John Mearsheimer | The elites play games with our plant and our lives https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oVUCCLDUb-k Chris Hedges Fan Club 6.21万位订阅者 解说词 0:00 I has several questions dealing with what kind of scenarios could be realistic for the war in Ukraine to end; now given your distinctive positions how would you see that what would be a realistic scenario going forward for the war well. I agree with Carl there when you ask Carl that question a slightly different form he basically said it's very hard to figure out where this train is headed I don't 0:25 know how this one is going to end 0:27 right I do want to go to Great Lengths 0:29 to make sure we don't end up getting uh 0:32 incinerated in a nuclear war but I don't 0:34 know where it's going to end because 0:36 what I hear you say also from your 0:38 intervention is that there is no obvious 0:39 end to this war because Russia is not 0:42 going to back down and the ukrainians 0:44 get the support for Europeans and the US 0:47 is also not going to back down right I 0:49 said that in my formal remarks 0:52 go back to this Russia Putin Putin is 0:54 not going to back down 0:56 and there might be a difference I I I 0:59 think there are a fair number of people 1:01 in Moscow even in senior positions who 1:03 would be interested in closing down this 1:05 war tomorrow 1:06 would they could would that include 1:09 Crimea withdrawing from Crimea probably 1:12 not probably not 1:14 so then we will be back to where we were 1:17 but uh prior to sort of February the 1:20 24th where we did not have an agreement 1:23 on Crimea and I think it could take 1:25 quite some time to get some sort of 1:27 solution to Crimea but I think the other 1:31 issues I would not consider it entirely 1:33 impossible that at some point in time we 1:36 get the change that sort of they 1:38 understand in Moscow that what they're 1:41 heading into into something that's got 1:43 to be danger for Russia not because we 1:46 are going to invade Moscow that's not 1:48 going to happen 1:50 but it's going to implode 1:52 and they will try to rescue what can be 1:55 rescued and go for something that might 1:58 be acceptable but that will only be 2:01 possible if we can give and and I think 2:04 we'll talk about the post Putin it's not 2:06 going to happen with Putin and it's also 2:08 going to be dependent us helping to 2:10 secure and and give a new future to 2:13 Ukraine because as I said if we don't 2:15 get a stable Ukraine 2:17 uh we will not get a stable Europe 2:19 because then there will be a constant 2:22 Temptation for I mean if you see some of 2:25 the loonies that are paraded on Russian 2:27 television these days they're truly 2:29 dangerous loonies parading there but 2:32 we'll give temptation to them but we do 2:34 not know where this war will end we do 2:36 not not know where Russia will end up 2:38 what we do know is that there is a 2:43 movement towards a geopolitical rivalry 2:46 where you have the UF and China coming 2:49 back to John's intervention and the U.S 2:52 Russia now where is Europe in all this 2:56 in the 2:59 now where is excuse me where is Europe 3:01 in that picture because the Rivalry is 3:06 primarily the dyad between the UF and 3:09 China on the one hand and you depicted 3:11 to be the U.S and Russia on the other so 3:13 it's a tripolar dynamic but where is 3:17 Europe in that dynamic 3:21 in that particular Dynamic I mean we are 3:23 John mentioned the Taiwan issue uh as 3:27 perhaps the most dangerous one which is 3:29 really is a very very different issue 3:31 because it's really done the resolve the 3:32 Civil War from 1949 and and the Chinese 3:36 want to sort of obey Jing once in some 3:39 sort of way primarily prevent Taiwan 3:41 from going independent they would 3:43 consider that something completely 3:45 unacceptable so we are distinctly in 3:48 favor of one China principle we say 3:50 however defined it somewhat differently 3:51 and we are in favor of a peaceful 3:53 resolution to it and we are distinctly 3:55 against 3:57 uh trying to resolve that by military 3:59 means then Europe is not a military 4:01 power in that part of the world we are 4:04 trading power we are diplomatic power 4:06 but we are not a military power with 4:07 that part of the world 4:09 yeah yeah uh I think uh the