The Camp David Dividend: For the Same Damage, a Ballistic Strike Now Costs Moscow Less Than Drones
By: Giorgio Provinciali
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Kyiv Twenty-seven ballistic missiles, one interceptor. The kickoff of a new phase of the war came overnight, but the goal had already been waved off Friday afternoon at Camp David. Western media will file this one, too, as yet another night of terror, caused by a desperate Putin a liturgy fit for every season before returning to the supposed frustration of a Kremlin that would be striking at random. The figures the Ukrainian Air Forcereportedreveal an entirely different discipline.
On the night between July 31 and August 1, Russia launched 35 missiles 27 ballistic missiles, including Iskander-Ms and S-400-launched weapons; four hypersonic anti-ship Tsirkon and Oniks missiles; and a handful of air-to-surface and anti-radiation missiles along with 185 attack drones. Ukrainian defensesneutralized156 of them: 154 drones and two missiles. Of the 27 ballistic missiles, only one. Kyiv is counting nine dead, seven of them in a single district, Darnytskyi, while the number of woundedroseabove thirty, including four minors and a police officer on duty. The headquarters of Kyivmedspetstrans, the municipal ambulance service,was strucktwice, leaving four buildings partly destroyed and five ambulances burned. The double strike on the capitals ambulance fleet was not desperation but methodical interdiction of medical-response flows, exactly as weexplainedwhen we dismantledthe lullaby of frustration.
Let us therefore do the calculation nobody in the West makes: how many delivery vehicles Moscow must launch, on average, to get one through to its target. With drones, the nights 185 launches and 23 recorded impacts across 21 locations yield eight launches for every arrival. The night before, the Air Forcerecorded255 launches and 22 impacts: eleven and a half to one. On a night in late June, itcounted86, with 17 arrivals: five to one. Across the combined sample 526 launches and 62 impacts Russia therefore needs an average of eight and a half drones to place one on target. One correction must be entered in the ledger: the formationincludesGerberas and Parodiyas, meaning unarmed decoys and radar-track simulators designed not only to swell the saturation wave and consume interceptors, but also toreinforcethe backbone of the mesh network that lets the rest of Russias killing vectors communicate according to the script dictated by the Kremlin. Strip out one quarter as decoys andthe ratio for armed drones alone falls toward six to one. Even then,Ukraines counter-drone barrier absorbs almost ninety percent of the volume.
For ballistic missiles, the calculation fits on one line: 27 launches, one shoot-down, 26 arrivals. That is1.04 missiles to put one on target, with a penetration rate of 96.3 percent. Tsirkon and Oniks? Four out of four, while three other weapons in the salvo failed on their own because of malfunctions the only defense that worked for free that night. Thus,while the counter-drone barrier stops almost nine vehicles out of ten, the anti-ballistic barrier stops one in twenty-five. The arithmetic tastes even more bitter because Patriot doctrinecalls fortwo PAC-3s for every incoming ballistic weapon: the 27 missiles fired overnight therefore represented, on paper, demand for as many as 54 interceptors in a single night, against Ukrainian consumption alreadyestimatedat 6070 per month under ordinary conditions and 150180 at peak intensity.Only one ballistic missile was shot down last night, solely because there are no missiles for the Patriots, Zelenskywrote, having already called ballistics Russias final argument. He added thatthis very shortage of interceptors encourages such attacks against human life. True, butresponsibility also rests with those who had already conceived an alternative system in many respects more modern, versatile and promising than the Patriot and whocontinue to financethe war machine that manufactures those missiles.
Now add the economics, which Western commentators carefully avoid. A GerancostsMoscow, by current estimates, between $50,000 and $80,000: at eight and a half launches per impact, a warhead of roughly seventy kilograms falling on a Ukrainian city costs about $500,000$600,000, or $7,000$8,000 per kilogram. An Iskander-M,estimatedat around $3 million,carriesa 500700-kilogram warhead and, at a ratio of 1.04, reaches the same target at roughly $5,000 per kilogram. In other words, less than the drone. To make the point concrete,reproducing the payload of a single Iskander about 600 kilograms with Gerans requires 72 launches, costing Moscow $3.6$5.8 million, while the Iskander gets through for $3.1 million.
With Patriot magazinesrunning dry, the Kremlins premium weapon has therefore also become the most efficient in its arsenal, and Zelenskys statement that the shortage encourages the attacks describes a cost curve with an accountants precision.
