空色一体
千江有水千江月，万里无云万里天。
拉贾：负债民主国家的三条道路
发自芝加哥——
典型的投资手法讲究先在短期内支付一定成本，然后获取长期收益，但民主国家的政府往往都缺乏制定类似决策的动机。倘若要在民主制度下实施这类投资行为的话，要么需要一位勇气可嘉的领导人，要么要求选民能明白回避这类痛苦决策所导致的弊端。
有勇气的领导人堪称凤毛麟角，而那些信息充分而且富有参与精神的选民也为数不多，因为那些提供给选民的所谓专家意见本身都模棱两可。不同学派的 经济学家都发现就任何政策的必要性达成共识非常艰难。比如说关于政府支出的激烈争论：它究竟是唯一能将萧条拒之门外的手段，还是一条毁灭之路？最终这些争 论无法达成任何共识，中间派选民根本不知道该选择哪一方，而政策选择最终往往会走上避重就轻的道路——直到碰壁了为止。
发达国家逐渐堆积的债务（其实早就在迅速增长，只不过最近这场大萧条将其推到了几乎无法维持的境地）就反映了类似的算计。民主政府着手应对由竞 争性市场所引发的经济下跌风险，而公众也对此表示赞赏——不管它是通过支出来创造就业，还是拯救那些在资产负债表中拥有有毒债券的银行。
就算不作为（或者是着眼于长远的行动）才是最佳政策，但对那些通过民主选举出来的政客来说这可不是一个选项，选民希望他们能有所行动，于是无法 避免地意味着采取一些追求短期效应的行为。同情心泛滥的媒体大肆渲染那些关于失业或者无家可归的心碎故事，使得那些反对政府干涉或者建议采取长期性措施的 人看上去就像冷血动物。民主制度一般都是温情脉脉的，而市场又总是残酷无情；于是政府出现，填补了其中空白。
但如今许多发达国家的政府已经无力填补可以空白，因此出现三种负面情况的可能性正逐渐增加（除非各国最终走投无路只能实施那些被长期推迟的改 革，创造需要更少政府缓冲作用的可持续增长，这是个积极的情况）。其一是政府直接干涉国内外市场以减少竞争和波动性，并借机重建自身的危机缓冲能力。另一 个则是压制民主以抑制民众的愤怒。第三则是寻找替罪羊。
上述三个做法都在1930年代的大萧条中尝试过了，而结果也都不甚乐观。
一个减少政府更直接干预市场的因素是最近这场危机不但令民众丧失了对金融部门的信任，也极大打击了政府的威信。但当年大萧条时情况可不是这样 的。经济崩溃使得民众对私人部门和市场失去了信心，但却令政府的号召力不断上升。比如在1930年代的美国，罗斯福新政就是受到民众普遍欢迎的。
造成新旧两种不同情况对比的一个可能原因就是1930年代的银行家们都在众目睽睽下受到了惩罚。类似格拉斯-斯蒂高尔法案（Glass- SteagallAct）这样的立法断了他们后路。许多银行家都在银行倒闭后受到了直接经济损失，或者相关调查使他们在公众面前蒙羞，甚至有些人被投进了 监狱。
但如今大部分公众看到的却是在同一批精英们掌控下的大银行和大国政府，是这些人制造了危机，却又巧立名目用纳税人的钱去拯救那些银行。一面是银 行家们重新坐拥大笔花红，另一面却是纳税人苦苦支撑为经济崩溃买单。许多劳动者都面临着失业以及被银行收回物业的危险，却没有一个大银行家获罪入狱。
在享受了政府的援助之后，那些大银行如今的市场份额反而还增加了，而类似《多德-弗兰克法案》（Dodd-FrankAct）这类试图对银行采取更多限制的法案则在国会游说者的影响下变了味。看上去那些精英，无论身处政府还是商界，都只管自己逍遥，不顾他人死活。
在美国，这种情绪鼓动了茶党运动，它们联合起来反对政府扩张（或者更普遍地反对精英政治），连那些旨在规管大型银行的政府扩张行为了不放过（大 概是因为政府的监管条文往往都是那些被监管者中的大佬们制定的）。像茶党这样的运动因此倾向于反对那些在经历了美国这么一场危机后希望有更多政府行动（包 括限制市场和竞争）的人。
失信的政府可不仅仅是美国一家。在欧元区，除了察觉到的政府和银行勾结之外，政府精英实现欧洲整合的愿望，以及用纳税人税款支付跨国财政援助 ——都是在没有事先咨询公众——也激发了类似的情绪。在日本，持续20年的无情经济瘫痪已经使公众对政治家和政府完全失去了信心。
第二个负面情况——那些没有足够财力来花钱平息民众愤怒的政府转而开始压制民主和言论自由——出现的几率目前还很小。相对与1930年代来说，发达国家的民主体制已经发展得相当根深蒂固了。
这就剩下了第三个负面情况，那就是找一个容易欺负的替罪羊以便转移公众的愤怒情绪。不幸的是，许多国家都走上了这条道路，而非法移民和穆斯林则成为了首要受害者。
那些找提替罪羊的政客可能会辩解说他们其实不是想伤害这些人，而是在帮助他们的社会去避免出现更坏的情况。但1930年代的经验告诉我们，没有比这种行为所造成的后果更遭糕的情况了。
拉古兰·拉贾为前国际货币基金组织首席经济学家，芝加哥大学布斯商学院经济学教授，著有《断层：隐藏的断裂是如何持续威胁世界经济的》一书。他的博客http://blogs.chicagobooth.edu/faultlines
One is that they intervene directly in markets, both domestic and across borders, to reduce competition and volatility while they rebuild their buffering capacity. Another is that they muzzle democracy to suppress public anger. A third is that they find scapegoats.
