当前经济政策分析
这两天看到又有人漫天造谣，说什么4万亿又要来了，我下面来分析现实的局势和发布这样的言论（说4万亿又来了）的背后动机。
我国现在的经济情况不容乐观，整体来说美国的经济情况相对还可以，中国其次，欧元区日本印度巴西等等经济体已经相当差，俄罗斯相对来说比较独立情况较好（但是油价快速下跌的话情况就会发生逆转，这个就是美国一定要打压油价的原因）。
从前面4个月的我国的经济数据来看，面临几个问题，一个就是从外汇占款来看快速减少，也就是外资撤离，针对这个问题极左势力用了查三非的手段来恶化这个问题；另外一个是经济增长乏力，企业税负大，针对这个问题，温家宝和李克强最近提出来了给企业减税和把下半年的投资提前到6月份进行，实质并没有增加投资，只是计划提前，针对这个问题极左势力造谣说又要来4万亿了，目的是绑住现政府的手脚，让经济在十八大之前硬着陆；还有就是经济结构性问题，就是外向型经济衰退但是自发性的高科技行业还没有成形，这个问题就需要中美交割完成高科技技术的转移，针对这个问题极左势力极力阻挠中美的交割。等等还有其他一些因素，今天就不过多详细讲。
我们再来看，中国经济整体的软着陆和持续性发展，是一个过程，在变成新的模式的过程中会有一个青黄不接的过程，那么这个过程如何渡过是一个严峻的问题。
那么我们再来看，我国前面10年是货币拉动型的经济体，是一个外贸型的经济体，问题已经在那边了，这个问题是极右造成的，后面他们必然也会承担责任，但是现在需要这股力量来完成经济的软着陆。我国前面10年，经济问题是极右在搞鬼，社会问题是极左在搞鬼，大家看一下武警的调动权收归军委后，当政法委无法调动武警的情况下，大家最近几个月看到频繁发生强拆事件了吗？是否强拆的事情发生的频度快速下降。这个就是我最近一直要说极左的原因。
那么我们再来看在这个青黄不接的过程中，如何处理投资、M2货币手段、减税等等因素。我们要制定一个M2的长期下降规划，同时要制定一个投资拉动经济模式慢慢退出的规划，但是不能马上立马下来，假如烈度过大会造成经济崩盘。因此投资还是要的，M2的一定幅度的增长还是要的，关键是一个下降趋势，比如制定5年内M2的年增长速度下降到9%－10%左右，那么2012年比较合适的位置就是12%－14%之间看经济情况来调节。同时投资也是，原来假如投资占GDP的比重在45%，那么我们就要制定一个5年内把投资比重降到25%左右，那么2012年比较合适的是把这个比重降到35%－40%之间，而不是一下子降的很低。另外我国未进入发达国家之前（也就是快速工业化的过程中），投资占比不宜过低。
根据这个局面，我们再来看现在温家宝和李克强出来的政策和现在经济下滑的局面的对应关系，我可以说是正确的。一个是并没有货币大量放水，一个是现在确实是保增长最重要（因为通胀问题在美元指数快速拉升的过程中已经被消化）。
但是我又要说了，发改委的那位说现在要降息，这个思路是错误的，降息是一个成本型工具，并且是一个趋势性工具，现在比较适合的是用降准的这个数量型工具来对冲外汇占款的减少。关于短期内不能降息的分析我前面就专门写过一篇文章的。
总结：所以我的建议是：现在可以通过降准(降低存款准备金率)的模式缓解外汇占款减少带来的资金层面的问题，但是不能动利率，另外可以把下半年的一些投资项目提前，但是不能大量增加投资，另外这些投资可以倾向于民生工程和农业工程，另外要打破一些行业的垄断，让民营资本进来，给民营资本更多的空间解决就业问题，还有就是要给企业减税，同时减税造成的财政收入减少用减少三公经费等等模式来填补这个窟窿，另外对于房地产要控制，要让房地产价格缓慢下跌。要支撑股市，不能让股市暴跌。
现在的国际形势是：现在谁先倒下，那么别人就是踩在你的尸体上面前行，你手上的筹码瞬间消失。现在全世界都在扛着，包括印度、巴西、欧盟，就俄罗斯逍遥一点（但是油价跌到80美元以下他就会感受到压力了）。
美国能印票子，不是有奴才买单么？
美国的物价是很低的，天朝的物价？
But if it’s simple, it’s not easy: the problem is persuading Germany, the zone’s dominant economic power, to accept it.