United 4:12 States is deeply committed to containing 4:15 if not uh rolling back Chinese power and 4:21 that containment strategy has two 4:24 Dimensions to it one is a military 4:26 Dimension and the other is an economic 4:28 Dimension and in terms of the military 4:30 Dimension the Europeans are going to 4:33 play hardly any role at all I think we 4:34 agree on that 4:36 where the Europeans are going to matter 4:38 is on the economic front and this is a 4:40 very tricky issue and they're of course 4:43 now lots of articles in the media on 4:45 this subject but the Europeans are going 4:49 to want to trade extensively with China 4:54 this is especially true given the 4:56 negative Economic Consequences of the 4:59 Ukraine war and it's no accident that 5:02 early last month the German Chancellor 5:05 went to Beijing and there's all sorts of 5:07 evidence the Europeans are thinking 5:09 about trading more and more with China 5:12 and of course the Europeans because they 5:14 have these sophisticated economies with 5:16 all these sophisticated technologies 5:18 will trade Technologies with the Chinese 5:22 which will enrage the Americans the 5:25 Americans are going to want the 5:26 Europeans to help Washington throttle 5:32 the Chinese economy you are not going to 5:35 have any interest in throttling the 5:37 Chinese economy you're going to have an 5:40 interest in enhancing your prosperity 5:43 facilitating economic growth and that 5:45 means more trade with Europe so I think 5:48 there is a potential 5:51 for significant tension between the 5:55 United States and Europe 5:57 over the whole issue of trade between 6:01 Europe and China 6:04 now is this not the challenge because we 6:07 have no good deterrent to prevent war 6:10 and instability in a more multi-polar 6:14 world and that means that we are moving 6:16 over to more hybrid measures now the new 6:19 U.S uh defense strategy talks about 6:23 integrated deterrence which is not only 6:25 military but which is also integrating 6:28 all other kinds of of domains all the 6:31 military domains but also sanctions and 6:33 a number of other institutional measures 6:36 now how does this look from the 6:39 perspective of Europe is Europe is the 6:41 EU ready for that world 6:44 I think to some extent Europe is more 6:46 ready than Americans are in the sense 6:48 that I said 6:50 um EU is very much a Hybrid Power if you 6:52 talk talk about all of the different 6:54 elements of hybrid Warfare they are 6:58 elements where there are instruments in 7:00 the hands of the European Union uh we 7:02 are not a military power we don't have 7:04 any armored divisions at all but we 7:07 coordinate cyber policies we coordinate 7:09 trade policies we coordinate migration 7:11 policies to a certain extent not always 7:13 a smashing success has to be said we 7:16 coordinate uh security sort of domestic 7:19 security Affairs that sort of thing that 7:22 is necessary in order to meet hybrid 7:24 threats we have I think more instruments 7:28 than the Americans have for obvious 7:30 reasons because the U.S continent has 7:33 not been fake as you said you live in 7:35 peace with the Canadians and the 7:36 Mexicans uh while we have been uh 7:39 exposed to these sorts of hybrid things 7:41 and accordingly have more instruments 7:44 so you think that Europe is well 7:46 equipped I wonder why it's well equipped 7:48 I mean shouldn't but but we are better 7:50 equipped and we are equipping ourselves 7:52 uh that I would argue but what do you 7:54 think of my argument that the Europeans 7:57 are going to trade with the Chinese in 8:00 ways that's going to anger The Americans 8:04 are we were going to trade with Chinese 8:05 we do or also the Americans do America 8:07 American yes exports you know what I'm 8:10 saying here high technology yeah on high 8:13 tech there's an element of tension 8:15 sometimes uh we have this sort of Chip 8:17 restrictions that came in the beginning 8:20 of October that affects a couple of 8:22 European companies that are less happy 8:24 there will be talks as a matter of fact 8:26 on Tuesday uh in Washington in the 8:30 traded Technology Council and see if we 8:31 can sort out these issues yeah yeah uh 8:34 we have a trade relationship across the 8:35 Atlantic that is not without its 8:37 tensions growing tensions at the