风萧萧_Frank
以文会友
【编者按】杰克·马特洛克（Jack Matlock，1929.10.1—）是美国驻苏联最后一任大使，见证了美苏关系的重大变局及随后的发展走向。本月14日，就在俄乌战争一触即发之时，92岁的马特洛克在美国美俄协议委员会（ACURA）官网发表长篇文章，题为Today's Crisis Over Ukraine（今日的乌克兰危机），并在副标题称此为一场“蓄意促成的”（willfully precipitated）危机。文章虽发表在战争爆发前，却准确地预测和分析了战争的必然性以及导致战争的诸多因素，特别对美国长期以来针对俄罗斯的外交政策进行了深刻而犀利的反思，并透露出一些重大的珍贵史实，值得一读。特予全文编译分享。
美国驻苏联大使杰克·马特洛克（1987-1991）
美苏协议委员会官网发表马特洛克文章（官网截图）
副题：
今天，我们正面临着一场本可避免的危机。这是一场可以预见的、也确曾被预见的、却又被蓄意促成的危机。但这也是运用常识即可轻易解决的危机。
我们每天都被告知，乌克兰可能即将发生战争。我们还被告知，俄罗斯军队正在乌克兰边境集结，随时可能发动袭击。美国公民被建议离开乌克兰，美国大使馆工作人员的家属正在被疏散。与此同时，乌克兰总统建议民众不要恐慌，并明确表示他不认为俄罗斯即将入侵。
俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京否认他有任何入侵乌克兰的意图。他的要求是停止增加北约新成员的进程，特别是要向俄罗斯保证，乌克兰和格鲁吉亚永远不会成为北约成员。拜登总统拒绝提供此类保证，但明确表示愿意继续讨论欧洲战略稳定问题。同时，乌克兰政府已明确表示，它无意执行 2015 年达成的将顿巴斯省重新纳入乌克兰并拥有高度地方自治权的协议——这份与俄罗斯、法国和德国达成的协议得到了美国的支持。
也许我错了，可悲地错了。但我不能否认，我们正在目睹一场被美国媒体精英严重放大且被用以服务于国内政治目的精心策划的闹剧。面对不断上升的通货膨胀、奥密克戎的肆虐、从阿富汗撤军的指责（在很大程度上是不公平的），以及未能获得本党对“重建更好”法案的全力支持，拜登政府在低迷的支持下步履蹒跚，就像它为今年的国会选举做准备一样。既然在国内问题上取得明显的“胜利”似乎越来越不可能，为什么不假装他通过“对抗弗拉基米尔·普京”阻止了对乌克兰的入侵呢？实际上，普京总统的目标似乎很可能正如他所说的那样——正如他自 2007年在慕尼黑发表演讲以来所说的那样。简言之，就是：“请至少对我们展示哪怕一点尊重嘛。我们并不威胁你或你的盟友，你们为何拒绝我们的安全却又坚持你们自己的安全？”
1991 年苏联解体时，许多观察家忽略了标志着 1980 年代末和 1990 年代初迅速发展的事件，认为冷战结束了。他们错了。冷战至少在两年前就结束了。它以谈判结束，符合各方的利益。乔治·H. W.布什总统（以下简称老布什）希望戈尔巴乔夫能够设法将十二个非波罗的海共和国中的大多数保持在一个自愿联邦中。 1991 年 8 月 1 日，他在乌克兰议会（最高议会）发表讲话，支持戈尔巴乔夫的自愿联邦计划，并警告不要“自杀式民族主义”。后一句话意指格鲁吉亚领导人Zviad Gamsakurdia 对苏维埃格鲁吉亚境内少数民族的迫害。出于我将在其他地方解释的原因，这些话也适用于今天的乌克兰。
底线是：并不像美国的“芸芸众生”和大多数俄罗斯公众都普遍认为的那样，美国支持甚至导致了苏联解体。我们在爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛的整个独立过程中都予以支持，但也和苏联的态度是一致的：苏联议会的最后一项行动就是将他们的独立要求合法化。顺便说一句，普京尽管经常表达恐惧的声音，但从未威胁要重新吞并波罗的海国家或索要他们的任何领土。尽管他批评了一些剥夺俄罗斯族人全部公民权利的做法，但这也是欧盟承诺强制执行的原则。
但是，让我们回到副标题中的第一个断言……
里根总统（左）与戈尔巴乔夫总书记在日内瓦峰会上握手，桌子尽头是马特洛克（网络）
危机可以避免吗？
好吧，既然普京总统的主要诉求是保证北约将不再接纳其他成员，特别是乌克兰或格鲁吉亚，那么如果北约在冷战结束后没有扩大联盟，或者如果这一扩张能与在欧洲建立包括俄罗斯在内的安全结构相协调，那么显然，当前的危机就没有爆发的基础。
也许我们应该更宏观地看待这个问题。其他国家如何应对其边境附近的外国军事联盟？既然我们在谈论美国的政策，也许我们应该关注一下美国对外界试图与其周边国家建立联盟的反应方式。还记得“门罗宣言”、那个涵盖整个半球势力范围的“门罗主义”吗（1823年，美国总统詹姆斯·门罗在国会演说中宣称，欧洲列强不得再殖民美洲或涉足美国与墨西哥等美洲国家主权相关的事物，否则美国将视其为敌意行为——译注）？
我们当时是认真的。当我们得知凯撒的德国在第一次世界大战期间试图将墨西哥作为盟友时，这成为我们随后对德宣战的重大理由。然后在我有生之年，我们经历了古巴导弹危机。因为我当年在莫斯科的美国大使馆翻译赫鲁晓夫的一些写给肯尼迪的书信，所以我记忆犹新。
