字母中淘筛历史的细节
西人资料中搜寻关于中国的点滴
正文
1954年，日内瓦会议招开，周恩来作为中华人民共和国总理，第一次参加大型的国际会议，很多人对他不了解。张国焘于1954年4月25日在纽约时报上发表了一篇文章，介绍周恩来。有意思的是张介绍周恩来的角度，他说中国有两个字来形容一个人，一个是圆，就是很圆滑；一个是方，就是有原则性，按规矩办事。他说周恩来属于前者。
可惜纽时不能看全文，下面是该文的英文摘要：
THE Chinese often characterize a man either as "round," meaning smooth; or as "square," meaning one with strict principles and set ways. Premier-Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, who is the directing chief of Communist China's delegation to the Geneva Conference, which convenes tomorrow, is definitely a "round" man.
2018.7.2补：近日去图书馆查纽约时报，在微缩胶片上看1954年4月25日的，然后相关文章拷贝到USB盘上，录下了张国焘的这篇文章的全文，附在这里，
Chou En-lai is a “Round” Man，the Idiom, Warns one who has known Red China delegate to Geneva, means “smooth”
By Chang Kuo-tao Hong Kong
The Chinese often characterise a man either “round,” meaning; or as “square,” meaning one with strict principles and set ways. Premier-Foreign Minster Chou En-lai, who is the directing chief of Communist China’s delegation to the Geneva Conference, which convenes tomorrow, is definitely a “round”man. He belongs in this category as one who is smooth in his dealings with society, who is good at making friends, who never goes to extremes and who always adapts himself to the existing situation. Chou En-lai, who will probably be pushed forward by the Russians at Geneva as the main Communist spokesman on Asiatic problems, is, as Americans would say, a smooth operator.
Let us begin with the rhetorical question Secretary of State Dulles asked at the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Berlin: “Who is this Chou En-lai?” I will try to anwser this question on the basis of my past experience with him in the Chinese Communist Party.
Actually, Chou En-lai is no stranger to foreign diplomats, particularly to officials of the United States Department of State. Two envoys of President Roosevelt, first Gen. Patrick J. Hurley and then Gen. George Marshall, dealt with him at various stages of the civil war negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communists in China.
He is one of the most capable of Chinese Communist leaders and has played a role in the party second only to that of Mao Tse-tung himself. It is perhaps fitting that he should be coupled with Vyacheslav Molotov at Geneva, for even though the personalities of the two men differ, Chou En-lai is now the Chinese Molotov.
Chou En-lai is a man of such tremedous energy that idlenness throws him completely off balance. He is efficient, meticulous and adept in dealing with manifold tasks; he has a good knowledge of modern affairs; he is endowed with a sharp analytical mind, a strong memory and the ability to express himself lucidly; he has good looks, a robust physique and works best under pressure.
Moreover, he is an artful diplomat who is skilled in shifting ground and a great actor who can weep, shout or simulate modesty as the occasion requires. When he was a student at Nankai Middle School in Tientsin, he used to play feminine roles in school dramatic performances. But there is nothing effeminate about Chou.
Throughout his career he has been untouched by personal scandal. He always has led a regular and methodical life. He is a good drinker, but is not addicted to liguor; he does not smoke. So far as I know, he has no hobbies of any kind. He is married to teng Ying-chao, an alternate member of the Communist Central Committee. They are childless.
Chou En-lai, one of the earliest members of the Chinese Communist party, is of neither worker nor peasant origin. Born in 1898 at Huaian in Kiangsu Province, he comes from a Mandarin family and could hardly have escaped the early influences of a bureaucratic philosophy and an atmosphere of relative affluence. At the time of the patriotic “May 14th“ student movement in 1919 he was studying in at Nankai in Tientsin.
Later he went to France as a student-worker, joining the Chinese Communist party there in 1921. This was the same year in which the party was formally organised in Shanghai at a meeting in which I participated. Chou En-lai and I had known of each other while we were working in the student movement, he in Tientsin and I in Peiping, but we did not meet until 1925, when I went to Canton to attend an all-China Labor Conference.