moment 8:40 growing tensions due to certain 8:42 protectionist tendencies in American 8:43 politics but we normally sort them out 8:47 um the relationship across the Atlantic 8:49 uh we are allies whatever that means but 8:52 that doesn't mean that we are 100 of the 8:54 same view all the time never been the 8:57 case uh not now either and and of course 9:00 the difference I would say the the 9:02 fundamental difference between the 9:03 European View 9:04 an American view on China is that 9:07 for the U.S correct me if you think I'm 9:10 exaggerating 9:12 but for the U.S it's a fear of what I 9:14 call 1870 9:17 um 1870 was when 9:20 U.S replaced Britain as the dominating 9:23 power in the world in terms of economy 9:25 and there was consequences coming out of 9:28 that and and Americans of course feared 9:31 that an increasingly economically 9:33 powerful China 9:35 will over time 9:37 replace the Americans replace U.S as the 9:40 dominant power in the world I think 9:41 that's grossfully exaggerated I don't 9:44 think it will happen 9:46 but there's no question that that is 9:47 driving a lot of the fears in American 9:49 politics yeah but you know I think that 9:53 you are right that that is the great 9:56 fear that they will the Chinese will 9:58 overtake us the United States and I also 10:01 agree that it is probably greatly 10:04 exaggerated but this gets to my earlier 10:07 point that you never want to 10:09 underestimate the extent to which great 10:13 Powers assume worst case assumptions or 10:16 make worst case assumptions about the 10:19 other side so when you bring NATO 10:23 up to Russia's borders even if there are 10:26 no military forces American military 10:28 forces on Ukraine's territory and even 10:31 if it's going to take a long time for 10:34 Ukraine to become a member of NATO from 10:37 a Russian point of view they assume 10:39 worst case and they get really scared 10:41 because it's a security issue and the 10:43 same thing is true with the Americans 10:45 looking at China the Americans are 10:47 scared stiff 10:49 she pointed out that China is going to 10:51 overtake them and great powers are just 10:55 they get very nervous they get very 10:59 antsy and then they pursue risky 11:02 strategies that's the point I've tried 11:03 to drive home yet I mean 11:06 not quite the same thing but I'm in 11:08 Norway as a border with Russia Norwegian 11:11 Force which is very close to more months 11:13 which is the most yes density's 11:15 concentration of nuclear military power 11:17 that's been fairly okay uh since the 11:21 1940s I don't think the Russians were 11:23 particularly happy about Russia about 11:24 Norway joining NATO they were not but 11:27 his work Estonia is a member of NATO 11:31 um that is very close to Saint 11:32 Petersburg I mean the the Border City of 11:35 narva is closer to Saint Peters than to 11:37 Talib 11:39 um they live fairly harmoniously 11:40 together that is not a threat it works 11:44 but don't you see uh geopolitics leading 11:47 to an escalation of tensions in the 11:50 Arctic and in the north doesn't the fact 11:53 that the Cold War was a bipolar 11:56 situation that was relatively stable we 12:00 are now in a situation that is fairly 12:02 unstable because we do not know exactly 12:04 where we are heading and we have major 12:06 states that are uncertain about the 12:08 capabilities and the intentions of the 12:10 others and that brings us into a very 12:12 dangerous territory 12:14 it does but but but but the Arctic is 12:17 essentially not another thing and that 12:19 is of course the fact that the ice is 12:21 receding 12:22 and that means that for example now if 12:25 you want to go with north of Siberia you 12:29 can't go without the help of the 12:30 Russians simply not doable 12:33 um 12:35 20 30 years down the road 40 50 years 12:37 down the road you might have a lot of 12:40 commercial traffic going to the north of 12:41 Siberia and that will invite a lot of 12:44 legal and political issues be that 12:46 rivalry a bit something else I don't 12:49 think war is going to break out in the 12:50 Arctic but we're going to face a number 12:52 of new questions primarily as a result 12:55 of climate change I would argue but that 12:58 is also more urgent because we have 13:00 climate cooperation among the major 13:02 