我们究竟是应该从一些国际法原则的角度来看待古巴导弹危机这样的事件，还是从一个国家领导人在感到受到威胁时可能采取的行为的角度来看待这些事件？当时的国际法对古巴使用核导弹有何规定？规定就是：古巴是一个主权国家，有权从它选择的任何地方寻求对其独立的保障。而那时它受到了美国的威胁，美国甚至企图策动反卡斯特罗的古巴人进行入侵。于是古巴请求苏联的支持。苏联领导人尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫（Nikita Khrushchev）得知美国在土耳其部署了核武器，而土耳其实际上是与苏联接壤的美国盟友，苏联便决定在古巴部署核导弹。如果苏联部署的武器与美国针对它部署的武器类似，美国怎么可能合法地反对呢？
显然，这是一个错误。大错特错！（人们不由会想起塔列朗的话......“比犯罪更糟糕......”）国际关系，无论喜欢与否，都不是通过辩论、解释和应用“国际法”的细节来决定的——无论如何这与仅在一国之内实施的国内法律不可相提并论。于是肯尼迪不得不做出反应以消除威胁。参谋长联席会议建议轰炸摧毁导弹。幸而肯尼迪没有这样做，而是采取封堵措施，并要求苏联撤回导弹。
在来回沟通信息的那一周里，我翻译了赫鲁晓夫最长的信息，最终赫鲁晓夫同意从古巴撤回核导弹。当时没有对外宣布的是，肯尼迪也同意从土耳其撤出美国导弹，但前提是这一承诺不得公开。
当然，我们驻莫斯科大使馆的美国外交官对结果感到高兴。我们甚至没有被告知有关土耳其导弹的协议。我们不知道我们曾如此接近一场核战争。我们知道美国在加勒比地区拥有军事优势，如果美国空军轰炸了这些（有苏联导弹的）地点，我们也会欢呼的。但我们错了。在后来与苏联外交官和军官的会面中，我们了解到，如果这些地点遭到轰炸，现场的军官可能会在没有莫斯科命令的情况下发射导弹。我们会因此失去迈阿密，然后呢？我们也对一艘苏联潜艇差点向阻止其上浮的美军驱逐舰发射一枚装有核武器的鱼雷一无所知。
千钧一发的危机。卷入与拥有核武器国家的军事对抗是相当危险的。你不需要国际法的高级学位来理解这一点。你只需要常识。
这看来是可以预见的。但果真被预见到了吗？
“冷战结束以来最严重的战略失误”
我的话和我的声音都不是唯一的。 1997年，当关于增加北大西洋公约组织（北约）成员的问题被讨论时，我被传唤到参议院外交关系委员会出席听证。在我的介绍性发言中，我发表了以下声明：“我认为政府在此时将新成员纳入北约的建议是错误的。如果该建议得到参议院批准，很可能会成为冷战结束以来犯下的最严重的战略失误而载入史册。它不仅不能改善美国、其盟国和希望加入联盟的国家的安全，还可能助长一连串事件，这些事件可能对这个国家产生自苏联解体以来最严重的安全威胁。”
我这么说的理由，是俄罗斯联邦存在核武库，其总储量与美国相当，甚至超过美国。我们的任何一个核武库，如果真的用于热战，都具备终结地球文明的可能性，甚至可能导致人类和地球上许多其他生命的灭绝。尽管里根政府和老任布什政府时期美苏达成了一系列军备控制协议，美国和苏联在克林顿政府期间就进一步削减军备的谈判还是陷入了停滞，甚至从欧洲撤出短程核武器的谈判都未曾进行。
这并不是我建议将俄罗斯包括而不是排除在欧洲安全之外的唯一原因。我在听证会上做如是解释：“增加北约成员国的计划没有考虑到冷战结束后的真实国际形势，而是按照只有在冷战时期才有意义的逻辑进行的。在没有考虑让新成员加入北约之前，欧洲的分裂就结束了。没有人威胁要重新分裂欧洲。因此，像一些人所说的那样，声称有必要让新成员加入北约以避免未来的欧洲分裂是荒谬的。如果北约要成为统一欧洲大陆的主要工具，那么从逻辑上讲，它能够做到这一点的唯一方法就是扩大到包括所有欧洲国家。但这似乎不是政府的目标，即使是，实现目标的方法也不是零零散散地接纳新成员。”
然后我补充说，“北约扩大的所有声称目标都是值得称赞的。中欧和东欧国家在文化上当然是欧洲的一部分，应该保证在欧洲机构中占有一席之地。当然，我们与那里的民主和稳定经济的发展息息相关。但加入北约并不是实现这些目标的唯一途径。在没有明确和可识别的安全威胁的情况下，这甚至不是最好的方法。”
事实上，逐步扩大北约的决定是对导致冷战结束和东欧解放的美国政策的逆转。老布什总统宣布了一个“完整和自由的欧洲”的目标。苏联总统戈尔巴乔夫曾谈到“我们共同的欧洲家园”，并欢迎东欧政府的代表摆脱共产党统治者，还下令彻底裁减苏联军队，并解释说，一个国家要想安全，就必须确保其他国家的共同安全。老布什总统还于 1989 年 12 月在马耳他会晤期间向戈尔巴乔夫保证，如果允许东欧国家通过民主进程选择其未来方向，美国将不会“利用”这一进程为自己牟利。（显然，将当时加入华沙条约的国家带入北约就是“牟利”。”）
第二年，戈尔巴乔夫得到保证，尽管没有正式条约，如果苏联允许统一的德国（含原来华沙条约内的东德——译注）留在北约，北约的管辖权就不会向东移动，“一英寸也不会”。
这些承诺是在苏联解体之前向戈尔巴乔夫总统提出的。一旦解体，俄罗斯联邦的人口将不到苏联的一半，军事机构士气低落，充满混乱。如果说，连苏联承认并尊重东欧国家的独立后，北约都没有扩大的理由，那就更没有理由担心俄罗斯联邦是一种威胁。
任性而为？