That curve has already produced its little offspring. It is called Banderol parcel post a small cruise missile under development since 2021, air-launched from Orion drones, firstdissectedby the HUR in April 2025 and nowproducedby the hundreds each year. Bloomberg nowdescribesit as the scourge of the Black Sea ports. It carries a 150-kilogram warhead, flies beyond the reach of interceptor drones and is estimated to cost between $150,000 and $300,000 apiece. Too little to make firing a Patriot at it worthwhile. According to the office of Vladyslav Vlasiuk, Zelenskys sanctions-policy commissioner, itaccounts for80 percent of the strikes on the ports of Greater Odesa, including Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi, with more than twenty merchant ships damaged and the grain corridor slowed, as the Navy confirms. Itcontainsmany international components, along with the standardization we documented in modems, this time applied to turbojets. At $1,000$2,000 per kilogram rising to $3,000$6,000 once two or three launches per impact are factored in Banderol runs along the bottom of the entire curve: when it gets through, it delivers at clearance-sale prices; when it is stopped by a surface-to-air missile, it has won the exchange anyway.
There is, finally, a dimension that cost alone leaves out:the extension of terror. Attrition statistics apply to every target, however small. In line with what we have beendocumentingfor weeks, today again we recordedthe surgical bombardment of Ukrainian gas stations, struck one by one by Russian drones. Even there, for the record, the average holds: to burn one, Moscow needs eight launches. The paradox is complete in its brutal banality.
For a target that must explode immediately and with certainty, the rational delivery vehicle is now a ballistic missile, even against a gas pump.
Per kilogram delivered, it already costs less than the drone; impunity absorbs the waste of dropping its half-ton payload on a target of lesser value. Its launch site is also generally more convenient: farther to the rear and better defended. Payload, weight and even list price matter little: trajectory is what counts.A quasi-ballistic arc now pays a four-percent toll; a slow Shahed profile pays 87 percent.
The only trajectory on which Ukrainian defenses can still levy a duty is the cruise profile, while the ballistic toll was set to zero Friday at Camp David.
Thus a strategic precision weapon, which a functioning air defense would force Russia to reserve for command nodes and the defense industry, drops down a class and becomes an everyday munition. The only remaining constraint is Russias assembly line a constraint Moscow manages and expands, financed in part by the West while Kyiv no longer controls the opposing constraint.
Terror therefore expands along two axes: in space, because every square inch of Ukraine lies within the targeting envelope of ground-launched ballistic missiles, with air-launched weapons covering the rest;and in time, because people here now live under the constant threat of weapons that are almost certain to reach their targets, with no real possibility of finding shelter. The hours of warning provided by a Shahed swarm give way to the few minutes or seconds by which the siren precedes the blast of a quasi-ballistic arc.
In early July, during the latest NATO summit in Ankara, Donald Trump publiclypromisedVolodymyr Zelensky a license to manufacture PAC interceptors in Ukraine:Were going to give a license to you to make Patriots. On July 9, Zelenskyannouncedthat an agreement had been reached, with the first components expected within days. On July 15, he expressed thanks for an already historic political decision, while Lockheed Martin itselfsaid it supportedthe license. On Thursday, speaking to the Financial Times, Trump pulled back:not sure. On Friday, at the Camp David cabinet meeting, heretractedit the United Stateshas not agreed and warned that such technology would be difficult to transfer because its recipient might one day turn it against America. In a single stroke, the Ankara promise, the July 9 agreement and the historic decision of July 15 all fell against the manufacturers own position and while a country endured nightly ballistic bombardment, just three days after a White House meeting that Zelensky himself had called good. A few hours later came the 27 Iskanders. Coincidences.
In 2022, when Ukraine held the strategic advantage created by a successful counteroffensive, timid and fearful Europeans with Washington setting the escalation ceiling on tanks, ATACMS and F-16s granted the Russians an entire winter in which to entrench behind the Surovikin lines. Today, after Kyiv had regained the technological advantage through deep drone warfare, the best asset the Kremlin has ever had in Washington put the ball back at midfield. Between those moments stand two precedents that bind the episodes into a pattern: Congressfrozeaid between October 2023 and April 2024, causing Ukraines ammunition famine andcontributing tothe fall of Avdiivka; and the United Statescut offintelligence sharing with Ukraine at the height of the Kursk operation. Suddenly precise Russian strikes followed against positions Moscow had missed for seven months, until Putin washanded backcontrol of the region.
Four windows in four years:every time Ukraine generates an asymmetric advantage, theWesternpolitical cycle cancels it before it can become structural.
