个人资料
正文

澳外长黄英贤 用大国竞争来看待印太的未来不妥

(2023-05-11 14:20:59) 下一个

澳外长黄英贤:仅从大国竞争的角度来看待印太地区的未来不妥

 

澳大利亚外交部长、工党人黄英贤(Penny Wong)自上任以来多次出访太平洋地区诸岛国,继续推动与英国和美国在上届联盟党政府期间达成的澳英美三边安全伙伴关系(AUKUS,又称奥库斯协议),并于去年首次访问中国。4月17日,黄英贤受邀在澳大利亚国家新闻俱乐部以澳洲在区域力量平衡中的利益为题,发表了主旨演说。我们也将在本期的节目中为您介绍黄英贤对澳大利亚在太平洋地区和更广泛的印太地区对外政策的阐述。

澳大利亚外交部长黄英贤资料图片

澳大利亚外交部长黄英贤资料图片 © 网络图片

 

活动当天,黄英贤在讲话一开始时谈到:“我想特别感谢我今天的一位客人,(澳洲国家评估办公室前总干事)艾伦·金格尔(Allan Gyngell)。几十年来,艾伦一直是各届政府的官方和非官方顾问,始终在为澳大利亚的国家利益提供独特的服务。他是澳大利亚外交政策的权威历史学家。他是关于澳大利亚外交政策的最好的作家。坦率地说,他是澳大利亚外交政策届最优秀的大脑。也可能是澳大利亚外交政策届最谦卑的人。我感谢我们所处这片土地的传统主人,恩古纳瓦人(Ngunnawal)和恩甘布利人(Ngambri),并向过去、现在和新出现的长老们表示敬意。”

黄英贤说:“澳大利亚原住民是这片土地上的第一批外交官和商人。但就在这个月,贾斯汀·穆罕默德(Justin Mohamed)先生开始被任命为澳大利亚首任原住民大使。提升原住民的视角将加强我们在全世界和我们地区的联系,特别是在蓝色太平洋地区。这些联系的潜在力量长期以来一直被忽视,这对我们自己是不利的,而我们应该把我们拥有的一切都摆到桌面上。不言而喻,我们带到桌上的第一件事就是我们自己。当我旅行时,我倾向于通过解释我们是谁来开始接触:这片土地拥有地球上最古老的连续文化,以及来自 300 多个祖先的人们。一个其人民与世界上如此多的人民有共同点的国家。”

黄英贤说:“当澳大利亚人放眼世界时,我们看到自己在世界中的反映——正如世界可以看到自己在我们身上的映像一样。这意味着我们有能力与世界各地的人们建立共同的基础。这是一个强大的天然资产,可以建立一致,可以表达我们的决心,看到世界上所有人民的利益与我们自己的利益一起得到维护。这很重要,因为我们的外交政策必须准确和真实地反映我们的价值观和利益,即我们是谁和我们想要什么。这很重要,因为我们的国家力量,比其他任何东西都更多地来自于我们的人民。我们需要利用我们国家力量的所有要素来促进我们的利益,因为在我们地区不受控制的战略竞争的影响是严重的。”

黄英贤说:“因此,今天我想和你们谈谈我们如何避免战争和维护和平——更重要的是,我们如何塑造一个反映我们国家利益和我们共同区域利益的地区。这些利益在于一个按规则、标准和规范运作的地区——在那里,一个大国不会决定一个小国的命运;在那里,每个国家都可以追求自己的愿望,自己的繁荣。而我想谈的是,我们如何通过塑造我们所希望的地区,为维持和平的地区力量平衡作出贡献。战略竞争是在几个层面上运作的。我们可能更愿意分开的领域——经济、外交、战略、军事都交织在一起,并且都被激烈的叙述竞赛所左右。但是,除了了解竞争是如何运作的,我们还需要了解竞争的内容——它不仅仅是大国之间的竞争,实际上不亚于对我们地区和我们世界运作方式的争夺。”

黄英贤说:“许多评论家和战略家喜欢简单地从大国争夺首要地位的角度来看待本地区正在发生的事情。他们喜欢二元论。二元论的吸引力是显而易见的。简单、明确的选择。非黑即白。但是,仅仅从大国争夺首要地位的角度来看待本地区的未来,意味着各国自己的国家利益可能会被忽略。它削弱了每个国家通过大国的棱镜以外的其他方式参与的力量。将讨论范围缩小到我们海岸上的潜在动能冲突也是无益的,因为地区利益受到的挑战远不止于此。胁迫性贸易措施;不可持续的贷款;政治干预;虚假信息;以及重塑从贸易到人权等有利于小国的国际规则、标准和规范——这些都侵犯了各国行使其机构、促进区域平衡和决定自己命运的能力。”

黄英贤说:“因此,在这个存在争夺的地区,像我们这样的国家需要加强关注,关注我们的利益是什么,以及如何维护这些利益。我们的重点必须是我们需要做什么,以便我们能够按照我们自己的法律和价值观生活,由我们自己的公民决定,追求我们自己的繁荣,作出我们自己的选择,尊重但不屈从于他人。我们的重点需要放在如何确保我们的命运不由他人决定,如何确保我们的决定是自己的。如果有任何疑问,俄罗斯对乌克兰的非法且不道德的入侵使我们对生活在一个没有国家占主导地位,也没有国家被支配(no country dominates, and no country is dominated)的地区的利益变得非常明显。诚然,澳大利亚一直需要以这种方式关注自己。但现在尤其如此,因为我们的地区面临着在某些方面前所未有的情况。而这些情况需要我们在国家政策方面表现出空前的协调和雄心。”

黄英贤说:“在南中国海有重叠主张的国家之间的紧张局势已经上升。有争议地物的军事化以及空中和海上的危险遭遇使情况变得更加复杂。中国继续以近一个世纪以来世界上从未见过的速度和规模实现军事现代化,但对其战略意图几乎没有透明度或保证。去年8月,据报道有5枚中国弹道导弹落入日本的专属经济区。而就在上周,我们看到中国在台湾周围进行打击和封锁的演习。除此之外,朝鲜继续破坏稳定,其持续的核武器计划和弹道导弹发射,威胁着我们在日本、韩国和更广泛地区的友邦。总的来说,这些因素的组合和误判的风险构成了几十年来最棘手的情况。”