在乔治·W·布什（以下简称小布什）政府（2001-2009 年）期间，东欧国家继续加入北约，但这并不是唯一引起俄罗斯反对的原因。与此同时，美国开始退出军控条约，这些条约一度缓和了一场非理性和危险的军备竞赛，是结束冷战的基础协议。最重要的是决定退出反弹道导弹条约（ABM Treaty），该条约是一系列协议的基石条约，曾一度终止核军备竞赛。
在纽约世贸中心和北弗吉尼亚五角大楼遭到恐怖袭击后，普京总统是第一位致电布什总统并表示支持的外国领导人。他言出必行，促成了对阿富汗塔利班政权的袭击，该政权窝藏了发动袭击的基地组织领导人奥萨马·本·拉登。当时很明显，普京渴望与美国建立安全伙伴关系。瞄准美国的圣战恐怖分子也瞄准了俄罗斯。尽管如此，美国通过入侵伊拉克继续其无视俄罗斯及其盟国利益的做法，这种侵略行为不仅受到俄罗斯的反对，也受到法国和德国的反对。
随着普京总统将俄罗斯从 1990 年代后期发生的破产中拯救出来，稳定了经济，还清了俄罗斯的外债，减少了有组织的犯罪活动，甚至开始建立金融储备金以抵御潜在金融风险，但普京对俄罗斯尊严和安全的立场却遭受了一次又一次的侮辱。他在 2007 年在慕尼黑的一次演讲中提到这些侮辱。美国国防部长罗伯特·盖茨回应说，我们不需要新的冷战。当然这是真诚的，但他、他的上级和他的继任者似乎都没有认真对待普京的警告。然后，参议员约瑟夫·拜登（Joseph Biden）在 2008 年总统大选候选人竞选期间向选民承诺，“要与弗拉基米尔·普京抗衡！”好奇怪，在这个世界上，普京到底对他或对美国做了什么？
尽管巴拉克·奥巴马总统上任之初承诺改变政策，但事实上，他的政府继续无视俄罗斯最严重的关切，并进一步强化美国之前的努力，以使前苏联加盟共和国脱离俄罗斯的影响，乃至鼓动俄罗斯自身的“政权更迭”。俄罗斯总统和大多数俄罗斯人都认为，美国在叙利亚和乌克兰的行动是对俄罗斯的间接攻击。
叙利亚总统阿萨德是一个残暴的独裁者，但却是对抗伊斯兰国的唯一有效的堡垒。伊斯兰国运动在美国入侵伊拉克后蓬勃发展，并正在蔓延到叙利亚。对叙利亚境内所谓的“民主反对派”的军事援助很快落入与组织 9·11 袭击美国的基地组织结盟的圣战分子手中！但对附近俄罗斯的威胁要大得多，因为许多圣战分子来自包括俄罗斯在内的前苏联地区。叙利亚也是俄罗斯的近邻；有人认为，美国企图将叙利亚政府斩首，客观上加强了美国和俄罗斯的共同敌人。
就乌克兰而言，美国对其国内政治的干预很深——甚至到了似乎在为其挑选总理的地步。实际上，它还支持了 2014 年改变乌克兰政府的非法政变，这一程序通常被认为不符合法治或民主治理。乌克兰仍在酝酿的暴力事件始于“亲西方”的西部，而不是顿巴斯。顿巴斯的冲突被视为是当地政府对俄罗斯族乌克兰人施暴的反应。
在奥巴马总统的第二个任期内，他的言辞变得更加个性化，加入了美国和英国媒体诋毁俄罗斯总统的日益高涨的大合唱。奥巴马谈到对俄罗斯人的经济制裁是因为普京在乌克兰的“不当行为”而使他“付出了代价”，但他很容易忘记普京的行动在俄罗斯很受欢迎，而且奥巴马自己的前任则可能被确切地指控为战犯。奥巴马随后开始对整个俄罗斯国家进行侮辱，并毫无依据地提出诸如“俄罗斯造不出任何人想要的东西”之类的指控，而忽略了这样一个事实，即当时我们可以让美国宇航员进入国际空间站的唯一方法是使用俄罗斯火箭。奥巴马的政府也正在尽最大努力阻止伊朗和土耳其购买俄罗斯的防空导弹。
我相信有些人会说：“这有什么大不了的？里根称苏联为邪恶帝国，但随后通过谈判结束了冷战。”没错！里根谴责旧的苏联帝国——并随后称赞戈尔巴乔夫改变了它——但他从未公开谴责过苏联领导人。他以个人的尊重和平等的态度对待他们，甚至请外交部长格罗米科参加通常为国家元首或政府首脑保留的正式晚宴。他在私人会议上的第一句话通常是这样的：“我们将世界的和平掌握在我们手中。我们必须采取负责任的行动，这样世界才能和平相处。”
在唐纳德·特朗普任职的四年里，情况变得更糟。在没有证据的情况下，特朗普被指控是通俄骗子。（为证清白）他更加积极地通过了一系列反俄措施，一方面又奉承普京是一位伟大的领导人。美国在奥巴马任期的最后几天开始的对外交官的互斥驱逐，在一个严峻的恶性循环中持续进行，导致使领馆外交人员严重不足，以至于几个月来美国在莫斯科没有足够的工作人员为俄罗斯人签发访美签证。
与最近的许多其他事态发展一样，外交使团的相互扼杀扭转了冷战后期美国外交最引以为豪的成就之一，当时我们努力成功地打开了苏联的封闭社会，拉倒了隔开“东”“西”的铁幕。我们成功了，在一位苏联领导人的合作下，他明白他的国家迫切需要加入世界。
好吧，我相信今天的危机是“蓄意促成的”。但如果是这样，我怎么能说它可以凭借常识轻松解决？
应用常识便可轻松解决？
简短的回答是因为它可以。普京总统的要求是非常合理的，即结束北约扩张并在欧洲建立一个确保俄罗斯和其他国家安全的安全框架。他没有要求任何北约成员退出，也没有威胁任何人。按照任何务实的常识标准，促进和平而不是营造冲突符合美国的利益。试图使乌克兰脱离俄罗斯的影响——那些鼓动“颜色革命”的人所公开的目标——是愚蠢的，也是危险的。我们这么快就忘记了古巴导弹危机的教训吗？
现在，说批准普京的要求符合美国的客观利益，并不意味着这很容易做到。民主党和共和党的领导人都形成了这样一种恐俄立场（一个需要另作研究的议题），以至于需要高超的政治技巧才能驾驭危险的政治水域并取得理性的结果。
