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中国的政治改革应遵循哪些理念？ 对 Sam Crane 评论的回应
丹尼尔·A·贝尔 (DANIEL A. BELL) 2023 年 12 月 16 日
1995年，克兰教授和我在威廉姆斯校园共同组织了一次示威活动，抗议新加坡对学术自由的限制。 在我的新书中，最长的一章是捍卫学术自由和批评审查制度。 但出于某种原因，克雷恩认为这些年来我已经演变成“独裁主义”的捍卫者。 我向自己保证，我会忽略他的评论，但说起来容易做起来难，因为这条评论似乎在社交媒体上流传，朋友们说我应该做出回应。 所以就这样吧。
我写《山东院长》并不是为了那些相信中国的政治制度从根本上来说是邪恶的、越早崩溃越好的人。 我为那些对中国学术界内部运作感到好奇的人写了这本书，并为评估中国政治制度提供了启示。 我写这本书也不是为了那些缺乏幽默感的人。 我的书涉及严肃的主题——官僚主义、学术精英主义、儒家、君主制、法家、腐败、集体领导、审查制度——但我写得轻松，重自我批评，以表现人性和幽默。 这经常影响我与中国朋友和同事的互动，这与西方普遍存在的对中国的负面刻板印象形成鲜明对比。 这也是我的书被英国《金融时报》选为年度图书的部分原因，甚至连我最严厉的批评者，如中国超级鹰派张家辉也认为这本书“有趣”。 但克雷恩似乎把这本书当作一本关于中国政治的极其严肃的小册子来读。
遗憾的是，克兰几乎没有提及我书中的论点和故事。 他的“评论”是空洞的美德信号，与我的书无关。 他批评了几句话，完全断章取义（关于新疆的评论是关于中国问题的一长段的一部分——批评的意图很明显——而关于党委书记角色的评论没有注意到我讨论了中国的角色） 学术机构的党委书记，而不是更高级别的政府党委书记，因为他们的工作可能涉及处理政治异议等）。 他花了很大力气批评我2015年写的一本书，并选择了对该书最严厉的争论性评论（我对他没有提及的评论做出了回应；他错误地将黄玉顺识别为“外国中国分析家”，而事实上 他是在中国生活和工作的中国学者）。
克雷恩从我的新书中没有学到任何东西（而且，我承认，我从他的评论中没有学到任何东西）。 那么他为什么要费力写评论呢？ 原因是他有政治目的，而他就是这么做的。 看来我的政治罪过就是不赞成推翻中国的政治制度。 让我按指控认罪。
难道我就想捍卫“独裁主义”吗？ 我认为将政治世界划分为“民主国家”和“独裁国家”没有什么帮助，正如拜登总统和克兰教授所赞成的那样。 我们应该将理想与理想进行比较，将高度不完善的政治现实与高度不完善的政治现实进行比较。 理想旨在提供道德标准，允许对政治现实进行批判性评估，并提出改进标准。 在美国，知识分子和政治改革者通常将“民主”视为一种理想。 然而，在中国，知识分子和政治改革者并不为“专制主义”辩护，因为“专制主义”在中文中带有极重的贬义。 因此，我们需要思考哪些政治理想可能会激发改革，这就是为什么我写了（较早的）一本书，捍卫“上层精英政治、中层实验、下层民主”的理想。 自从我写这本书以来，我们可能倒退了两步，又前进了一步，但我想说的是，这个理想仍然有效，并被广泛坚持，作为中国政治背景下的灵感和批评的源泉。 因此，如果我们要将理想与口号形式的理想进行比较，在如何选择政治领导人的问题上，相关的二分法应该是美国的“选举民主”与中国的“垂直精英政治”。
如果我们想比较高度不完美的政治现实，那就是另一回事了。 在美国，现实更接近“一美元一票”，而不是“一人一票”。 在中国，法家传统与列宁主义遗产结合起来具有巨大的影响力（正如我在书中试图展示的那样），特别是在更高级别的政府中。 因此，如果我们想以口号形式比较高度不完美的政治现实，它应该类似于美国的“选举美元统治”与中国的“列宁法家”。
无论如何，相关的问题是：鉴于两国的现实都非常不完美，什么样的政治理想应该激发政治改革？ 对于克雷恩来说，激励美国改革的自由民主理想也应该激励中国改革。 我认为我们应该考虑到文化特殊性的道德相关性，以及儒家和社会主义传统可以激励中国的改革。 有一些普遍人权——反对酷刑、奴役、种族灭绝和系统性种族歧视的“消极”权利，以及生命和基本物质需求的“积极”权利——但除此之外，不同的政治团体可以在这些问题上坚持不同的标准 作为选拔和晋升公职人员以及组织经济生活的最佳方式。
最后一件事。 克雷恩批评我“希望”中国进步。 在这里，我也按指控认罪，尽管我尽力给出希望的理由，但这不是盲目的希望。
丹尼尔·贝尔（香港大学）
2023 年 12 月 16 日
Which Ideals Should Inform China's Political Reform? Response to Sam Crane's Review
I did not write the Dean of Shandong for those who are convinced the Chinese political system is fundamentally evil and the earlier it collapses, the better. I wrote the book for those curious about the inner workings of Chinese academia and I draw implications for evaluating the Chinese political system. Nor did I write the book for those who lack a sense of humor. My book deals with serious subject matter — bureaucracy, academic meritocracy, Confucianism, monarchy, Legalism, corruption, collective leadership, censorship – but I wrote it with a light-hearted touch, heavy on the self-criticism, to show the humanity and humor that so often informs my interactions with Chinese friends and colleagues, in contrast to the negative stereotypes about China so pervasive in the West. It’s part of the reason my book was selected as a book of the year by the Financial Times and even my harshest critics such as China uber-hawk Gordon Chang find the book “entertaining.” But Crane seems to have read the book as a deadly serious tract on Chinese politics.