Chou arrived in Canton from France just as the Whampoa Military Academy was being established there with Chiang Kai-shek as president. He was recommended for the post of secretary in the school’s political department, and soon became the acting political commissar of the Academy. When I met him in Canton he still spoke with a Tientsin accent, but he struck me as one who had become Europeanised in many ways.
In addition to the post he held in the Whompoa Academy, Chou was concurrently a member of the Kwangtung Province Committee of the Chinese Communist party and the director of its Military Affairs Department. His success in Kwangtung was attributable to two factors. First, he was one of the best students of Borodin, the Russian advisor; second, he maintained a fairly good relationship with Chiang Kai-shek.
It was no simple task for him to collaborate with Chiang; as an official of the Whompoa Military Academy, he had to deal with criticism from his own comrades, who complained that he was influenced too much by the “Whompoa atmosphere.”
As a member of the Chinese Communnist party for thirty-three years, Chou En-lai has gone through numerous intra-party struggles, but he always has emerged as a powerful figure. Thus, he has been likened to pu tao weng(“The old man/Continued on Page 58)Who never falls downs”）--the lead-weighted, round-bottomed Chinese toy figure that can not be overturned.
The Chinese Communist party often refers to the “opportunism” of Chen Tu-hsiu, the first leader of the party, who was deposed at the “August 7th Conference" of 1927. In point of fact, Chou En-lai was a contral figure in the series of events that led to Chen Tu-hsiu’s downfall.
When the Kuomintang turned on the Shanghai insurrectionists in the purge of April 12, 1927, Chou--as the leader of the insurrection--erred by not being vigilant and taking precautions. But it was Chen Tu-hsiu who was made to admit this failure. Chou not only escaped censure, but was elected a member of the politburo.
Stalin, who was himself a supreme artist in political maneuver, admired the political artistry of Chou. Beginning with the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist party, which was convened in Msocow in June, 1928, Chou visited Russia several times. In the early days of the Communist party he was charged with the duties of military organization, secret service work and external relations, all of which were regarded as important by Moscow.
Divergences developed between Chou En-lai, the sophisticated student, who had been to Europe, and Mao Tse-tung, the native product. In 1931, when the party’s Central
Committee was transferred from Shanghai to Mao Tse-tung’s Soviet area in Kiangsi, Chou En-lai seized military power from Mao. When Mao regained his leadership in January, 1935, he made Chou En-lai the main target of attack. Again Chou weathered the storm. He submitted to Mao Tse-tung, who felt he could use him as a politburo member and as vice-chairman of the Military Affairs Committee.
Thus began the Mao-Chou partnership. Although relations between the two have never been cordial, they have managed to work together, Mao Tse-tung has found Chou En-lai an extremely capable and valuable associate.
The Latter’s dexterity is shown by his activities during the “Sian coup” of December, 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by the war lord Chang Hsueh-liang. Although he was the executor and not the policy-maker in this incident, Chou--who operated under the directives of Stalin and the maneuvers of Mao Tse-tung--succeeded in obtaining the peaceful release of Chiang Kai-shek.
This event created the basis for a new “united front” co-
Operation between the Kuomintang and the Communists against the Japanese, and gave Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai a chance to strengthen their position. Chou absorbed the bulk of the war lord’s troop’s into the Communist Eighth Route Army. The “Sian coup” signified a turn in Chinese history--for without it, the Chinese Communists might never have seized the mainland of China.
From 1937 to 1945 and again from 1945 to 1947 Chou En-lai reresented the Chinese Communists as their negotiator, first in Hankow, then in Chungking and later in Nanking.
It was almost inevitable for Chou En-lai to become premier and foreign minister when the Chinese Communist party established the “Chinese People’s Republic” in 1949. He is the man in the party best qualified to fill those jobs. In my opinion, Chou is also the best qualified to succeeded Mao Tse-tung if anything should happen to Mao. But this question is most complex and the answer is related to the continuous struggle that goes on in the party.
