风萧萧_Frank
以文会友
作者：泽内尔·加西亚 2024 年 1 月 20 日
自2013年习近平主席宣布“一带一路”倡议以来，中国已在全球数千个项目投资超过1万亿美元。 这解决了全球南方部分预计的基础设施投资缺口； 然而，这也引发了中美及其合作伙伴之间的重大地缘政治和地缘经济竞争。 因此，这些参与者中的许多人都诉诸于推广自己的经济走廊来与“一带一路”倡议“竞争”，希望减轻他们认为的中国日益增长的影响力。
这种方法在三个方面没有达到目的。 首先，由于国内和国际利益相关者的影响，“一带一路”的制定和实施已经并将继续处于碎片化状态，这使得北京很难单方面获取地缘政治和地缘经济影响力。 其次，一些旨在与“一带一路”倡议竞争的走廊早于“一带一路”倡议，并促进了“一带一路”倡议的出现。 第三，这些走廊可能是互补的，而不是彻底的竞争对手。
传统观点将“一带一路”视为中国的一项大战略，正在重塑国际体系以使其有利于自己。 这一论点隐含的是，由于中国在中国贷款和投资中的作用，中国可以通过“一带一路”产生地缘政治和地缘经济影响力。
然而，“一带一路”的起源和演变表明它从根本上来说是支离破碎的。 “一带一路”倡议起源于20世纪90年代的省级倡议。 这种国内动态仍在持续，因为省级官员仍然是塑造“一带一路”项目制定和实施方式的关键角色。 甚至国有企业在这一过程中也发挥着至关重要的作用。 在国际上，参与国对于决定在本国选择和实施哪些“一带一路”项目也至关重要。 因此，尽管中国官员可能希望从“一带一路”倡议中获取地缘政治和地缘经济利益，但有证据表明，这两个因素限制了他们有效实现这一目标的能力。
尽管存在这些限制，美国及其合作伙伴仍然宣布了竞争性举措。 讽刺的是，其中一些举措早于“一带一路”倡议，并为其发展发挥了促进作用。 日本在东南亚推动的东西经济走廊和南部经济走廊就是如此。
这两条走廊均已纳入日本自由开放的印太战略。 然而，它们起源于 1998 年，是美日主导的亚洲开发银行大湄公河次区域 (GMS) 经济合作计划的一部分，该计划自 1992 年启动以来就有中国各省份的参与。 中印缅经济走廊、中国-中南半岛经济走廊和中缅经济走廊始于云南和广西的省级倡议，并自20世纪90年代以来通过GMS投资得到加强。
虽然这个案例并不能说明所有基础设施举措，但它确实暴露了讨论中固有的紧张关系：这些“竞争”走廊实际上可能是互补的。 从参与国的角度来看尤其如此。 毕竟，如果一座发电厂是由中国企业通过中国资本建造的，而一个工业园区是由日本企业利用日本资本建造的，那么最终的效果就是这些项目有可能解决参与国的能源和工业能力问题。
从支持者的角度来看，也存在互补性。 以上面的例子为例，日本资助和建造的工业园区自然会受益于可靠的能源供应，无论是美国还是中国资助和建设它。 这从印度拟议的东海岸经济走廊中可以明显看出，该走廊很可能直接或间接受益于已建立的“一带一路”和大湄公河次区域走廊。 此外，现实情况是，“一带一路”和“竞争”走廊沿线的项目是通过中国和外部贷款机构提供资金的，并且通常是通过跨国合资企业运营的，从而使简单化的竞争框架变得复杂化。
这三点的含义是显而易见的。 首先，“一带一路”的碎片化限制了中国官员单方面获取地缘政治和经济利益的能力，并允许参与国发挥更大的作用。 这表明美国及其合作伙伴表达的担忧可以通过加强与“一带一路”及其合作伙伴的接触来部分解决。
参与国。
其次，“一带一路”倡议与美国及其合作伙伴提出的各种基础设施倡议之间的互补性可能比人们通常认为的更多。 这意味着应更多地关注这些举措如何利用特定提案的积极成果来造福提案国和东道国，以及如何减轻一些负面成果。
纯粹竞争性的经济举措框架不太可能引人注目，特别是考虑到全球南方基础设施投资差距日益扩大。
China's Belt and Road and Its Alternatives: Competing or Complementary?