And if Germans have learned one lesson from their tumultuous economic path over the past century, it’s that this solution – inflation in Germany – is a deadly danger to be avoided at all costs.
Yet any lasting solution to the eurozone’s torment will almost have to include some extra German inflation.
That’s the least painful way to begin equalizing its very high competitiveness with lower levels in countries like Spain, Italy and even France.
That psychological sticking point is why, despite temporary upticks in European markets and the euro’s value, this crisis is likely to drag on and worsen before it is resolved.
Peter Berezin, a former International Monetary Fund economist, lays out his vision for the resolution of this continent-wide financial catastrophe in the latest issue of Montreal’s Bank Credit Analyst investment publication, which he edits,
The European Central Bank eventually “will end the turmoil through one simple action,” he says.
That would be by setting a limit on borrowing costs for eurozone governments – maybe six per cent for a 10-year-bond – and defending it by pledging to buy enough government bonds to keep their interest rate from rising above this level.
This would immediately improve the financial situation of countries like Spain, where borrowing costs have already exceeded this level and could well be headed higher.
Of course, it would also spark primal German fears about currency debasement through the monetizing of government debt. Monetizing is just another way to say that the eurozone would print as many euros as needed in order to buy up its own members’ bonds, creating the spectre of serious inflation.
Germany’s aversion to inflation isn’t arbitrary.
The country’s hyperinflation of the 1920s destroyed savings, caused terrible suffering and is widely believed to have contributed to the rise of the Nazi party.
But even virtue can be carried too far. Countries that have monetized some of their own debt, like the U.S. and the U.K., are in far better financial shape than most of the eurozone’s members today.
What’s more, their borrowing costs remain low, suggesting that investors aren’t worried about being inflated into big losses.
That’s because their economies are still sluggish, with far too little consumer demand and far too much surplus labour to support harmful levels of inflation.
Monetization can’t be carried too far or continued forever, but when a country is in this condition, the real danger is deflation and depression, not inflation.
This is very clear in the eurozone. The whole region is slipping back into recession under the burden of a harsh German-inspired austerity regime that has forced countries to slash spending even as their economies desperately needed support.
The next step, observers like Berezin believe, will be the default of Greece under its crushing debt load, either forcing it out of the eurozone or into a shadow area where it subsists on a combination of euros and locally issued currency.
About this time, Berezin guesses, Germany’s leaders will finally realize that it’s better to bend their principles than to undergo a complete eurozone collapse.
In a collapse, after all, German banks might never be repaid the euro loans they had made in Spain and Italy. Instead, they’d be lucky to get devalued pesetas and liras. At the same time, euro deposits held by German banks would now be denominated in expensive deutschmarks.
“A recipe for bank failure, if ever there was one,” Berezin says.
That’s not all. Germany’s export-driven economy depends heavily on selling to eurozone partners. But these exports would be devastated if they were produced in an expensive currency for sale to countries with cheap currencies. Exporters could be bankrupted.
So under pressure from business leaders, Germany’s political class, which is already having second thoughts about austerity, would swallow hard and approve of easy money, perhaps late this year. This would bring precious relief to Europe’s weaker economies, but at least a few years of higher inflation in Germany, whose vigorous economy would be overstimulated.
But the result over the coming decade could be a resurgent European economy, with big gains for investors who now hold the region’s securities. At least that’s the likely outcome. Berezin admits that people don’t always do what’s in their best interest, so there’s maybe a 25-per-cent chance that the euro really does crumble.
jbryan@montrealgazette.com
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