拜登总统明确表示，如果俄罗斯入侵乌克兰，美国将不会用自己的军队进行干预。那么，为什么要将这些军队派驻到东欧呢？只是为了向国会的鹰派表明他的强硬立场？派驻东欧干什么呢？除了逃离叙利亚、阿富汗和非洲大草原干旱地区的难民潮之外，没有人威胁波兰或保加利亚。那么第82空降师的任务到底是什么呢？
正如我之前提到的那样，也许这只是一个昂贵的游戏。也许拜登和普京政府随后的谈判会找到解决俄罗斯担忧的方法。如果是这样，也许这个游戏就达到了它的目的。也许那时我们的国会议员将开始处理我们在家中日益严重的问题，而不是让它们变得更糟。
人是可以有梦想的，不是吗？
原文链接：
https://usrussiaaccord.org/acura-viewpoint-jack-f-matlock-jr-todays-crisis-over-ukraine/
ACURA ViewPoint Jack F. Matlock, Jr.: Today’s Crisis Over Ukraine
ACURA VIEWPOINTFebruary 14, 2022
Today we face an avoidable crisis that was predictable, actually predicted, willfully precipitated, but easily resolved by the application of common sense.
We are being told each day that war may be imminent in Ukraine. Russian troops, we are told, are massing at Ukraine’s borders and could attack at any time. American citizens are being advised to leave Ukraine and dependents of the American Embassy staff are being evacuated. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian president has advised against panic and made clear that he does not consider a Russian invasion imminent. Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, has denied that he has any intention of invading Ukraine. His demand is that the process of adding new members to NATO cease and that in particular, Russia has assurance that Ukraine and Georgia will never be members. President Biden has refused to give such assurance but made clear his willingness to continue discussing questions of strategic stability in Europe. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government has made clear it has no intention of implementing the agreement reached in 2015 for reuniting the Donbas provinces into Ukraine with a large degree of local autonomy—an agreement with Russia, France and Germany which the United States endorsed.
Maybe I am wrong—tragically wrong—but I cannot dismiss the suspicion that we are witnessing an elaborate charade, grossly magnified by prominent elements of the American media, to serve a domestic political end. Facing rising inflation, the ravages of Omicron, blame (for the most part unfair) for the withdrawal from Afghanistan, plus the failure to get the full support of his own party for the Build Back Better legislation, the Biden administration