Nations how does the geopolitical 13:04 Rivalry influence our ability to move 13:09 forward and climate if you look at what 13:11 has happened over the past 10 months 13:12 they didn't it didn't vary 13:15 optimistic would you say 13:17 no I wouldn't although 13:19 Russia was never a big play on global 13:23 climate they should have been because 13:25 they're going to be performantly 13:26 affected by it and it takes them a long 13:27 time to understand that that's going to 13:30 be the case China is a was the big one 13:33 India to a certain extent we have I 13:36 think is 28 to 29 of global emissions 13:40 all from China and even if they are 13:42 leaders in Lord of the Renewables and 13:45 other things now they're also the 13:47 leaders in Coal emissions which is the 13:49 most dangerous thing so um one of the 13:51 good things that came out of the meeting 13:52 between Biden XI Xin ping in Bali was 13:56 that they restarted 13:58 the climate dialogue and the president 14:01 of the European Council is invading 14:02 today 14:04 in order to discuss primarily we start 14:07 in the climate dialogue with the Chinese 14:10 Russia different thing but we know that 14:13 war is a very very 14:16 detrimental activity for climate and for 14:20 uh focus on climate issues the emissions 14:23 in Europe have certainly taken a 14:25 different uh Road and so has the 14:28 situation with coal in Asia and so forth 14:30 so this is having very detrimental 14:32 effects both on emissions but also on 14:35 the economies that we need to turn it 14:37 around so there are certainly some very 14:39 unfortunate consequences for for for 14:42 climate in the short to midterm 14:46 I think to get in agreement on climate 14:50 uh and to get agreements on how to deal 14:54 with pandemics and to get arms control 14:57 agreements unique cooperation among the 15:01 great powers in the system the most 15:03 powerful states 15:05 as we remember we shut down 15:09 proliferation in the second half of the 15:11 Cold War because the United States and 15:14 the Soviet Union decided to create the 15:16 npt the nuclear suppliers group and so 15:19 forth and so on the great Powers have to 15:22 cooperate there's no question about that 15:25 the problem that we face today is 15:27 twofold first of all they're not two 15:30 great powers in the system like there 15:33 were during the Cold War there's not one 15:35 great power which is really the ideal 15:37 situation like there was in the unipolar 15:40 moment there are three great powers 15:43 second problem is 15:45 a young woman named Eliza George who 15:48 wrote 15:49 article on proliferation during the Cold 15:53 War and her argument is the more intense 15:57 the security competition between great 16:00 Powers the less likely it is you'll get 16:04 cooperation on proliferation and 16:07 assorted issues because the great Powers 16:11 really don't want to cooperate they want 16:13 to contest each other and she shows that 16:16 you got very little 16:18 cooperation between the United States 16:20 and the Soviet Union on the nuclear 16:22 proliferation front in the Hat first 16:25 half of the Cold War it was with the 16:27 coming of day taunt where you've got 16:29 cooperation between more cooperation 16:31 between the United States and the 16:32 Soviets that led to cooperation on the 16:36 proliferation front anyway all this is 16:39 to say when you look at the fact that we 16:41 have three great powers that you have to 16:43 coordinate and that you have an intense 16:45 security competition in East Asia 16:48 between the United States and China you 16:50 have an intense security competition 16:52 almost a war between the United States 16:54 and Russia and Europe it's no accident 16:57 ladies and gentlemen the Xi Jinping 17:00 recently told John Kerry that he was not 17:03 interested in cooperating on climate and 17:07 it's no accident that the Russians have 17:10 just made it clear that they're not that 17:12 interested in cooperating on arms 17:14 control with the United States so I 17:16 think we're going to have a lot of 17:18 trouble 17:19 garnering copyright cooperation on this 17:23 set of issues moving forward because of 17:25 the change in the structure of the 17:27 system moving to multi-polarity and the 17:29 intensity the Cooper of the competition |