黄英贤说:“这就是为什么我如此坚定地拒绝参与对地区热点的猜测,无论是喜马拉雅山、台湾、韩半岛还是其他地方。特别是,在政治和媒体界,当涉及到台湾问题时,有很多关于时间表和情景的狂热讨论。任何像我这样(身居要职)的人,如果觉得有冲动要加入这种讨论,应该抵制这种诱惑。这是最危险的猜谜游戏。我在这方面的做法不是简单的政治家寻求避免假设性的问题。它是对利益的坦率和清晰的评估。我们不希望看到任何单边改变现状的行为。我们呼吁通过对话和平解决两岸问题,不威胁或使用武力或胁迫。因为让我绝对明确地表明。一场关于台湾的战争对所有人来说都会是灾难性的。”

黄英贤说:“我们知道不会有真正的赢家,而且我们知道维持现状比任何替代方案都要全面优越。这将是具有挑战性的,既需要保证也需要威慑,但这是最能避免冲突并使本地区生活在和平与繁荣中的主张。因此,我现在要对澳大利亚国家新闻俱乐部说——以避免任何可能的误解:我们的工作是降低任何潜在冲突的热度,同时增加对其他国家的压力,让他们也这样做。阿尔巴尼斯(Anthony Albanese)政府在国内这样做,我们在外交上也这样做。这可能不会像今天那样卖出很多报纸,但它会帮助你们在更长时间内卖出报纸。”

黄英贤说:“具体到我们的对华关系,阿尔巴尼斯政府将保持冷静和连贯,并继续做我们上任以来的工作:在我们能合作的地方合作,在我们必须不同意的地方不同意,明智地处理我们的分歧,最重要的是接触并大力追求我们自己的国家利益。我们从中国要继续做中国的现实出发。其中一部分是世界第二大经济体的现实,它占世界GDP的18%。中国的增长故事在减轻其本国人民、本地区和世界的贫困方面发挥了关键作用。中国经济的急剧增长一直是澳大利亚繁荣的推动力。即便是在多元化发展的情况下,在可预见的未来,中国仍将是澳大利亚最大的贸易伙伴,也是符合我们国家利益的宝贵的外国投资来源。”

黄英贤说:“除此之外,习主席已明确表示,中国的目标是‘到本世纪中叶,把我国建设成为综合国力和国际影响力领先的社会主义现代化强国’。像任何国家一样,中国将部署这一力量,并利用这种影响力来推进其国家利益。我们知道,这些利益有时会与我们的利益以及本地区其他国家的利益不同。重要的是,中国将国家利益理解为通过有利的结果,通过减少不利结果的可能性,以及通过减少分歧或异议的空间来推进。这种理解通过其持续的国家政策得到了协调。像中国这样的大国利用其掌握的一切工具来最大限度地提高自己的韧性和影响力——其国内产业政策;其在基础设施、外交和军事能力方面的大规模国际投资;进入其市场的机会。这种国家政策说明了中等国家,如我们和我们在东南亚和太平洋地区的合作伙伴所面临的挑战。”

黄英贤说:“然而,我们不需要对中国寻求最大限度地发挥其优势而浪费精力,感到震惊或愤怒。相反,我们要把精力用于争取我们自己的优势。我们部署我们自己的国家政策,以塑造一个开放、稳定和繁荣的地区。一个可预测的地区,按照商定的规则、标准和法律运作。在这里,没有国家占主导地位,也没有国家被支配(Where no country dominates, and no country is dominated)。一个主权受到尊重,所有国家都从战略平衡中受益的地区。一个保障我们提出异议的能力的地区。一个维护我们的能动性的地区。一个保护我们决定自己命运的能力的地区。当我们谈及我们的利益时,这就是我们的意思。这样的地区并不是简单地有机存在的。它需要我们的国家努力,特别是在一些人试图改写规则的时候。这种努力不能由澳大利亚政府的单独一个部门来承担。”

黄英贤说:“我们的外交官不能单独做这件事,我们的军队也不能。我们在世界范围内所做的事情需要通过我们的身份和我们在国内所做的事情来加强和强化。这需要对我们国家力量的所有要素进行投资。经济更加多元化,在本土制造更多的东西,应对气候变化并使澳大利亚成为一个可再生能源超级大国,通过国家反腐败委员会(NACC)加强对我们机构的信任,面对我们的网络安全需求,投资于教育和培训,加强人们所依赖的服务,增长工资——所有这些都是使澳大利亚更加强大和抵抗外部冲击的一部分。我们的经济安全、我们作为一个多文化民主国家的国内韧性和我们的国际参与结合起来就是我们的国家政策。阿尔巴尼斯政府正在部署所有这些国家力量的要素,以使澳大利亚在国内更加稳定、自信和安全,并在世界范围内更具影响力。”

黄英贤说:“国家政策的核心是我们的外交政策,在本地区和世界范围内推进澳大利亚的利益和价值观——保证澳大利亚人的安全,确保我们的经济实力。这是我们为塑造本地区而部署的战略,以使其特点更符合我们的利益;避免冲突并维持和平。这也是本地区国家所希望的。东盟对‘可能会破坏该地区的稳定,并最终导致大国之间的误判、严重对抗、公开冲突和不可预测的后果’的行动表示关切,并呼吁坚持多边主义、伙伴关系和合作。正如我一开始所说的,战略竞争不仅仅是关于谁是夺魁者,谁在比赛中领先,或者谁在印度-太平洋拥有战略首要地位。它实际上是关于该地区的特点。它关系到支撑我们安全和繁荣的规则和规范,确保我们在一个开放和包容的区域内的准入,并负责任地管理竞争。”

黄英贤说:“从我在整个地区的旅行中可以清楚地看到,各国不希望生活在一个封闭的、等级森严的地区,那里的规则是由一个大国为满足其自身利益而制定的。相反,我们希望有一个开放和包容的区域,以商定的规则为基础,大小国家都能选择自己的命运。各国希望有一个繁荣的、相互联系的地区,通过一个透明的体系,在全球经济增长的中心共同进行贸易,经济的相互依存不被滥用于政治和战略目的。各国都希望有一个和平和稳定的地区。这意味着要有足够的平衡来阻止侵略和胁迫——如果要实现持久的平衡,包括澳大利亚在内的更多参与者必须为此作出贡献。在这种平衡中,通过外交的战略保证得到了军事威慑的支持。这就是为什么澳大利亚对管理大国竞争的护栏(guardrails)的想法如此投入,从而使其不会陷入冲突。大国在各个层面都有可靠和开放的沟通渠道,以尽量减少误解和误判的风险。在这里,对每个国家的安全政策都有限制。”