The matrix of the pattern, after all, predates those four windows by at least thirty years. In 1994, at Budapest, Ukrainegave upthe worlds third-largest nuclear arsenal about 1,900 strategic warheads, not counting tactical weapons, together with intercontinental delivery systems and bombers in exchange for security assurances, a term the signatories carefully chose in place of guarantees. Yet those warheads were only the visible part of the price. The structural part was the school.Soviet Ukraine designed ballistic missiles. In Dnipro, the Pivdenne bureau the Yangel school and the Pivdenmash production lines, directed by the same Leonid Kuchma who later signed the renunciation,producedthe R-36M, which NATO renamed Satan, the heaviest intercontinental ballistic missile ever deployed, along with the rail-mobile RT-23. In Kharkiv, Khartron wrote their guidance systems. That industrial chain wasdismantledunder American supervision and funding, with silos blown apart and delivery vehicles cut into pieces. In 1999, to settle gas debts, Kyiv evenhandedMoscow eight of the Tu-160 bombers that now attack it and nearly six hundred Kh-55 cruise missiles the same weapons that, after conversion, began falling back on Ukraine in 2022.Thirty years later, the country that wrote the history of ballistics is paying the price: one Budapest signatory launches Iskanders at its cities, another lowers its shields, and the rest finance the attacker more than they finance its defense.
Of the two ratios examined here, then, one is earned and one is given away.
The eight-and-a-half-to-one drone ratio is an attritional equilibrium won on the battlefield and renegotiated every month. Moscow raises flight altitudes, fits Shaheds with turbojets, andstandardizesChinese modems and mesh networks, while Kyiv answers with interceptor drones, mobile fire groups and electronic warfare.
The 1.04 ratio for ballistic missiles is instead a political variable. When PAC-3s were available, Iskanders and Kinzhalsdid fall apartover Kyiv, not on their targets. If they reach their marks today, it is because that parameter was set and confirmed Friday at Camp David.
To colleagues who are once again reading the latest American reversal as a negotiating tactic, we recommend an exercise in elementary arithmetic:multiply 26 ballistic warheads by their explosive weight and divide by the number of interceptors available for the next night. That is the only negotiation now in progress, and it is being conducted above the rooftops of Darnytskyi. Those who for four years have mistaken the methodical interdiction of volumes and flows for outbursts of frustration will continue to be astonished at each dawn.
In modern warfare, the deep battle is a duel between symmetrical interdiction campaigns. Kyiv degrades Russias fuel, logistics and command flows; Moscow degrades Ukraines energy, production and rescue flows. Without interceptors, only one of those campaigns runs unopposed: to place a drone warhead, Russia needs eight and a half launches; to place a ballistic one, since Friday, it needs 1.04.
The final question belongs by right or, more accurately, by return of serve to the European family that Ukraine will join, who as weexplained knows thatLockheed Martin is not able to produce a quantitiy of PAC-3 interceptors sufficient to satisty the demand. Europe had alreadydevelopedan alternative to the Patriot that again, as weexplained is in some respects better: the Franco-Italian SAMP/T, now in its NG version. Yet Europe neither brought it to maturity norhonoredthe deliveries promised to Kyiv, thereby moving from a potentially winning position on the only variable that matters trajectory toco-developingthe Freya project with Ukraine as the basis of its own anti-ballistic defense, even as it, too, asks Washington for Patriots. On the same Thursday as thenot sure, a Kh-101buried itselfninety kilometers inside Poland. Now that Russian weapons are falling on their territory as well, how long will Europeans need to understand that the debate over PAC-3 licenses is running off course and that the tap to close is the one thatfinancesMoscows production line?
In 1.619 days of war, we recorded over 300 videos from ground zero and wrote more than 3,000 articles at least 1,600 in English, and over 1,400 in Italian.