is staggering under sagging approval ratings just as it gears up for this year’s congressional elections. Since clear “victories” on the domestic woes seem increasingly unlikely, why not fabricate one by posing as if he prevented the invasion of Ukraine by “standing up to Vladimir Putin”? Actually, it seems most likely that President Putin’s goals are what he says they are—and as he has been saying since his speech in Munich in 2007. To simplify and paraphrase, I would sum them up as: “Treat us with at least a modicum of respect. We do not threaten you or your allies, why do you refuse us the security you insist for yourself?”
In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, many observers, ignoring the rapidly unfolding events that marked the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, considered that the end of the Cold War. They were wrong. The Cold War had ended at least two years earlier. It ended by negotiation and was in the interest of all the parties. President George H.W. Bush hoped that Gorbachev would manage to keep most of the twelve non-Baltic republics in a voluntary federation. On August 1, 1991, he made a speech to the Ukrainian parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) in which he endorsed Gorbachev’s plans for a voluntary federation and warned against “suicidal nationalism.” The latter phrase was inspired by Georgian leader Zviad Gamsakurdia’s attacks on minorities in Soviet Georgia. For reasons I will explain elsewhere, they apply to Ukraine today. Bottom line: Despite the prevalent belief, both among the “blob” in the United States, and most of the Russian public, the United States did not support, much less cause the break-up of the Soviet Union. We supported throughout the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and one of the last acts of the Soviet parliament was to legalize their claim to independence. And—by the way—despite frequently voiced fears—Vladimir Putin has never threatened to re-absorb the Baltic countries or to claim any of their territories, though he has criticized some that denied ethnic Russians the full rights of citizenship, a principle that the European Union is pledged to enforce.