黄英贤说:“(美苏两国)在古巴导弹危机后制定的护栏可充当向导。拜登(Joe Biden)总统已经向中国提出了同意护栏的建议。他的建议得到满足符合全世界的利益。我已经对我的中国同行,以及他的前任说过这一点。我将继续这样说。在我不断的旅行中,我将不断提醒我的同事们,推动对大国竞争进行负责任的管理,符合我们所有在地区和平与稳定中具有生存利益的国家的利益。事实上,这是一种超越印度-太平洋的利益。所有国家都需要行使我们的能动性来避免战争,并维护和平。而倡导这一目标是澳大利亚外交的最关键方面。这要从我们外交部门的能力开始——我们在当地将我们的外交政策付诸行动的人。我每天都为澳大利亚外交与贸易部感到自豪,该部由安思捷(Jan Adams)秘书长干练地领导,她今天与我们在一起。他们提供重要的战略洞察力和警告,他们捍卫我们的利益,他们影响和说服,他们在房间里和桌子旁,他们与合作伙伴一起提供澳大利亚的援助,他们为需要的澳大利亚人提供关键的领事支持。”

黄英贤说:“由于上届政府未能确保为我们的外交能力提供长期资源,澳大利亚的外交足迹实际上已经缩减。尽管莫里森政府一直在谈论太平洋地区的发展,但实际上在太平洋地区工作的外交官比自由党上台时还要少。这是在上届政府对我们的发展计划削减118亿澳元的基础上,留下的真空让别人来填补。我们的第一个预算提供了自2011至12年以来最大的一次官方发展援助增长,以建立一个更强大的地区。阿尔巴尼斯政府不久将发布我们的新发展政策。发展援助是国家政策的核心。它帮助我们的区域伙伴在经济上变得更具韧性,发展关键的基础设施,并提供自己的安全,这样他们就不太需要求助于他人。而所有这些都是在总理和政府其他成员的参与下进行的。在我被任命(为外长)后的11个月里,我已经访问了30个国家,其中5个国家的访问次数超过了一次。本周我将访问新喀里多尼亚和图瓦卢,这意味着我作为外交部长将访问所有太平洋岛国论坛成员国。”

黄英贤说:“我们的工作必须从太平洋地区开始,因为太平洋地区是个大家庭,因为上届政府的短处我们需要弥补,也因为这是工党的DNA。我提醒你们,在巴布亚新几内亚从澳大利亚独立的过程中,(澳洲工党籍前总理)惠特拉姆(Gough Whitlam)与(巴布亚新几内亚前总理)大酋长索马雷爵士(Sir Michael Somare)曾是合作伙伴。尽管惠特拉姆并不缺乏出色的改革,但他说:‘如果历史要抹去我的整个公共生涯,除了我对民主的巴布亚新几内亚的独立所做的贡献,我应该感到满足’。太平洋地区的许多国家都经历过大国竞争演变成灾难和冲突的现实——当时他们自己的能动性被搁置,他们的声音被忽视。任何质疑太平洋岛国对澳大利亚安全的战略重要性的人,只需要对历史有一个最简单的了解。虽然我们的战略环境在过去50年里发生了变化,但我们的地理环境没有变化,太平洋对我们自身安全的中心地位也没有变化。”

黄英贤说:“随着战略较量重新回到本地区,当我们共同努力,当我们对太平洋的优先事项作出反应,当我们尊重太平洋能动性时,这种安全就会得到加强。作为太平洋大家庭的一员,我们的优先事项是确保蓝色太平洋保持和平、繁荣并有能力应对我们时代的挑战。这就是为什么我们与我们的区域同行密切合作,帮助太平洋大家庭保持团结,以及为什么我们将继续提升太平洋地区在对我们地区最重要的问题上的声音。我们和太平洋岛国论坛的观点是,太平洋大家庭对太平洋安全负责。我们对太平洋地区正在发生的事情很现实——我们知道事情不会再回到以前的样子了。当国家不尊重太平洋的能动性,当他们强加不可持续的债务负担,或者当宣布后没有兑现惠及社区的承诺时,我们会明确表达我们的关切。我们希望澳大利亚能成为本地区国家的首选合作伙伴。是伙伴,而不是家长。”

黄英贤说:“在上届政府九年的不尊重之后,我们对气候变化采取了真正的行动。我们已经在四年内将我们对太平洋地区的官方发展援助增加了近10亿澳元。我们增加了基础设施投资,并建立了专门的气候和基础设施伙伴关系,为太平洋地区的需求提供具有气候适应性的投资。我们扩大并改善了太平洋地区的劳动力流动计划,并与伙伴政府合作,确保所获得的技能为所有人带来红利。我们加强了海上安全合作,与瓦努阿图签署了双边安全条约,并正在与巴布亚新几内亚签署条约方面取得进展,与斐济签署了部队地位协定,帮助合作伙伴在大规模网络攻击后恢复关键服务,并应对自然灾害——最近在瓦努阿图发生的‘朱迪’和‘凯文’飓风。我们正在帮助区域伙伴提高经济复原力,发展关键的基础设施,并提供自己的安全,这样他们就不太需要求助于他人。如果没有这些投资,其他国家将继续填补真空,澳大利亚将继续失去地位,就像我们在自由党和国家党执政期间那样。”

黄英贤说:“我们对待太平洋地区的原则——小国以加强影响力、杠杆作用和主权的方式进行合作——是澳大利亚外交政策的基本原则,其基础是澳大利亚最伟大的外交部长伊瓦特博士(H. V. Evatt)的工作。澳大利亚的外交政策,在其最佳状态下,从来都是‘你与大国的关系’。像我们这样的国家需要一个用规则来约束权力的国际体系。这正是伊瓦特在(1945年)旧金山会议上努力实现的目标,他明白,仅仅通过赢得当时大国的青睐,永远无法满足我们的利益。然而,无论是孟席斯(Robert Menzies)前总理还是霍华德(John Howard)前总理,澳大利亚历史上一直有人认为我们的外交政策应该仅仅是依附于一个大国。现在有些人暗示我们应该依附于他们预期的霸权中国。但是,阿尔巴尼斯政府将始终对澳大利亚抱有更大的期望。我们将始终追求更大的自力更生和更积极的外交政策。现如今,我们将伊瓦特的遗产现代化,与本地区的伙伴和朋友合作,在维持对我们所有人都有利的平衡方面发挥能动性作用。”