Promoting various economic corridors as “alternatives” to the BRI misses the mark, for three reasons.
This approach misses the mark on three accounts. The first is that the formulation and implementation of the BRI has been, and continues to be, fragmented due to domestic and international stakeholders, thus making it difficult for Beijing to unilaterally extract geopolitical and geoeconomic influence. The second is that some of the corridors meant to compete with the BRI predate it and have facilitated its emergence. The third is that these corridors may be complementary rather than outright competitors.
Conventional accounts frame the BRI as a Chinese grand strategy that is reshaping the international system to its favor. Implicit in that argument is that China can generate geopolitical and geoeconomic influence through the BRI due to its role in Chinese lending and investment.
However, the origins and evolution of the BRI indicate that it is fundamentally fragmented. The BRI originated from provincial-level initiatives dating back to the 1990s. This domestic dynamic continues because provincial officials remain key players in shaping the way in which BRI projects are formulated and implemented. Even state-owned enterprises play a vital role in this process. Internationally, participant countries are also crucial in determining which BRI projects are selected and implemented in their countries. Consequently, while Chinese officials may desire to extract geopolitical and geoeconomic benefits from the BRI, evidence suggests that these two factors limit their capacity to do so effectively.
Despite these limitations, the United States and its partners have moved forward with announcing competing initiatives. Ironically, some of these initiatives predate the BRI, and have played a role in facilitating its development. This is the case with the East-West Economic Corridor and the Southern Economic Corridor promoted by Japan in Southeast Asia.
Both corridors have been incorporated into Japan’s Free and Open Indo Pacific strategy. However, they originated in 1998 as part of the U.S.-Japan-led Asian Development Bank’s Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation Program, which has had Chinese provincial participation since its inception in 1992. The groundwork of what makes up the BRI’s Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor began with Yunnan’s and Guangxi’s provincial initiatives, and have been enhanced by GMS investment since the 1990s.
While this case is not illustrative of all infrastructure initiatives, it does expose an inherent tension in the discourse: that these “competing” corridors may in fact be complementary. This is especially true from the perspective of the participant countries. After all, if a power plant is built through Chinese capital by Chinese firms, and an industrial park is built with Japanese capital by Japanese firms, the net effect is that these projects have the potential to address the participant country’s energy and industrial capacity.
There is also complementarity from the proponent’s perspective. Using the example above, a Japanese-funded and built industrial park naturally benefits from access to reliable energy supplies regardless of whether the United States or China funds and builds it. This is evident from India’s proposed East Coast Economic Corridor, which is likely to benefit directly and indirectly from established BRI and GMS corridors. Furthermore, the reality is that projects along the BRI and “competing” corridors are funded through Chinese and external lenders, and are often operated through multinational joint ventures, thus complicating simplistic competitive framings.
The implications of these three points are clear. First, the fragmentation of the BRI limits the ability of Chinese officials to unilaterally extract geopolitical and economic benefits and allows for greater agency on the part of participant countries. This indicates that the concerns expressed by the United States and its partners can be partially managed through greater engagement with the BRI and its participant countries.
Second, there may be more complementarity than often assumed between the BRI and the various infrastructure initiatives proposed by the U.S. and its partners. This means that greater attention should be paid to how these initiatives can leverage the positive outcomes of a given proposal to the benefit of the proponent and host country, as well as how to mitigate some of the negative outcomes.
A purely competitive framing of economic initiatives is unlikely to be salient, especially given the growing gap in infrastructure investment in the Global South.