Regrettably, Crane says hardly anything about the arguments and the stories that inform my book. His “review” consists of empty virtue signaling that has nothing to do with my book. He criticizes a couple of sentences completely out of context (the comment about Xinjiang is part of a long paragraph about what’s wrong with China – the critical intent is obvious — and the comment about the role of party secretary fails to note I discuss the role of the party secretary in academic institutions, not at higher levels of government where their work might involve dealing with political dissent and such). He devotes much effort to criticizing a book I wrote in 2015 and selects the harshest polemical reviews of that book (I wrote responses to the reviews which he doesn’t mention; he mistakenly identifies Huang Yushun as a “foreign China analyst” when in fact he is Chinese scholar living and working in China).
Crane learned nothing from my new book (and, I confess, I learned nothing from his review). So why did he bother writing the review? The reason is that he has a political axe to grind and that’s what he did. My political sin, it seems, is that I do not favor overthrow of the Chinese political system. Let me plead guilty as charged.
Does it follow that I seek to defend “authoritarianism”? I do not think it’s helpful to divide the political world into “democracies” and “autocracies”, as both President Biden and Professor Crane favor. We should compare ideals with ideals, and highly imperfect political realities with highly imperfect political realities. Ideals are meant to provide moral standards that allow for critical evaluation of the political reality and to suggest standards for improvement. In the United States, intellectuals and political reformers typically invoke “democracy” as an ideal. In China, however, intellectuals and political reformers do not defend “authoritarianism” （专制主义）， which is highly pejorative in Chinese. So we need to think of which political ideals might inspire reform, and that’s why I wrote (an earlier) book defending the ideal of “political meritocracy at the top, experimentation in the middle, and democracy at the bottom”. We may have gone two steps backward and one step forward since I wrote the book, but the ideal, let me suggest, is still valid and widely adhered to as an inspiration and source of criticism in the Chinese political context. So if we want to compare ideals with ideals in slogan form, with respect to the question of how political leaders should be selected, the relevant dichotomy should be something like “electoral democracy” in the U.S. case versus “vertical political meritocracy” in China.
If we want to compare highly imperfect political realities, then it’s a different story. In the United States, the reality is closer to “one dollar, one vote” than “one person, one vote”. In China, the Legalist tradition is hugely influential (as I try to show in my book), in combination with Leninist legacies, especially at higher levels of government. So if we want to compare highly imperfect political realities in slogan form, it should be something like “electoral dollarcracy” in the United States versus “Leninist Legalism” in China.
In any case, the relevant question is: given that both countries have highly imperfect realities, which political ideals should inspire political reform? For Crane, the same liberal democratic ideals that should inspire reform in the United States should serve to inspire reform in China. I think we should allow for the moral relevance of cultural particularity and that the Confucian and socialist traditions can inspire China’s reform. There are some universal human rights – “negative” rights against torture, slavery, genocide, and systematic racial discrimination as well as “positive” rights to life and basic material needs – but beyond that different political communities can adhere to different standards regarding such issues as the best way to select and promote public officials and to organize economic life.
One last thing. Crane criticizes me for having “hope” that China improves. Here too, I plead guilty as charged, though I do my best to give reasons for hope, it’s not blind hope.
Daniel A. Bell (University of Hong Kong)
Dec. 16, 2023