黄英贤说:“这就是我们通过与整个地区的伙伴进行有价值的双边战略合作所寻求实现的目标。这也是我们通过与东盟和太平洋岛国论坛的区域伙伴关系所寻求的。当(阿尔巴尼斯)总理欢迎莫迪和岸田首相以及拜登总统下个月访问澳大利亚时,我们将致意四方安全对话(Quad)的重要贡献,也致意日本和印度的力量、分量和影响力,它们本身就在为战略平衡作出贡献。而奥库斯协议代表了我们与美国和英国关系的演变,有助于使澳大利亚本身成为本地区更强大的合作伙伴。我们的做法在太平洋地区很重要,在东南亚也很重要。回到之前的话题——有些人认为东南亚只是一个大国竞争的舞台。我们不赞同这种观点。因为它剥夺了东南亚国家以及东盟这个持久的核心机构的影响力、活力和作用。剥夺了他们为追求国家和集体利益而做出主权选择的能力。它掩盖了东南亚国家内部和之间存在的复杂动态——我们地区的国家在面对战略竞争时寻求最大化其影响力的方式。”

黄英贤说:“以及他们如何决定自己对其主权所面临的真实和直接挑战的反应,包括在南中国海。它淡化了澳大利亚和我们的伙伴可以与本地区合作以加强我们的集体安全和繁荣的方式。更重要的是,它把消极怠工作为一种可行的选择:在别人代表我们作出选择的时候,我们可以袖手旁观,希望得到最好的结果。这削弱了我们——澳大利亚和我们在东南亚的邻国塑造我们希望生活的地区的能力。这就是为什么阿尔巴尼斯政府将与东盟及其成员国的接触作为核心优先事项。到我们政府上台一周年时,我将作为外交部长访问东南亚的每一个国家,除了缅甸。”

黄英贤说:“这种外交努力必须辅之以更多的经济接触。本届政府将于今年晚些时候发布的《2040年东南亚经济战略》,以及我们与区域伙伴的自由贸易协定网络,都是这方面的核心。这不仅是互惠互利的,而且创造了共享价值,这是和平的重要激励因素。在一个拥有超过6.75亿人口的多元化地区,我们必须有针对性地了解如何最大限度地发挥我们的影响力。并与合作伙伴合作,加强和扩大这种影响力。共同创造机会,并向本地区表明,除了安全利益之外,还有其他利益可以培养。要建立一种确信,即知道他们的成功就是我们的成功。这就是为什么我们鼓励美国和来自印度-太平洋及其他地区的其他伙伴在东南亚进行更大的经济参与,包括通过‘印太经济框架’(IPEF)。”

黄英贤说:“如果不清楚美国对这种平衡的重要性,我们就无法谈论我们想要的平衡地区。我认为现在是时候进行一些现实检查了。在澳大利亚历史上,没有比科廷(John Curtin、澳洲前总理)在二战时转向美国更重要的转折点。美国是我们最亲密的盟友和主要的战略伙伴。如果没有美国及其对本地区的安全保障,印度-太平洋就不会享有长期的、不间断的稳定和繁荣。整个地区都受益于美国的参与,受益于他们对本地区战略平衡的贡献。美国经常被谈论为不可缺少的大国。它仍然如此。但这种不可或缺性的性质已经改变。在我们寻求战略平衡的过程中,所有国家都在行使其能动性以实现和平与繁荣,美国是平衡多极地区的核心。许多对美国的不完美自鸣得意的人会发现,如果美国停止发挥其作用,世界就会变得不那么令人满意。”

黄英贤说:“话虽如此,我们不能只把它交给美国。本地区的所有国家都必须通过外交、经济和其他方面的接触来行使其权力,以维持本地区的平衡——并维护支撑了几十年和平与繁荣的规范和规则。而这种平衡必须得到军事能力的支持。上个月,澳大利亚和我们的奥库斯协议合作伙伴宣布了我们获得核动力潜艇的途径——这是我们历史上对国防能力最大的一次投资,代表了我们国家、我们的国防军和我们的经济的一个转型时刻。正如我们每个人都有责任通过我们的外交帮助维持和平的条件一样,我们也有责任在集体威慑侵略方面发挥我们的作用。如果任何国家能够计算出他们可以成功地支配另一个国家,那么这个地区就会变得不稳定,冲突的风险就会增加。正如《2020年国防战略更新》所强调的,澳大利亚必须对我们自己的安全负责,这意味着我们必须增强我们自己的能力,以发挥威慑作用。”

黄英贤说:“在一个军事现代化的时代,由于其他国家的军队可以在更大的范围内,以更快的速度和更高的精度和杀伤力进行作战,对我们的安全负责意味着能够从更远的距离将潜在对手的部队和基础设施置于危险之中。通过我们自己拥有强大的防御能力,并与投资于自身能力的伙伴合作,我们改变了任何潜在侵略者的计算方式。我们必须确保任何国家都不会得出结论,认为冲突的好处超过了风险。这对于确保我们国家和人民的安全和保障至关重要。我们的外交和国防政策是我们如何使澳大利亚在世界范围内更强大、更有影响力的两个基本和相互依赖的部分。它们共同使各国更难通过武力或威胁使用武力来胁迫其他国家损害其利益。它们共同促进了维持我们地区和平的战略力量平衡。正如我的同事(国防部长)马尔斯(Richard Marles)所说:‘威慑并不是合作的替代品——它们一起是相互加强的’。”

黄英贤说:“在我们这样的民主国家,像奥库斯协议这样大的工程应该引起审查。有些人担心价格太高。对此有两个回应。首先,从我们地区军事扩军的规模和速度来看,需要进行严肃的财政投资,以使我们自己拥有可靠的防御能力,并为区域平衡作出贡献。第二,大部分的金融投资是在我们自己身上。在我们自己的工作、工业和主权能力方面。让我们不要忘记,奥库斯协议不仅仅是关于潜艇。它也是关于联合开发能力,包括人工智能、量子技术和网络。有些人担心时间框架。的确,在九年的能力公告中,我们失去了很多时间,但没有交付。但我们不能回到过去;我们只能开始工作,以现实的速度和最低的过渡风险提供必要的能力。这就是为什么该最佳途径不仅仅涉及获取弗吉尼亚级潜艇或建造我们自己的潜艇,而且还涉及延长柯林斯级潜艇的寿命。”