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戴维营红利：同等破坏效果下，如今莫斯科发射弹道导弹的成本已低于使用无人机
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻译：旺财球球
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基辅二十七枚弹道导弹，一枚被拦截。这场战争新一阶段的序幕是在夜间拉开的，但信号早在周五下午就已从戴维营发出。西方媒体会再次将此归类为又一个恐怖之夜，归咎于绝望的普京，四季皆宜的祷辞，随后回到有关克里姆林宫挫败感的陈词，称其为随机打击。乌克兰空军公布的数据揭示的却是完全不同的现实。
（图：我从在基辅的一位挚友处收到这张照片。这是在他家门前，俄罗斯当晚袭击乌克兰后拍的??）
在7月31日至8月1日的夜间，俄罗斯发射了35枚导弹，其中27枚为弹道导弹，包括伊斯坎德尔-M与S-400发射的导弹；4枚高超声速反舰锆石与缟玛瑙导弹；还有若干空对地与反辐射导弹，以及185架攻击型无人机。乌方防空摧毁了其中156架：154架无人机和2枚导弹。在27枚弹道导弹中，仅有一枚被拦截。基辅方面统计显示，袭击已造成9人死亡，其中7人集中在达尔尼茨基区，受伤人数超过30人，包括4名未成年人和1名执勤警察。基辅市急救服务中心总部两度遭到打击，四座建筑部分被毁、五辆救护车被烧毁。对首都救护车队的双重打击并非绝望之举，而是系统性的阻断医疗响应系统，正如我们此前在绝望摇篮曲文中所解释的那样。
因此，让我们做一个西方从未做过的计算：莫斯科平均需要发射多少运载武器，才能有一枚击中目标。对于无人机，当晚185次发射与记录到在21处造成的23次命中，得出平均每一次命中需8次发射。前一晚，空军记录255次发射与22次命中：约11.6比1。六月下旬某夜，记录86次发射与17次命中：约5比1。合并样本为526次发射与62次命中，因此俄方平均需约8.5架无人机才能换来一次命中。需作一项修正：编队中包含格尔贝拉与帕罗迪亚，即无武装诱饵与雷达跟踪模拟器，其目的不仅是膨胀饱和波以消耗拦截器，也为俄方其它杀伤飞行器构建网状通信主干，按克里姆林宫所定脚本协同运作。若将四分之一视为诱饵，则仅计算有武装的无人机命中比率约降到6比1。即便如此，乌克兰的反无人机屏障仍拦截了近90%的攻击量。
弹道导弹的计算则一目了然：27次发射，1枚被击落，26枚命中。即发射1.04枚导弹即可实现一次命中，穿透率达96.3%。锆石与缟玛瑙？四发四中，同时还有三枚其他导弹自损失效，那晚唯一免费奏效的防御。因此，当反无人机屏障能拦截近九成飞行器时，反弹道导弹防御仅能拦截二十五枚中的一枚。算术结果更苦涩的是，因为爱国者防御学说要求对每枚来袭弹道武器使用两枚PAC-3拦截器：夜间发射的27枚导弹在纸面上就意味着一夜间对多达54枚拦截器的需求，而乌克兰在常规情况下已估计每月消耗6070枚拦截器，高强度作战高峰时为150180枚。泽连斯基写道：昨夜仅一枚弹道导弹被击落，完全是因为没有可用的爱国者拦截导弹，并已将弹道武器称为俄罗斯的最后论据。他补充说，正是这种拦截器的短缺助长了俄军对人类生命的此类攻击。这话虽有道理，但责任也在那些已构想出一种在许多方面比爱国者更现代、更通用、更有前景的替代系统的人身上，同时他们仍在为制造这些攻击导弹的战争机器提供资金。
现在加入经济学计算，这是西方评论界小心回避的。按现在行情估算，一枚天竺葵成本在5万至8万美元之间：以每次命中需8.5次发射计算，一枚约70公斤弹头成功落在乌克兰城市的代价约为50万60万美元，约合每公斤7,0008,000美元。一枚伊斯坎德尔-M估值约300万美元，携带500700公斤弹头；以1.04的比率，其到达同一目标的成本约为每公斤5,000美元。换言之，弹道导弹的成本低于无人机。为更直观说明这一点，用天竺葵实现一枚伊斯坎德尔的大约600公斤弹头的投送效果，需要72次发射，成本为360万580万美元，而伊斯坎德尔的成本约为310万美元便可完成效果。
在爱国者库存日益枯竭，克里姆林宫的最高端的武器因此也成了其军备库中最具成本效益的武器，泽连斯基称拦截器短缺助长了这些攻击，描述的是一条带有会计精确度的成本曲线。