One hears much these days of “collective leadership” in the Chinese Communist party and of the possibility of a triumvirate’s taking power in the event of Mao’s death. Such a triumvirate, the speculation runs, would consist of Chu Teh, commander-in-chief of the army; Liu Shao-chi, secretary -general of the party; a nd Chou En-lai.
How would such a triumvirate work out?
General Chu Teh, an amiable man with great restige, is only a titular leader of the party. His position is analogous to that of Voroshilov in the Soviet Union. He has been friendlier with Chou than with Mao, and might very well concede actual leadership to Chou while playing the role of party peace-maker. In the Chinese Communist scheme of things, the mediator must be a man of special talents. His role is often decisive.
Liu Shao-chi, who started his career as a trade union leader and underground partisan, is close to Mao Tse-tung. Mao would probably like him as a (Continued on Page 60)
(Continued from Page 58) successor, but he is less versed in administrative tasks, diplomacy and military affairs than Chou.
Chou En-lai does not have a large following in the lower and middle ranks of the party, but he has had strong support in the past among many high-ranking officials and senior military men. If Moscow and General Chu Teh helped Chou, he might emerge victorious in any succession contest. But it is not wise to be dogmatic in such matters.
It is clear, however, that there is no one in the Chinese Communist party who can compete with Chou in the ability to deal with such problems as will arise at the Geneva Conference. He may be expected to concentrate there on trying to obtain the admission of Communist China into the United Nations as a member of the “Big Five.”
The Chinese Communist party often refers to the “opportunism” of Chen Tu-hsiu, the first leader of the party, who was deposed at the “August 7th Conference" of 1927. In point of fact, Chou En-lai was a contral figure in the series of events that led to Chen Tu-hsiu’s downfall.
When the Kuomintang turned on the Shanghai insurrectionists in the purge of April 12, 1927, Chou--as the leader of the insurrection--erred by not being vigilant and taking precautions. But it was Chen Tu-hsiu who was made to admit this failure. Chou not only escaped censure, but was elected a member of the politburo.
Stalin, who was himself a supreme artist in political maneuver, admired the political artistry of Chou. Beginning with the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist party, which was convened in Msocow in June, 1928, Chou visited Russia several times. In the early days of the Communist party he was charged with the duties of military organization, secret service work and external relations, all of which were regarded as important by Moscow.
Divergences developed between Chou En-lai, the sophisticated student, who had been to Europe, and Mao Tse-tung, the native product. In 1931, when the party’s Central
Committee was transferred from Shanghai to Mao Tse-tung’s Soviet area in Kiangsi, Chou En-lai seized military power from Mao. When Mao regained his leadership in January, 1935, he made Chou En-lai the main target of attack. Again Chou weathered the storm. He submitted to Mao Tse-tung, who felt he could use him as a politburo member and as vice-chairman of the Military Affairs Committee.
Thus began the Mao-Chou partnership. Although relations between the two have never been cordial, they have managed to work together, Mao Tse-tung has found Chou En-lai an extremely capable and valuable associate.
The Latter’s dexterity is shown by his activities during the “Sian coup” of December, 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by the war lord Chang Hsueh-liang. Although he was the executor and not the policy-maker in this incident, Chou--who operated under the directives of Stalin and the maneuvers of Mao Tse-tung--succeeded in obtaining the peaceful release of Chiang Kai-shek.
This event created the basis for a new “united front” co-
Operation between the Kuomintang and the Communists against the Japanese, and gave Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai a chance to strengthen their position. Chou absorbed the bulk of the war lord’s troop’s into the Communist Eighth Route Army. The “Sian coup” signified a turn in Chinese history--for without it, the Chinese Communists might never have seized the mainland of China.
From 1937 to 1945 and again from 1945 to 1947 Chou En-lai reresented the Chinese Communists as their negotiator, first in Hankow, then in Chungking and later in Nanking.