黄英贤说:“还有人对核不扩散问题提出了关切。工党在倡导切实可行的国际防扩散与裁军努力方面有着自豪的历史,我们已经批准了《不扩散核武器条约》,并将确保我们继续以最高和最严格的标准履行其义务。我们的奥库斯协议合作伙伴理解并认可澳大利亚在国际法下的承诺,包括《拉罗通加条约》(即《南太平洋无核区条约》)。海军核推进符合我们在《拉罗通加条约》下的义务。美国已经确认,轮流访问澳大利亚的核动力潜艇将采用常规武器。虽然我们不是该条约的缔约国,但澳大利亚将继续以符合《曼谷条约》(即《东南亚无核武器区条约》)基本原则的方式行事。我们已经并将继续定期和透明地与国际原子能机构和我们的区域伙伴进行接触。我感谢我们的合作伙伴愿意参与,并感谢他们公开表示赞赏我们为使他们了解情况而作出的努力。我特别注意到印度尼西亚的评论,即:‘维护本地区的和平与稳定是所有国家的责任。至关重要的是,所有国家都要成为这一努力的一部分’。这正是我们正在做的事情。”

黄英贤说:“澳大利亚在许多方面是幸运的——尤其是我们受益于我们最伟大的政治家的远见卓识:科廷、伊瓦特和惠特拉姆。他们为我们指明了在世界范围内促进我们国家利益的道路。这条道路今天仍在继续,使他们的遗产、联盟、伙伴关系、规则和区域现代化。在我们面对今天的情况时,这条道路一如既往地指导着我们,使我们的后代受益的远见卓识。我想用我对世界各地的许多听众提出的一个观点来结束,因为它确实触及了问题的核心。当今的情况已经促使人们将其与1914年、1930年代和1962年进行比较。这些比较应该作为警告,但仅此而已。因为我们不是历史的人质。我们决定如何对待当下。”

黄英贤补充说:“我们正在对我们的国家力量进行投资,不仅仅是为了防止区域竞赛,而是为了塑造和影响它,以促进我们的国家和共同利益。我们正在通过对未来军事力量的重大军事投资,包括通过奥库斯伙伴关系,创造威慑力。我们正在通过创造国内经济的韧性,解决气候变化和能源安全问题,通过更强大的供应链,在澳大利亚制造更多的东西,以及培训我们的人民来实现这一目标。而我们正在通过投资我们的外交力量,更新澳大利亚最紧密的伙伴关系,以及推进我们的利益和价值观来实现这一目标。我们的决定是利用我们国家力量的所有要素来塑造符合我们利益的世界,并使之变得更好。非常感谢大家的关注!”

National Press Club Address, Australian interests in a regional balance of power

https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/national-press-club-address-australian-interests-regional-balance-power 

Speech,  Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong 

17 April 2023

Thank you to the National Press Club for having me today, and to Jane for your introduction and moderating today’s discussion.

Thank you all for being here. I acknowledge members of the diplomatic corps, and my ministerial colleague Pat Conroy.

I want to particularly acknowledge one of my guests today, Allan Gyngell.

Allan has been an official and unofficial adviser to governments for decades, always in singular service of Australia’s national interest.

He is the definitive historian of Australian foreign policy. He is the finest writer about Australian foreign policy. He is, frankly, the finest mind in Australian foreign policy. And possibly also the smallest ego in Australian foreign policy.

I acknowledge the traditional owners of the land on which we meet, the Ngunnawal and Ngambri peoples, and pay my respect to elders past, present and emerging.

First Nations peoples were this land’s first diplomats and traders.

But it was just this month that Mr Justin Mohamed commenced his appointment as Australia’s inaugural Ambassador for First Nations People.

Elevating First Nations perspectives will strengthen our connections across the world and in our region, especially across the Blue Pacific.

The potential power of those connections has been neglected for too long, and it has been to our own detriment, when we ought to bring everything we have to the table.

Self-evidently, the first thing we bring to the table is ourselves. As I travel I tend to begin engagement by explaining who we are: a land that is home to the oldest continuous culture on the planet, and to people from more than 300 ancestries.

A nation whose people share common ground with so many of the world’s peoples.

When Australians look out to the world, we see ourselves reflected in it – just as the world can see itself reflected in us.

What that means is we have the ability to build on common ground with people around the world. This is a powerful natural asset for building alignment, for articulating our determination to see the interests of all the world’s peoples upheld, alongside our own.

This matters because our foreign policy must be an accurate and authentic reflection of our values and interests – of who we are and what we want.

And it matters because our national power, more than anything else, comes from our people.

We need to harness all elements of our national power to advance our interests, when the implications of unchecked strategic competition in our region are grave.

So today I want to talk to you about how we avert war and maintain peace – and more than that, how we shape a region that reflects our national interests and our shared regional interests.

Those interests lie in a region that operates by rules, standards and norms – where a larger country does not determine the fate of a smaller country; where each country can pursue its own aspirations, its own prosperity.

And I want to talk about how we contribute to the regional balance of power that keeps the peace by shaping the region we want.

Strategic competition is operating on several levels. Domains that we might prefer to separate – economic, diplomatic, strategic, military – all interwoven, and all framed by an intense contest of narratives.

But as well as understanding how competition is operating, we need to understand what is being competed for – that it is more than great power rivalry and is in fact nothing less than a contest over the way our region and our world work.

Many commentators and strategists prefer to look at what is happening in the region simply in terms of great powers competing for primacy. They love a binary. And the appeal of a binary is obvious. Simple, clear choices. Black and white.

But viewing the future of the region simply in terms of great powers competing for primacy means countries’ own national interests can fall out of focus.

It diminishes the power of each country to engage other than through the prism of a great power.

It is also unhelpful to narrow this discussion to the potential of kinetic conflict on our shores, when regional interests are challenged by actions that fall far short of that.

Coercive trade measures; unsustainable lending; political interference; disinformation; and reshaping international rules, standards and norms that have benefited smaller countries, from trade to human rights – these all encroach on the ability of countries to exercise their agency, contribute to regional balance and decide their own destinies.

So countries like ours in this contested region need to sharpen our focus, on what our interests are, and how to uphold them.

Our focus must be on what we need to do so we can live according to our own laws and values, determined by our own citizens, pursuing our own prosperity, making our own choices, respecting but not deferring to others.

Our focus needs to be on how we ensure our fate is not determined by others, how we ensure our decisions are our own. And if there were any doubt, Russia’s illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine renders stark our interest in living in a region where no country dominates, and no country is dominated.