（图：在俄罗斯弹道导弹摧毁了克里维吉里赫当地仅存的Epitsenter连锁店，我在现场报道版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
这条曲线已孕育其子代武器，被称为班杰洛尔（包裹邮寄），一种自2021年起开发的小型巡航导弹，由猎户座无人机空投，2025年4月乌克兰总参情报局首次对其进行技术解析，目前每年产量已达数百枚。《彭博社》现将其描述为黑海港口的祸根。它携带约150公斤弹头，飞程超出拦截无人机的有效范围，并估计单价在15万至30万美元之间。成本之低以至于发射一枚爱国者拦截几乎不值得。根据泽连斯基制裁政策专员弗拉西尤克办公室的说法，在针对大敖德萨地区港口（包括乔尔诺莫尔斯克与皮夫德尼）的袭击中，班杰洛尔占了80%，造成20多艘商船受损并减缓了粮食走廊的运行，海军亦予以确认。它包含许多国际组件，并且在涡轮喷气发动机上体现了我们先前在调制解调器中记录的标准化趋势。按每公斤1,0002,000美元计算，若考虑每次命中需发射2到3次则升至3,0006,000美元每公斤，班杰洛尔处在整条曲线的底端：一旦穿透，它的投放性价比相当于清仓甩卖价；若被地对空导弹拦截，在成本交换角度，它依然胜出。
最后，还有一个仅靠成本无法涵盖的维度：恐怖的延展性。消耗统计适用于每一个目标，无论目标多么微不足道。与我们数周来记录一致，今天我们再次记录到对乌克兰加油站的外科式轰炸模逐个被俄方无人机击中。即便在这里，平均水平同样成立：要烧毁一座加油站，莫斯科需要发射八次无人机。这个驳论以其残酷的平庸达到极致。
对于必须立即并要确保命中的目标，现在理性的投送工具便是弹道导弹，即便目标是一个加油泵。
按每公斤投送成本计，它已比无人机更便宜；至于将半吨级战斗部投向低价值目标所造成的浪费，在几乎不受惩罚的突防成功率面前，已不再构成真正约束。其发射地点通常更为便利：更靠后方且防护更好。载荷、重量乃至标价变得不再重要：关键在于弹道轨迹。一条准弹道弧线如今只需付出约4%的关税；一列慢速的沙赫德轨迹则需付出87%的代价。
乌克兰防空仍能对付的唯一路径是巡航弹轨迹，而弹道关税在周五的戴维营会议上被定为零。
因此，那些在正常防空环境下本应被俄罗斯保留用于打击指挥枢纽、军工设施等高价值战略目标的精确制导武器，正在被降级为一种日常消耗弹药。唯一剩下的制约是俄罗斯的装配线，这是莫斯科能管理并扩张的约束，部分由西方资助，而基辅不再控制敌方的制约因素。
（图：我在乌克兰扎波罗热一座被俄罗斯联邦摧毁的加油站报道??版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
恐怖因此沿两条轴线扩展：空间维度上，每一寸乌克兰领土都处于路基弹道导弹的射程覆盖下，空射武器覆盖其余地区；时间维度上，这里的人们现在生活在几乎必定命中目标的武器的持续威胁下，几乎无处可逃。沙赫德群所提供的预警是几小时，而如今准弹道弧线出现在天空时，警报响起与爆炸之间的间隔仅为几分钟或几秒钟。
七月初，在安卡拉举行的最新北约峰会上，唐纳德特朗普公开向弗拉基米尔泽连斯基承诺批准乌克兰制造PAC拦截器的许可：我们将给你们制造爱国者的许可。7月9日，泽连斯基宣布已达成协议，首批组件预计数日内到达。7月15日，他对已是历史性政治决定表示感谢，而洛克希德马丁公司本身也表示支持该许可。周四，在接受《金融时报》采访时，特朗普收回表述：不确定。周五，在戴维营内阁会议上，他更明确否认，美国尚未同意，并警告称该项技术难以转移，因为接收方未来可能将其反用于美国。安卡拉承诺、7月9日协议与7月15日的历史性决定一笔勾销，这与制造商本身的立场相悖，且发生在乌克兰正承受夜复一夜弹道导弹轰炸之时，仅在泽连斯基自己称为良好的白宫会晤后三天。数小时后便是27枚伊斯坎德尔的来袭。巧合吗？
（视频：为《伦敦时报》栏目《前线》自顿涅茨克地区发回报道。该栏目由美国资深记者埃米凯洛格主持）
