article 5 guarantee—that’s all that matters. Furthermore, he’s never shown any evidence that he’s interested in conquering the Baltic states. Indeed, he’s never shown any evidence that he’s interested in conquering Ukraine.

It seems to me that if he wants to bring back anything, it’s the Russian Empire that predates the Soviet Union. He seems very critical of the Soviet Union, correct?

Well, I don’t know if he’s critical.

He said it in his big essay that he wrote last year, and he said in a recent speech that he essentially blames Soviet policies for allowing a degree of autonomy for Soviet Republics, such as Ukraine.

But he also said, as I read to you before, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” That’s somewhat at odds with what you just said. I mean, he’s in effect saying that he misses the Soviet Union, right? That’s what he’s saying. What we’re talking about here is his foreign policy. The question you have to ask yourself is whether or not you think that this is a country that has the capability to do that. You realize that this is a country that has a G.N.P. that’s smaller than Texas.

Countries try to do things that they don’t have the capabilities for all the time. You could have said to me, “Who thinks that America could get the Iraqi power system working quickly? We have all these problems in America.” And you would’ve been correct. But we still thought we could do it, and we still tried to do it, and we failed, right? America couldn’t do what it wanted during Vietnam, which I’m sure you would say is a reason not to fight these various wars—and I would agree—but that doesn’t mean that we were correct or rational about our capabilities.

I’m talking about the raw-power potential of Russia—the amount of economic might it has. Military might is built on economic might. You need an economic foundation to build a really powerful military. To go out and conquer countries like Ukraine and the Baltic states and to re-create the former Soviet Union or re-create the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe would require a massive army, and that would require an economic foundation that contemporary Russia does not come close to having. There is no reason to fear that Russia is going to be a regional hegemony in Europe. Russia is not a serious threat to the United States. We do face a serious threat in the international system. We face a peer competitor. And that’s China. Our policy in Eastern Europe is undermining our ability to deal with the most dangerous threat that we face today.

What do you think our policy should be in Ukraine right now, and what do you worry that we’re doing that’s going to undermine our China policy?

We should be pivoting out of Europe to deal with China in a laser-like fashion, number one. And, number two, we should be working overtime to create friendly relations with the Russians. The Russians are part of our balancing coalition against China. If you live in a world where there are three great powers—China, Russia, and the United States—and one of those great powers, China, is a peer competitor, what you want to do if you’re the United States is have Russia on your side of the ledger. Instead, what we have done with our foolish policies in Eastern Europe is drive the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. This is a violation of Balance of Power Politics 101.

I went back and I reread your article about the Israel lobby in the London Review of Books, from 2006. You were talking about the Palestinian issue, and you said something that I very much agree with, which is: “There is a moral dimension here as well. Thanks to the lobby of the United States it has become the de facto enabler of Israeli occupation in the occupied territories, making it complicit in the crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians.” I was cheered to read that because I know you think of yourself as a tough, crusty old guy who doesn’t talk about morality, but it seemed to me you were suggesting that there was a moral dimension here. I’m curious what you think, if any, of the moral dimension to what’s going on in Ukraine right now.

I think there is a strategic and a moral dimension involved with almost every issue in international politics. I think that sometimes those moral and strategic dimensions line up with each other. In other words, if you’re fighting against Nazi Germany from 1941 to 1945, you know the rest of the story. There are other occasions where those arrows point in opposite directions, where doing what is strategically right is morally wrong. I think if you join an alliance with the Soviet Union to fight against Nazi Germany, it is a strategically wise policy, but it is a morally wrong policy. But you do it because you have no choice for strategic reasons. In other words, what I’m saying to you, Isaac, is that when push comes to shove, strategic considerations overwhelm moral considerations. In an ideal world, it would be wonderful if the Ukrainians were free to choose their own political system and to choose their own foreign policy.

But in the real world, that is not feasible. The Ukrainians have a vested interest in paying serious attention to what the Russians want from them. They run a grave risk if they alienate the Russians in a fundamental way. If Russia thinks that Ukraine presents an existential threat to Russia because it is aligning with the United States and its West European allies, this is going to cause an enormous amount of damage to Ukraine. That of course is exactly what’s happening now. So my argument is: the strategically wise strategy for Ukraine is to break off its close relations with the West, especially with the United States, and try to accommodate the Russians. If there had been no decision to move nato eastward to include Ukraine, Crimea and the Donbass would be part of Ukraine today, and there would be no war in Ukraine.

That advice seems a bit implausible now. Is there still time, despite what we’re seeing from the ground, for Ukraine to appease Russia somehow?

I think there’s a serious possibility that the Ukrainians can work out some sort of modus vivendi with the Russians. And the reason is that the Russians are now discovering that occupying Ukraine and trying to run Ukraine’s politics is asking for big trouble.

So you are saying occupying Ukraine is going to be a tough slog?

Absolutely, and that’s why I said to you that I did not think the Russians would occupy Ukraine in the long term. But, just to be very clear, I did say they’re going to take at least the Donbass, and hopefully not more of the easternmost part of Ukraine. I think the Russians are too smart to get involved in an occupation of Ukraine.

More on the War in Ukraine

• How Ukrainians saved their capital.

• A historian envisions a settlement among Russia, Ukraine, and the West.

• How Russia’s latest commander in Ukraine could change the war.

• The profound defiance of daily life in Kyiv.

• The Ukraine crackup in the G.O.P.

• A filmmaker’s journey to the heart of the war.