It’s true that Australia has always needed to apply ourselves with this focus. But it is especially true right now because our region faces circumstances in some ways unprecedented.

And these circumstances require a response of unprecedented coordination and ambition in our statecraft.

Tensions have risen between states with overlapping claims in the South China Sea.

Compounding that have been the militarisation of disputed features and dangerous encounters in the air and at sea.

China continues to modernise its military at a pace and scale not seen in the world for nearly a century with little transparency or assurance about its strategic intent.

In August last year, five Chinese ballistic missiles were reported to have fallen in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. And just last week, we saw China practice strikes and blockades around Taiwan.

On top of that, North Korea continues to destabilise, with its ongoing nuclear weapons program and ballistic missile launches, threatening our friends in Japan, the Republic of Korea and the broader region.

Altogether, this combination of factors and the risk of miscalculation comprise the most confronting circumstances in decades.

This is why I am so steadfast in refusing to engage in speculation about regional flashpoints, whether the Himalayas, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula or anywhere else.

In particular, there is much frenzied discussion in political and media circles over timelines and scenarios when it comes to Taiwan. Anyone in positions like mine who feels an urge to add to that discussion should resist the temptation.

It is the most dangerous of parlour games.

My approach to this is not simply a politician seeking to avoid hypothetical questions. It is a frank and clear-eyed assessment of interests.

We do not want to see any unilateral change to the status quo. We call for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues through dialogue without the threat or use of force or coercion.

Because let me be absolutely clear. A war over Taiwan would be catastrophic for all.

We know that there would be no real winners, and we know maintaining the status quo is comprehensively superior to any alternative. It will be challenging, requiring both reassurance and deterrence, but it is the proposition most capable of averting conflict and enabling the region to live in peace and prosperity.

So I will say it now to the National Press Club – to avoid any possible misunderstanding: our job is to lower the heat on any potential conflict, while increasing pressure on others to do the same. The Albanese Government does that here at home, and we do that in our diplomacy.

That may not sell as many newspapers today, but it will help you to sell them for a lot longer.

In our China relationship specifically, the Albanese Government will be calm and consistent, and continue to do as we have since coming to office: cooperate where we can, disagree where we must, manage our differences wisely, and above all else, engage in and vigorously pursue our own national interest.

We start with the reality that China is going to keep being China.

Part of that is the reality of the world’s second largest economy, representing 18% of the world’s GDP. China’s growth story has played a crucial role in alleviating poverty for its own people, the region and the world.

Its dramatic economic growth has been a driver of Australian prosperity.

Even with increased diversification, China will remain Australia’s largest trading partner for the foreseeable future, and a valued source of foreign investment, where it meets our national interests.

Beyond that, President Xi has made clear China’s goal of being “a great modern socialist country that leads the world in terms of composite national strength and international influence by the middle of the century.”

Like any country, China will deploy this strength and utilise this influence to advance its national interests.

We know at times these interests will differ from our interests, and from others in the region.

Importantly, China understands national interest as being advanced by favourable outcomes, by reducing the possibility of unfavourable outcomes – and by reducing the space for disagreement or dissent.

This understanding is coordinated through its persistent statecraft.

A great power like China uses every tool at its disposal to maximise its own resilience and influence - its domestic industry policy; its massive international investment in infrastructure, diplomacy and military capability; access to its markets.

This statecraft illustrates the challenge for middle powers, like us and our partners in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Yet we need not waste energy with shock or outrage at China seeking to maximise its advantage.

Instead, we channel our energy in pressing for our own advantage.

We deploy our own statecraft toward shaping a region that is open, stable and prosperous. A predictable region, operating by agreed rules, standards and laws. Where no country dominates, and no country is dominated. A region where sovereignty is respected, and all countries benefit from a strategic equilibrium.

A region that safeguards our capacity to disagree.

A region that preserves our agency.

A region that protects our ability to decide our own destiny.

When we talk about our interests, this is what we mean.

That kind of region doesn’t simply exist organically. It demands our national effort, especially as some seek to rewrite the rules.

That effort cannot be left to one or another arm of Australian Government.

Our diplomats cannot do it alone, nor can our military. And what we do in the world needs to reinforce and be reinforced by who we are and what we do at home.

It takes investment in all elements of our national power.

A more diversified economy, making more things here, responding to climate change and making Australia a renewable energy superpower, strengthening trust in our institutions through the National Anti-Corruption Commission, facing our cyber security needs, investments in education and training, strengthening the services people rely on, growth in wages - all part of making Australia more robust and resistant to external shocks.

Our economic security, our domestic resilience as a multicultural democracy and our international engagement combine as our statecraft.

The Albanese Government is deploying all of these elements of national power to make Australia more stable, confident and secure at home, and more influential in the world.

Central to statecraft is our foreign policy, advancing Australian interests and values in our region and the world – to keep Australians safe, to ensure our economic strength.

It’s the strategy we deploy to shape the region so that its character is closer to our interests; to avert conflict and maintain peace.

That is what the countries of the region want too. ASEAN has expressed concern over actions that “could destabilise the region and eventually lead to miscalculation, serious confrontation, open conflicts and unpredictable consequences among major powers” and called for upholding multilateralism, partnership and cooperation.

As I said at the outset, strategic competition is not merely about who is top dog, who is ahead in the race, or who holds strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific.

It’s actually about the character of the region. It’s about the rules and norms that underpin our security and prosperity, that ensure our access within an open and inclusive region, and that manage competition responsibly.

It’s clear to me from my travels throughout the region that countries don’t want to live in a closed, hierarchical region where the rules are dictated by a single major power to suit its own interests.

Instead, we want an open and inclusive region, based on agreed rules, where countries of all sizes can choose their own destiny.

Countries want a prosperous, connected region, trading together at the epicentre of global economic growth, through a transparent system, where economic interdependence is not misused for political and strategic ends.

And countries want a region that is peaceful and stable. That means sufficient balance to deter aggression and coercion – balance to which more players, including Australia, must contribute if it is to be durable.

A balance where strategic reassurance through diplomacy is supported by military deterrence.

It is why Australia is so invested in the idea of guardrails to manage great power competition, so it does not career into conflict.

Guardrails where the major powers have reliable and open channels of communication at all levels to minimise the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation. Where limits are established on each country’s security policies.

The guardrails that were developed in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis serve as a guide.

President Biden has made overtures to China toward agreeing guardrails. It is in all the world’s interests that his overtures are met. I have said this to my Chinese counterpart, and to his predecessor. And I will keep saying it.