2022年，当乌克兰凭借成功的反攻占据战略主动时，胆怯与畏缩的欧洲人，在华盛顿将升级上限设定在坦克、ATACMS与F-16上的背景下，授予俄方整整一个冬季的事件，让其在苏罗维金线后筑巢固守。如今，在基辅通过深度无人机战争重新夺回技术优势后，克里姆林宫在华盛顿的最好卧底又一次把比赛拉回到中场。这两个时间节点之间，存在两个具有标志性的先例，揭示出一个已成的模式：美国国会在2023年10月至2024年4月冻结对乌援助，造成乌克兰弹药短缺并直接导致阿夫迪伊夫卡陷落；美国在库尔斯克行动关键阶段时切断对乌情报共享。随后俄方对莫斯科七个月来未命中的阵地发起了精准打击，直到普京重新获得该地区控制权。
四年里出现四个窗口：每当乌克兰创造出非对称优势时，西方政治周期便在其成为结构性优势之前将其扼杀。
这一模式的源头，实际上比这四个窗口至少早三十年便已形成。1994年，在布达佩斯，乌克兰放弃了世界第三大核弹头库，约1,900枚战略弹头，不含战术武器，以及洲际投送体系和轰炸机，以换取所谓的安全保证，签字方刻意以保证代替承诺一词。但那些弹头只是代价的显性部分。结构性部分在于那套学派：苏联时期的乌克兰设计了弹道导弹。在第聂伯市，南方局，扬格尔学派，与南方机械制造厂生产线，在后来签署弃核条约的列昂尼德库奇马的管理下，制造了R-36M（北约称撒旦），即史上部署过的最重型洲际弹道导弹，以及铁路机动的RT-23。在哈尔科夫，哈特龙公司研制了其制导系统。那条工业链在美国的监督与资助下被拆解，导弹井被摧毁，运载系统被切割报废。1999年，为偿付天然气债务，基辅甚至向莫斯科交付了八架图-160轰炸机（今用于攻击乌克兰）及近600枚Kh-55巡航导弹，这些武器在2022年经改装后又落到了乌克兰头上。三十年后，书写弹道导弹史的国家正在付出代价：一位布达佩斯协议签署国向其城市发射伊斯坎德尔，另一位正在削弱乌方防御，其他国家资助侵略者的资金超过了对受害者的国防的资助。
在本文中考察的两种比率，一种是靠战场取得的，另一种则被拱手让出了。
8.5比1的无人机比率是经由战场赢得的消耗均衡，并且每个月都在重新博弈。莫斯科提高飞行高度、为沙赫德装备涡喷发动机并标准化中国调制解调器与网状网络，基辅则以拦截无人机、机动火力组与电子战予以回应。
弹道导弹1.04的比率则是一个政治变量。当PAC-3拦截器可用时，伊斯坎德尔与匕首会在基辅上空解体，而不是在其目标上爆炸。若如今它们能够命中目标，那正是因为这个参数已被设定，并在周五被戴维营确认。
（视频：我在乌克兰巴拉克利亚??为意大利AGEEI报道）
我们建议那些再次将美国最新逆转解读为谈判手段的同仁做一道初等算术练习：把26枚弹道弹头乘以其爆炸当量，再除以下一个夜晚可用的拦截器数量。这就是目前正在进行的唯一谈判，它在达尔尼茨基的房顶之上进行。那些四年来一直将系统性阻断运输能力和资源流动误读为挫败感爆发的人，会在每一个拂晓继续感到惊讶。
在现代战争中，深度战是两场对称的截断运动之对决。基辅削弱俄方的燃料、后勤与指挥流；莫斯科削弱乌方的能源、生產與救援流。没有拦截器时，只有其中一场运动不受制约：要一枚无人机弹头命中，俄方需8.5次发射；要一枚弹道弹头命中，自周五起只需1.04次发射。
最终的问题理应，或更准确地说，作为回击，落到乌克兰将要加入的欧洲大家庭身上。正如我们此前所阐述的，洛克希德马丁无法生产出足以满足需求数量的PAC-3拦截器。欧洲本已开发出一种在若干方面更优的爱国者替代方案，我们也曾分析过：法意合作的SAMP/T（现为其NG版本）。然而欧洲既未将其成熟化，也未兑现对基辅承诺的交付，从而从在唯一重要变量（轨迹）上可能取胜的位置退下来，转而与乌克兰共同开发作为自身反弹道防御基础的弗蕾娅项目；另一边，仍向华盛顿请求爱国者系统。在尚不确定的同一个周四，一枚Kh-101巡航导弹坠落在波兰境内，深入其领土九十公里。既然俄武器也开始落在他们领土上，欧洲人还需多长时间才能理解：关于PAC-3许可的辩论已偏离航向，而应关上的阀门是那个持续资助莫斯科生产线的水龙头？
（图：乌克兰第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯卡州第聂伯罗省第聂伯罗省，在克里维吉里赫，俄罗斯无人机对沿线的加油站袭击中，一辆民用汽车被摧毁??版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
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