But, let’s move on to the first of the assertions in the subtitle…
Was the crisis avoidable?
Well, since President Putin’s major demand is an assurance that NATO will take no further members, and specifically not Ukraine or Georgia, obviously there would have been no basis for the present crisis if there had been no expansion of the alliance following the end of the Cold War, or if the expansion had occurred in harmony with building a security structure in Europe that included Russia.
Maybe we should look at this question more broadly. How do other countries respond to alien military alliances near their borders? Since we are talking about American policy, maybe we should pay some attention to the way the United States has reacted to attempts of outsiders to establish alliances with countries nearby. Anybody remember the Monroe Doctrine, a declaration of a sphere of influence that comprised an entire hemisphere? And we meant it! When we learned that Kaiser’s Germany was attempting to enlist Mexico as an ally during the first world war, that was a powerful incentive for the subsequent declaration of war against Germany. Then, of course, in my lifetime, we had the Cuban Missile Crisis—something I remember vividly since I was at the American Embassy in Moscow and translated some of Khrushchev’s messages to Kennedy.
Should we look at events like the Cuban Missile Crisis from the standpoint of some of the principles of international law, or from the standpoint of the likely behavior of a country’s leaders if they feel threatened? What did international law at that time say about the employment of nuclear missiles in Cuba? Cuba was a sovereign state and had the right to seek support for its independence from anywhere it chose. It had been threatened by the United States, even an attempt to invade, using anti-Castro Cubans. It asked the Soviet Union for support. Knowing that the United States had deployed nuclear weapons in Turkey, a U.S. ally actually bordering on the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, decided to station nuclear missiles in Cuba. How could the U.S. legitimately object if the Soviet Union was deploying weapons similar to those deployed against it?
Obviously, it was a mistake. A big mistake! (One is reminded of Talleyrand’s remark..”Worse than a crime …”) International relations, like it or not, are not determined by debating, interpreting and applying the finer points of “international law”—which in any case is not the same as municipal law, the law within countries. Kennedy had to react to remove the threat. The Joint Chiefs recommended taking out the missiles by bombing. Fortunately, Kennedy stopped short of that, declared a blockade and demanded the removal of the missiles.
At the end of the week of messages back and forth—I translated Khrushchev’s longest—it was agreed that Khrushchev would remove the nuclear missiles from Cuba. What was not announced was that Kennedy also agreed that he would remove the U.S. missiles from Turkey but that this commitment must not be made public.
We American diplomats in Embassy Moscow were delighted at the outcome, of course. We were not even informed of the agreement regarding missiles in Turkey. We had no idea that we had come close to a nuclear exchange. We knew the U.S. had military superiority in the Caribbean and we would have cheered if the U.S. Air Force had bombed the sites. We were wrong. In later meetings with Soviet diplomats and military officers, we learned that, if the sites had been bombed, the officers on the spot could have launched the missiles without orders from Moscow. We could have lost Miami, and then what? We also did not know that a Soviet submarine came close to launching a nuclear-armed torpedo against the destroyer that was preventing its coming up for air.
It was a close call. It is quite dangerous to get involved in military confrontations with countries with nuclear weapons. You don’t need an advanced degree in international law to understand that. You need only common sense.
OK—It was predictable. Was it predicted?
“The most profound strategic blunder made since the end of the Cold War”
My words, and my voice was not the only one. In 1997, when the question of adding more members to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), I was asked to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In my introductory remarks, I made the following statement: “I consider the Administration’s recommendation to take new members into NATO at this time misguided. If it should be approved by the United States Senate, it may well go down in history as the most profound strategic blunder made since the end of the Cold War. Far from improving the security of the United States, its Allies, and the nations that wish to enter the Alliance, it could well encourage a chain of events that could produce the most serious security threat to this nation since the Soviet Union collapsed.”
The reason I cited was the presence in the Russian Federation of a nuclear arsenal that, in overall effectiveness, matched if not exceeded that of the United States. Either of our arsenals, if actually used in a hot war, was capable of ending the possibility of civilization on earth, possibly even causing the extinction of the human race and much other life on the planet. Though the United States and the Soviet Union had, as a result of arms control agreements concluded by the Reagan and first Bush administrations, negotiations for further reductions stalled during the Clinton Administration. There was not even an effort to negotiate the removal of short-range nuclear weapons from Europe.