And in my continuing travels, I will keep reminding my colleagues that it is in the interests of all of us with an existential interest in regional peace and stability to press for the responsible management of great power competition.

Indeed, this is an interest that extends beyond the Indo-Pacific.

All countries need to exercise our agency to avert war, and maintain peace.

And advocating this objective is the most critical aspect of Australia’s diplomacy.

This starts with the capability of our foreign service – our people on the ground that put our foreign policy into action.

I am proud every day of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, so ably led by Jan Adams – here with us today.

They provide vital strategic insights and warning, they champion our interests, they influence and persuade, they are in the room and at the table, they work with partners to deliver Australian assistance, they provide critical consular support for Australians in need.

As a result of the previous Government’s failure to ensure long-term resourcing for our diplomatic capability, Australia’s diplomatic footprint has actually shrunk.

For all their talk of a Pacific step up, the Morrison Government actually had fewer diplomats working in the Pacific than when the Liberals took office.

This is on top of the former government’s $11.8 billion of cuts to our development program, which left vacuums for others to fill.

Our first budget delivered the single biggest ODA increase since 2011-12 to build a stronger region.

The Albanese Government will soon release our new development policy. Development assistance is central to statecraft. It helps our regional partners become more economically resilient, develop critical infrastructure and provide their own security so they have less need to call on others.

And all of this led by the engagement of the Prime Minister and other members of the Government.

In the eleven months since my appointment, I have visited 30 countries, five of them more than once.

This week I will visit New Caledonia and Tuvalu, meaning I will have travelled to all Pacific Island Forum members as foreign minister.

Our work had to start in the Pacific because the Pacific is family, because of the shortcomings of the previous government we needed to remedy, and because it is in Labor’s DNA.

I remind you of Gough Whitlam’s partnership with Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare in Papua New Guinea’s independence from Australia. Though Whitlam was not short of remarkable reforms, he said:

If history were to obliterate the whole of my public career, save my contribution to the independence of a democratic PNG, I should rest content.

Many countries in the Pacific have lived the reality of great power competition spiralling into catastrophe and conflict – when their own agency was sidelined and their voices ignored.

Anyone who questions the strategic importance of Pacific islands to Australia’s security needs only acquire the briefest familiarity with history.

While our strategic circumstances have changed in the last 50 years, our geography has not, and nor has the centrality of the Pacific to our own security.

With the return of strategic contest to the region, this security is enhanced when we work together, when we respond to Pacific priorities, and when we respect Pacific institutions.

As a member of the Pacific family, our priority is to ensure the Blue Pacific remains peaceful, prosperous and equipped to respond to the challenges of our time.

That’s why we have worked closely with our regional counterparts to help the Pacific family stay united, and why we will continue to elevate Pacific voices on the issues that matter most to our region.

Our view and the view of the Pacific Islands Forum is that the Pacific family is responsible for Pacific security.

We’re realistic about what is happening in the Pacific – we know that things won’t go back to how they were before.

We make our concerns clear when countries don’t respect Pacific institutions, when they impose unsustainable debt burdens, or when announcements aren’t followed by delivery that benefits communities.

We want Australia to be a partner of choice for the countries of our region. Partners, not patriarchs.

We have delivered real action on climate change, after nine years of disrespect from the previous government.

We have increased our ODA to the Pacific by nearly a billion dollars over four years.

We’ve boosted our infrastructure investments and established a dedicated climate and infrastructure partnership to deliver climate-resilient investments for Pacific needs.

We’ve expanded and improved Pacific labour mobility programs and are working with partner governments to ensure the skills gained pay dividends for all.

We’ve enhanced our maritime security cooperation, signed a bilateral security treaty with Vanuatu and are making progress on a treaty with PNG, signed a status of forces agreement with Fiji, helped partners restore critical services in the wake of massive cyber attacks and responded to natural disasters – most recently cyclones Judy and Kevin in Vanuatu.

We are helping regional partners become more economically resilient, develop critical infrastructure and provide their own security so they have less need to call on others.

Without these investments, others will continue to fill the vacuum and Australia will continue to lose ground as we did under the Liberals and Nationals.

The principle of our approach to the Pacific - smaller countries working together in a way that strengthens influence, leverage and sovereignty - is a fundamental principle of Australian foreign policy, grounded in the work of Australia’s greatest foreign minister, Dr Herbert Evatt.

Australia’s foreign policy, at its best, has never simply been “what you do with the great powers.”

Countries like us need an international system that constrains power with rules.

That was what Evatt worked so hard to achieve at the San Francisco Conference, understanding that our interests could never be served just by winning favour with the great powers of the day.

Yet whether Menzies or Howard, there have been those throughout Australia’s history who have thought our foreign policy should simply be to attach ourselves to a great power.

Now some imply we should attach ourselves to what they anticipate will be a hegemonic China.

But the Albanese Government will always be more ambitious for Australia. We will always pursue greater self-reliance and a more active foreign policy.

Today we modernise the Evatt legacy, working with partners and friends in the region to exercise agency in maintaining an equilibrium that benefits us all.

That is what we seek to achieve through our valued bilateral strategic cooperation with partners throughout the region.

That is what we seek to do through our regional partnerships with ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum.

When the Prime Minister welcomes Prime Ministers Modi and Kishida and President Biden to Australia next month, we will acknowledge the critical contribution of the Quad and also the power, weight and influence of Japan and India, which in their own right are contributing to strategic balance.

And AUKUS represents an evolution of our relationships with the US and the UK, helping make Australia itself a stronger partner for the region.

Our approach matters in the Pacific and it matters in Southeast Asia.

To return to an earlier point—some would see Southeast Asia as a mere theatre for great power competition.

That is not a view we share.

Because it strips Southeast Asian nations—and the enduring, central institution of ASEAN—of their influence, dynamism and agency.

Of their ability to make sovereign choices in pursuit of their national and collective interests.

It glosses over the complex dynamics that exist within and between Southeast Asian nations—the ways in which the countries of our region seek to maximise their influence in the face of strategic competition.

And how they determine their own responses to the real and direct challenges to their sovereignty, including in the South China Sea.

It downplays the ways in which Australia and our partners can work with the region to enhance our collective security and prosperity.

And importantly, it presents passivity as a feasible option: that it’s possible to stand by and hope for the best, while others make choices on our behalf.

That diminishes our ability—both Australia and our neighbours in Southeast Asia—to shape the kind of region we want to live in.