It was almost inevitable for Chou En-lai to become premier and foreign minister when the Chinese Communist party established the “Chinese People’s Republic” in 1949. He is the man in the party best qualified to fill those jobs. In my opinion, Chou is also the best qualified to succeeded Mao Tse-tung if anything should happen to Mao. But this question is most complex and the answer is related to the continuous struggle that goes on in the party.
One hears much these days of “collective leadership” in the Chinese Communist party and of the possibility of a triumvirate’s taking power in the event of Mao’s death. Such a triumvirate, the speculation runs, would consist of Chu Teh, commander-in-chief of the army; Liu Shao-chi, secretary -general of the party; a nd Chou En-lai.
How would such a triumvirate work out?
General Chu Teh, an amiable man with great restige, is only a titular leader of the party. His position is analogous to that of Voroshilov in the Soviet Union. He has been friendlier with Chou than with Mao, and might very well concede actual leadership to Chou while playing the role of party peace-maker. In the Chinese Communist scheme of things, the mediator must be a man of special talents. His role is often decisive.
Liu Shao-chi, who started his career as a trade union leader and underground partisan, is close to Mao Tse-tung. Mao would probably like him as a (Continued on Page 60)
(Continued from Page 58) successor, but he is less versed in administrative tasks, diplomacy and military affairs than Chou.
Chou En-lai does not have a large following in the lower and middle ranks of the party, but he has had strong support in the past among many high-ranking officials and senior military men. If Moscow and General Chu Teh helped Chou, he might emerge victorious in any succession contest. But it is not wise to be dogmatic in such matters.
It is clear, however, that there is no one in the Chinese Communist party who can compete with Chou in the ability to deal with such problems as will arise at the Geneva Conference. He may be expected to concentrate there on trying to obtain the admission of Communist China into the United Nations as a member of the “Big Five.”
Chou En-lai has served the Chinese Communists well as a political negotiator and one must not underestimate his talents in such capacity. How he will function in cooperation with the Russians remains to be seen. The tactics he will use will also depend on what specific situations he encounters.
But it should not be forgotten that Chou En-lai is skilled in the tactic of splitting the opposition. This technique is one of singling out the main adversary, focusing the attack upon him and exploiting splits in the enemy camp either by pressure, cajolery, or appeals to “principle” and “justice.” Often a measure of conciliation is introduced to offset the pressure.
Chou is also a master of the technique of introducing exorbitant demands and then offering to “Compromise” at a level beyond what he wanted in the first place. But he does not compromise easily. He argues for every point, no matter what it is, and while he may seem reasonable on “principles” he does not yield easily on concrete substantive matters. He knows the art of stalling, too, and there are many ways to stall.
The Chinese Communists may well be prepared to accept an advantageous political settlement at Geneva, but if a settlement is out of the question Chou also knows how to break up a conference in such a way as to cast himself in a role of the aggrieved and oppressed party.
As I have said, we Chinese tend to classify men either as “square” or “round.” And I say again: Chou En-lai is a very “round” man.
But it should not be forgotten that Chou En-lai is skilled in the tactic of splitting the opposition. This technique is one of singling out the main adversary, focusing the attack upon him and exploiting splits in the enemy camp either by pressure, cajolery, or appeals to “principle” and “justice.” Often a measure of conciliation is introduced to offset the pressure.
Chou is also a master of the technique of introducing exorbitant demands and then offering to “Compromise” at a level beyond what he wanted in the first place. But he does not compromise easily. He argues for every point, no matter what it is, and while he may seem reasonable on “principles” he does not yield easily on concrete substantive matters. He knows the art of stalling, too, and there are many ways to stall.
The Chinese Communists may well be prepared to accept an advantageous political settlement at Geneva, but if a settlement is out of the question Chou also knows how to break up a conference in such a way as to cast himself in a role of the aggrieved and oppressed party.
As I have said, we Chinese tend to classify men either as “square” or “round.” And I say again: Chou En-lai is a very “round” man.
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