That was not the only reason I cited for including rather than excluding Russia from European security. I explained as follows: “The plan to increase the membership of NATO fails to take account of the real international situation following the end of the Cold War, and proceeds in accord with a logic that made sense only during the Cold War. The division of Europe ended before there was any thought of taking new members into NATO. No one is threatening to re-divide Europe. It is therefore absurd to claim, as some have, that it is necessary to take new members into NATO to avoid a future division of Europe; if NATO is to be the principal instrument for unifying the continent, then logically the only way it can do so is by expanding to include all European countries. But that does not appear to be the aim of the Administration, and even if it is, the way to reach it is not by admitting new members piecemeal.”
Then I added, “All of the purported goals of NATO enlargement are laudable. Of course the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are culturally part of Europe and should be guaranteed a place in European institutions. Of course we have a stake in the development of democracy and stable economies there. But membership in NATO is not the only way to achieve these ends. It is not even the best way in the absence of a clear and identifiable security threat.”
In fact, the decision to expand NATO piecemeal was a reversal of American policies that produced the end of the Cold War and the liberation of Eastern Europe. President George H.W. Bush had proclaimed a goal of a “Europe whole and free.” Soviet President Gorbachev had spoken of “our common European home,” had welcomed representatives of East European governments who threw off their Communist rulers and had ordered radical reductions in Soviet military forces by explaining that for one country to be secure, there must be security for all. The first President Bush also assured Gorbachev during their meeting on Malta in December, 1989, that if the countries of Eastern Europe were allowed to choose their future orientation by democratic processes, the United States would not “take advantage” of that process. (Obviously, bringing countries into NATO that were then in the Warsaw Pact would be “taking advantage.”) The following year, Gorbachev was assured, though not in a formal treaty, that if a unified Germany was allowed to remain in NATO, there would be no movement of NATO jurisdiction to the east, “not one inch.”
These comments were made to President Gorbachev before the Soviet Union broke up. Once it did, the Russian Federation had less than half the population of the Soviet Union and a military establishment demoralized and in total disarray. While there was no reason to enlarge NATO after the Soviet Union recognized and respected the independence of the East European countries, there was even less reason to fear the Russian Federation as a threat.
Willfully precipitated?
Adding countries in Eastern Europe to NATO continued during the George W. Bush administration (2001-2009) but that was not the only thing that stimulated Russian objection. At the same time, the United States began withdrawing from the arms control treaties that had tempered, for a time, an irrational and dangerous arms race and were the foundation agreements for ending the Cold War. The most significant was the decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) which had been the cornerstone treaty for the series of agreements that halted for a time the nuclear arms race. After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Northern Virginia, President Putin was the first foreign leader to call President Bush and offer support. He was as good as his word by facilitating the attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had harbored Osama ben Laden, the Al Qaeda leader who had inspired the attacks. It was clear at that time that Putin aspired to a security partnership with the United States. The jihadist terrorists who were targeting the United States were also targeting Russia. Nevertheless, the U.S. continued its course of ignoring Russian–and also allied–interests by invading Iraq, an act of aggression which was opposed not only by Russia, but also by France and Germany.
As President Putin pulled Russia out of the bankruptcy that took place in the late 1990s, stabilized the economy, paid off Russia’s foreign debts, reduced the activity of organized crime, and even began building a financial nest egg to weather future financial storms, he was subjected to what he perceived as one insult after another to his perception of Russia’s dignity and security. He enumerated them in a speech in Munich in 2007. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates responded that we didn’t need a new Cold War. Quite true, of course, but neither he, nor his superiors, nor his successors seemed to take Putin’s warning seriously. Then Senator Joseph Biden, during his candidacy for the presidential election in 2008, pledged to “stand up to Vladimir Putin!” Huh? What in the world had Putin done to him or to the United States?
Although President Barack Obama initially promised policy changes, in fact his government continued to ignore the most serious Russian concerns and redoubled earlier American efforts to detach former Soviet republics from Russian influence and, indeed, to encourage “regime change” in Russia itself. American actions in Syria and Ukraine were seen by the Russian president, and most Russians, as indirect attacks on them.
President Assad of Syria was a brutal dictator but the only effective bulwark against the Islamic state, a movement that had blossomed in Iraq following the U.S. invasion and was spreading into Syria. Military aid to a supposed “democratic opposition” quickly fell into the hands of jihadists allied with the very Al Qaeda that had organized the 9/11 attacks on the United States! But the threat to nearby Russia was much greater since many of the jihadists hailed from areas of the former Soviet Union including Russia itself. Syria is also Russia’s close neighbor; the U.S. was seen strengthening enemies of both the United States and Russia with its misguided attempt to decapitate the Syrian government.