That’s why the Albanese Government has made engagement with ASEAN and its members a core priority. By the first anniversary of our Government, I will have visited every country in Southeast Asia as foreign minister, except Myanmar.

This diplomatic effort must be complemented by increased economic engagement.

The Government’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, due for release later this year, is central to that, as is our web of free trade agreements with regional partners.

Not only is this mutually beneficial, but it creates the shared value that is a critical incentive for peace.

In a diverse region of more than 675 million people, we have to be targeted about how we can maximise our impact.

And work with partners to reinforce and multiply that effect.

To create opportunity together, and to demonstrate to the region that there are interests to nurture beyond security interests.

To build the assurance that comes with knowing that their success is our success.

That’s why we encourage greater economic engagement in Southeast Asia by the United States and other partners from the Indo-Pacific and beyond, including through IPEF.

We can’t talk about the balanced region we want without being clear about America’s importance to that balance.

And I think it’s time for some reality checks here.

There is no greater turning point in Australian history than Curtin’s wartime turn to America.

The United States is our closest ally and principal strategic partner.

The Indo-Pacific would not have enjoyed its long, uninterrupted period of stability and prosperity without the US and its security guarantee to the region.

The whole region benefits from US engagement, from their contribution to the region’s strategic balance.

America has often been talked of as the indispensable power. It remains so. But the nature of that indispensability has changed.

As we seek a strategic equilibrium, with all countries exercising their agency to achieve peace and prosperity, America is central to balancing a multipolar region.

Many who take self-satisfied potshots at America’s imperfections would find the world a lot less satisfactory if America ceased to play its role.

Having said that, we cannot just leave it to the US.

All countries of the region must exercise their agency through diplomatic, economic and other engagement to maintain the region’s balance – and to uphold the norms and rules that have underpinned decades of peace and prosperity.

And this balance must be underwritten by military capability.

Last month, Australia and our AUKUS partners announced our pathway for acquiring nuclear-powered submarines – the single biggest investment in our defence capability in our history, representing a transformational moment for our nation, our Defence Force and our economy.

Just as we each have a responsibility to help maintain the conditions for peace through our diplomacy, we also have a responsibility to play our part in collective deterrence of aggression.

If any country can make the calculation that they can successfully dominate another, the region becomes unstable and the risk of conflict increases.

As the Defence Strategic Update in 2020 emphasised, Australia must take responsibility for our own security, meaning we must grow our own ability to deliver deterrent effects.

In an age of military modernisation, as other militaries can operate from increased range, with faster speed, and greater precision and lethality, taking responsibility for our security means being able to hold potential adversaries’ forces and infrastructure at risk from a greater distance.

By having strong defence capabilities of our own, and by working with partners investing in their own capabilities, we change the calculus for any potential aggressor.

We must ensure that no state will ever conclude that the benefits of conflict outweigh the risks. This is fundamental to assuring the safety and security of our nation and our people.

Our foreign and defence policies are two essential and interdependent parts of how we make Australia stronger and more influential in the world.

Together, they make it harder for states to coerce other states against their interests through force or the threatened use of force.

Together, they contribute to the strategic balance of power that keeps the peace in our region.

As my colleague Richard Marles has said, “deterrence isn’t an alternative to cooperation – together, they are mutually reinforcing.”

Now, an undertaking as big as AUKUS in a democracy like ours should attract scrutiny.

Some are concerned the price is too high. There are two responses to that.

First, in the context of the scale and speed of the military build-up in our region, a serious financial investment is required to have credible defence capabilities of our own, and making our contribution to regional balance.

Second, much of the financial investment is in ourselves. In our own jobs, industry and sovereign capability. Let’s not forget AUKUS is about more than submarines. It’s also about joint development of capabilities including artificial intelligence, quantum technology and cyber.

Some are concerned about timeframes. It’s true that we lost a lot of time over nine years of capability announcements with no delivery. But we can’t go back in time; we can only get to work on the best way forward to deliver the necessary capability, at a realistic pace, with the lowest transition risk.

It is why the pathway doesn’t just involve acquiring Virginia class submarines or building our own, but also extending the life of the Collins class.

And some have raised concerns about nuclear non-proliferation.

Labor has a proud history of championing practical international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, having ratified the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – and will ensure we continue to meet its obligations to the highest and most rigorous standards.

Our AUKUS partners understand and recognise Australia’s commitments under international law, including the Treaty of Rarotonga.

Naval nuclear-propulsion is consistent with our obligations under the Treaty of Rarotonga.

The US has confirmed that the nuclear-powered submarines visiting Australia on rotation will be conventionally-armed.

And while we are not a party to it, Australia will continue to act in a manner that is consistent with the basic principles of the Bangkok Treaty.

We have and will continue to engage, regularly and transparently, with the IAEA and with our regional partners.

I thank our partners for their willingness to engage – and for their public messages of appreciation of our efforts to keep them informed.

I particularly note the comment from Indonesia, that: “maintaining peace and stability in the region is the responsibility of all countries. It is critical for all countries to be a part of this effort.” That is precisely what we are doing.

Australia is fortunate in so many ways – not least in the way we benefit from the foresight of our greatest statespeople: Curtin, Evatt and Whitlam.

They showed us the path to advance our national interests in the world. That path continues today, in modernising their legacies, of alliance, partnerships, rules and region.

That path guides us as well as ever as we face today’s circumstances with the foresight to benefit the generations that follow us.

I want to conclude with a point I make with many audiences around the world, because it really gets to the heart of it.

Today’s circumstances have prompted comparisons with 1914, the 1930s, and 1962.

Those comparisons should serve as warnings, but nothing more.

Because we are not hostages to history. We decide what to do with the present.

We are investing in our national power, not just to guard against regional contest, but to shape and influence it to advance our national and shared interests.

We are doing this by creating deterrence, with major military investments in future capability, including through the AUKUS partnership.

We are doing this by creating domestic economic resilience, addressing climate change and energy security, through more robust supply chains, making more things in Australia, and skilling our people.

And we are doing this by investing in our diplomatic power, renewing Australia’s closest partnerships, and advancing our interests and values.

Our decision is to use all elements of our national power to shape the world in our interests, and to shape it for the better.

Media enquiries

  • Minister's office: (02) 6277 7500
  • DFAT Media Liaison: (02) 6261 1555
[ 打印 ]
阅读 ()评论 (0)
评论
目前还没有任何评论
登录后才可评论.