By Raghuram Rajan
CHICAGO – Democratic governments are not incentivized to take decisions that have short-term costs but produce long-term gains, the typical pattern for any investment. Indeed, in order to make such investments, democracies require either brave leadership or an electorate that understands the costs of postponing hard choices.
Brave leadership is rare. So, too, is an informed and engaged electorate, because the expert advice offered to voters is itself so confusing. Economists of different persuasions find it difficult to reach a consensus about the necessity of any policy. Consider, for example, the cacophony of arguments about government spending: is it the only thing keeping depression at bay, or is it moving us steadily down the road to perdition? The debate does not lead to agreement, moderate voters do not know what to believe, and policy choices ultimately follow the path of least resistance – until they run into a brick wall.
The build-up of public debt in industrial countries (which was rising briskly well before the Great Recession pushed it to near-unsustainable levels) reflects this kind of calculus. The public rewards democratic governments for dealing with the downside risk caused by competitive markets – whether by spending to create jobs or by rescuing banks that have dodgy securities on their balance sheets.
Even if inaction (or action oriented towards the longer term) is the best policy, it is not an option for democratically elected politicians, whom voters expect to govern, which inevitably means action with the potential for quick results. A sympathetic press amplifies heart-rending stories of lost jobs and homes, making those counseling against intervention or advocating longer-term fixes appear callous. Democracies are necessarily softhearted, whereas markets are not; government action has expanded to fill the gap.
With governments in many developed countries now reaching the limits of their gap-filling capacity, three undesirable possibilities loom large (in addition to the desirable possibility that they will have no choice but to undertake long-postponed reforms that will create sustainable growth with less need for government buffers). One is that they intervene directly in markets, both domestic and across borders, to reduce competition and volatility while they rebuild their buffering capacity. Another is that they muzzle democracy to suppress public anger. A third is that they find scapegoats.
All three were tried during the Great Depression of the 1930’s. The results were not encouraging.
One factor diminishing the likelihood of governments intervening more directly in markets is that the recent crisis seems to have discredited government as much as it discredited the financial sector. During the Great Depression, matters were different. As economic collapse caused the public to lose faith in the private sector and markets, faith in government grew. For example, in the United States, public support for President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal was broad-based throughout the 1930’s.
One possible reason for the difference in attitudes today is that bankers were visibly punished in the 1930’s. Legislation such as the US Glass-Steagall Act clipped their wings. Many bankers also suffered direct losses as their banks collapsed, or as investigations exposed them to public ridicule, and even jail.
Today, by contrast, broad segments of the public see the big banks and big government as being run by the same elites who created the crisis, and then spent public money under one guise or another bailing the banks out. Even as bankers are back to reaping enormous bonuses, taxpayers have been left to foot the bill for the economic collapse. Many workers are unemployed and in danger of being evicted from their homes, while no important banker has been put in jail.
The biggest banks now account for an even larger share of the financial sector after benefiting from a government rescue, while efforts like the Dodd-Frank Act to legislate more constraints on banks have been lobbied into shadows of their original selves. The elite, whether in government or big business, seems to look after itself and no one else.
In the US, this sentiment has fueled the Tea Party, which coalesces around opposition to government expansion (and to elites more generally), even if that expansion is aimed at regulating big banks (presumably because government regulations tend to be shaped by the powerful among the regulated). Movements like the Tea Party have thus tended keep in check those who, after a crisis of the sort that America has had, typically want more government action, including curbing markets and competition.
The US is not alone in having a discredited government. In the eurozone, in addition to the perceived nexus between banks and governments, the governing elite’s willingness to embrace European integration, and taxpayer-financed cross-border financial support, without broad public consultation has generated a similar sentiment. In Japan, two decades of relentless economic malaise has decimated the public’s faith in politicians and the government bureaucracy.
The second undesirable possibility – that governments with little spending capacity to assuage public anger turn against democracy and free expression – is also remote for now. Democratic institutions in industrial countries are stronger, and have deeper roots, than was the case in the 1930s.
That leaves the third undesirable possibility, the search for unprotected scapegoats upon whom public anger can be dissipated. Unfortunately, several countries are taking this path, with undocumented immigrants and Muslims being the first targets.
Politicians who seek scapegoats might argue that they mean no harm to their targets, and that they are helping their societies to avoid worse possibilities. But, as the 1930’s showed, it is hard to imagine any possibility worse than where this type of behavior can lead.
Raghuram Rajan, a former chief economist of the IMF, is a professor of finance at the University of Chicago's Booth School of Business and the author of Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy. His blog is at http://blogs.chicagobooth.edu/faultlines.