So far as Ukraine is concerned, U.S. intrusion into its domestic politics was deep—to the point of seeming to select a prime minister. It also, in effect, supported an illegal coup d’etat that changed the Ukrainian government in 2014, a procedure not normally considered consistent with the rule of law or democratic governance. The violence that still simmers in Ukraine started in the “pro-Western” west, not in the Donbas where it was a reaction to what was viewed as the threat of violence against Ukrainians who are ethnic Russian.
During President Obama’s second term, his rhetoric became more personal, joining a rising chorus in the American and British media vilifying the Russian president. Obama spoke of economic sanctions against Russians as “costing” Putin for his “misbehavior” in Ukraine, conveniently forgetting that Putin’s action had been popular in Russia and that Obama’s own predecessor could be credibly accused of being a war criminal. Obama then began to hurl insults at the Russian nation as a whole, with allegations like “Russia makes nothing anybody wants,” conveniently ignoring the fact that the only way we could get American astronauts to the international space station at that time was with Russian rockets and that his government was trying its best to prevent Iran and Turkey from buying Russian anti-aircraft missiles.
I am sure some will say, “What’s the big deal? Reagan called the Soviet Union an evil empire, but then negotiated an end of the Cold War.” Right! Reagan condemned the Soviet empire of old—and subsequently gave Gorbachev credit for changing it—but he never publicly castigated the Soviet leaders personally. He treated them with personal respect, and as equals, even treating Foreign Minister Gromyko to formal dinners usually reserved for chiefs of state or government. His first words in private meetings was usually something like, “We hold the peace of the world in our hands. We must act responsibly so the world can live in peace.”
Things got worse during the four years of Donald Trump’s tenure. Accused, without evidence, of being a Russian dupe, Trump made sure he embraced every anti-Russian measure that came along, while at the same time flattered Putin as a great leader. Reciprocal expulsions of diplomats, started by the United States in the final days of Obama’s tenure continued in a grim vicious circle that has resulted in a diplomatic presence so emaciated that for months the United States did not have enough staff in Moscow to issue visas for Russians to visit the United States.
As so many of the other recent developments, the mutual strangulation of diplomatic missions reverses one of the proudest achievements of American diplomacy in latter Cold War years when we worked diligently and successfully to open up the closed society of the Soviet Union, to bring down the iron curtain that separated “East” and “West.” We succeeded, with the cooperation of a Soviet leader who understood that his country desperately needed to join the world.
All right, I rest my case that today’s crisis was “willfully precipitated.” But if that is so, how can I say that it can be…
Easily resolved by the application of common sense?
The short answer is because it can be. What President Putin is demanding, an end to NATO expansion and creation of a security structure in Europe that insures Russia’s security along with that of others is eminently reasonable. He is not demanding the exit of any NATO member and he is threatening none. By any pragmatic, common sense standard it is in the interest of the United States to promote peace, not conflict. To try to detach Ukraine from Russian influence—the avowed aim of those who agitated for the “color revolutions”—was a fool’s errand, and a dangerous one. Have we so soon forgotten the lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis?
Now, to say that approving Putin’s demands is in the objective interest of the United States does not mean that it will be easy to do. The leaders of both the Democratic and Republican parties have developed such a Russophobic stance (a story requiring a separate study) that it will take great political skill to navigate the treacherous political waters and achieve a rational outcome.
President Biden has made it clear that the United States will not intervene with its own troops if Russia invades Ukraine. So why move them into Eastern Europe? Just to show hawks in Congress that he is standing firm? For what? Nobody is threatening Poland or Bulgaria except waves of refugees fleeing Syria, Afghanistan and the desiccated areas of the African savannah. So what is the 82nd Airborne supposed to do?
Well, as I have suggested earlier, maybe this is just an expensive charade. Maybe the subsequent negotiations between the Biden and Putin governments will find a way to meet the Russian concerns. If so, maybe the charade will have served its purpose. And maybe then our members of congress will start dealing with the growing problems we have at home instead of making them worse.
One can dream, can’t one?
Jack F. Matlock served as US ambassador to the USSR (1987-1991). A member of the board of director of ACURA, he writes from Singer Island, Florida.
